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THE HISTORIAN AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Three papers describing research and
publication opportunities in the Department
of State, the Department of the Army, and in
the National Archives, presented at the 28 December
1950 meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago.

HARVEY A. DEWEERD, *Chairman*

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE SCHOLAR

BY G. BERNARD NOBLE*

PRESIDENT WILSON, in his 14-Point program of 1918, placed *open diplomacy* at the top of his list of principles according to which the settlement after World War I should be made. He wanted the other negotiating powers to abandon the practices traditionally associated with old-world diplomacy, and to join with the United States in the more enlightened practices which were regarded as characteristic of our Government. The President had earlier, during the war, condemned secret diplomacy as one of the factors largely responsible for the world conflict.

The American people have commonly regarded our country as free from this malodorous practice, and I believe we will agree that our record of open diplomacy is relatively good. This principle is reflected in the constitutional provision against secret treaties, as expressed in the requirement for approval by the Senate of ratification. It is also reflected in the policy of our Government with

regard to making its diplomatic record available to the public as soon as possible after the events themselves.

This attitude found expression during the Lincoln Administration in the provision for the publication of our diplomatic correspondence. The practice was begun, on a regular basis, in 1861, and has continued to this day in the volumes of *Foreign Relations of the United States*. Down to the end of the 19th century, these volumes were issued during the year following the events themselves. During this century, however, owing largely to the growing complexities of our international relations, there has developed an increasing time-lag between the date of the events and the date of publication of the volumes.

The "open diplomacy" attitude of our Government is also expressed in the liberal policy of the Department of State in opening its diplomatic papers to qualified researchers within a comparatively short time after the occurrence of the events.

I believe it is correct to say that the Department of State has the most progressive

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policy of any Foreign Office in the world in making the record of its diplomacy available to the public. Certainly its policy is more progressive than that of any of the other great powers, even if we use that term rather liberally. The files of the Department of State are at present open to qualified researchers down to 1 January 1925, subject to the normal regulations of the National Archives, where they are deposited. This date, which marks the end of the so-called *open period*, will be advanced one year each succeeding year, during the next five years, beginning 1 January 1951, so that on 1 January 1955 the files will be open down to 1 January 1930. There is no commitment that this time-lag of 25 years will be adopted as a general principle.

In comparison with this policy, the files of the British Foreign Office are open to general research down to 1902. The British Foreign Office is, however, publishing selected documents on the origins of World War II. These will cover the period from 1919 to 1939. In the case of France, the Foreign Office files are open to 1877. I am told, however, that some scholars are permitted to work in the French Foreign Office files down to 1885.

The Italian Foreign Office archives are open to research down to 1870. Requests for materials after that date will be given consideration on their merits by the Foreign Office. I understand also that the Italian Government is planning a large-scale publication of its diplomatic papers covering the years 1861 to 1943; but thus far no volumes have appeared.

As to the policy of the Soviet Union, the iron curtain principle applies as rigidly to its diplomatic papers as it does to ordinary informational contacts with the outside world. So far as I have been able to discover, scholarly researchers are not permitted to use the Soviet archives. While not opening its diplo-

matic papers to researchers, the Soviet has, from time to time, published highly selected documents from its files and especially from the files of the old Czarist regime. Even the publication of the Czarist diplomatic papers, however, which had a promising beginning, was apparently discontinued over a decade ago.

The files of the German Foreign Office are under the control of the United States, Great Britain, and France. As is generally known, these three powers are presently editing the documents of the German Foreign Office, which were captured at the close of hostilities, and the aim of the three Governments is to make these materials available to scholars as soon as the editorial staffs have completed their need for them. As soon as a given section of the documentation has been covered and publication for that period has been completed, the materials will be opened to private scholars. The policy of the Governments in this case is due to their desire to enlighten the world as to the aims and purposes of the German, and particularly the Nazi Government, with regard to the background and conduct of World War II.

A related project is being undertaken by the Department of State, with the financial assistance of the Library of Congress. That is the microfilming of the archives of the Japanese Foreign Office from 1867 down to V-J Day, 1945. The motivation here is comparable to that in the case of the German documents—the desire to enlighten the world as to Japanese diplomacy relating to World War II. These documents, however, will not be edited and published, as is being done with the German documents. They are being placed in the Library of Congress, where they will be available for the scholars of the world to study. Some of them are already available. The Department has agreed with the Library of Congress that these records

may be open to study down to 7 December 1941.

Coming back to our own diplomatic papers, they are, as stated, open to private scholars down to 1 January 1925. Access to them can be had through application to the Archivist of the United States at the National Archives, where the documentation is placed.

These are a few categories of these materials which, under Department agreement with the National Archives, have not in the past been available to researchers. These include such items as (1) passport and visa records; (2) personnel records of the Department and of the Foreign Service; (3) loyalty files; (4) Foreign Service inspection records, and (5) records relating to unsettled claims in which the United States or its nationals have an interest. The restrictions on these categories are imposed primarily for technical reasons, and do not relate to matters of general governmental policy.

Presumably the law of 5 September last, dealing with the responsibilities of the National Archives for federal records and setting up a National Historical Publications Commission will not necessarily alter these restrictions—though the General Services Administrator is given increased authority over records that are more than 50 years old.

I have pointed out that the documents of the Department of State down to 1 January 1925 are open to qualified scholars. Access is not entirely closed, however, to the documents after 1 January 1925. The years from 1925 to the present are divided into two periods: *limited-access* and *closed*.

The principle on which the *limited-access* period rests is that access to the papers of that period ought to be generally permitted to qualified researchers, but that there should be reasonably close supervision of the papers by the Department, owing to their relatively

sensitive character. Some files may be withheld, though, for the most part, the control consists only of a review of the notes of the researcher, or a review of the final manuscript—not for censorship of interpretation, but only for clearance relating to the sensitivity of the material. This *limited-access* period runs from 1 January 1925 to 1 January 1935, and, during the next five years, beginning 1 January next, the dates will be advanced one year each year.

Access to the papers of the *limited-access* period may be sought through application to the Chief of the Division of Historical Policy Research.

The diplomatic documents of the most recent period are obviously regarded as *closed* to the public. This, as a general principle, is necessary (a) because of considerations of security, (b) because of the sensitivity of some documents bearing on current negotiations, and (c) because of the need to protect for a reasonable period the confidential character of some papers written by our own or by foreign officials, in order to avoid embarrassment to these officials when they are still in important official positions, and to avoid causing possible crises in other governments. Some such protection is indispensable if frankness on the part of diplomatic representatives is to be expected.

How long this period ought to be is a question the answer to which naturally varies with the particular subject or paper in question. Some documents that are *top secret* today may justify downgrading to *restricted* or even to *unclassified* tomorrow. This sort of downgrading takes place, for example, when a white paper is put out by the Department.

This *closed* period now extends back to 1 January 1935, which represents a 15-year time-lag behind the events themselves. It seems possible, even probable, that this 15-year time-lag can be adopted as a principle

governing the length of the *closed* period. In that way the *limited-access* period would each year move ahead automatically one year.

As I have indicated, the papers of the *closed* period are in principle not available to outside researchers. That is the general rule. Provision is, however, made for exceptional cases.

The Departmental Regulation bearing on research facilities — #183.2 — provides that, where the Department considers that *the interest of national policy* would be served by a particular piece of research, permission may be granted for this to be done. This means, in fact, that the initiative may come either from the Department itself, or it may come from some outsider who wants to do a given job and applies to the Department for permission to do it. If the Department regards the project as significant and desirable, and if the qualifications of the applicant indicate that he is well qualified to do it, permission will presumably be granted.

Here again permission for this research should be sought through the Chief of the Division of Historical Policy Research, who acts in conjunction with a committee on the use of Departmental files.

Summarizing briefly, the diplomatic papers of the Department are divided into three periods: *open* which runs to 1 January 1925; *limited-access*, which follows and extends to 1 January 1935; and the *closed* period from 1935 to the present. The dates determining these periods are not at present fixed in terms of any rigid principle. It might seem reasonable, as I have suggested, that the *closed* period should extend back approximately 15 years from currency. A shorter period than that could scarcely be hoped for, owing to the extreme sensitivity of many of the documents involved. We hope that agreement can be reached for the *limited-access* period to cover the next following fifteen years. In this

way the diplomatic documents would automatically be open to public scrutiny after a thirty-year time lag, and, during the 15 to 30-year period after currency, access would be generally permitted under reasonable control. This principle, if finally adopted, would be one of unprecedented liberality among foreign offices.

The facilities of the Department for research in its diplomatic records are not unlimited. Considerations of physical arrangements for researchers are important, though the problem is not too serious at present. More important is the administrative problem of selecting the documents and making them available, and later of securing clearance of notes taken from the documents or of reviewing the manuscript, if that procedure is decided on.

These problems, of course, do not arise in the *open* period. They arise only in the *limited-access* period and in those exceptional cases where research is permitted in the *closed* period. Policy officers are extremely busy and sometimes find it difficult to do the necessary reviewing so that the return of notes or manuscript may at times be somewhat delayed. These problems tend to limit the number of researchers that can be satisfactorily accommodated by the Department. Every effort, however, will always be made to be of assistance.

During the past year there have been, on the average throughout the year, six or eight non-official scholars continuously working in Departmental files, and during this period, advice and assistance in one form or another have been given to some 300 scholars by the Historical Advisory Staff of the Division of Historical Policy Research.

This Historical Advisory Staff endeavors to maintain contact with outside scholars with a view to familiarizing them with research possibilities in US foreign policy and

to encouraging them to undertake certain research projects which private researchers can appropriately handle. It also furnishes guidance to researchers in the use of the diplomatic papers of the Department and makes occasional visits to universities.

The discussion thus far has related to research in the Department's documentary record of U.S. foreign policy. It should be noted, however, that the Intelligence area of the Department is concerned with research in economic, social, political, and cultural conditions in foreign areas. In connection with this work, the Department recognizes that many outstanding scholars and authorities on economic, social, and political conditions in foreign areas are outside the Government and that a great deal of valuable research on foreign areas is done or directed by them. The Department desires to utilize the product of this research as fully as possible, and wishes to provide all possible assistance to scholars in the social sciences working on foreign areas.

The responsibility for a program to ensure that the Department is informed about research in progress on foreign areas and that appropriate assistance is given to scholars in the social sciences working in these fields has been centered in the External Research Staff, which carries out a program in connection with the various divisions of the Office of

Intelligence Research. The External Research Staff invites inquiries regarding topics and resources for research on foreign areas.

The Division of Library and Reference Services maintains and services the Department's central collection of reference materials pertaining to foreign areas of the world and their peoples. Scholars interested in doing research on foreign areas can obtain from the Division of Library and Reference Services information regarding available documentation, and lists of references or bibliographies on particular subjects, and can often have the benefit of inter-library loans.

During recent years there have been important developments in the public relations of the Department of State. The appointment of an Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and the activities of the Office of Public Affairs for domestic information are evidence of a desire to bring about closer understanding between the Department and the public in policy matters. The Department's willingness to make the historical record of its diplomacy available to qualified researchers within a comparatively short time after the events themselves is a further reflection of this same policy.

We hope the program deserves your cooperation and support. We are always glad to have your comments and suggestions.

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND THE SCHOLAR¹

BY WAYNE C. GROVER

WHEN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES was established about 15 years ago, many of us thought that our resources and energies would be devoted in very large part to the service of private scholarship. We

have since discovered that our services in the National Archives are divided about equally between Government agencies and the public — and scholars constitute only a part of that public. But our original enthusiasm for service to scholarship has not abated. Our rule is simple: we work to make the research materials we administer as useful and as widely

¹Read at a session of the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, at Chicago, Illinois, 28 December 1950. Dr. Grover is Archivist of the United States.

available as possible.

H. G. Wells once wrote that our universal human weakness is "... that what we are given to administer, we presently imagine that we own." I have heard rumors that in some great countries of the world, the archivists and even the librarians occasionally exhibit attitudes toward researchers that bear out Mr. Wells' observation. I have even heard it said that some American institutions of higher learning, having gone to a certain expense and inconvenience in the collection of unique documentary resources, are inclined to be somewhat conservative when it comes to reproducing them for the use of nonresident scholars. We give little credence to these ugly rumors. In the National Archives, the greatest good that we desire is to serve the man of research, whether he is the social scientist that we observe increasingly within the Government itself, or the student or professor of the universities.

We have in our custody, of course, records that are not yet open for use by private researchers. Before I discuss restrictions, however, I would like to give you a general idea of just what we do have in the National Archives Building. It is our impression that scholars generally are not yet aware of the profound change that has taken place in Washington in the past 15 years with respect to the availability of Federal records. The National Archives Act was passed in 1934; we moved into the newly constructed Archives Building in 1935. Beginning about 1937, we began to accession the older records of the Federal Government on a large scale. During the decade 1937 to 1947, we were occupied very largely with the tremendous task of appraising and selecting for preservation the valuable records from the huge backlog of materials accumulated by the Government since its establishment under the Constitution in 1789.

Some of these materials have come to us from distant consular posts and embassies throughout the world and contain a wealth of information heretofore unavailable to scholars. In this country we have searched the offices and attics and basements and even those half-forgotten structures known euphemistically as *outlying* buildings. Our single greatest service to scholarship thus far is that we have brought this immense body of documentation together — no simple task. The archives of the Federal Government are now physically accessible in a building suitable for their housing and are attended by a reasonably well informed and sympathetic staff of archivists.

This is an improvement over the *beautiful state of things in Washington with respect to archives* that Dr. J. Franklin Jameson wrote about in a letter to Senator Beveridge in 1916. He was explaining why he was having trouble obtaining certain information that the Senator desired for his work on John Marshall. To quote Dr. Jameson:²

... The papers are under the jurisdiction of the Treasury Department, but, as you probably know, the old building is crammed with papers, even to a mile or so of wooden shelving in the attic, right under the hot roof, and a considerable number of cubic feet in improvised chambers down around the base of the fountain in the sunken court at the north end, so many tons of papers are colonized out. Some of them are in the abandoned building of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, a place only less unfit than the others. The others are [in] an ordinary non-fireproof warehouse on E Street, in the heart of the city, and other like structures, wherein

²Elizabeth Donnan and Leo F. Stock (eds.), "Senator Beveridge, J. Franklin Jameson, and John Marshall," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXV (1948-1949), 475.

the papers are packed tightly in wooden boxes and the wooden boxes are packed tightly together. If one wishes to get the historical data for which you are inquiring, he goes from the Treasury Department down to the old Bureau of Engraving and Printing where the list or index . . . is kept. When he has found in that book his reference and the number of the file, the lady in charge of the index volume sends him with a clerk to the E Street building, where a clerk will in all probability know where to find the paper desired, though the inquirer himself can get nothing by going there directly.

It is a great system for the largest financial institution of the richest country in the world to maintain. You will not wonder that for eight years I have been hammering away at successive Congresses respecting the need of a National Archive Building. . . .

The range of subject-matter contained in the records now in this National Archives building that Dr. Jameson and his associates finally brought into being, defies generalization. When I am asked casually at a budget hearing or even by one of my inquisitive daughters what we *have* in the National Archives, I am reduced immediately to incoherence. We have, to be sure, the treaties and the statutes-at-large and the diplomatic correspondence and the records of the 1st to the 77th, or 78th, or 80th Congress (I can never quite keep up). There are the Indian Office records and the Land Office records and the records of six or seven wars. (It is even getting difficult to keep up with them!) In the statistical terms that we bureaucrats like so well, (we have, say, the equivalent of a library of about 15 million volumes. Chronologically, nearly all the valuable records of the executive and legislative branches of the

Government prior to 1930 are in the National Archives. A very large proportion of those for the period 1930 to 1940 and there too, including the records of NRA and WPA and other depression-born agencies. And, of course, we have had to deal with the second generation of the alphabetical spawn, the war-born agencies—WPB, OPA, PAW, and all the others. We have appraised the records of these agencies and, insofar as we have adjudged them worthy of preservation, they are in the National Archives Building. There is, I think, no richer collection of contemporary economic and industrial data relating to the United States in any institution in this country.

The centralization of the records desired by Dr. Jameson and his associates has been achieved. Physical accessibility (barring any temporary arrangements brought about by the present state of international affairs) is also a reality. But there are further problems.

First, the very bulk and extensiveness of the documentation thus brought together have seemed to discourage some scholars. To exhaust a subject in the National Archives may seem an endless task. Second, it is not a simple matter for scholars to come to Washington. Washington is an expensive city, and travel is expensive. Third, there are the restrictions.

As to the first matter, the problems presented by the mass of contemporary records are fearsome, but they are not overwhelming. We have developed techniques to deal with these problems, both in the agencies where the records accumulate and in the National Archives where the residue of permanent records finally is deposited. To speak only of the latter, although we have not gone as far as we intended to go in the production of finding aids to our holdings, no investigator putting in an appearance at the Archives Build-

ing need fear that he will lose himself in a wilderness of records devoid of guideposts. Our collection of finding aids in the central search room now occupies some 50 feet of shelving and this is exclusive of more detailed indexes located with related records in the stacks. Archivists who are familiar both with the records and with the requirements of scholarly research are available to give assistance. In the last analysis, however, one must face the fact that finding aids, either written or human, cannot take the place of plain, arduous research. This the historical profession knows better than its colleagues in some of the other social sciences. If it is research that frightens the investigator, then I suggest that he had better not come to the National Archives and that perhaps it would have been better if he hadn't gone to graduate school at all.

We do find many historians and other scholarly researchers who are not dismayed. We count them each year in the hundreds and they are increasing in number. Our staff members look with discouraged and even jaundiced eyes at articles in professional journals for which, it is evident, the authors neglected to investigate relevant information of substantial importance in the National Archives. But there are some indications that such cases are decreasing. A survey of four pertinent professional publications for the year 1943 disclosed that out of 55 authors who should have been our clients, only 16—or 29 percent—had consulted our source materials. A similar survey in the same publications for 1949 revealed that the figure had gone up from 29 to 41 percent. I do not present these statistics as indisputable evidence of a trend, but they are confirmed, partially at least, by the increased number of scholarly investigators who are making use of the records.

The second problem I mentioned above—

the expense of coming to Washington—is very real. The only solution to it is to find a way of taking the research materials to the scholar. This we think we can do in large part through our file microcopy program. When specified bodies of research materials are known to be in demand, we prepare a microfilm copy of them on negative film and sell positive reproductions. The sales price is determined by the cost of the positive film plus a small share of the original cost of making the negative. Since 1940 we have produced in this way some 3700 rolls of microfilm containing reproductions of approximately two and one-half million documents. During the fiscal year 1950 we sold 2700 rolls of positive copies to institutions and individuals in 40 different states and 11 foreign countries. We have a published list of microcopies that are available, and I should add that it may be obtained upon request.

We also propose to continue to print documentary publications, such as *The Territorial Papers of the United States*, and indeed, under the sponsorship of the National Historical Publications Commission, to expand such activities. We are not yet ready to admit that the microfilm camera has made the printed page entirely obsolete; we hope, in fact, that these methods may be made to complement each other.

Finally, and at last, restrictions. So far as I know, the policy of the United States Government in this respect is the most liberal and democratic in the world—liberal in the sense that many records of very recent date are open without any restrictions; and democratic in the sense that, so far as our own policy in the National Archives is concerned, what is open to one private investigator is open to all. By volume, approximately 70 percent of the records in the National Archives Building are unrestricted. We or-

ganize our holdings under a system of record groups, each record group being comprised of the accessioned records of a governmental organization equivalent in size to a major bureau or independent agency. There are now 267 such record groups, and 160 contain no records under specific restrictions. For the remaining record groups, the restrictions usually apply to various series of documents that constitute only a relatively small proportion of the materials within the whole record group. We are obliged by statute—and properly so—to observe restrictions placed on series or bodies of documents by the agencies that transfer the records to us. We recently obtained legislation that enables us to remove all restrictions on the records of an executive or judicial agency after 50 years, unless there are special circumstances requiring a temporary extension of this time period. The burden of proof is on the agency that originally transferred the records. Over a period of time, we should be able to remove virtually all restrictions, statutory and administrative, on records more than 50 years old. That may seem a rather tame and anticlimactic statement, but I don't think you would find any one of my official fraternity anywhere else in the world who would be able to make it.

Like all Federal agencies holding records of recent date, however, we are governed by standards of propriety and the interests of national security. For example, in connection with a review of the Roosevelt papers at Hyde Park, the majority of which were opened for research last year, we defined the various categories of restricted papers as carefully and as specifically as we could. The restricted documents will remain closed for varying periods of time, but it was the opinion of Judge Samuel J. Rosenman and Miss Grace Tully, who with myself constituted the review committee, that few papers will

need to remain restricted for a period longer than 25 years from the date of President Roosevelt's death. The types of restrictions that were imposed on the Roosevelt papers will be found to exist generally throughout the Federal Government on official records of recent date, and I believe they are not unreasonable. I should like to read them.

These are the types of documents that for a period of years must be restricted:

- Investigative reports on individuals;
- applications and recommendations for positions;
- documents containing derogatory remarks concerning the character, loyalty, integrity, or ability of individuals;
- documents containing information concerning personal or family affairs of individuals;
- documents containing information of a type that could be used in the harassment of living persons or the relatives of recently deceased persons;
- documents containing information the release of which would be prejudicial to national security; and, finally,
- documents containing information the release of which would be prejudicial to the maintenance of friendly relations with foreign nations.

A further category, which tends to overlap with all the above categories, consists of communications addressed to the president in confidence. As Judge Rosenman, Miss Tully and myself agreed, the release of such communications at this time, so soon after the President's death and termination of office, might result in discouraging confidential communications to Presidents in the future. Historians and other scholarly investigators can see very readily, I am sure, that restrictions of this character, maintained for a reasonable period of time, are absolutely essential to the conduct of Government.

By all odds the most difficult restriction problem that we have is presented by documents coming into our custody that have been stamped *secret* or *confidential* for reasons of national security and have not been *downgraded* or *declassified*, to use technical terms, prior to their transfer. It is our policy, insofar as circumstances permit, to insist that such documents be reviewed and *downgraded* prior to transfer. But the mere physical problem of reviewing such documents is enormous. I have been told that a group in the Department of the Army engaged exclusively at this task estimates that work in hand will require some 26 years to complete with the existing staff.

This problem is a legacy largely of World War II but it is not likely to disappear in the world to come. I am frank to say we have found no ready solution, and the intelligence services of our Government (again, I am afraid, quite properly so) are very stubborn about the matter. The number of years it takes to *downgrade* documents can of course be reduced by adding to the number of men engaged in the task. Although I doubt whether the times are propitious just now for the extensive use of manpower for this purpose, the problem is one, among many, that should persuade the American Historical Association to keep its Committee on

Historians and the Federal Government in good working order.

I should like to repeat that so far as I know the policies of the United States Government with respect to restrictions on the use of its records for scholarly research purposes are the most liberal in the world. We have a Government that is accountable to a free and democratic people and is reluctant to cherish secrets beyond the bounds of necessity and propriety. We have a Government also that believes in the practical benefits of research. I need not argue the philosophical questions involved in this approach to cultural activities, but the value of scholarly research to our nation and our civilization is implicit in all our thinking on the question of restrictions. A corollary proposition, of course, is that our Government must rely largely on the private brain-power of the nation for its creative research—a proposition, if one reads the newspaper columnists, that need hardly be mentioned.

Private scholarly and scientific research is the mainstay of our educational system and the backbone of our culture. So far as the National Archives is concerned, the scholar has only to ask and he shall receive—at least, to the best of our bureaucratic abilities, resources, and good sense.

ACCESSIBILITY OF U. S. ARMY RECORDS TO HISTORICAL RESEARCH

BY KENT ROBERTS GREENFIELD*

I SHALL BEGIN by stating the boundaries and limitations of the documentary material to which my talk will refer, in order to anticipate disappointments.

It is limited to the records of the War Department and of the Army. What I shall

say, therefore, does not apply (with an exception to be noted) to the records of the Air Force, now separated from the Army. It does not apply at all to the records of the Navy. Nor does it apply to those of the Joint or Combined Chiefs of Staff. This last exclusion is important since these records are one of the primary sources of information

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regarding decisions on strategy and general military policy. Again, it applies only to documents originating in the War Department or the Army during World War II, that is to say, prior to 2 September 1945, and to records of a later date relating to events that occurred before 2 September 1945. You will notice that it does include records of the War Department, as well as the Army, prior to that date, a period in which the Air Force was under the direction of the War Department. Important documents of the Army Air Forces remain in the records of the Department. These, and other Army Air Forces records, are subject, in general, to the Army's rules of access.

All of the records of the War Department relating to the War Department and the Army prior to 1940 have been transferred to the National Archives. I will leave statements about them to be made by the Archivist of the United States.

In view of the foregoing statements it will be evident that my subject boils down to accessibility of the records of the War Department and the Army during World War II.

A further limitation is imposed by the fact that certain records of the Army and certain others that are also in the custody of the records officer of the Army, The Adjutant General, are controlled by agreements with other services or other governments. An important example is the captured records of the German Army, in which many of you may well be interested. This collection is subject to the joint authority of the United States and British Governments, and is not subject to the rules of the Department of the Army regarding access. At present it is not accessible to any individual not acting as the accredited agent of a government.

It should be helpful to a good understanding to remind you of certain general condi-

tions that affect the access of individual historians to the records of the War Department and the Army that are under Army control.

The most obvious is the comparative contemporaneity of the records in question. The oldest of them are ten years old. As you well know, public records, and also private records, whether of individuals or of business concerns, have usually been closed to general research for periods up to fifty years and more after the date of their origin—even after they have been deposited in archives and libraries.

A second conditioning factor is the mass of these records (the Army alone produced some 17,120 tons of them during the war) and the consequent cost and other difficulties of organizing them and providing services and facilities for research.

The primary purpose for which the Army's records are collected and held by the Adjutant General after being released from current files is to meet demands for information from the Army and other agencies of the Government. These demands are formidable in number. They have first claim on the archival services which the custodians of the Army's records are equipped to perform. Such services for private scholars are bound to be identical and less extensive than those to be expected in public archives and libraries.

Finally there is the great problem presented by the wartime *security classification* of many of the Army's records. Most of the information in them could now be made public without endangering national security. But no one has yet thought up any way, except by a vast and costly effort of examination, to determine which documents in the mass of those originally restricted should still be restricted for reasons of security.

In spite of the conditions just reviewed, the Department of the Army has made a

notable effort to put the information contained in its records at the disposal of the public, and particularly of historians.

The first step, taken in 1946, was to provide free access and facilities for research to the historians engaged to write the history of the War Department and the U. S. Army in World War II. It also secured for them access to the records of other services and of higher military organizations than the War Department, such as the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, and gives them official support in obtaining access to those of all other war agencies.

In 1947 the Chief of Staff, then Gen. Eisenhower, went further and declared that the preparation of this history does not . . . constitute any reason or excuse for denying to the public immediate access to facts and records, where they deal solely with operations of the Army, and where the security of the Nation is not involved.

He then directed "maximum downgrading of all information on military subjects" in the Army's records, "except only when to do so would in fact endanger the security of the Nation." He further directed all appropriate members of his staff to facilitate "the efforts of individuals who desire access to military information of historical character."

This policy is the basis of the rules and regulations that now govern the access of private individuals to the Army's records of World War II. To sum up, briefly, these provide, first, for the accreditation for access to persons whose application indicates trustworthiness and a serious purpose. Such persons are freely given access to unclassified records. If their inquiry calls for the use of documents still classified, an effort will be made to have these declassified. If they cannot be declassified, the inquirer with proper

clearance may still be allowed to see such records, under certain conditions.

It is evident that these rules and regulations are being administered in the liberal sense of the "Eisenhower policy." But it is important to know and understand the restrictions imposed by them both in order to avoid disappointments and also to take such action under them as is likely to get the best results.

The restrictions on accessibility applicable to all records whether clear or "classified" are neither startling nor unreasonable. Access will not be given to records in the following categories: (1) individual personnel records, including loyalty records and records of disciplinary action, including trials by court martial; (2) "unsubstantiated allegations concerning individuals"; (3) "reports of investigation by the Inspector General"; (4) "records upon which a claim against the United States might be based"; (5) records that would reveal or compromise sources of military intelligence; (6) records regarding weapons and plans still kept secret; (7) records "of a nature to jeopardize the friendly relations of the United States with other nations." It will be recognized at once that material in the last three categories named could not be declassified or revealed without "endangering the security of the Nation."

The regulations permit an inquirer with proper clearance to see records, which, though not in these categories, cannot at present be declassified. The scholar must, however, agree in writing not to use them directly, but only "for background purposes," and *after having seen such records he must clear any manuscript he prepares with the Public Information Division*. These conditions, in themselves, are not unreasonable. But they do not permit a historian to conduct research with the freedom necessary to make it conclusive, since he cannot range through the

material that may be pertinent to his inquiry; he cannot cite the documents as evidence for his conclusions; and he cannot be sure that he knows of the existence of documents withheld from him under the rules in force. My impression is that the best the historian can hope for from documents that still remain classified is to get some particular question answered when the information is contained only in such documents.

So we come up against the iceberg of documents frozen by wartime restrictions. This is the really serious obstacle to extended or conclusive research in the Army's World War II documents.

The Eisenhower policy calls for a vigorous effort to melt this iceberg. Much was done while the office charged with responsibility had an adequate force of officers for the purpose. The officer in charge is seriously interested in pushing this work and disposed to carry out the directive of the Chief of Staff in the most liberal sense. But lack of funds and consequent reduction in the number of officers qualified to declassify has cut his promising efforts down to minor proportions.

Since satisfactory research can be accomplished only if there exists uninhibited use of the needed records, and since the Army wishes to strip unnecessary classification from its records, the best approach of the historian is not to seek permission to see classified documents but to request the declassification of documents that he wants to see. This may take some time, but when they reflect a serious purpose such requests will be welcomed by the officer charged with security classification review, and he can be counted on to do his best for the historian in furtherance of his interest in getting on with his job of "maximum downgrading."

Now that I have said everything I know of a nature to discourage false hopes, let me

say everything that I honestly can to encourage one to understand research in Army records. It is my duty as well as my pleasure to do so since one of the missions of the Office of the Chief of Military History, and a particular obligation of its Chief Historian, is "to stimulate interest and study in the field of military history."

The field in which one will encounter the least difficulty on account of the classification of documents is the administration and operations of the U. S. Army. In this field downgrading of records has been largely accomplished. The historian will run into serious difficulties if he extends his inquiry into the realm of strategy, since that requires the use of the documents of the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff and their agencies. Many of these are in the War Department's records, but they can be seen only with the consent of those agencies, and this is practically impossible to obtain. Within the War Department itself the records of G-2 may be considered as off-limits. The principle followed in this case is that to open them would reveal and compromise the sources from which the information was obtained.

The Army's records are rich in information on other than strictly "military" subjects, often not thought of in connection with those records. I have in mind subjects in the fields of industrial and business history, many aspects of which are reflected in the records of the Army as the result of its vast wartime activities in the procurement and distribution of supplies. Army records are equally if not more important in the field of administrative history, not only because of the Army's plans and operations in educating, equipping, feeding, transporting, and managing the millions under its control in war, but in administering responsibilities normally civilian, such as civil affairs and civilian supply in occupied areas. Don't forget that in war the Army

operates industries, railroads, and ports, at home and abroad, and within its own vast household has to take the place of the butcher and baker, the doctor, the judge, the lawyer, the priest, pastor, rabbi, and psychiatrist, not to mention the athletic coach and the theatrical manager. At a rough estimate, perhaps 75 percent of the Army's records of these activities are unrestricted. And in these fields the downgrading of documents still classified can be requested with a hope of success limited chiefly by the quantities involved.

I have found that the officials charged with custody of the Army's records are sincerely interested in giving effect to the Chief of Staff's directive on access. But they are very busy men. They have time to be really helpful only to outsiders who have in hand a serious undertaking and show themselves to be well prepared to proceed with the investigation of official documents. The general rules for success in archival research are therefore particularly important in seeking access to Army records and getting the most out of them. One will, in short, get more attention and help if he knows just what he wants, if he wants something important, and has found that he cannot get it anywhere else.

The first step in preparation is, of course, to go as far as possible in published works and other readily accessible materials. In the General Reference Section of our Office, presided over by Mr. Israel Wice, is a collection of some 5,000 volumes of historical manuscripts and reports prepared during the war and bearing on it—almost all of them unclassified. In these one may find much of the information needed or clues to the records that contain it. Mr. Wice and his staff, in answering questions from every quarter, and assisting our historians in their research, have acquired a wealth of knowledge about

Army records and their location. A hundred or more students, civilian and military, work in Mr. Wice's office every year, and he and his staff fully share our interest in helping with any serious inquiry, in so far as their time and our limited facilities permit. Finally, one can get much help from the footnotes of the histories that we are publishing, since these are especially designed to provide a guide to the nature and location of the sources for the history of World War II.

These measures I regard as coming under the head of preparations a scholar normally makes before plunging into the mass of documents in any depository of records. Let me add some words of advice about the way in which to go about seeking access to Army records. The formal procedure is to write to the Public Information Division, Department of the Army, requesting a blank application for access. When filled out, this should be mailed, not brought by hand. For a good effect it should be accompanied by credentials and should describe as specifically as possible the nature and purpose of the inquiry and the kind of records one wishes to use. If a preliminary inquiry about the records seems to be in order, one may initiate action by writing a letter, similarly definite in regard to a projected study, its purpose, and its needs, directly to The Adjutant General of the Army, Attention: Chief, Departmental Records Branch, Washington 25, D. C., or to the Office of the Chief of Military History, or to both. In any case, to obtain clearance for access, one will need to make the application to the Public Information Division, and this step should be taken some weeks in advance of the date when the researcher expects to go to work. The point I wish to emphasize is that, given the conditions I have described (and human nature, under conditions of pressure, being what it is), the character and contents of applications for clearance or in-

formation will have a great deal to do with the seriousness of the effort made to meet individual needs. I have said that one should make application, for clearance, or for preliminary information about the records, by mail. I need hardly add that one should not try to conduct his investigation by mail.

I wish to conclude on a note of encouragement and welcome. Our records people are not prepared to take care of a large number of scholars, but to date the number that have come has been disappointingly small, and not, in our opinion, proportionate to the opportunity presented. This opportunity is, by its nature, not for the beginner, certainly not for the M.A. candidate. In exceptional cases,

the candidate for a Ph.D., with a limited and well-defined subject, may be able to find his way to profitable conclusions. But in view of the situation that I have presented, I believe that only an experienced and self-propelled scholar will be able to make the best use of the records held by the Army. The opportunity presented to such a scholar for profitable study of our military system in action and of the impact of war on our economic and other institutions, is a challenge to which I hope that many will respond. Only with the active interest and cooperation of such investigators will we be able to develop conditions that will fully open these rich fields to research in military records.

FIRST BLOOD FOR THE INFANTRY — 1776

BY LINCOLN DIAMANT

SOMETIME DURING the summer of 1876, the New York Historical Society decided that a large outdoor ceremony would be the proper way to celebrate the approaching centenary of the Revolutionary Battle of Harlem Heights. The Society planned a huge public picnic on the actual battle site, with several prominent speakers to address the gathering. It was a year after the Revolutionary celebrations at Lexington and Concord, and the six-year centenary period was getting into full stride.

Although only a few thousand men had been involved on both sides, the military engagement on the Heights (whose name has successively been Vanderwater, Harlem, Bloomingdale, and finally Morningside) had considerable importance, for it ended in the first clear-cut victory for the strategy and fighting ability of the Continental Army. Coming when it did after the disastrous rout on Long Island and the subsequent defeat along the East River, the victory did much to restore the shattered confidence of the patriots in their own ability to stand up against seasoned veterans of the Crown.

The action itself was simple. An early morning scouting party left the American positions on the heights north of the "Hollow Way," a deep east-west valley splitting the high ground that parallels the Hudson River on upper Manhattan Island. The scouts worked their way onto the southern heights and then further south until they encountered

a British picket near what is now 108th Street. After a skirmish, they retreated, and arrived back at the Hollow Way with two regiments of British Light Infantry in hot pursuit. When Washington realized these British had overextended themselves, he successfully decoyed them down into the Hollow Way, sent a flanking column around toward their rear, and joined battle.

The American attack on the British front was *too* strong. Instead of arriving on the enemy rear, the American circling column struck what retreat had turned into a strong British flank, and in the initial shock, Colonel Thomas Knowlton (heading America's first "commando" group, the Connecticut Rangers) was mortally wounded. His men deployed successfully, however, and reuniting with the Americans on the front, soon drove the British up into a barley-field at the crest of the southern heights. It was in this field and in a small orchard to the immediate south that the day's heavy fighting took place.

Washington and Lord Howe, content with feeling each other out, fed small groups of fresh troops into the conflict. The Americans, however, never lost their initial edge, and by late afternoon, the beaten and disheveled British Regulars had broken and were fleeing to the safety of their main lines. The tried but victorious patriot troops were called from the chase by their Commander, who wished to avoid a major encounter at that

time. The men who rested around the American campfires that evening had been treated to their first taste of victory since the militia engagements at Lexington and Concord, and were imbued with new courage and determination.

This was the victory whose centenary the good people of New York City would gather to commemorate on September 16, 1876, and the members of the New York Historical Society made extensive preparation for the celebration. "The ground was carefully studied by the committee charged with the details: all known maps, records and deeds relating to the locality were examined and compared, and all the documents and letters, printed and in manuscript, known to exist, were collected and collated."¹ The center of the battleground was finally determined to be near the eastern edge of Morningside Heights at 117th Street, and it was on that spot that the speaker's pavilion was erected.

In reviewing the committee's reasons for choosing this location, it must be noted that there were no contemporary maps available to the committee which indisputably marked the location of the battleground. The Americans had abandoned New York City entirely soon after the battle and hence had no occasion to map the site, which was in a "no-man's land." And the British always disregarded the engagement as an "unfortunate skirmish." So the spot remained unmarked (so far as the 1876 Committee knew), except for a sketch map drawn by Sloss Hobart, who participated in the battle. This map had been unearthed in the diary of Ezra Stiles, D.D., along with the following note:

Oct 18-1776—When I was at Fairfield I saw Sloss Hobart Esq a sensible Gent. & a member of the New York Conven-

tion. He gave me the following draft of the Action of 16 Sept which began near the 14 m stone & ended at the 8 m stone.

Unfortunately, these mileage figures were wrong and contributed much to the later confusion. But the sketch map, despite its crudity, easily fitted the battle onto Morningside Heights.

Selections from two contemporary letters served to corroborate this choice of Morningside. One is from a letter which General George Clinton of the American Army wrote to his wife a few days after the battle:

Our Army, at least one division of it, lay at Colo. Morris's² & so southward to near the Hollow Way, which runs across from Harlem Flats to the North River at Matje Davit's Fly.³

This apparently identified the "Hollow Way" as the valley of present day 125th Street, for no other comparable topographic feature exists on upper Manhattan. And in a letter dated the 18th of September, Lewis Morris, one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence, wrote of the battle:

. . . the enemy advanced to the top of the hill, which was opposite to that which lies before Dayes door.

The Day Tavern was located near what is now 126th Street on the road that led to the King's Bridge over Spuyten Duyvil. Directly across the road from the tavern lay the steep slope leading up Point of Rocks, the southernmost tip of the high ground on which the American Army was encamped. It was from Point of Rocks that Washington directed the course of the battle.

With these few but apparently conclusive bits of direct evidence before them, the Committee unhesitatingly placed the engagement at the Morningside Heights spot previously mentioned. The celebration was held on a

¹From the main Centennial speech by John Jay, grandson of the Chief Justice, and U. S. Minister to Austria.

²Now the Jumel Mansion.

³A swampy meadow.




FIGURE I. MAJOR ANDRÉ MAP.




FIGURE II. NEW YORK CITY TODAY

beautiful Saturday afternoon, and was considered a great patriotic success. The Historical Society was proud of its work, and closing the book, considered they had done an excellent job of research and preparation.

But just a year and a half later at their regular spring meeting in February, 1878, grave doubts arose in the minds of some members when no less an historical authority than the Chancellor of the University of the State of New York, Erastus C. Benedict, delivered a paper wherein he charged the celebration Committee with gross negligence and misinterpretation in locating the battlefield site on Morningside Heights. Actually, Benedict claimed, the engagement was fought two miles to the direct north, in the vicinity of what is now Audubon Park.

A heated argument followed, with Benedict, a thoroughly accredited historian, ranged against all the other members of the Society. Despite his convincing re-interpretation of the available evidence, he could rally no support. Already in his late seventies, Benedict died two years later, but the dispute was continued following the publication of Martha Lamb's famous *History of New York*. Therein it was apparent that Benedict had finally succeeded in convincing Mrs. Lamb (formerly a supporter of the Morningside site), for she located the Hollow Way as being "the ravine, now Audubon Park (153rd to 158th Streets),"⁴ and reiterated all of Benedict's arguments with a few additional interpretations of her own.

A surprising fact was that the source material with which Benedict and Lamb were repudiating the selection of the Morningside location was practically identical with that already presented in *its support*. The Stiles-Hobart sketch map (with its disturbing mile-stones) was one exhibit. Another was some

additional material from the Clinton letter. A third, newly introduced, was a brief account by a British Army Captain; and the final argument was that cannon balls had been recently uncovered in excavations in the vicinity of Audubon Park.

If one were to accept the Hobart mile-stones, the battle *did* take place on lower Washington Heights, and the crossed swords on his sketch (indicating the Point of Rocks command post) were interpreted by Mrs. Lamb to indicate the Jumel Mansion, Washington's general headquarters, located (fittingly) at 160th Street.

General Clinton's complete letter had contained a short account of the entire battle, and he estimated the various distances traversed during the day. His estimates total two and a half miles, which means that if the battle had begun at Morningside, it would have ended at 75th Street, or a mile and a half within the main British lines, which is ridiculous. So to make any sense out of Clinton's total, the high-water mark of the British Light Infantry pursuit must be moved two and a half miles north from the British outposts to the ravine at 158th Street. This fits the Lamb theory perfectly.

The British Captain was George Harris of the Fifth British Regiment, and he wrote an account of the battle to his uncle:

The 16th of September we were ordered to stand to our arms at eleven A.M. and were instantly trotted about three miles (without a halt to draw breath), to support a battalion of light infantry which had imprudently advanced so far without support as to be in danger of being cut off.

His estimate of a three-mile trot north matches the Clinton estimate of the distance covered by the Americans going south.

It was on these sources that Benedict and Lamb based their theory that the Battle of

⁴*History of New York*, Vol. II, No. 3.

Harlem Heights was fought, not on Morningside, but on the lower section of Washington Heights (which section, through the irony of fate and local nomenclature, had by 1880 itself come to be known as "Harlem Heights").

The stage was now set for a researcher's battle-royal. In the May, 1880, issue of the New York Historical Society's *Magazine of American History*, John Austin Stevens, founder of the magazine, replied sharply to the Lamb-Benedict theory in his review of the Lamb *History of New York*. Stevens outlined in print for the first time the source material on which the 1876 Committee's choice of location was based. Apologizing for the circumstantial nature of the material, he nevertheless insisted that the final selection was correct, and the Harris-Clinton distance estimates nothing more than natural exaggerations. The cannon balls near Audubon Park were ascribed to the British assault on Fort Washington, which took place two months to the day after the Battle of Harlem Heights.

Stevens then struck a devastating blow at the Lamb interpretation. He cited the original order-of-the-day for the 16th of September, which began by ordering out the scouting party that precipitated the battle, and concluded by instructing General Silliman to take his brigade and throw up entrenchments along a line roughly paralleling present-day 147th Street. Stevens continued by quoting from a soldier's journal to the effect that the Silliman brigade had been kept busy at this task all day, despite "heavy firing below us." In other words, the fighting never even came near 147th Street, which exploded the 158th Street Audubon Park theory. Mrs. Lamb realized its demise, and though she did not recant, showed no further interest in the controversy.

January, 1881, however, saw the publica-

tion of a pamphlet by Erastus Benedict's nephew, containing his uncle's original 1878 paper plus some added recriminations against Mr. Stevens by the younger Mr. Benedict. To which Stevens replied in April:

... of itself it needs no notice or comment, the author having attained no reputation as an historian which gives weight to his individual opinion, when it conflicts with well-known facts, established by authority in accord with tradition; and the subject would not receive further attention in this column but for the prefix and appendix which accompany it. In both of these Mr. Benedict (younger) charges the writer with unworthy personal motives in the review of Mrs. Lamb, and the condemnation of the new version which she adopted on his authority. And secondly, of perverting facts and of "garbling authorities and cooking maps," to use his own inelegant but characteristic words.⁵

There was no reply (in print) by Mr. Benedict (younger) to this expressive review of his work, and the matter rested for another sixteen years unresolved, for although Stevens had successfully destroyed the Audubon Park theory, he had uncovered no further substantiating evidence for the Morningside site.

In the fall of 1897, Columbia University became an interested party to the proceedings, for it moved in October from its cramped quarters on Madison Avenue downtown to the proclaimed Revolutionary battlefield on Bloomingdale Heights (whose name was soon altered again, to the present "Morningside"). Inspired by its new location, the Columbia University Press in the winter of 1897 brought out what is still the most authoritative and well-documented work on

⁵*Magazine of American History*, Vol. VI, No. 7.

the Harlem Heights engagement. Its author was Henry P. Johnston, Professor of History at the College of the City of New York, long interested in the excited discussion raging over the proper location of the battlefield.

In *The Battle of Harlem Heights*, Johnston supported the majority view that placed the battle on Morningside, but he located it farther west on 117th Street, at Broadway rather than Morningside Drive. He justified this shift on purely logical grounds, supported adequately by photographs he had made of the few remaining contemporary landmarks on Morningside. His primary exhibit was the location of Bloomingdale Road, the only road running through the district in 1776, and around which most of this battle of advance and retreat must of necessity have centered. Bloomingdale Road ran to the west of present Broadway, but crossed over at about 118th Street.

Johnston also argued that Knowlton's flank attack would never have attempted to climb the sheer rockface of Morningside Park. Instead, he claimed, it actually ascended the rocky ridge (no longer visible) just west of Amsterdam Avenue and 124th Street. Johnston also disclosed for the first time that the 1876 Committee had discarded still another candidate for the battlefield site, for in 1860, Benson J. Lossing's *Field Book of the Revolution* had more or less arbitrarily placed the action on the flats (or "Plains") of Harlem around McGowan's Pass, near the northeastern end of what is now Central Park. (In consequence the battle was often referred to as the "Battle of Harlem Plains.")

Although the Lamb-Benedict theory could now be considered buried, Johnston officially staked it into its grave:

Their version represents that four hundred light infantrymen, chasing Knowlton's Rangers, actually penetrated the

American lines for more than a mile without being observed by other troops; that they blew their defiant bugle notes⁶ in the rear of our main encampment; that Washington found it necessary to order out a flanking party to hem them in when there were ten American brigades already below them. . . . In a word we are given to understand that a mere detachment of the British army pushed through Washington's lines, fought, at times, within four short blocks of his headquarters, made the circuit of his strong position, and then returned to Morningside Heights, carrying all the guns and wounded with them, and losing but fourteen men killed. A proud day that, for the enemy!

Noting the order-of-the-day to General Silliman's brigade regarding the digging of entrenchments, Johnston concludes:

. . . they present us with the singular spectacle of an army fortifying itself against an enemy . . . engaged in a "bloody battle" immediately in its rear.

He then added one final touch. A member of the American burial party on the night of the battle had written that "the British had already removed their own dead when we arrived." This, Johnston pointed out, would have entailed a double crossing of the American lines by the British. Finally feeling that he had satisfactorily disposed of the Lamb-Benedict theory, Johnston ended his discussion. But he too failed to supply any new evidence that indisputably placed the battlefield on Morningside.

This time it was nine years before argument was resumed. Then, in the fall 1906

⁶The notes of the fox-chase, represented by some chroniclers as having irritated Washington into giving battle.

⁷"The Battle of Harlem Heights," *Magazine of History*, Vol. IV, No. 3.

issue of the (retitled) *Magazine of History*, an article⁷ appeared over the signature of Thomas Addis Emmet, M.D., in which he repudiated Johnston's carefully documented work. Basing most of his assertions on boyhood reminiscences, Emmet endeavored to prove that the battle was fought north of 125th Street, and took the following swipe at Columbia along the way:

... beyond the fact that the present site of Columbia University must necessarily be nearer the locality where the battle was fought, it has no greater claim, I believe, to that honor than has Union Square. . . . I simply wish to offer a protest, in consequence of my knowledge that the history of our country is being constantly perverted and misstated.

This article naturally caused considerable agitation among those members of the Historical Society who imagined that the problem of the Morningside site had been accepted as settled.

In a blistering attack⁸ on Dr. Emmet in their January, 1907, issue, two editors of the *Magazine of History*, Reginald P. Bolton and Edward Hagaman Hall, took it for granted that the Doctor was resurrecting the old Audubon Park theory, and immediately proceeded to pounce upon him with all the proper arguments. To which the instigator of the uproar could only reply weakly that he didn't believe the Lamb-Benedict theory either, and that:

The battle was, in my judgment, fought below the site of the present Convent of the Sacred Heart, at the Point of Rocks and along the irregular line of high ground to the north of the plain to the east of Manhattanville.⁹

All these anti-climactical fireworks were in

one respect fortunate. The Bolton-Hall research unearthed a paragraph from Moore's *Diary of the Revolution* which cleared up the oldest problem of all, proving the inaccuracy of the milestones on the Hobart sketch map, and showing that the mileages given by Captain Harris and General Clinton were exaggerated. The Moore entry ran:

16 Sept. 1776

Our army is now between the nine and ten-mile stones, where they are strongly fortified and intrenched. The enemy's lines are about one mile and a half below them.

Contemporary maps show the tenth milestone at what is now 153rd Street, the ninth at 133rd Street. A mile and a half below would be 103rd Street, which fits our picture of a British picket at 108th Street exactly.

Since 1907, the controversy has rested without presentation of new material for either side. The Sons of the American Revolution of the State of New York imbedded a bronze plaque marking the (preferred) battlefield site in the west wall of Columbia University's School of Engineering, soon after the building's erection, and thereby added to the University's pride in its Revolutionary War heritage.

The present author's interest in this long chain of events beginning in the dim morning light of the 16th of September, 1776, was first generated by a study of the inscription on this tablet, while still an undergraduate at Columbia College. He became also interested in the obvious modification of the Morningside terrain from 1776 to the present day, as part of a great city grew up upon it, and conceived the idea of a large map depicting the battle area as it must have appeared in 1776, with an overlay showing the contemporary culture of the area. After several years, sufficient time presented itself and the cartographic job was begun and finished.

⁸"The Battle of Harlem Heights Again," *Magazine of History*, Vol. V, No. 1.

⁹A small village existing later in the Hollow Way.

But it was in the research of preparing a proper 1776 base-map of Morningside Heights that a most startling discovery was made. Thumbing through a catalogue list of maps contained in the Clinton Collection of the Clements Library at the University of Michigan, the author was arrested by a description of Map No. 143, a map of Manhattan Island and vicinity, drawn during the winter of 1776 by the sadly famous Major John André (then of His Majesty's Royal Engineers).

Located by block letters on the map (the description said) were a number of important places — one of them keyed as follows:

"G Noltens Battle Sept. 16" .

—so clearly and delightfully a misspelling of Knowlton, who had died heroically at the head of the flanking column.

So a map definitely locating the battle site —and one made soon after the battle—actually existed! A piece of paper that Stevens and Johnston and Bolton and Hall would have moved worlds to learn about, and all the while it lay quietly and undiscovered along with the rest of the Sir Henry Clinton papers in the bottom of an old trunk until almost twenty years after the last shot in the

great literary Battle of Harlem Heights had been fired.

The seventy-five-year-old controversy can now be resolved. Further investigation has shown the André map to be of sufficient scale to prove the location of the battle site beyond any further doubt. *Figure I* accompanying this article is a rigidly accurate pen tracing of the original André map now at the University of Michigan, with superfluous details omitted in the interests of clarity. *Figure II* is a pen tracing of a modern topographic survey map of New York City, reduced to exactly the same scale as that of the André original, and also relocating several important points shown on that copy.

The letter "G" — the key letter — superimposes precisely on the site of Columbia University, on Morningside Heights.

Thus the long-held (but circumstantial) view is effectively vindicated, the element of doubt completely removed. Columbia University rests upon a height whose rocky soil was splashed with the blood of free men fighting bravely to defend precious ideals of liberty — Colonial infantrymen giving the newly-formed American nation its very first taste of military victory.

FEDERAL DRAFT EXEMPTIONS 1863-1865

BY NEIL C. KIMMONS

DURING THE LATTER PART of 1862 the necessity for a radical change in the method of raising troops in order to prosecute the war to a successful conclusion became more and more apparent. The demand for reinforcements from the various armies in the field steadily and largely exceeded the current supply of men. The old agencies for filling the ranks proved more and more ineffective. It was evident that the efforts of the Government for the suppression of the rebellion would fail without resort to the unpopular, but necessary, measure of conscription.¹ But it was not easy to convince the public at once of the justice and wisdom of conscription. It was a novelty contrary to the traditional military policy of the nation. It was only after an extended discussion in Congress that the enrollment act was passed and became a law on March 3, 1863.²

Under the original law all able-bodied males of military age were registered and designated as the "national forces of the United States." All persons thus enrolled were subject for two years after July 1, 1863, to be called into the military service, and to continue in service during the rebellion, not, however, exceeding the term of three years. It was determined that the national forces not already in the military service of the nation were to be divided into major groups,

the first of which comprised all persons subject to military duty between the ages of twenty and thirty-five years, and all unmarried persons below the age of forty-five; the second group comprised all other persons, and was not to be called into service in any district until those of the first class had been exhausted. Between drafts those who had passed the age of forty-five were stricken from the rolls and those who had reached the age of twenty were added to them.

Each district, varying in geographic size according to the density of population, had a board of enrollment composed of the provost-marshal, serving as president and holding the rank of captain, and two other persons appointed by the President, one of whom had to be a licensed and practicing physician and surgeon.³ Members of boards of enrollment were forbidden to absent themselves from their duties or their districts without leave first obtained from the acting assistant provost-marshal-general of the state, who was not to grant leave of absence for more than five days at any one time without the approval of the provost-marshal-general. The members of the boards were in effect, although not legally, exempted from the draft because of the importance of their duties.⁴

The draft act of March 3, 1863, provided that men otherwise eligible for the draft⁵

¹*The War of the Rebellion: The Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Government Printing Office, Washington, Series III, Vol. 5, pp. 883-885, hereinafter designated as *Official Records*.

²*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 88-93.

³*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, 656.

⁴*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 631.

⁵In addition the law stated that aliens, felons and the physically and mentally unfit were exempted and not designated as part of the national forces.

could be exempted from service for any one of the following seven reasons:

1. The Vice-President, the judges of the various courts of the United States, the heads of the various executive departments of the government, and the governors of the several states.

2. The only son liable to military duty of a widow dependent upon his labor for support.

3. The only son of an aged or infirm parent or parents dependent upon his labor for support.

4. Where there were two or more sons of aged or infirm parents subject to draft, the father, or if he were dead, the mother, could elect which son would be exempt.

5. The only brother of children not yet twelve years of age dependent upon his labor for support.

6. The father of motherless children under twelve years of age dependent upon his labor for support.

7. Where there were a father and sons in the same family and household, and two of them were in the military service as non-commissioned officers, musicians, or privates, the residue of such a household not exceeding two was exempted.

Inevitably some one had to interpret and apply the legal provisions. This was done by the Judge Advocate General, Joseph Holt, and his opinions built up a system of legal precedents. Generally speaking the opinions and decisions of the Judge Advocate General were strict interpretations of the letter of the law, regardless of how deserving a particular case might have been.

The second and third classification (which can be grouped together inasmuch as the classifications were almost identical) were the cause of many decisions on the part of the Judge Advocate General. The primary qualifications before an exemption was even considered were that the parent or parents had to be aged or infirm and dependent upon the labor of the son for the principal part of their support. The only son of such parents was not exempt if but one of the parents was aged or infirm.⁶ The supposed disability which gave rise to the exemption had to apply

to both again; the parents might have any number of sons as minors, overage or otherwise and with just one of them liable to military duty, and if they were dependent upon the latter's labor for support, he was exempted.

The second classification, referring to a widow and her only son, provided this interesting decision, to wit, a woman divorced from her husband who was still living was not in the sense of the law a widow, a widow being defined as a "woman who had lost her husband by death."⁷ Her only son, therefore, upon whose labor she was dependent for support was not exempted. It was not specifically stated that a widow had to be aged or infirm to exempt her son; it was stated that she merely had to be dependent upon his labor for her support.

In the case of a widow who had two sons, one of whom was a cripple or a helpless invalid disabled from the service, the other was exempt provided, of course, that she was dependent upon his labor for support. The condition of the invalid son, however, was not to be a temporary disability but one chronic in its character.⁸

The fourth classification was responsible for its share of opinions and decisions. In the case of aged or infirm parents who had two or more sons subject to military duty, election of the son to be exempted had to be made before the draft, whereupon his name did not appear in the draft box. If the parents neglected to do so, then all sons were held liable and none were eligible for exemption. If one of only two sons of such parents was already in the military service, the other was automatically exempt.⁹

In the event that two or more sons of aged or infirm parents were subject to draft, it was necessary for them to be of one house-

⁶*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 655.

⁷*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 709.

⁸*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 709.

⁹*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 606.

hold in order to entitle the parents to elect one of them for exemption; however, as a precaution, the parents were required when making the election to accompany it with an affidavit stating that no claim of exemption had been preferred on behalf of any other sons. This was intended to protect the Government from the fraud of having more than one exemption claimed where the sons resided in different states or within the jurisdiction of different boards of enrollment.¹⁰

In those cases where the parents had three sons—one at home, one in the service, and one who had been killed in it—the son remaining at home was not exempt unless the parents were dependent upon his labor. Before exemptions were automatically granted, it was necessary for there to be at least two members of the same family and household in the service. A son killed in the military service was not counted.¹¹ The parents could have had four sons, two of whom had died in the service, and two of whom were at home, and the latter would not have been exempted. Before such an exemption was allowed it had to be shown that the parents had, at a given moment, two sons in the service, and not simply had had them at some time previous to the draft. Congress might well have accepted the loss of two sons in the field as equivalent to their continuance in the service and therefore securing the same privileges to their family, but that was not the case, nor were there any amendments at a later date to correct the injustice.

It was also necessary to decide the status of the father of children under twelve years of age who had married again. Such a man was exempt even though his second wife was still living, for a stepmother was not considered to be a mother in the sense of the act.¹²

A very interesting decision was granted referring to insanity—insanity not of the drafted husband and father, but rather of the mother and wife. The children of an insane mother who at any time might have regained her reason were not, in the sense of the law, considered "motherless children." The father of such children, even though they might have been dependent upon his labor for support, could not claim exemption from the draft. It was admitted by the Judge Advocate General¹³ that the case was a hard one and would probably have been provided for had it been foreseen. But since it had not been foreseen nor provided for, the legal staff had no alternative other than to interpret the law as it was and not as it ought to have been. Once the interpretation had been rendered it remained. There is no evidence that later amendments took cognizance of this obvious hardship, possibly because that type of case occurred so infrequently. Then again, being of an isolated nature, there was no concentrated organized bloc to demand the necessary revision. Obviously such a decision was of a very minor character insofar as its having any noticeable effect on the conduct of the draft.

Although not considered in the law as an exemption, the draft included in its jurisdiction those men who were already in the military or naval forces in clerical capacities. For example, paymasters' clerks, as such, were not found in the list of exempted classes. They sustained a certain relation, it is true, to the service, as did teamsters and others who received a daily ration as a portion of their allowances, but they were not so far in that service as to have been liable for the field duty for which the national forces were drafted. And they were not, therefore, by reason of their position permitted to escape that liability had the chances of the draft

¹⁰*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 726.

¹¹*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 631.

¹²*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 709.

¹³*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 606.

board imposed it upon them. Field duty carried the obligation of shouldering a musket and actually engaging in battle. By that definition paymasters' clerks were virtually non-combatants, and by the same interpretation the clerks of naval or military commanders were not considered in the service and were therefore not exempted. Nor were those individuals who were in service on board Government lightships considered exempt.

As a matter of fact, even persons engaged in the manufacture of arms for the Government, a "vital industry," were not exempted as they had been prior to the enactment of the draft act on March 3, 1863. No ground was perceived on which the claim of exemption made for these men could rest. It is true that they were recognized by the Secretary of War¹⁴ as being in the service of the Government, which they could very well have been without their having been in the military service in the sense of the enrolling act. The expediency of the moment demanded that men be placed in the field as rapidly as possible; consequently it would have been unwise for the Provost-Marshal-General's office to have allowed any unauthorized exemptions which would have served to increase the amount of red tape, and although these men were engaged in an industry vital to the Union's continuance of the war, nevertheless they were not considered to be irreplaceable. Nor was it likely that this group of men would have been drafted in a body, such as to cripple the industry. Only a few would be taken each time, thereby allowing their positions to be filled without noticeable dislocation.

Again, what was the status of men who had been drafted, but were abroad or at sea at the time of the draft? Such persons, although deserters according to the letter of the Government.¹⁵ The drafted men who

were declared to be deserters were those who had had actual personal notice, by summons at their last place of residence, that their attendance in question has received such notice. Desertion involved a criminal intent, and a man could not, in the sense of the law, be held to have deserted a service when he did not know he belonged to it—to have neglected a duty when he had had no means of knowing that it had been imposed upon him. The law would have stultified itself had it declared otherwise. Ignorance of the law excuses no man, but ignorance of the facts does. The law requires no man to do an impossible thing, nor can it on any principle hold him responsible for not having done it. When, therefore, a drafted man was abroad or at sea, or otherwise placed in such circumstances as to have rendered it physically impossible for him to have knowledge of the draft and of his duty under it, he was not advertised or treated as a deserter. If persons did not without delay report themselves for duty after having received information that they had been drafted, they were arrested as deserters. It was for the Secretary of War to determine how long the public interest would permit the Government to wait for the return of this class of persons.

It was soon perceived that the plea of exemption on the basis of alienage was not fully understood by the boards of enrollment. By August 6, 1863, the Provost-Marshal-General's Office had prepared a circular (number 65) to clear up the confusion.¹⁶ By it the decision was reached that wherever the fact of alienage was clearly established, exemption had to be granted. But when the board had any doubt in the matter the case had to be deferred, through the Provost-Marshal-General's Office, for the decision of the State Department, and until such decision had been obtained all action in the case

¹⁴*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 632.

¹⁵*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 655.

¹⁶*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 632.

was necessarily suspended. Once the State Department had reviewed the case and decided the person was an alien it issued a certificate which stated the particulars. The certificate was deemed conclusive evidence and the question of liability or non-liability to the draft was decided by the board in accordance therewith. With the revision of the draft by the act of February 24, 1864,¹⁷ all persons of foreign birth who had declared on oath their intention to become citizens of the United States, or who had at any time assumed the right of a citizen by voting at any election held under the authority of any state or territory of the United States, or who had held any office under such laws, were not exempt. The total number of individuals who were exempted on grounds of alienage during the four drafts of the Civil War was 36,165.¹⁸

To Americans of a later period it is perhaps strange that no exemptions were allowed for reason of conscience or religion. Such people were not found in the list of exempted classes, and the act expressly declared that no persons but those enumerated in that list could or would be exempted. The Society of Friends and others entertaining similar sentiments, if drafted, could find relief from their scruples in the employment of substitutes or in the payment of \$300.¹⁹ As a result of the opposition aroused by the omission of such a class of exemptions in the original act, the amendments approved February 24, 1864, granted relief to persons of this class with certain limitations. By the latter act members of religious denominations, who by oath or affirmation declared that they were conscientiously opposed to bearing arms, and who were prohibited from doing so by the rules and articles of faith and practice of

their religious denominations, were, when drafted into the military service, considered a non-combatant. As non-combatants they were assigned by the Secretary of War to duty in the hospitals or to the care of freedmen. Or, if they preferred, they could pay the \$300 to the agent of the Secretary of War which would be applied to the benefit of sick and wounded soldiers. J. B. Fry, the Provost-Marshal-General, in reporting to Secretary Stanton on February 7, 1865, stated that he knew of no instance in which boards of enrollment had exempted preachers of the gospel belonging to churches "whose religious tenets do not bring them within the scope of the act of February 24, 1864, for enrolling and calling out the national forces."²⁰ Nor did he know of any privileges having been granted to the preachers of any denominations of professing Christians which had been denied to others.

One is tempted to believe, however, that the amendments of February 24, regarding tender consciences, were not included simply because the authorities were concerned about the violation of religious scruples, but rather because the Quakers caused the Government considerable embarrassment in those districts where they were strongly entrenched.²¹ One is further inclined to believe that in the Society of Friends the Federal officials encountered a strongly organized minority determinedly articulate in defending what it considered to be its inalienable rights—a minority whose opposition to bearing arms was a tradition of long standing.

As one might expect, the principal cause for exemption was physical unfitness. The medical staff, in deciding upon which diseases were grounds for exemption, was guided in considerable degree by the urgency of the moment and did not, therefore, disqualify a

¹⁷*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, 131, 657-8.

¹⁸*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, 730-39.

¹⁹*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 606.

²⁰*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, 1155.

²¹*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, 633.

man except for the most serious types of disease. The following are some of the diseases for which drafted men were rejected as "physically or mentally unfit for the service": imbecility, insanity, epilepsy, paralysis, tuberculosis, cancer, loss of sight, deafness, etc.²² This list of diseases proved, as a general rule, acceptable, and only a few cases presented themselves deserving exemption which were not classified under its requirements. Of course no precise enumeration of all the particular diseases or disabilities which could disqualify drafted men for military service was possible, but the above list was given as a general guide, directing as far as practicable the judgment of examining surgeons. By rendering as definite as possible the list of disqualifying mental and physical disabilities much trouble and annoyance were saved to surgeons of boards, and promptness of decision was facilitated. Moreover, the drafted man seemed better satisfied if it was possible to point out to him that the surgeon, in his decision not to exempt the draftee from service, simply obeyed the instructions received from higher sources.

It took much more time to examine drafted men than volunteers. The volunteer and the drafted man were governed by very different motives in presenting themselves for examination, for while the former tried to conceal every physical defect, the latter was equally anxious to magnify every slight ailment. If the volunteer resorted to false teeth, hairdye, and falsehoods to conceal his age, bandages for varicose veins, and the application of ice for hernia, the drafted man also feigned deafness, blindness, liver and kidney complaints, or any other disease that would avail him in his extremity.²³ The frauds against which the examining surgeon had to guard were as various as the characters of the men

examined, and no rules could be given to govern in such cases. But to guard successfully against these frauds, the physician, aside from his professional skill, had to be conversant with the frailties and idiosyncrasies of human nature and to be able to turn his knowledge to account, for he had to rely to a great extent upon his own individual judgment.

According to the historical report²⁴ of the medical branch of the Provost-Marshal-General's Bureau, a grand total of 605,045 drafted men were examined. Of that number 155,730 were exempted for physical or medical disability, a ratio of 257.38 exempted per 1,000 examined. However, in adding up the totals,²⁵ draft by draft, one finds that the number exempted for physical and mental disability was 160,251 — a discrepancy of 4,521. This discrepancy is quite unimportant in itself, but it is nevertheless illustrative of the confusion of figures and totals associated with the Civil War records.

In addition to the various classifications of exemption mentioned above, any person drafted and notified to appear, could, on or before the day fixed for his appearance, furnish an acceptable substitute to take his place in the draft, or he could pay \$300 to the Secretary of War for the procurement of a substitute. Such a person procuring either the substitute or paying the money was discharged from further liability under that particular draft and given a certificate of discharge for that draft. However, any person who failed to report after being duly notified, without furnishing a substitute or paying the required sum, was deemed a deserter and subject to arrest by the provost-marshal to be sent to the nearest military post for trial by court martial.²⁶

²²*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, 660-62.

²³*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, 765.

²⁴*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, 767.

²⁵*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, 731-38.

²⁶*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, 90.

The large number of exemptions defeated the purpose of the draft in its initial stages. The number of names drawn in the first draft of July 1, 1863, was 292,441.²⁷ Of that number 39,417 failed to report, and 460 were discharged because the quotas of various sub-districts were full, leaving a total of 252,564 men to be examined. The examination of the drafted men was apparently conducted with reasonable faithfulness and fairness, and yet of 252,564 men examined under this draft only 9,880 failed to secure exemption from personal service under one or another of the special provisions of the law of March 3, 1863.

Only 22,858 escaped service via the seven classifications of exemption. What defeated the draft was the great number of exemptions due to physical disability or payment of commutation. The number of men that were exempted for various causes is as follows:²⁸

Physical and mental disability.....	81,388
Aliens, felons and overage.....	38,096
Only son of a widow.....	7,899
Only son of aged parents.....	6,711
Two or more sons, one of whom was elected by the parents to remain home.....	3,576
Only brother of motherless children	154
Father of motherless children.....	1,191

Of those held to service, 26,002 furnished substitutes, so that after drafting 292,411 men the Government actually obtained but 35,882 soldiers, for 52,288 paid commutation. Obviously the Government had to become more strict if soldiers were to be inducted into the ranks. It was not the purpose of the Government to raise money through the commutation clause, but to raise troops. Consequently, by the revision of the enrollment act on February 24, 1864, and July 4, 1864, the

privilege of paying commutation was first limited and then completely repealed.

Section five of the amendatory act of February 24, 1864,²⁹ stated that any drafted person who thereafter paid commutation was exempted only for that particular quota. His name was retained on the roll in filling future quotas, and in no instance was the exemption to extend beyond one year, at which time he was to be enrolled again. Despite these restrictions 32,678 men availed themselves of the commutation clause in the draft of March 14, 1864. Only 12,303 men were actually raised, including substitutes.

Further revisions were passed July 4, 1864. By this act it was determined that in case the quota in a district or sub-district was not filled within the space of fifty days the President was immediately to order a further draft for one year to fill that quota. If such a draft were necessary in any district no payment of money was accepted by the Government to release any enrolled or drafted man from personal obligation to perform military service. This section of the act of July 4 repealed in large measure the commutation feature of the previous enrollment acts. Conclusive evidence that the draft was by then an effective means of raising troops was demonstrated in the fact that by the draft of July 18, 1864, there were 84,291 men furnished, and in contrast there were but 1,298 men who paid commutation, the majority of whom were from Indiana and Pennsylvania. The only people who paid commutation under that draft were those who were allowed to do so because of their conscientious scruples against bearing arms. By the draft of December 19, 1864, only 460 men availed themselves of the commutation clause. For the four drafts a total of 86,724 escaped personal service via commutation.

²⁷*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, 626.

²⁸*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, 731.

²⁹*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, 129.

	<i>Men furnished</i>	<i>Paid commutation</i>
Draft of July, 1863	35,882	52,288
Draft of March, 1864 —	12,303	32,678
Draft of July, 1864	84,291	1,298
Draft of December, 1864	36,173	460
Totals	168,649	86,724

(The column "men furnished" includes substitutes for enrolled men.)

The remaining means of exemption was by substitution.³⁰ In the draft of July, 1863, there were 26,002 men who furnished substitutes: 8,911 more were added by the draft of March, 1864; 28,502 by the draft of July, 1864; the final draft of December, 1864, added 10,192. The cumulative total for all the drafts was 73,607.³¹ However, this form of exemption did not directly rob the Government of soldiers such as the commutation clause did.

Under the original act all persons who desired to present substitutes had to give notice in writing to the draft board that on such a day he would present a substitute, giving his full name, residence, age, and stating whether he was an alien or a citizen, and whether he was liable to draft. The substitute was then presented to the board whose duty it was to examine him and, if he was accepted, to place his name on the book of persons drafted with explanatory remarks. The board was charged with the duty of determining whether a substitute offered was acceptable or not. The board necessarily had the power of ascertaining and deciding whether he was a deserter, or whether he was under obligation to perform military service on his own account, which of course would have disqualified him as a substitute.

Every substitute who enlisted and reported

to the provost-marshal was held subject to all pains and penalties for desertion or other offenses in the same manner as other soldiers. The person who furnished the substitute was not held responsible for the acts which the latter committed after he had enlisted and reported for duty, unless, of course, it was discovered that at the date of enlistment of the substitute he was a deserter from the land or naval forces of the United States, or that he had secured exemptions from the draft by fraud, in which case the principal was required to furnish another substitute or be held liable to duty.³²

In an attempt to encourage the raising of troops by substitution rather than by the payment of commutation the act of February 24, 1864, lowered the barriers in some respects. By that act it became possible for a drafted person to furnish a substitute who could himself be liable to the draft. If the substitute were liable to the draft the principal was again placed on the roll as being liable to the draft on future calls, but not until the existing enrollment had been exhausted. In the event that the substitute was not liable to the draft, then the principal was exempt during the time which the substitute was not liable just as before. In either case, the exemption was not to exceed the term for which the principal was drafted. Further encouragement was given by the act of March 3, 1865, which provided that persons who were drafted for one year and who furnished substitutes for three years were exempted from military duty during the time for which such substitutes were not liable to the draft.³³

The act of March 3, 1865, stated that in case any substitute should desert from the army, and satisfactory evidence disclosed that

³⁰See Fred A. Shannon, *Studies in the Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-65* for a discussion of the mercenary factor in the army.

³¹*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, 730-39.

³²*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, 664.

³³*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, 1224, Sec. 16.

³⁴*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, 1225, Sec. 20.

the principal furnishing the substitute had in any way, directly or indirectly, aided, or even had knowledge of any intention on the part of the substitute to desert, then such a person was immediately placed in the Army to serve for the period for which he was liable for the draft.⁸⁴ The service began at the date of the desertion of the substitute.

Furthermore, under the provisions of the twenty-third section of the act of March 3, 1865, the principal could in advance of the draft muster in a recruit not subject to the draft. The recruit stood to the credit of the enrolled person, and in the event that the latter was drafted the recruit became his substitute. But the "credit" availed him only for the particular draft in anticipation of which he secured the "recruit." There was no provision in the act of March, 1865, stating that the person who furnished a recruit under the twenty-third section was exempt from draft during the time for which the recruit had been accepted and enlisted.

Thus the only benefit which a person furnishing such a recruit derived was the securing of a credit in the event that he was drafted. The liability of the principal to draft at any other drafts occurring after the mustering in of the recruit, and during his

term of service, was not at all affected. The recruit could have been mustered into the service for three years and yet as a substitute he could only exempt the principal for the draft in anticipation of which he was recruited.

Chiefly, the design of the provision of the act of 1865 was to offer inducement and to present a stimulus to numbers or associations of individuals in any sub-district before the liability of any of them became fixed by a draft. The policy of the law was to encourage recruiting, not the procurement of substitutes—to induce the people to organize associations for the advancement of volunteering, rather than the purchase of substitutes. The act of 1865 did not speak of the recruits in question as substitutes, but declared that they should be taken as substitutes for the persons who caused them to be mustered in. They were not substitutes, but only of the nature of substitutes. Their primary and essential character under the law was that of credits for their procurers or principals. Though the war ended before another draft was put into effect, nevertheless some groups did provide recruits, but not in large numbers, as it was evident that the war was nearing the end.

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SIR EDWARD CREASY, 1812-1878

BY CHARLES E. NOWELL*

The year 1951 marks an anniversary that is likely to pass almost unnoticed because of our intense preoccupation with current political and military events. A hundred years ago, in the comparative calm of Victorian England, Edward Creasy published the *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*. By 1856 the book had gone through seven editions, with many more yet to come. Though perhaps not a great work nor a profound piece of scholarship, it soon became a minor classic. Thousands of English and American readers, who otherwise paid little attention to military history, knew Creasy's "fifteen decisives." William Schwenck Gilbert, though with tongue in cheek, paid tribute by having his comic major general in *Pirates of Penzance* sing.

*I know the kings of England and I
quote the fights historical
From Marathon to Waterloo in order
categorical.*

Earlier in the present century many school-boys, the present writer included, could reel off the battles at least by name. The average American now past forty was nourished, whether he knows it or not, on history texts in which the Creasy influence was still visible.

Though changing points of view have caused less attention to be paid in recent years to battles of the past, it would be wrong even now to call Creasy altogether a back

number. A new edition of the *Battles* was issued by the Military Service Publishing Company as late as 1945 and it is safe to say that there will be others in the future. Some older edition is to be found in the average public library, and many a home library contains a battered copy.

Creasy, with no military background of his own, wrote essentially for an amateur public, though he did not lack military readers. Too young to fight against Napoleon and too old to serve in the Crimea, he devoted his active life to law, teaching, and administration. Educated at Eton and Cambridge, he became a member of the bar in 1837, a professor of history at London University in 1840, and Chief Justice of Ceylon, as well as a knight, in 1860. After serving ten years in the East, he returned to England with gravely impaired health, yet managed to write busily until his death in 1878. His extensive works on English, Turkish, and Constitutional history are not without merit, but these are all but forgotten and his fame will always rest on the *Fifteen Decisive Battles*.

Whoever looks over histories of the art of war, such as those of Kromayer, Delbrück, Oman, and Fuller, will realize that by comparison Creasy did not write military history in the real sense at all; he merely described certain battles selected according to a scheme of his own. None of his battle descriptions could ever be used, in his day or ours, for

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staff college purposes. Few of the engagements on his list are the ones commonly chosen for the education of military men. A professional writing for professionals selects those examples with the soundest military lessons to teach; Creasy chose his battles for altogether different reasons.

His great appeal to the reader, aside from his excellent literary style, lay in his ability to correlate battles with vital historical issues. He had his own definition of a decisive battle, and each of the fifteen he included and described was first submitted to a rigid test and required to pass it. In Creasy's judgment, the battle need not have been a major military encounter, and the number of men engaged made no particular difference. Nor did it have to mark an advance in military science; no battle connected with the development of the English longbrow or the evolution of firearms found any place. The brilliant victories of Hannibal, Caesar, and Frederick the Great were all omitted; Charles XII of Sweden and Napoleon figured in Creasy's list only as defeated commanders. On the other hand, the surrender of Burgoyne's 6,000 English and Hessian soldiers at Saratoga in 1777, and the French success in the Valmy artillery duel of 1792 were considered decisive enough to be included.

The basis of choice was Creasy's estimate of a battle's importance in long term results. In each of his selections, according to his judgment, if victory had gone the other way, there would have been a significant alteration or deflection of the course of history. The germ of the whole idea, as the author states frankly, came from Hallam, who had earlier written that Charles Martel's victory over the Arabs at Tours in 732, could "justly be reckoned among those few battles of which a contrary event would have essentially varied the drama of the world in all its significant scenes." Creasy

may also have been influenced by Gibbon, who wrote of the same battle that if the Moslems had won "perhaps the interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mohammed."

Creasy, therefore, sought the turning points of history wherever he could find them. On that basis many of the high military peaks of the past had no significance. Since Hannibal ultimately lost the Second Punic War, he settled nothing by triumphing brilliantly at Cannae, so Cannae must be rejected. Napoleon's genius accomplished nothing decisive at Austerlitz, since ten years later the emperor was a helpless prisoner in English hands. But the skirmish at Valmy in 1792 decided that the infant French Revolution, instead of being snuffed out, would run its full course, with all the admittedly vital consequences to civilization.

As Creasy saw history and military events up to 1851, he believed that the decisive battles of the world had been the following fifteen:

1. Marathon, 490 B.C.
2. The Athenian defeat at Syracuse, 413 B.C.
3. Arbela, 331 B.C.
4. The Metaurus, 207 B.C.
5. The Teutoberg Forest, 9 A.D.
6. Chalons (Attila's defeat), 451.
7. Tours, 732.
8. Hastings, 1066.
9. Orleans (Joan of Arc's defeat of the English), 1429.
10. The Spanish Armada, 1588.
11. Blenheim, 1704.
12. Poltava, 1709.
13. Saratoga, 1777.
14. Valmy, 1792.
15. Waterloo, 1815.

Oddly enough for an Englishman, Creasy showed himself no great believer in sea power. Of his fifteen decisive battles, only the Armada defeat was a naval engagement, though ships did play some subsidiary role in the Marathon, Syracuse, and Hastings campaigns. Certainly many an English authority by 1851 would have placed Trafalgar ahead of Waterloo in contributing to Napoleon's downfall. It seems hardly possible that Creasy and A. T. Mahan could have conversed long without serious disputation.

Yet Creasy was not rigid to the point of scoring other judgments, for in his preface he wrote, "It is possible, indeed, that no two historical inquirers would entirely agree in their lists of the Decisive Battles of the World." Nor did he believe that the number fifteen had any mystic significance, for if he had found more battles fulfilling his requirements he would have included them. Though he never revised his book, he lived until 1878, long enough to learn of Gettysburg and Sedan, both of which by his own standards he must have regarded as decisive. Various later editions of the work, prepared by others, included these two, plus other recent battles, though always more as appendices than as integral parts of the volume.

It is easy to pick flaws in Creasy's method. The whole sequence is too neat, too pat, and too climactic to be altogether acceptable to modern military critics. Creasy liked to determine the course of history for centuries on the basis of single engagements. He liked to have his Greek hoplites, Roman legionaries, and modern artillerymen and musketeers wind up the issue for good in a day's fighting. His scheme took no account of the fact that there have been campaigns (the Mongol conquest of Russia, for instance) that produced no one battle of towering significance and yet accomplished all the results Creasy demanded of a decisive engagement.

Creasy's Victorian optimism made everything, with the possible exception of Syracuse and Poltava, come out for the best. The interests of world civilization demanded the victory of Greece over Persia, of Rome over Carthage, of Christendom over Islam, and of England over Napoleon. Even setbacks which might have daunted some English historians had a silver lining. The Norman conquest was after all a blessing in disguise, Joan of Arc's victory released England from an impossible involvement in France, and the American success at Saratoga created a new and greater England in the Western Hemisphere.

For all Creasy's shortcomings, there is something to be said for his method. Wars do have turning points, whether they are immediately recognized as such or become visible only later in retrospect. For that reason Creasy will continue to be read, and it is even likely that future historians will themselves try to identify the decisive battles or campaigns of history, making some use of the rules he laid down. Such historians should be able to improve on his selections, not from their more abundant wisdom but from their more adequate perspective.

Creasy composed the *Fifteen Decisive Battles* according to the time honored Classical-Western European tradition that took little account of any other historical stream. He left Asia out of the picture except where orientals collaborated to help civilization along by suffering defeats at European hands. He noticeably failed to perceive the many occasions when they had won. Charles Martel did stop the Arabs at Tours, but only after they had torn vast provinces away from a Christian civilization to which they have never returned. In view of Creasy's demonstrated interest in Turkish history, it is remarkable that he did not appreciate the consequences of the Seljuk victory at Man-

zikert in 1071 and the Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453, both disasters to Europe that centuries have not repaired. The future historian must be less of a traditionalist and will certainly find, even in Farther Asia, wars that settled greater issues for longer times than did several of the rather parochial European military engagements that struck Creasy as so vital.

Even when the future writer sticks to the general historical pattern Creasy followed he will probably throw out some of the original fifteen battles and make several substitutions. It is doubtful whether he will find much use for Syracuse, the Teutoberg Forest, Orleans, Blenheim, or Poltava. He will very likely make such alterations as Salamis for Marathon, Yorktown for Saratoga,¹ and Leipzig for Waterloo. As for events since Creasy's day, the historian will be on safe ground only until 1870, when Sedan established German military hegemony in continental Europe, a hegemony which may now be ended but which lasted long enough to make changes of terrific consequences.

If we apply Creasy's standard of judgment to the military events of the present century, we must see that nothing has yet happened which it will be safe to include in the decisive

category. The defeat of Russia by Japan seemed epoch-making in 1905, yet within forty years the Japanese military power had been destroyed, while Russia, through no real fighting in the East, had grasped even more than she had earlier tried and failed to gain. Gigantic though World War I was, it settled nothing, since within twenty-five years defeated Germany was on her feet, fighting again, with every apparent chance of victory.² Could we be sure that World War II was decisive, it would then be a question of choosing the most strategic of its various turning points—Midway, El Alamein, or Stalingrad. Possibly, since the military events of 1939-45 embraced two wars after all, two turning points might be selected. But only time will tell whether anything in those years was really decisive, and so far not enough time has elapsed.

And finally, back to Creasy. Though we may find his Victorian point of view quaint and his judgment as to battles often obsolete, we must realize that he had something of importance to say. His method, which seems obvious enough today, was original; no one had thought of it before. Though it needs modification, it still does not have to be entirely abandoned; it can still be of much use despite the changes in emphasis that a century has brought.

¹Anyone doubting this is invited to reread the dismal later history of the American Revolution and to notice how nearly the Colonial cause came to disaster several times. Only the near miracle of the contact established by Washington and Rochambeau with De Grasse's fleet in Chesapeake Bay in 1781 rendered victory possible. Even after Yorktown, if the British had pushed the war, they could probably have won it.

²It has been suggested, with some reason, that the only decisive campaign of World War I may have been the German victory, whichever it was, that definitely broke the military power of Tsarist Russia, thus clearing the way for the vastly greater Soviet power.

THE COMMAND OF THE ITALIAN ARMED FORCES IN WORLD WAR II

BY HOWARD MCGAW SMYTH

A NATIONAL STATE committed to total war over a period of years tends to develop organizations peculiar to that nation's cultural institutions and reflecting, to a greater or less degree depending on the pressures involved, the kind of war effort the state is exerting. So, for Italy, in the effort that started with the Ethiopian adventure and ended with the collapse of the effort, the phases in national organization are represented in the account which follows.

Command over all the armed forces of the Kingdom of Italy was explicitly vested by the constitution in the King. Article 5 states:

To the King alone belongs the executive power. He is the supreme head of the State; commands all land and naval forces; . . .

The exercise of this power of command was a serious problem and a matter of dispute from the very beginning of constitutional government under the House of Savoy. King Charles Albert (1831-1849) exercised the command personally in the campaign of 1848. In the campaign of 1849 the King was titular commander only: responsibility for the war was entrusted to the Chief of

Staff, Alberto Chrzanowsky. In 1859 King Victor Emmanuel II personally assumed the supreme command but exercised the power through his Chief of Staff. In 1866 the power of command was entrusted to General La Marmora in the name of the King who retained the title of *Comandante Supremo*. After the war of 1866 a royal decree provided the basis for constitutional separation of the royal prerogative of command from personal responsibility for the exercise of that power. Except for such times as the King would personally exercise command in time of war, he was to entrust it to a general officer on whom would devolve responsibility for the conduct of military operations.¹ During the first World War the power of command was exercised in the King's name by the Chief of the General Staff on the basis of the regulations of 10 March 1912 which provided:

When His Majesty the King does not personally assume command of the mobilized army, he entrusts this to a general officer who takes the title of Supreme Commander. In such a case, at the time of his nomination, the relationships between the Commander and the other powers of the State are to be fixed. Responsibility [for conduct] of the war

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pertains entirely and exclusively to the Supreme Commander.²

During World War II Mussolini personally exercised the supreme command over the Italian Armed Forces. The acquisition of this power was a protracted process and was completed only on the eve of Italy's entrance into the war in 1940. Its explanation requires some exposition of the reorganization of the organs of military and naval command under Fascism. The process was analogous to that by which Mussolini secured for himself supreme political power in the Italian State. The Albertine constitution was not abolished or even formally amended, but was given an altogether different form by supplementary enactment and decree. Mussolini from the beginning of his regime devoted great attention to the army and navy. Italy very early established an air force (*Regia Aeronautica*) as a distinct and separate armed force. Mussolini himself served simultaneously as Minister of War, Minister of the Navy, and Minister of the Air Force.³ In each of the ministries Mussolini usually appointed a professional officer as Under Secretary who at the same time held the office of Chief of Staff of the respective Armed Force (Army, Navy, Air). The responsibility for the organization, training, and preparation of Italian Armed Forces during the Fascist period devolved chiefly on Mussolini, but he did not gain, as Minister of War or as Minister concurrently of the three Armed Forces, the war time power of command. Except for the Fascist Militia,

who were bound by oath to Mussolini and who in 1925 were put on the State payroll, the royal power of command over all the armed forces remained. The oath was to the King, sworn individually by officers and collectively by recruits.

In 1925 a scaffold of unification of the Armed Forces was set up, but for a long time there was little solid structure behind it. The law of June, 1925 established a Chief of Staff of the Supreme General Staff "for control over the organization of the armed forces, their preparation for war, and the defensive organization of the national territory." Initially these broad coordinating powers were conferred on the Chief of Staff of the Army General Staff who was immediately subordinate to the Minister of War. But this office created powers somewhat too large for Mussolini's jealous temperament. In February 1927 the Chief of Staff of the Supreme General Staff ceased to be simultaneously Chief of the Army General Staff, and ceased to function under the War Ministry; instead, he was made a technical adviser to the Head of the Government (Mussolini) with the function of coordinating the military organization under the direct control of Mussolini. He was empowered to draw up general plans only: detailed plans of operations pertained respectively to the several Chiefs of Staff of the armed forces.⁴

It was Marshal Pietro Badoglio who held this high-sounding position with such a modest retinue: one executive officer and six assistants, two respectively from each of the three armed forces. What did this amount to? The U. S. Military Attaché reported:

The so-called Supreme General Staff is practically our Joint Army-Navv Board with the addition of Air members. I doubt if it plays a more impor-

²Francesco Racioppi and Ignazio Brunelli, *Commento allo statuto del regno*, 3 vols. (Milan-Rome-Turin, 1909) I, 256.

³Carmelo Carbone, *La Posizione giuridica del comandante supremo in guerra* (Rome, 1946) p. 17.

⁴Mussolini served as Minister of War 4 April 1925 to 12 September 1929, and from 22 July 1933 continuously until his overthrow on 25 July 1943. He served as Minister of Aviation 30 August 1925 to 11 September 1929 and from 7 November 1933 continuously until 25 July 1943.

⁴U. S. Military Attaché Report No. 13789, Rome, 26 March 1934, G-2 Library, National Archives.

tant role in Italy's defense than the Joint Board does in ours. One reason for this is that Mussolini is not only Head of the Government but is also actually the head of the War, Navy and Air Departments. He decides questions pertaining to the Army, Navy or Air Corps more often than not without consulting Marshal Badoglio who as head of the Supreme General Staff is his technical adviser on defense matters. As a matter of fact, a great many people believe that Marshal Badoglio was kicked upstairs when he was made head of the Supreme General Staff. He is the strongest man in the Army and Mussolini likes to have strong men right under him where they can do no harm. . . . The general impression now in well informed circles is that the Supreme General Staff amounts to very little.⁵

The duties of Marshall Badoglio's office were indeed not onerous. In 1929 he took the new job of Governor of Libya without giving up the old one.

After the Ethiopian War, Mussolini, who hitherto had held no grade in the Italian Army above that of corporal, established by legislation a new grade, First Marshal of the Empire; the law of 2 April 1938 appointed two persons only to this highest grade,—Mussolini and the King. In one jump Mussolini landed at the top of the military hierarchy of Italy, viz.—

First Marshal of the Empire;
Marshall of Italy (Pecori-Giraldi, Badoglio, Caviglia, De Bono, Graziani);
Generale d'armata (Army General, equivalent to U. S. General);
Generale di corpo d'armata comandante designato d'armata (Corps General designated to Army Command);

Generale di corpo d'armata (Corps General, equivalent to U. S. Lieutenant General);

Generale di divisione or *Tenente Generale* of artillery, engineers, or services (equivalent to U. S. Major General);
Generale di brigata or *Maggiore Generale* of artillery, engineers or services (equivalent to U. S. Brigadier General).

In his speech to the Chamber of Deputies on 30 March 1938 Mussolini declared:

"In Italy the war will be directed, as was the case in Africa, at the orders of the King by one person only: by him who speaks, if once again that grave task should be reserved by destiny."⁶

A new code of the laws of war (*leggi di guerra*) was issued on 8 July 1938 which stated:

"He is supreme commander who is invested with command of all the operating armed forces."⁷

On 29 May 1940 King Victor Emmanuel III reluctantly consented to delegate the royal power of command to Mussolini.⁸ On 11 June, the day following Italy's declaration of war, the king issued a proclamation to the troops delegating the power of command to Mussolini as "Supreme Commander of the armed forces operating on all fronts."⁹

Meanwhile, between Mussolini's assumption of the rank of First Marshal of the Em-

⁵Quirino Armellini, *La crisi del esercito* (Rome, 1945) p. 109; Military Attaché Report, No. 16544, Rome, 8 April 1938, G-2 Library, National Archives.

⁶Carbone, *Posizione giuridica*, p. 17.

⁷Quirino Armellini, *Diario di guerra: nove mesi al Comando Supremo* (Cernusco sul Naviglio, 1946) p. 10; Minutes of the Meeting Held in Duce's Room at Palazzo Venezia 29 May 1940, Michele Vaina, *La grande tragedia italiana: Il crollo di un regime nefasto*, Vol. I. (Milan, 1946) pp. 158-151.

⁸Carbone, *Posizione giuridica*, p. 18. See also: Armellini, *Diario di guerra*, pp. 1-2, 5, 9, 12; *The Ciano Diaries*, edited by Hugh Gibson (New York, 1946) pp. 250, 256, 261. Full text of the proclamation is in: *Armata del Po* (Milan, 1942) p. 55.

⁹Military Attaché Report, No. 11297, Rome, 21 December 1928, G-2 Library, National Archives.

pire and his assumption of supreme command, the Armed Forces General Staff had again been reorganized by the law of 15 May 1939. It was still innocuous,—an overall coordinating body without direct power of command over any of the armed forces. The Chief of the Supreme General Staff was defined as “the technical adviser to the Head of the Government on matters involving coordination of the State defensive system and Italian overseas possessions as well as on projects concerning eventual war operations.” The Chief of the Supreme General Staff was made directly subordinate to the Head of the Government (article 2). He was expected to submit “general outlines of policies covering comprehensive war plans” to the Head of the Government who in turn would forward them to the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Each of these Chiefs of Staff retained the real power of making plans and issuing orders. The Chief of the Supreme General Staff communicated with them only indirectly. He had neither an operations section nor intelligence section. His staff remained restricted to seven persons. Military Intelligence Service (*Servizio Informazione Militare* or S. I. M.) remained subordinate to the Minister of War. The Chief of the Supreme General Staff received whatever information the Chief of Staff of Army, of Navy, or of the Air Force saw fit to submit (article 7). His suggestions for coordinated plans were transmitted to those Chiefs of Staff indirectly, first to the Head of the Government, and then by way of the respective Ministries (article 4).¹⁰

The picture of unification of the Italian Armed Forces under the Supreme General Staff at the outbreak of the war is a false one, despite Marshal Badoglio's circular of 4 June 1940 which boasted of “the unitary

and totalitarian concept of the command exercised, by delegation of the King, personally by the Duce.”¹¹ Mussolini was free to accept or reject what advice or plans Badoglio submitted. The actual conduct of operations devolved on the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force who received their respective orders from Mussolini directly. Badoglio had no power, but his prestige served as window dressing for Mussolini. In many crucial matters Mussolini consulted only the Deputy Chief of the Supreme General Staff (*Sotto capo di Stato Maggiore Generale*) General Ubaldo Soddu, or, without consulting Badoglio, Mussolini issued his orders directly to one or another of the following: Marshal Rodolfo Graziani (Chief of the Army General Staff), General Francesco Pricolo (Chief of Staff, Air Force), Admiral Domenico Cavagnari (Chief of Staff, Navy). Everyone exercised command except the Supreme General Staff.¹² Even the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Count Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini's son-in-law) horned in on command: on 17 August 1940 it was necessary to issue instructions to General Visconti-Prasca, commander of the army in Albania, that he was to act only under the orders of the Army General Staff.¹³ The decision to attack Greece was made chiefly under the influence of Ciano and against the advice of Badoglio who had urged that twenty divisions would be necessary.

When the Greek campaign developed into a fiasco, Mussolini insinuated that “the military” were responsible for the faulty plan and inadequate preparations. Badoglio denied this in full council on 11 November. The Fascist press, led by Farinacci's *Regime*

¹¹Text of this circular order No. 5569 is printed by Benito Mussolini, *Il tempo del bastone e della carota* (Milan, 1944) pp. 16-17. Cf. Pietro Badoglio, *L'Italia nella seconda guerra mondiale* (Milan, 1946) p. 44.

¹²Armellini, *Diario di guerra*, pp. 35, 53, 55; Ciano *Diaries*, pp. 266, 281, 282, 284, 290.

¹³Armellini, *Diario di guerra*, pp. 57-58.

¹⁰Military Attaché Report No. 17084, Rome, 5 June 1939, G-2 Library, National Archives.

CHAIN OF COMMAND — PERIOD OF BADOGLIO 1940





CHART 1



Fascista then began a torrent of abuse of Badoglio who was made the scapegoat. Badoglio's dismissal was officially announced on 6 December 1940. Marshal Badoglio, however, played a pitiful role. A perverted sense of duty had kept him in an innocuous position of seeming responsibility without power, though he clearly understood as early as 26 November that Farinacci's press attacks were inspired by Mussolini himself, and offered his resignation at that time. On 4 December he told Mussolini that "as a soldier" he was willing to remain at his post. He had allowed himself for years to serve as a front for Mussolini; he permitted Mussolini to dismiss him and smear him with the responsibility for the Greek disaster.¹⁴

As successor to Marshal Badoglio, whose dismissal was a profound shock to the officer corps of the Royal Italian Army, Mussolini appointed Army General Ugo Cavallero. His very name stank. After the first World War Cavallero gave up his military career and offered his services to the Pirelli Rubber Company, a monopoly which had many contracts with the Italian Government. In 1925 Mussolini made Cavallero Under Secretary in the Ministry of War. In 1928, however, Cavallero again left public service to become manager of the Ansaldo Company. While Cavallero occupied this position it was discovered that the plates for the cruisers "Trento" and "Trieste," furnished by the Ansaldo Company and by the Orlando Company of Leghorn, were not armor plate as specified but of a common kind of steel and that the identification marks had been forged. Cavallero should have been sent to prison, but by the intervention of Costanzo Ciano (a

prominent Fascist and father of Galeazzo Ciano) the scandal was hushed up. But the facts were well known in Italian military circles and the appointment of Cavallero was received with astonishment and contempt.¹⁵ Some officers, however, such as Division General Giacomo Carboni, made haste to offer their congratulations to the new chief.¹⁶

From December 1940 until May 1941, General Cavallero's attention was absorbed by the Greek campaign where he took direct command of the two Italian armies engaged. During this period the work of the Supreme General Staff largely devolved on General Alfredo Guzzoni, who on 29 November had been appointed successor to Soddu, in the two offices of Under-Secretary of War and Deputy Chief of the Supreme General Staff. When the Greek campaign had been concluded (as a result of German effort) Cavallero returned to Italy and was quite unwilling to occupy a high sounding office devoid of effective power, such as Badoglio had graced for years. On 15 May he submitted to Mussolini a memorandum on the reorganization of the Supreme General Staff, and four days later he presented a project for a complete reorganization. The Duce gave his approval.¹⁷

With the issuing of the decree reorganizing the Supreme General Staff in June, 1941, that body rapidly expanded and became the most important organ of command. Thereafter it was known as the *Comando Supremo* rather than as *Stato Maggiore Generale*. The office of Deputy Chief was abolished: Cavallero refused to permit Mussolini to short-circuit him as he had done Badoglio. Most

¹⁴Armellini, *Diario di guerra*, pp. 146-147, 168, 171, 196, 229-230. Badoglio also bears a serious responsibility, along with Mussolini, for the unpreparedness of the Italian armed forces when Italy entered the war. See: Rodolfo Graziani, *Ho difesa la patria* (Cernusco sul Naviglio, 1948) pp. 179-180.

¹⁵O.N.I.-M.I.D. 2022-530, 23 January 1941, G-2 Library, National Archives. See also Armellini, *Diario di guerra*, pp. 188, 190; Ciano *Diaries*, p. 320.

¹⁶Armellini, *Diario di guerra*, p. 196.

¹⁷Ugo Cavallero, *Comando Supremo: Diario 1940-43, del Capo di S. M. G.* (Rocca S. Casciano, 1948) pp. 101-103.

CHAIN OF COMMAND — PERIOD OF CAVALLERO 1941 — 1943




CHART 2
LEGEND—see previous chart

important, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were made directly subordinate to the Chief of the *Comando Supremo*. As an organ of command it established an Operations Section for each of the armed forces, and took over control of military intelligence (S. I. M.). Cavallero pushed through his reorganization despite the objections of Admiral Riccardi, Undersecretary of the Navy, and General Francesco Pricolo, Air Force.¹⁸

In the regime of Cavallero there developed a closely integrated relationship with the German High Command, and the relationships between Cavallero and the German military representatives in Italy were close. These were Fieldmarshal Kesselring, Commander-in-Chief, South (*Oberbefehlshaber Süd*), and General Enno von Rintelen, German Military Attaché in Italy concurrently attached to the Italian High Command. Under Cavallero the *Comando Supremo* issued orders directly to the four chiefs of staff; of the Army (*Stato Maggiore Regio Esercito*, or SMRE and also known as *Super-esercito*); of the Navy (*Supermarina*); of the Air Force (*Superaeronautica*); and of the Fascist Militia (*Milizia Volontaria di Sicurezza Nazionale* or MVSN). Hitherto the Chief of Staff of the Militia, who was also commanding general of the Militia, had been immediately under Mussolini. Furthermore the *Comando Supremo* exercised direct command over the Italian armies operating in Russia (Eighth Army), in Africa, in Greece and the Dodecanese, in Albania, Montenegro, Croatia and Dalmatia.¹⁹

The *Comando Supremo* had now grown into a huge organization of three great departments or divisions and three other coordinate offices. The Chief of the Supreme General Staff was served by his individual secretaryship, and by the "attached general" (*generale addetto*). The First Department embraced the four Offices: Operations, Organization and Training; Order of Battle ("Ufficio Situazione"); and Press and Propaganda. The Second Department comprised the Office of Services, of Fuel Oils and Transportation, and of War Potential. The Third Department included a Secretaryship of the General Staffs, the Personnel Office, Office of General Affairs (Statistics, military law, prisoners), a Code Office, and Office of General Headquarters. The three other coordinate branches of the *Comando Supremo* were Military Intelligence, the Office of War Economy, and the Office of Communications. There was thus achieved, in the period of Cavallero, a kind of reversal of the respective functions of the *Comando Supremo* and of the Army General Staff such as they had been earlier. Under Badoglio the *Comando Supremo* exercised no command over operational troops but was concerned only with overall plans and preparations for defense. Under Cavallero the operating troops were under command of the *Comando Supremo*, and the Army General Staff had merely the task of preparing the ground forces in the homeland, and supervising anti-aircraft defense.²⁰

In no way did Mussolini consider his office of commander of the armed forces of Italy

¹⁸Military Attaché Report, No. 17965, Rome, 10 June 1941, G-2 Library, National Archives; also Mario Roatta, *Otto milioni di baionette: l'esercito italiano in guerra dal 1940 al 1944* (Milan, 1946) pp. 141-142.

¹⁹Roatta, *Otto milioni di baionette*, p. 142. On January 1, 1943, the following headquarters were under command of the *Comando Supremo*: Hq. Armed Forces Libya, Hq. Armed Forces Albania, Hq. Armed Forces Greece, Hq. Armed Forces of the Italian Islands of the Aegean, Hq. Second Army (Slovenia and Dalmatia),

Hq. Eighth Army (Russia). The SMRE at that time commanded: Hq. Fourth Army (in Southern France), and Army Group South which was composed of the Fifth Army (Central Italy), Sixth Army (Sicily), and Seventh Army (Southern Italy).

²⁰Giuseppe Castellano, *Come firmai l'armistizio di Cassibile* (Milan, 1945) p. 10.

as a sinecure or honorary position. He devoted enormous energy, time and attention to this task, uniting in his own hands all major military and political decisions in Italy until his overthrow. He had a quick and retentive mind, and, like Hitler, he was an assiduous reader of military literature and of professional-technical military data, and in discussions with the Chiefs of Staff who served him used a technical military language which was quite perfect. Yet even when he fully understood the individual facets of a problem he did not always comprehend their reciprocal relationships. Although his general views were broad he was prone at times to seize on some detail of a problem and attribute to that detail which he fully comprehended an altogether disproportionate importance. The very essence of certain military problems, for that reason, often escaped him. He was quite unable to appreciate the subtle, "artistic" elements of creative military solutions of problems.

Furthermore, in the formative years of his intellectual growth, Mussolini had been a military and anti-military and he retained a suspicion and skepticism toward the professional military class. Like Hitler he was quick to distrust the advice and counsel of men of whose complete loyalty he was not sure. At the same time he was inordinately jealous of any personality which in any way might take the spot light away from himself in the center of the stage. He tended to suspect advice which ran counter to his own views as being inspired by political motives if it came from men more devoted to the House of Savoy than to Fascism. Since 1925 or even earlier he had been carrying on a struggle to undermine and weaken the traditional caste spirit and corporate loyalty of the officer corps of the Royal Italian Army. The Fascist Militia, bound by per-

sonal oath to the Duce of Fascism, was built up and favored at the expense of the regular army whose officers looked with disdain upon the spurious decorations and titles conferred upon self seeking politicians.

Mussolini, having grasped supreme power for himself in the Italian state, was in the position of the typical absolute ruler who dares not entrust too much authority or influence to any one office or any one man, but plays his subordinates off against each other. The crowd of sycophant Fascist politicians who surrounded him more often gained his ear than professional military men. Particularly in the first year or so of Italy's participation in World War II, Mussolini made decisions inspired by political motives, by the guesses of Fascist politicians, and disregarded the technical data provided through channels by professional military advisers. But here, in contrast to the glittering triumphs of Hitler's intuition (1936-1941), over the soberly cautious calculations of the German general staff officers, Mussolini at the start experienced the rude shocks of the failures of his bluffs in the pitifully feeble advance against prostrate France, the fiasco in Albania and Greece, the utter routs of Graziani in Africa. He gradually learned that he had to operate through the professionals, and, in contrast to the development in Germany, the professional staff officers in Italy won an increasing influence over Mussolini in the period 1942-1943. He became increasingly willing to listen to unpleasant reports and to accept unpalatable advice. He particularly needed Italian professionals to resist the growing ascendancy of the German Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) over the *Comando Supremo*, for the eclipse of his own fame by that of Hitler was more galling and bitter than the prospect of permitting the

Comando Supremo to conduct Italy's war.²¹

In the closing months of 1942 Mussolini reached the conclusion that victory had escaped the Axis and that a political solution of the war was essential. From December 1942 to April 1943 he urged Hitler to make a separate peace with Russia or to withdraw to a shorter line on the Eastern front. During his last few months in power Mussolini appears to have considered a separate peace with the Western Powers: he tolerated some unofficial soundings which had this purpose, and he encouraged some persons to believe that such was his own intention. Furthermore, Cavallero's subservience to the Germans and the integration of the *Comando Supremo* with the German command in the Mediterranean had not brought military success but only disaster. Cavallero had to go. Not only was the Italian officer corps embittered by the patronizing ascendancy of the Germans, but Cavallero's former supporter, Count Ciano, had turned against him. Mussolini, in searching for some political solution of the war, determined to reestablish Italian control over the Italian armed forces.

On 1 February 1943 Mussolini summoned General Vittorio Ambrosio to the Palazzo Venezia and made him the new Chief of the *Comando Supremo*. Ambrosio was a professional through and through. He had commanded a cavalry squadron during the Libyan War (1911-12) and served as Chief of staff of the 3rd Cavalry Division during the first World War. In 1935 he achieved the rank of Corps General, in October 1942 he was made Army General. In January 1942 Ambrosio had succeeded General Mario Roatta as Chief of the Army General Staff and in

this position he had become quite familiar with the operation of the Italian High Command. Ambrosio was well regarded among the Italian officer corps and was considered even by the German commanders in Italy as "correct." His appointment marked a new phase in the relationship of the *Comando Supremo* with the German OKW. Yet the dramatic and personal aspect of this change should not be exaggerated. During his last months in office Cavallero began to protest against the German domination: he urged on Mussolini that Rommel be removed from command in Africa; he protested to Kesselring against the assertion of German command over Italian forces in the Balkans.²² Furthermore Ambrosio had risen to the position of Chief of the Army General Staff under Cavallero: he had some share of responsibility for the policies of the Cavallero period.²³ Count Ciano and Generals Giuseppe Castellano and Giacomo Carboni were particularly influential with Mussolini in securing the appointment of Ambrosio.²⁴

Apparently Ambrosio had little inkling that he was to be appointed. He wrote his own ticket. Mussolini simply summoned him to the Palazzo Venezia, stated that he was appointed, and then asked him what course he intended to follow. To this Ambrosio replied: bring back our divisions to the home country; lighten the organization of the *Comando Supremo*; and stand up to the Germans.²⁵

Ambrosio made strenuous efforts to carry out his program. He succeeded, with German consent, in withdrawing the remnants of the Italian Eighth Army from Russia. But it proved impossible to make large-scale

²¹See: Roatta, *Otto milioni di baionette*, pp. 21-30. For Mussolini's resentment against the Germans, note the curious approval which he gave to Ciano in collecting in his diary items of an indictment of the Germans for future use (*Ciano Diaries*, pp. 383, 402, 435, 439, 463-64, 467, 509, 539, 580).

²²Cavallero, *Comando Supremo*, pp. 424, 433, 441.

²³See: Enzo Galbiati, *Il 25 luglio e la M. V. S. N.* (Milan, 1950) p. 177.

²⁴*Ciano Diaries*, pp. 554, 558, 572-574, 576, 577; Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 22-26.

²⁵Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 26-27.

withdrawals from the Balkans and Greece or from the Fourth Army in Southern France. The *Comando Supremo* was partially reorganized. The office of Deputy Chief (which Cavallero had abolished) was revived and conferred on General Francesco Rossi (11 March 1943). Brigadier General Castellano who had served as "*Generale Addetto*" under Ambrosio in the Army General Staff was made *Generale Addetto* in the *Comando Supremo*. To his own former position as Chief of the Army General Staff Ambrosio secured the appointment of General Ezio Rosi (1 February-31 May 1943) and then of General Roatta. On 12 February 1943 Antonio Sorice supplanted Antonio Scuero as Undersecretary of the Ministry of War. There were no changes in the Navy and Air Force ministries. Arturo Riccardi remained simultaneously Undersecretary and Chief of Staff, Navy. Corso Fougier stayed on as Undersecretary and Chief of Staff, Air Force.

The basic structure of the *Comando Supremo*, as it had been developed under Cavallero, remained. Mussolini, as Commander of the troops operating on all fronts, exercised the command through Ambrosio to whom all the armed forces were subordinate. The respective chiefs of staff of the Army, Navy, and Air Force received their directives, written and verbal, from Ambrosio. The line of division between troops under command of the *Comando Supremo* and those under command of the Army General Staff remained essentially as it had been drawn by Cavallero. The *Comando Supremo* exercised direct command over all headquarters outside Italy and Southern France, i.e., over the active theaters of Libya, Albania, Greece, the Aegean Islands, Slovenia and Dalmatia, and over the Eighth Army in Russia. The Army General Staff had command over the Fourth Army (Southern France), and Army Group

South which comprised the Fifth Army (Central Italy), Sixth Army (Sicily), and Seventh Army (Southern Italy). This division in the chain of command ceased to have functional meaning under Ambrosio. Cavallero had established it in order to gain for the *Comando Supremo* the command over all active theaters of war, leaving to the Army General Staff the training and preparation of the second class troops which were stationed in Metropolitan Italy and Southern France. But during May the Axis forces in Tunisia were destroyed and Africa ceased to be an active theater of war. By June the last elements of the Eighth Army had returned to Italy and the Eastern Front was also cancelled as an active Italian theater. After March, 1943, the preparations for meeting an Allied attack in Sardinia or Sicily devolved on the Army General Staff, and when Sicily was invaded the Army General Staff directed the operations of the Sixth Army. Thus both the *Comando Supremo* and the Army General Staff had command over certain active theaters (*Comando Supremo*, Eighth Army: Army General Staff, Army Group South), and over occupational areas (*Comando Supremo*, Greece: Army General Staff, Southern France). The line of division of command ceased to have any logical or functional basis.

The division of command between the *Comando Supremo* and the SMRE directly affected the efforts of Ambrosio to carry out the third part of his program which he defined as "standing up to the Germans." Ambrosio wished German help as the Allied threat to Italy approached. But his requests, and those which he inspired Mussolini to make, emphasized weapons and equipment and airplanes, not German units. General Roatta, who commanded the Italian Sixth Army in Sicily (January 31-May 1943) and then became again, at Ambrosio's nomina-

tion, Chief of the Army General Staff, took a purely professional view of his tasks. He considered that the defense of Sicily and of the Italian peninsula was impossible without large-scale German ground force reinforcements. His views often coincided almost exactly with those of Fieldmarshal Kesselring. Thus it frequently happened in May and June that Roatta would urge more German divisions in Italy while Ambrosio resisted German offers of troops. There was no unified front of the Italian High Command against the Germans.

In any case the attempt of Ambrosio to stand up to the Germans and assert parity of the *Comando Supremo* with the OKW was completely out of time. It was psychologically impossible while begging for German help. The meager resources of Italy even for her own defense did not permit Ambrosio to deal with Fieldmarshal Keitel on even terms.

Although the concentration of power and control over the Italian armed forces which Ambrosio inherited from Cavallero did not mean much as against the Germans, it did mean something as against Mussolini. Possibly as early as the summer of 1942, and certainly by the winter of 1942-1943, there were significant groups, in the Fascist Party, in the armed forces, near the throne, and in the underground who spoke of getting rid of Mussolini and ending the war. Ambrosio's position brought him into contact with business and political leaders who gave unmistakable suggestions that Mussolini should go. The most important of all new contacts of Ambrosio were those with the King, and all the threads of the various conspiracies against Mussolini led directly or indirectly to the royal palace. General Castellano who was closely attached to Ambrosio began scheming to overthrow Mussolini in March, and the next month drew up an outline plan

for a *coup d'état*. The King at first refused to give the scheme the green light. Not until July 20th did Victor Emmanuel III indicate to Ambrosio that the *coup d'état* should be executed. A new scheme was hastily drawn up. Within the *Comando Supremo* the arrangements were made for the arrest of Mussolini and for the concentration of troops around the capital against the possibility of reaction by the Fascist Militia.²⁶


In removing Mussolini from office, Victor Emmanuel III insisted on acting as a "constitutional" sovereign. He frequently told those who appealed to him in the late spring and early summer of 1943 that he could act only as a result of a crisis in the Senate or Chamber. Dino Grandi got wind of the King's intention to dismiss Mussolini—probably he was tipped off by the Duke of Acquarone, Minister of the Royal Household. Grandi, along with Ciano and Federzoni organized a revolt in the Grand Council of Fascism. The plan of these men was not to overthrow the Fascist system but to take over, as a triumvirate, political control of the Italian state. The essence of Grandi's scheme was to force Mussolini to give up command over the Italian armed forces. This was the crucial point of the resolution or order of the day which Grandi circulated among the Grand Council members and then proposed when Mussolini summoned the session of 24-25 July:

The Grand Council of Fascism . . . invites the Government to ask His Majesty the King, to whom all the nation turns in faith and confidence, that He be pleased to assume for the honor and salvation of the country, along with the effective command of the armed forces on land, on sea, and of the air, according to article 5 of the Constitution of

²⁶Castellano, *Come firmai*, pp. 35-70.

CHAIN OF COMMAND — BADOGLIO REGIME

25 JULY TO 8 SEPTEMBER 1943



the Kingdom, the supreme initiative of decision that our institutions attribute to Him, and that have always been, in our national history, the heritage of our Royal House of Savoy.

Mussolini himself had seen the resolution before the Grand Council meeting. Grandi had talked to Mussolini and urged him to give up the command over the armed forces. Although there were several Grand Councilors closely associated with Grandi who knew the real intent of the motion, there were a number who voted for it believing that only the issue of the power of command was involved. Mussolini warned them that they were striking at the Fascist regime itself.²⁷ In the end 19 of the 28 members of the Grand Council voted with Grandi and against Mussolini. The revolt within the Grand Council provided the King with the requisite crisis to cloak the overthrow of Mussolini with constitutional-legal forms. The keystone of Mussolini's personal dictatorship was his assumption of military command in June, 1940. The attack on this power of command marked his overthrow and the collapse of the Fascist system.

On July 25th the King announced the appointment of Marshal Badoglio as successor of Mussolini as Head of the Government, and entrusted with the "military government" of the country. Over his own signature the King proclaimed that he resumed command over the armed forces. With this proclamation, writes General Roatta, the Italian High Command returned to *normality*: the King held command over all the armed forces and the Chief of the *Comando Supremo* exercised the power in the name of the King.²⁸

It is doubtful, however, if this *normal* situa-

tion had any close resemblance to the organization or functioning of the Italian High Command in any previous period. The unification of command under the Supreme General Staff or *Comando Supremo* was in striking contrast to the separate organization and functioning of Army and Navy staffs during World War I. Nor was it a reversion to the Fascist system prior to 1940, for the unification of power achieved by Cavallero and inherited by Ambrosio was real if incomplete. What chiefly distinguished Marshal Badoglio from Mussolini as Head of the Government (*Capo del Governo*) was Badoglio's insistence that his powers were political only, that he had no responsibility in military questions. Coupled with this practice of Badoglio (a practice in which he was not altogether consistent) was his constant refusal to make any decision or take any action which was not the explicit wish of the King. There thus developed in the period of Badoglio (25 July-8 September 1943) a kind of parity between the political government headed by Marshal Badoglio and the military power headed by General Ambrosio, each responsible directly to the King and to the King alone. This division of authority and responsibility was an essential factor in the delays and misunderstandings which arose during the course of the Italian negotiations for an armistice with the Allies.

Furthermore, the curious division of command over troops, originally set by Cavallero and retained by Ambrosio, persisted after 25 July. In fact the return to *normality* brought with it a new division of authority. Badoglio made no attempt to imitate Mussolini and to serve simultaneously as Minister all three armed services. Admiral Raffaele de Courten was made Minister of the Navy and simultaneously Chief of Staff, Navy, as Minister under the authority of Badoglio; as Chief

²⁷Mussolini, *Il tempo del bastone e della carota*, p. 17.

²⁸Otto milioni di baionette, p. 146.

of Staff, Navy, in the chain of command under Ambrosio. General Renato Sandalli occupied a similar position in the Air Force. General Sorice became a full-fledged Minister of War in the Badoglio cabinet, moving up from the Undersecretaryship which he had occupied under Mussolini. Roatta continued as Chief of the Army General Staff. The Fascist Militia disappeared as a separate force and were incorporated into the regular army.²⁹ But Marshal Badoglio, in accordance with his proclamation of 25 July, assumed the military government of the country with broad powers for the suppression of political activity whether Fascist or anti-Fascist. Some four divisions of the Italian army were removed from command of the Army General Staff and placed under command of the Minister of War, and stationed in Turin, Bologna, Milan, and Florence in order to restrain civilian unrest.³⁰

When the armistice of Italy with the Allies was announced on 8 September 1943, the Italian armies were almost as much surprised as were the Germans. Neither Roatta nor Ambrosio had issued orders preparing or warning the various headquarters under them that the armistice with the Allies was im-

pending.³¹ The collapse of the Royal Italian Army in the face of German aggression, 8-11 September 1943, was in considerable measure due to the divided authority and disunity at Rome: the discordant actions of the Head of the Government, the Chief of the *Comando Supremo*, and the Chief of the Army General Staff.

As to the Minister of War, General Sorice, with command over four divisions maintaining public order in Italy, the news of the armistice caught him flat-footed in Rome. He knew nothing of it until Badoglio made the announcement by radio on the evening of 8 September. The King and the High Command (Badoglio, Ambrosio, Roatta, De Courten, and Sandalli) hastily left Rome in the early hours of 9 September. Sorice, Minister of War, showed up later in the morning as much astonished at developments as the civilian ministers of Badoglio's cabinet. One of these, Galli, even summoned a notary and officially testified his complete ignorance regarding the armistice.³²

So ended, abruptly as this account concludes, a governmental organization for war that was, for the greater part more of men than of laws—though there were laws.

²⁹Galbiati, *Il 25 luglio e la M. V. S. N.*, p. 260.

³⁰Francesco Rossi, *Come arrivammo all'armistizio* (Cernusco sul Naviglio, 1946) pp. 173-176, 404.

³¹Rossi, *Come arrivammo*, pp. 206-226.

³²Carmine Senise *Quando ero capo della polizia 1940-1943* (Rome, 1946) p. 249.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

AMI-AHA JOINT MEETING

This year's joint meeting of the American Military Institute and The American Historical Association is scheduled for Friday 28 December 1951 at 2 p.m. in Parlor A of the Hotel Statler in New York City. The topic chosen for the session is "Mobilization and Demobilization of the United States Army in World War II." Professor Wood Gray of George Washington University will act as chairman. Mr. John B. Spore, Associate Editor, *Combat Forces Journal*, accepted the role of discussion leader. Two papers are to be presented: "Mobilization of the United States Army in World War II," by Lieutenant Colonel M. A. Kreidberg; and "Demobilization of the United States Army after World War II," by Major John C. Sparrow. Colonel Kreidberg is serving with the Office of Military History, Department of the Army, and Major Sparrow was recently connected with that Office. All Institute members who may be in New York at that time are cordially invited to attend.

HAMER: HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS

At the request of the President of the United States the National Historical Publications Commission is preparing a report for publishing the papers of leading Americans. Two members of the Institute's Board of Trustees are members of the Commission. Dr. Wayne C. Grover as Chairman and Dr. Rudolph A. Winnacker as representative of the Department of Defense.

A preliminary report by the Commission,

intended chiefly to serve as a basis for consideration of what the Commission's final report should be, has been submitted to the President.

In preparing its final report, the Commission hopes to have the advice of specialists in various aspects of American history. It would welcome comments and suggestions from members of the American Military Institute, especially suggestions as to military leaders whose papers should be included in the publication program. Members who are interested may obtain copies of the preliminary report by writing to Dr. Philip M. Hamer, Executive Secretary, National Historical Publications Commission, National Archives Building, Washington 25, D. C.

SCHMITT: GERMAN WORLD WAR I DOCUMENTS

Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Chief, German War Documents Project, Department of State, reports that the Department has deposited in the National Archives in Washington approximately 100,000 frames of microfilms of documents of the Old Imperial German Foreign Office. These records cover the period from August 1914 to November 1918. While not presenting a complete documentation of German foreign policy during the first World War, some of the principal political files are included and offer an important research opportunity. The records are open to qualified scholars, and photostats of documents can be purchased. It is also expected that the State Department will soon release additional microfilms for the years 1914-1918. The British

Foreign Office has made a similar release of these German documents to the Public Record Office in London.

WORLD WAR II HISTORICAL STUDIES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Although the military agencies have prepared many historical studies dealing with World War II, an impressive number of administrative histories concerned with the economics of war were compiled in the emergency war agencies and "old line" agencies of the Federal Government. The National Historical Publications Commission recently issued a 53 page processed list of these studies. Many of these civilian agency histories of the war effort were never printed but exist in typed or processed copies, located mostly in the National Archives Library and the Budget Bureau Library, and still others are to be found only in the relevant agency. While the list is not exhaustive one may find mentioned here a wide variety of studies relating to the problems and activities of such wartime creations as the War Production Board, the Office of Civilian Defense, the Office of Censorship, the American War Production Mission in China, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the War Manpower Commission, the War Assets Corporation, the War Shipping Administration, the Selective Service System, and a host of others. Included at the end of the list is an alphabetical index of departments, offices, bureaus, boards and committees and the page numbers of the respective titles. A copy of this issuance may be obtained by writing to the National Historical Publications Commission, National Archives Building, Washington 25, D. C.

SPAULDING: OLD MILITARY BOOKS

On 15 February 1951, Colonel T. M. Spaulding, USA-Ret, a former Trustee of the Institute, addressed an assembly of the

Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington, D. C., on the subject of *Old Military Books* in the Folger collection. In an issue of the Journal of the American Military History Foundation (a former title of MILITARY AFFAIRS), Vol. I, No. 3, Colonel Spaulding discussed these items in the collection.

ARMY WAR COLLEGE LIBRARIAN: BLANCHARD

By appointment 1 March 1950, Mr. Alan Blanchard, until then chief of the Periodicals and Documents Section in the National War College, became Librarian of the Army War College. The College is to move, after 16 April 1950, from location at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

ALBION: NAVAL HISTORY, BIBLIOGRAPHY

The Institute gratefully acknowledges receipt of a preliminary edition of *Maritime and Naval History, an Annotated Bibliography*, by Dr. Robert Greenhelgh Albion, Gardiner Professor of Oceanic History and Affairs at Harvard University. Dr. Albion has served as President, and as a Trustee of the Institute. His bibliography, 60 typewritten pages in duplicate form, is limited to books in English. It covers the areas: general reference works; Ships and Men; Geography, Exploration, and Expansion; Commerce, Shipping, and Navies. World history from 1415 to 1950 is the scope in time of the bibliography. If there be sufficient demand for publication from members and subscribers, consideration will be given to publication of the Bibliography in MILITARY AFFAIRS, or to mimeograph publication as for the Military History Form Manual reported as below.

MILITARY HISTORY FORM MANUAL

A number of requests have been received from educators and educational institutions

for copies of the *Form Manual*, Part Two of the *Guide to the Writing of American Military History* which was omitted in the condensed *Guide* published in *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, Vol. XIV, No. 1 (1950). To satisfy them and to anticipate similar requests pending availability of the *Guide* in its full official Government Printing Office edition, the Institute has prepared a mimeographed edition of Part Two, of which over two hundred are now on hand, available at fifty cents each (stamps or coin) to cover cost of making, handling and mailing (if all are taken up). Address orders to the Secretary.

INSIGNIA: AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE

Now in custody of the Secretary are several hundred lapel-button insignia of the Institute, transmitted to him by his predecessor in office and—because purchased before 1950—available at one dollar each postpaid.

The lapel-button reproduces the seal of the Institute, finely executed, outlined in gold on a central dark red enamel background, and dark blue enamel border. Address orders to the Secretary.

COLOR PLATE: MARINES OF USS WASP

Several requests were received for additional copies of the color plate included in *MILITARY AFFAIRS*, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (1950). Accordingly, all remaining copies of the illustration were picked up from the printer. Approximately fifty are on hand, available at twenty-five cents each (stamps or coin) to cover cost of handling and mailing. Address orders to the Secretary.

BACK ISSUES DESIRED

The Institute needs copies of several back issues to meet the requests of libraries, collectors, and new life members for complete sets of *Military Affairs*. The following issues are particularly desired:

Vol. I, Nos. 1 and 2	Vol. XI, Nos. 1, 2, and 3
Vol. VII, No. 1	
Vol. VIII, Nos. 1 and 2	Vol. XII, Nos. 2, 3, and 4
Vol. X, No. 1	Vol. XIII, No. 4

The Institute will pay 75c a copy for a limited number of copies of the above issues. Please communicate with the Secretary before mailing any copies.

TISDELLE: BACK COPY WANTED

Major A. C. Tisdelle of Mira Rio, Orange Park, Florida would appreciate hearing from any member who may have a copy of *Military Affairs*, Vol. XI, No. 3 (Fall 1947) and may care to dispose of it. This number contains part of his Bataan diary. He lost his copy, and the Institute's supply is exhausted.

LISHCHINER AND "THE SACRED COW"

Our respected former secretary of the Institute, Jacob B. Lishchiner, tells us that in his capacity as a historian of the Air Force he was recently directed to furnish certain information concerning "The Sacred Cow," sometimes referred to as the "first flying White House." In delving into the matter he was much perturbed by the lack of adequate historical data even if only in the form of properly executed narrative logs of the significant missions flown by that famous aircraft. "Where I had expected to find memorabilia . . . perhaps a personalized account of missions flown by 'The Sacred Cow,' and even a definitive history," writes Brother Lishchiner, "on actual check I discovered there was no official historical record whatsoever." Our historical knight errant thereupon rushed in to rescue the gallant old craft from complete oblivion by "compiling an official log of the No. 7451 (for the period from 6 October 1947 to the present, or ever since the airplane lost its personality, becoming just another Special Missions aircraft).

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

Reviews

The Epic of Korea, by A. Wigfall Green.
(Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press,
1950. Pp. 136, \$2.50.)

American Military Government in Korea,
by E. Grant Meade. (New York: Kings
Crown Press, Columbia University, 1951. Pp.
281. \$3.75.)

These two books supplement each other in that their main purpose is to present a critical evaluation of United States military government in Korea. Mr. Green presents a fast-moving, and very readable, survey of Korean history from the fifth century A.D. to the outbreak of armed conflict in June, 1950. He devotes three-fifths of his monograph to the American occupation, particularly with respect to military government policy and administration at the Korean national level. Dr. Meade, on the other hand, deals more briefly with the antecedents to occupation and concentrates at length on military government in the province of Cholla Nam Do (Chulnam) during the first year of the American occupation, but in so doing he also throws much light on policy and administration at the national level. Although both books are documented, they are, aside from the pre-occupation period, primarily first-hand accounts of military government as the authors experienced it at their respective operational levels: Mr. Green as a Judge Advocate at the national level, and Dr. Meade as a member of the 101st Military Government Group at the provincial level. In dealing with the international agreements which have a bearing on Korea the authors are on less firm ground, for they have not had access to the Department of State and the Department of the Army records of international con-

ferences and United States policy making agencies.

Mr. Green is an ardent admirer of Koreans, their culture and their intense devotion to democracy. He notes that, in the past 4,000 years the Koreans have evolved a homogeneity in race and culture and a political integrity which resisted and threw off, until 1894, successive invasions by the Mongols, the Japanese, and the Manchurian hordes. Their culture is a blending of animism with shamanism and of Buddhism with Confucianism, with a final blending with Christianity after the late XVIII century. Of importance to the understanding of the interest of China in Korea, he cites the fact that for 268 years prior to 1895, Korea was considered a part of the Chinese empire of the Manchus and, although enjoying independence in practice, paid annual tribute to China. He might well have added that neither Nationalist nor Communist China has forgotten that former relationship.

Although the United States negotiated a treaty of friendship, trade and mutual assistance with Korea in 1882, the former failed to honor her obligations, first, when Japan snuffed out Korean independence, and, again later, when Korean representatives sought admittance to the Versailles peace conference in 1919. According to Mr. Green the fruit of this failure on the part of the United States has produced the situation in Korea today. Such a speculation must be dismissed as highly improbable.

Undaunted by the program of Japanization to kill Korean nationalism, the Koreans under Kim Koo and Dr. Syngman Rhee kept the hope of freedom alive through the formation of an independence committee and, when World War II came, formed a provisional government (in exile)

and declared war on Japan. In this connection, 35,000 Koreans fought with the Chungking government, the Eighteenth Route Army and with the communists in China.

Mr. Green believes that, upon cessation of hostilities in 1945 in the Far East, the United States should have done in Korea as was done by General MacArthur in Japan, turning the government over to the Koreans, instead of attempting to govern the country for them through a military government which was not only understaffed but entirely unprepared to assume that responsibility; that such a policy would have been in keeping with American democratic ideals, would have won the affection instead of the hostility of the Koreans, and would have defeated the communists in South Korea: here, again, Mr. Green is indulging in speculation. He observes further that, although Japan and the Soviet Union, both dominated by ulterior motives implemented by force, were comparatively successful in their occupations of Korea, the United States—intent on liberating the country and restoring its independence—failed in her occupation. Some of the other reasons advanced for this failure were: the organizing of the Korean government after the highly centralized pattern established by Japan; the retaining of Japanese officials in office too long after the United States took over control; the failure to transfer land and other property titles to the Koreans; the administration of Justice in a manner entirely un-American by condoning such practices as entrapment, the meddling of officials in the obtaining of conviction, and the failure of military government authorities to correct miscarriages of justice upon the recommendation of the review board; favoritism in personnel assignments and promotions; and the shortcomings of leadership both in Korea and Washington. Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Commanding General of the United States Forces in Korea (USAFIK), is characterized as wanting to govern with an iron hand, and Major General Archer L. Lerch, military governor until 1947, is berated as one with the "mind of a political sheriff." The organization set up for military government is condemned as complicated, incomprehensible and unsuited for the purposes of occupation, and the too-numerous headquarters and generals gave rise to an overlapping of commands, conflicting orders and boundless confusion. At the Washington level the dearth of qualified civilians is cited as resulting in military assumption of the offices of secre-

tary of state and of assistant secretary of state for occupied territories: thus placing policy making as well as the administration of military government in the hands of the military establishment.

While it must be conceded that there is much truth in the devastating charges which Mr. Green prefers against military government in Korea, one detects in his monograph the symptoms of prejudice which characterize the writings of so many military government officers who have been disillusioned by the personal disappointments and the cold realities of occupation experiences. The author was thoroughly disillusioned, so much so that he has failed at times to retain objectivity in treating his subject. For example, Mr. Green's conclusion that the Korean occupation was a failure is not borne out by Dr. Meade's excellent study. The latter shows quite conclusively that a good job of administration was done in the province of Cholla Nam Do, and that the Koreans preferred to delay the transfer of land titles held by the Japanese until a civilian government had been established.

Mr. Green's survey of the United States-Soviet Union and the United States-United Nations negotiations first to establish an independent united Korea and, subsequently, an independent republic of South Korea under theegis of the United Nations is commendable. He shows that the realization of a united Korea was blocked by the Soviet insistence on excluding from the national constituent assembly representatives of parties that opposed Russian communist designs, and that the formation of the Republic of South Korea was the best that the United States and the United Nations could offer in fulfillment of the Cairo declaration.

Mr. Green is in error in stating that the Provost Marshal General was in charge of military government affairs in Washington (p. 58), and misleading (p. 58) in stating that almost all industry was located in North Korea. In Washington the Civil Affairs Division, until its dissolution in July, 1949, was the agency charged with military government responsibility; and Dr. Meade discloses that there was considerable industry in South Korea, but that it was dependent upon North Korea for its raw materials.

Dr. Meade has been more successful in retaining objectivity in his very fine account of the American occupation. Not only does he give a sound analysis of Korean cultural, social, economic

and political backgrounds which should have been but apparently were not considered by the United States in setting up military government; but he throws much light on the amazing organization and activities of the Provisional Peoples Committee which took over the government of Korea upon the surrender of Japan, and in so doing adds weight to Mr. Green's belief that a Korean civilian government should have been recognized from the very beginning of the occupation. While for the most part Dr. Meade's study substantiates Mr. Green's pronouncement of failure of American military government in Korea at the national level, it goes farther in placing the blame on the Departments of State and of the Army for not having included Korea in their pre-occupation planning. As a result of this oversight there was neither a military government policy nor military government administrative personnel ready for the Korean occupation when Japan surrendered on 14 August 1945. That being the case the plans prepared for Japan were applied to Korea, even though the latter was supposed to be regarded as a liberated instead of an enemy country; and military government staff sections and operating teams trained in language and administration for service in Japan, but without the slightest knowledge of Korea, were hurriedly shunted to Korea. This neglect in planning for Korea also deprived the Korean military government of the advantage of direct channels to Washington.

But Dr. Meade by no means admits failure of American occupation in the province of Cholla Nam Do during the first year of occupation when the province was under the administration of the 101st Military Government Group. Notwithstanding unintelligible directives, or no directives at all, from Seoul, the 101st Group went ahead with the successful organization of a civilian provincial government, so that by the time the Group was withdrawn from Cholla Nam Do in the fall of 1946, a civilian government was already functioning.

Dr. Meade's detailed study is very revealing with respect to the functional aspects of military government organization and administration. Its chief weaknesses are that it is repetitious, at times not clear as to what level (national or local) is being discussed, and that, being detailed, it contains a number of conflicting statements and some errors in fact. For example, it cannot be said with certainty (p. 45) that Soviet Russia was not

seriously concerned that a leak in the news of her agreement to enter the war in the Far East would prompt a Japanese attack on Russia: Japan had eighteen divisions in her Kwantung Army in Manchuria; the Soviet Union required a stock-piling of two months of supplies by the United States in Siberia for Russian use, and three months' time after the defeat of Germany for the transfer of forces to the Far East from Europe, before she could undertake war against Japan. Again, (p. 47) one is told that there were no trained civil affairs units in Korea during the first five weeks only to be informed subsequently (pp. 64-65) that survey teams of civil affairs personnel operated as information gathering units during the first six weeks of the occupation. Also, (p. 83) it is stated that "with the exception of the extreme right and left the high command was held in considerable veneration by the Koreans" while the impression one gains from the book at large is that the high command was regarded as oppressors. It is stated (p. 208) that "property records were available and in good condition," while later (p. 210) it is stated that "no Japanese should have been allowed to leave Korea until a complete record of all his holdings had been made and titles checked." With respect to the Korean occupation zones it is stated (p. 91) that "at Yalta it was agreed that Russia should occupy North Korea and the United States South Korea; at Potsdam the 38th parallel was selected by the Chiefs of Staff as the dividing line." Until the official records of the international conferences are made available the action of the Crimea and the Potsdam conferences on Korea cannot be definitely determined. The reviewer knows definitely that final agreement on the 38th parallel was not reached until after the surrender of Japan, and that it was the climax of frantic negotiations carried on under the pressure of a Russian advance into Korea which threatened to give the Soviet Union a complete occupation of the peninsula unless a boundary was agreed upon.*

Dr. Meade's monograph suffers further by not containing an administrative map of Korea, and a chart showing the organization of the tactical and military government forces in Korea. A reader without knowledge of the organization of tactical and military government forces will get lost in attempting to follow the narrative. Although, as

*Editor's Note: See *The Thirty-eighth Parallel*, by Arthur L. Grey, Jr., in *Foreign Affairs*, (New York, Vol. 29, No. 3, April 1951, pp. 482-487).

Dr. Meade maintains, military government is the implementation of foreign policy, he over-stresses the importance of military government in Cholla Nam Do as a factor influencing United States foreign policy.

Both of the books reviewed over-stress the importance of developments of a relatively brief period of occupation on the long-range effects on Korean development, and both underestimate the dominant will of the Soviet Union to make impossible a peaceful settlement of the Korean problem on any other than Russian terms. On the other hand, these monographs add a valuable contribution to our bibliography on the American occupation of Korea. Dr. Meade's book in particular will be of much value for purposes of military government/civil affairs training and planning.

EDGAR L. ERICKSON
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Urbana, Illinois

Policy for the West, by Barbara Ward. (New York: Norton, 1951. Pp. 317. \$3.75.)

Defense of the West, by B. H. Liddell Hart. (New York: Morrow, 1950. Pp. 335. \$4.00.)

These two books deal with two aspects of the most important problem in the world today, the security of the Western World. Miss Ward, with outspoken faith in the ability of the West to contain Russia, discusses how to prevent a third world war. Capt. Liddell Hart, still believing in the superiority of defense over offense and emphasizing mobility, quality, and limited liability, tells us some of the things he believes we should do now in order to fight such a world war successfully if it does come. Both of these books should be read by all those who are trying to understand our involved foreign policies, not as tailor-made answers to our problems, but as challenging comments on the basic problems which we must correctly solve if we and our major allies are to survive as free democratic nations.

Miss Ward's analysis is largely economic, on the assumption that economics determine the political as well as the military effort necessary to contain the Soviet Union. She firmly believes that the Soviet Union will not risk a major war and that Communist expansion can be halted by developing "positions of strength" all over the world. In her opinion, the answer to the Soviet

challenge involves three essential tasks: the building of an effective system of joint defense, the maintenance of economic stability and expansion, and a new, systematic, and much more ambitious effort to raise the standards of backward peoples, especially in Asia. She is convinced that these objectives are possible of achievement, if we increase Western productivity by 20%, avoid the dangers of inflation, and develop a "practical federalism" for the Atlantic community.

Miss Ward's faith in Western civilization to rise to the challenge is most refreshing, especially at a time when skepticism and suspicion abound on all sides. In her own words, "we shall certainly fail unless our effort is at once sustained, calm, and supremely positive." We may agree with her that the West has the resources necessary for the task, but whether we, who are more apt to act on past traditions rather than future promises, have the foresight and wisdom to pursue a steady course remains to be demonstrated. Meanwhile, Miss Ward's book will stand as the clearest exposition of American foreign policy published up to now, either here or abroad, by persons in or out of the Government service.

Capt. Liddell Hart discusses only the military aspects of the Western security problem, ignoring political and economic factors and their possible effects on the proposed military solutions. His book does not furnish an outline for action but is a collection of the views propounded by the author on many previous occasions.

He estimates that a minimum of twenty, but preferably forty, highly mobile divisions might check a Soviet attack in Western Europe (Miss Ward suggests forty to fifty divisions). Future conflict is seen to be one of skill and technical superiority against hostile mass armies. Liddell Hart is convinced that for such a war a professional, rather than a conscript force, will be needed, expertly trained and constantly ready to meet the imminent danger. He views with alarm the dispersion of American strength in the Far East and even Alaska, the Western tendency to employ numerous echelons of command and large headquarters staffs, and the tendency to underestimate Soviet military strength. He suggests an organic fusion of the three Services (Army, Navy, Air), a Supreme Chief of Staff, greater attention to civil defense, and, above all, an intensive effort to quicken the tempo of military operations and the rapidity of maneuver of armored forces. The book concludes with comments on

an international force and international disarmament, and expresses the hope that limited wars might again become Standard Operating Procedure.

Both of these British books point out, more than most of us would like to admit, the decisive role that the United States currently plays in world affairs. Both emphasize, and Miss Ward demonstrates, the need for extensive American assistance, military as well as economic. Both insist that Western Europe is the key to future peace as well as war. Liddell Hart preaches the principle of the economy of force. Miss Ward argues that in Asia it is possible to retreat, to buy time by ceding space, and to regroup for attack after initial withdrawals, but that in Europe there is no space left for maneuver. These arguments should only be discarded when feasible alternatives are at hand. Since such alternatives have so far failed to be developed, anything that diverts us from the formidable objectives which we must reach endangers our security.

R. A. WINNACKER
Washington, D. C.

Military Management for National Defense,

by John Robert Beishline, Ph.D., Colonel, GSC, U. S. Army. (New York: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1950. Pp. 276, indexed. \$5.00.)

The professional military officer who reads this book will probably be surprised at the interpretation placed upon his career. The young officer who had thought that his career was principally concerned with preparing for, or actually leading troops in battle, will find a subtly different career being discussed. The officer's career which emerges from this book is one concerned with "management" of quantities of men, money and real estate.

The author has taken a number of the standard works on business management and translated or transferred their terminology into the language or area of the professional military officer. Under these terms the commander and his assistants become *military executives*, who administer military organizations.

The author seems specifically to divorce these *military executives*, who engage in *military management operations*, from any real connection with battle when he says, "It is emphasized that the term 'operations' as discussed in this study does not refer to the usual military meaning of the term, i.e., the complete process of carrying on

combat on land, sea or air and all maneuvers needed to gain battle objectives. Rather, it refers to the operations of management that result in the completion of specific projects."

The functions which these *military executives* are supposed to conduct are those of "planning, organizing, commanding and controlling." Planning appears almost solely in the sense that a commercial business would use the word, of planning a "specific project" such as a construction job, a certain sales campaign or a personnel retirement plan. Planning in the historical sense of true General Staff planning, making and testing various plans for combat under various circumstances, in various parts of the world, hardly appears in the book. The true profession of the military, the art of war, as distinct from the business and administrative problem of providing the supporting base for combat activities, seems to be an only incidental problem of *military management*. The out-generalling and out-maneuvering purpose of general staff planning, in which plans are drawn, tested, redrawn, and further readjusted in the light of projections of past military history, if it is there, is so submerged beneath the jargon of academic studies of business administration that this reviewer could not perceive it, and some effort was made to find it.

The function of organizing is treated in its normal, standard sense, subject to certain later comments. The function of controlling is described as "supervision, comparison and corrective action." This function is considered as a separate function from the remaining function of military management, which is commanding.

Military commanding, as a function is defined as "the activation of the plan" and is done "by means of orders and instructions." Apparently, commanding is principally the process of issuing commands of execution. This reviewer bogged down somewhat at this characterization of the commander, the leader responsible for ultimate success in battle.

As the author develops this differentiation between the various functions which management must accomplish, he elaborates upon a number of the factors involved, such as leadership, authority, objectives, morale, procedures, policies and military functions. His treatment of these factors is that normally given them in lectures at staff schools and colleges.

Throughout the book it is apparent that the author thinks of management of the Defense De-

partment in the same terms that he uses for the Department of the Army. As a matter of fact the organization and practices of the other military departments, particularly the Navy, are scarcely touched upon. Seen through the author's eyes, the management of the Department of Defense is to be but a scaling up of the Department of the Army. This is quite unfortunate, since the Navy Department's *management* is quite different from that of the Army Department, and is not without some claim to effectiveness—both as to business management and combat; and it is perhaps not an odd coincidence that this separation of business management and combat is a feature of the organization of the Navy Department.

This feature, such a major area of contrast between the two departments, could be a very interesting portion of any book making a thorough study of military management. In the Army, the organizational structure, as the author shows, is pyramidal in form with the Chief of Staff at the top or apex. His authority, and his responsibility, eventually extends to everything in the Army. The Secretary of the Army and his own assistants form a small pyramid above the Chief of Staff. In general the Secretary's group reaches the Army Department only through the office of the Chief of Staff.

The author briefly mentioned the Chief of Naval Operations and his staff, but failed to mention that the organization of the Navy Department is quite different from the Army. It has what might be called a parallel type of organization. The Chief of Naval Operations, under the Secretary of the Navy, heads the operating forces of the Naval establishment as one of the parallel branches. The Secretary himself heads the business and administrative branch formed of the Navy offices and bureaus. There is a third branch, the Marine Corps, whose Commandant is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Navy. Between these branches there are provided numerous cross-connections and liaison to assist in coordination. To show the flexibility and versatility which the Navy Department has attained with this arrangement, it is interesting to note that in time of war it even takes on a fourth branch. This occurs when, in wartime, the Coast Guard moves from the control of the Treasury Department to the Navy Department for control of its operations.

The book does not indulge in much historical reflection, save for a few pages of broad-brush

treatment, upon the origin and growth of current military organizations, which makes the absence of any thorough discussion of the Naval organization even more interesting. For an examination of what Elihu Root and his original supporters were striving to achieve for the Army Department justifies the conclusion that it has actually been achieved by the Navy Department.

In his annual report of 1902 Secretary Root said "our system makes no adequate provision for the directing brain which every army must have to work successfully. Common experience has shown that this cannot be furnished by any single man without assistants, and that it requires a body of officers working together under the direction of a chief and *entirely separate from and independent of the administrative staff* of an army (such as the adjutants, quartermasters, commissaries, etc., each of whom is engrossed in the duties of his own special department). This body of officers, *in distinction from the administrative staff*, has come to be called a general staff." [italics here supplied]

This separation of the business and administrative functions of providing support for the combat operating forces (what in Continental parlance would be termed the "ministerial function") from the great responsibility for the planning and conduct of battle, is essentially that which is provided in the Naval system. The book mentions two historical incidents which would have made a more thorough examination of this aspect even more valuable, and perhaps piquant.

These incidents were the occasions in both the last two world wars when, after the outbreak of war, the Army Department suddenly undertook major reorganizations of its structure. These reorganizations were undertaken to segregate, apart from the problems of the operating forces, the problems of procurement, production and general business and administrative support for those operating forces. The outcome was to approximate the Navy system of paralleling the business and administrative management with the control of the operating forces. It was only approximate since the Chief of Staff still retained his ultimate, even if theoretical, responsibility for the multitudinous administrative matters, as well as for the operational forces. The Navy Department had had all along, of course, the separation of the "ministerial function" from the operating function, and was not forced into a major upheaval of its system.

There is one more aspect of management which the book could have given a less narrow examination. This is the practise of decentralization. There is no doubt that the author considers it beneficial, within limits. But to this reviewer there is considerable question as to the type and amount of decentralization which he advocates. There is a distinct impression that by decentralization, he means only within the confines of the top headquarters. The authority and responsibility, as a rule, would seem never to leave the Pentagon. This of course, is quite foreign to modern business practice among large corporations. Here, the top management of such organizations as General Motors practice almost complete autonomy for their major companies. The top management carefully restricts its own field to the very broadest of *policy* formulation and direction. The operating companies are not given any detailed administration from on high. The autonomy is carried to the extent that the operating companies even compete among themselves, and may even be encouraged to compete among themselves.

It hardly seems likely that the author would really mean that the Defense Department should be managed in the rather highly centralized form which seems to be implicit from his discussion. From an analogy to business practices the improvident nature of such an attempt can readily be seen.

Under the severely austere military budgets for 1951, prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the annual military operating expenses were planned as two billion dollars more than the combined annual operating expenses of 1949 of General Motors, U. S. Steel, Chrysler, General Electric, International Harvester, General Foods and Standard Oil of New Jersey. When it is remembered that these giant companies practice great decentralization within their own managements, it is easy to understand the practical limitations to more than very broad policy formulation on the part of the Defense Department. The author, perhaps, does not intend that the implications of his discussion be taken too literally. Particularly since the National Security Act specifically provides that the military departments "shall be separately administered."

The author, in discussing military functions, commits a rather serious error in basing his discussion upon an obsolete and rescinded executive order dealing with the functions assigned within the Defense Department. He quotes, and refers

to, a 1947 "Executive Order—Functions of the Armed Forces." This order has been superseded by the so-called Key West agreement, "*Functions of the Armed Forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff*" published in April of 1948.

There are significant differences between the two orders. The 1947 order was found to be not in consonance with the functions of the services as outlined by Congress in the National Security Act of 1947. The discrepancies referred specifically to a functional philosophy which Congress had considered and rejected in writing the basic law. It is this rejected philosophy, not found in the law nor in the Key West document, which the author uses as the basis for his discussion of military functions.

He separates the functions of the services by means of the elements, land, sea and air. This is what is known as the *tri-elemental* philosophy, in which all that fights on the land is of the Army, all that fights on the sea is of the Navy, all that fights in the air is of the Air Force. This philosophy, with its *operating medium* theory has been found principally in Continental powers, where their Armies have been the predominant service, such as Germany, Russia, France and Italy. It has not been too successful in war—particularly when it has been opposed by the *functional theory* of organization which has been favored by the great maritime powers, such as the United States and Great Britain.

Under the *functional theory* the services are organized to include all those things which are needed for the successful performance of their own function. The means of successful combat to accomplish the Navy's function, for instance, are not denied to it by restricting those means to those which operate in or on water. The Navy's function is to gain, maintain and employ command of the seas in the interests of the United States. To this end the Navy Department maintains both air combat forces and, in the Marine Corps, land combat forces. Similarly the law provides that the Army and Air Force are composed of forces, regardless of the element in or on which they operate, which are necessary to perform their function.

The effect of this error on the part of the author is to be found throughout the book. Since the distinction between the two theories, the *operating medium* and the *functional*, is somewhat technical and requires some appreciation of military history, particularly of foreign developments,

this deviation is quite unfortunate. It could easily be overlooked by those who are not acquainted with the subject.

For this reviewer, the book was not easy reading. It was not because the sentences were long and grammatically difficult, for it is not written in that style. Certainly some difficulty is to be found in the profuse use of the jargon of the theoretical "public administrator." Probably the chief difficulty was mentally wrestling with the obvious gaps in coverage, the superficial narrowness of treatment to such broad subjects, and with the type of inaccuracy found in the discussion of service functions.

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Economics of National Security. Edited by Colonels G. A. Lincoln, W. S. Stone and T. H. Harvey, USA. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1950. Pp. 601. \$6.65)

This book, planned and edited by Professors of Social Science at the United States Military Academy, is based upon contributions from other members of the West Point faculty and upon studies of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Its aim is to offer a survey "of the economic problems caused by the 'anti-aggression' policy of our country and the related principles of national mobilization for 'hot war'." It follows closely a prior publication of the same name by the United States Military Academy, published in two paper bound volumes in 1949.

The book takes up most of the areas which seem to make up the new field of Security Economics. Typical chapter headings are: Manpower; Raw Materials; Industrial Mobilization; Transportation, Communication and Power; War Finance; Stabilization of the Civilian Economy; and Economic Weapons and Foreign Aid Programs. These and the other five of the twelve chapters serve the stated purpose of the book. Each chapter ends with about a dozen "topics for discussion" which are well selected and skillfully phrased in such a way as to provoke thought and discussion.

Each chapter has appropriate references. However, many of these are several years old, some even now obsolescent and all will soon tend to date the book. Rapid obsolescence also plagues the book in other respects as well. Statistical

tables are ended necessarily on or before 1949. Certain prediction studies such as population studies in the chapter on Manpower, have been shown to be incorrect even at this early date, within a year of publication.

The style tends toward the use of the tired clichés, such as "Global" or "Atomic War," "assurance of survival of our way of life," "Impact," "dynamic character," "Climate of national will," and so, wearily, on.

The bias to be naturally expected of military men is occasionally quite apparent, as in their treatment of "National Service" which they strongly favor; and Public Opinion, which receives little emphasis.

The first chapter, "The Economic Basis of National Security," might have been an excellent preview of the chapters to come, and could well have succeeded in drawing together the following chapters. While it fails to do this, it does define the subject of Economic Security and gives a background which is helpful to the student.

The final chapter entitled, hopefully, "The Outlook for the Future" also disappointingly failed in its expected task of summarizing the book. Furthermore, it introduced several important new subjects which could have had more complete coverage for themselves, such as Civil Defense, Standardization, and Morale. Additional subjects not adequately covered include, Public Opinion, Housing, Intelligence, and Technological Development.

The failure to emphasize the part played by local voluntary groups of citizens in national security is, to this reviewer, a major deficiency in this generally excellent work. There is also a tendency toward compartmentation into many separate packages. For its use as a college textbook, or reference book, this is not harmful. Appendices A & B are well done and appropriate, though here again the statistics must of necessity stop at 1948 figures. The index which closes the book is complete, (nearly 3,000 items), and in clear, readable form.

As a general appraisal, it should be stated that this is a valuable textbook on a new and important subject. It covers a variety of subjects in a factual and, usually, objective manner. Its treatment is fundamental, elementary, and fairly complete. It is a book of excellent typography, well-reproduced charts and graphs and of pleasing construction and format. It should be in the

library of anyone who would be a student of National Security.

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***United States Army in World War II,
Volume V: The Lorraine Campaign.*** By
Hugh M. Cole. (Washington, D. C.: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1950. Pp. 657;
Illustrated; Maps; Index. \$10.00)

Reading this volume, one begins to understand why — among all of the Armies of World War II — George Patton's Third Army made and held for itself an enviable reputation as a tough, iron-hard, professional formation, not only in the public mind but among soldiers who had been fighting Germans while Third Army was still operating out of Fort Sam Houston.

The Third Army, from the time of the breakout at Normandy, had covered nearly the breadth of France in a series of bold, slashing advances that were a nearly perfect demonstration of the doctrine of armor-infantry-artillery-air cooperation. Then, on September 1, 1944, with two bridgeheads across the Meuse, the Third Army quite literally ran out of gas. Four days later, when the Army got going again, the whole character of the battle had changed.

It was now moving into terrain that gave the enemy an opportunity for a stubborn defense with minimum commitment of troops. Beyond the Meuse was the Moselle, and a whole host of tributaries, tied together with fixed fortifications that defied alike 1000-pound bombs and the shelling of 8-inch howitzers. Beyond this was, of course, the Siegfried Line.

The Third Army, confident, almost cocky, convinced it faced a beaten enemy, moved squarely into one of the most savage campaigns of World War II — the assault against Fortress Metz and into the Saar. Troops and tanks moved in the open against a stubborn defense of permanent works, in weather that not only bogged down tanks and transport, but also sharply limited the amount of air support the troops could expect. The fact that General Patton's command could shift quickly and with a minimum loss of morale from one type of warfare to another — take their losses day after day and move doggedly forward — is a splendid tribute to Third Army and its

commanders.

This is the character of the campaign Colonel Cole set out to analyze, to reduce to words on paper and lines on maps. Had he done only that, his work would still have been excellent. He has, however, gotten into his narrative — without overwriting or going into the too-often florid language of citations — the spirit of the campaign, which is just as important to the historian as the bare record.

The spirit of this campaign was one of great heroism in the face of bitter resistance and conditions of weather and terrain that tried the human spirit to its limit — and sometimes beyond. This is seldom said in so many words, but it is there nevertheless, and Colonel Cole's awareness of it lifts his work from the level of pedestrian reporting to that of fine creative writing.

Naturally, the question is going to come up whether or not this history contributes fuel to the fire of controversy over diversion of supplies to Marshal Montgomery's 21st Army Group for the thrust aimed at crossing the Lower Rhine while Patton was stalled at the Meuse.

Although Colonel Cole draws no conclusions of his own, it is this reviewer's opinion that the facts in the book, particularly those gathered in detail from German files and interviews with German commanders and staffs, are sufficient to settle the argument once and for all. That they probably will not settle it is beside the point.

The Third Army had come up to the Meuse on September 1 extended to the limit from a long pursuit; this being no reflection on anyone but simply in the nature of such an action. German records prove conclusively that on that date the equivalent of five battle-ready German divisions were in the area and preparing to defend the Moselle line. The Third Army, competent and aggressive as it was, even had it had enough gasoline and ammunition, could not possibly have brought sufficient strength to bear at the point of impact to break through and continue to the Rhine and beyond. The operation would have failed for the same reason that Montgomery's Arnhem operation failed — not for lack of supplies, but for lack of strength at the decisive point.

Taken as a whole, *The Lorraine Campaign* represents to this reviewer the highest level of competence in military history. Colonel Cole has gone to great lengths to present the enemy side of

the picture from enemy documents and records properly and carefully evaluated, thus fleshing out what might otherwise have been a skeleton of enemy activity taken from our estimates of where the enemy was, and what we thought he was trying to do.

The record of our side is presented with equal care and equal good judgment. Colonel Cole often takes the action down to platoon level, recognizing the very sound principle that the action of a unit as small as a platoon may be the decisive action at a given time on a division front. Basically, however, he describes actions in terms of the division, and makes his tactical breakdown at the corps level. In other words, a major phase of Third Army's action is described first in one corps' sector and then in another. This makes inevitable a certain amount of cross-checking for the reader, but is in the long run the most efficient way to handle a history on the Army level where the Army is widely committed.

Documentation is all that the most discriminating reader could wish, and the maps and annotated air photos, prepared under the direction of Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff, are superb. The entire book, in fact, gives an impression of opulence that may turn historians not blessed with so liberal a budget, a nice shade of green.

The reviewer believes, however, that the same effect of opulence could have been achieved in a much more compact book by means of less wasteful design. This is, in fact, the only jarring note in a splendid work of military history, a history that the reviewer hopes will be a guide to the future in military operations as well as a monument to the past.

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The War Department: The Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations. By Mark Skinner Watson. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office. 1950. Pp. 551 \$3.75)

This is the first volume published by the Historical Division on the activities of the War Department but the sixth in the general series: *The United States Army in World War II*. Had it been possible to produce this particular volume as the first one offered to readers, many desirable

advantages would have been gained. As Mr. Watson points out, it is only from the vantage point of the Office of the Chief of Staff that one can glimpse "the entire panorama of America's part in World War II in all the confusion and frustration of the early days, the tumult of the battle period, the majesty of the victory."

There were, of course, many reasons why the first volume on the Chief of Staff could not appear sooner than it did. The organizational problem was one of immense complexity and the research and writing took three years. The effort was well worth waiting for; Mr. Watson and his associates have set a high standard for future volumes in this series. The objective approach of the author is clearly manifested. Even in those passages where he illustrates the weakness of our prewar staff organization or points to the failures of its personnel, his remarks have the effectiveness of studied understatement.

In his early chapters on the development of the General Staff and the increasing responsibilities of the Chief of Staff, Mr. Watson seems to have been influenced by Major General Otto Nelson's pioneer study. The number of things that the Chief of Staff was expected to do was so large that even such a gifted soldier as General George C. Marshall could not do justice to them all. By law the Chief of Staff was responsible for the administration, planning, supply, training, and armament of the Army. He had to convince Congress that appropriations asked for were warranted and soundly expended. He had to work out a system of cooperation with the Navy and with prospective allies. By Executive Decree of 5 July 1939, he was made responsible to the President in matters of strategy, tactics, and operations. Yet surviving legal restraints on the size and functions of his staff made the carrying out of all these responsibilities by the Chief of Staff practically impossible.

One of the greatest services performed by Mr. Watson in preparing this volume is in setting forth the dominant control exercised over the prewar military programs by the Director of the Budget and the President. Far from being able to frame a military program which met the international requirements of our situation, the Chief of Staff had to content himself with a program which met the appropriation ceilings set by the Director of the Budget for domestic political reasons. As these pages show, President Roosevelt not only set the upper ceilings of ap-

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propriations but he also occasionally exercised his powers as Commander-in-Chief to alter the character of staff plans and preparations.

Space limitations make it possible only to point out some subjects on which this volume sheds new light. They include: matters of military aid to Britain, training matters prior to the establishment of GHQ, armament requirements for the expanding Army, defensive preparations in Panama, the Philippines and Hawaii, and staff conversations with Britain and the Netherlands growing out of Japanese aggression in the Far East. There is also a full account of the origin of the so-called *Victory Program* worked out by Major A. C. Wedemeyer of the War Plans Division in the late summer of 1941. We are also given a tantalizing footnote (p. 359) summarizing the German exploitation of the version of the Victory Program which was published by the *Chicago Tribune* on 4 December 1941. Mr. Watson refrains from questioning where this celebrated leak might have occurred.

The final chapter dealing with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor offers no new material. In the author's opinion the failure of our naval and military staffs to forestall this grievous surprise stemmed from a basic misunderstanding of the Japanese strategic situation in December 1941. In retrospect it is clear that before Japan could undertake any aggressive action in the Pacific, the U. S. Fleet based at Pearl Harbor had to be crippled. The author believes that if this fact had been fully appreciated, the defenses of Pearl Harbor would have been increased even if this meant reducing other areas. A twenty-four hour radar alert would have been maintained, and a 360 degree air patrol would have been established despite the shortage of longrange planes. General Short would have been relieved of his training responsibilities and diverted from his anti-sabotage efforts to his primary task of defense. If regular access to "*Magic*" intercepts had not been limited to two officers on General Marshall's staff, it seems probable that a new warning would have reached General Short prior to the Japanese attack.

Four minor errors or misprints (pp. 303, 348, 366, 469) apparently escaped the attention of the otherwise vigilant editors and proof readers.

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Organization and Equipment for War. By Lt. General Sir Ronald M. Weeks. (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1950. Pp. 132. \$1.75)

This book deals with the problems of organization for national security in Great Britain during the last 50 years, with special emphasis on the period of World War II. Equipment for war is discussed to show where logistic problems were solved in the organization rather than to explain in any detail the theory of logistics. It is a treatment of the evolution of the organization in a period in which the concept of war changed from that of a military force using a small portion of the nation's productive potential, to the present concept of total war involving the entire population and the interlocking of all the resources of the State, civil and military.

The book must be read with the knowledge that the author, as Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff for the last three years of World War II, is eminently qualified to describe the organization and equipment problems which confronted the War Office. While the author served in the Army, his official position brought him into intimate contact with the other services and with the civilian war agencies.

The development and use of the "committee system" as a means of coordinating the related functions of a large organization are treated in detail with an evaluation of the strength and weaknesses of the system. The "committee system" is of special interest to American readers at this time while the United States organization for national security is being evolved to meet the present emergency of partial mobilization. The influence of the British system upon the United States Department of Defense, especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is noticeable.

In discussing equipment, the item of tanks is used to illustrate the organization for supply and the relationships of supply to other agencies of government. This leads to a discussion of the Ministry of Supply in which United States readers can find arguments both for and against a separate Service of Supply in the United States Department of Defense.

The author looks into the future and sees the necessity for scientific and technical training for more officers. Lack of adequate numbers of technically trained officers was felt in World War II

in dealing with supply problems including liaison with the Ministry of Supply.

The growth of unification of the services is traced as part of the modern concept of war. Apparently unification as such is as unpopular in Great Britain as it is in the United States. However, the author points to several preliminary steps which have already been taken which might be regarded as a prelude to some form of unification. He advances the theory that a more complete form of unification is inevitable and that progress in that direction will be slow but certain. In modern war the tasks of the three services are not nearly so clearly differentiated as they used to be. Further, many new weapons do not fit nearly into the picture of these separate services; and finally, the nation can no longer afford the luxury of duplication. Again, the reader will find it interesting to compare United States experience in unification with the author's appraisal of Great Britain's experiences.

The final chapters deal with the present status of the Army and preparedness. Of special interest is a short discussion of the United States effort in mobilization planning which ends with the thought that Great Britain is behind in that respect and should study our progress.

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Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, 22 July 1942—1 May 1944, By Samuel Eliot Morison, Vol. VI of History of United States Naval operations in World War II. (Boston: Little, Brown 1950. Pp. 463, with illustrations and charts. \$6.00)

When the carriers of the Pacific Fleet turned back the Japanese at Midway in June 1942, they restored the balance of naval power in the Pacific. The time had come for the opening of the Allied offensive, and in the weeks that followed the question of where the offensive should be and who was to command was hotly debated in Washington. The result of this debate was a directive, dated July 2nd, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to general MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. In this directive, both Pacific commanders were ordered to mount an offensive at once. The objective was the New Britain—New Ireland—New Guinea area, the Bismarcks Barrier. The joint Chiefs divided this operation into three tasks:

first, the seizure of Guadalcanal in the Solomons; *second*, the seizure of the remainder of the Solomons and of Lea, Salamaua and other positions in New Guinea; and *third*, the occupation of Rabaul, the main Japanese base in the Bismarck Archipelago. The *first* task would be under Admiral Nimitz' general direction and would be carried out by an officer designated by him, initially Admiral Ghormley and later Halsey. Those forces from the South Pacific advancing up the Solomons would remain under Halsey's tactical control, but Halsey himself would be under MacArthur's strategic direction after the completion of the *first* task. In the previous volume of this series Captain Morison has told the story of Guadalcanal. *Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier*, the sixth volume in the history of naval operations during World War II, deals with the operations required to complete the *second* and *third* tasks.

The operations described in this volume cover a period of almost two years, starting with the fight for Buna in the fall of 1942 and ending with the occupation of the Admiralties in the spring of 1944. During this period, MacArthur fought his way, step by step, up the tail of the lizard-shaped New Guinea coasts, then jumped across Vitiaz Strait to New Britain and finally to Manus Island. At the same time, Halsey's South Pacific Force pushed its way by progressive stages from Guadalcanal northward to Bougainville, thence to Green and Emirau, thus completing the encirclement of Rabaul.

Though Rabaul still remained in Japanese hands when the campaign was over, it was now cut off from Truk and the Philippines. Neutralized by daily air attacks from the 5th and 13th Air Forces, it could be left to "wither on the vine." The threat of a Japanese attack on Australia and the Allied line of communication had disappeared during the early stages of the campaign against the Bismarck Barrier. With its conclusion, Nimitz' southern flank was secure. Both he and General MacArthur could now proceed toward larger and more important objectives in the war against Japan. The period of defense and of the limited offensive was over. The Allies were now definitely on the offensive.

The strategic significance of the relatively small operations described in this volume is out of all proportion to the importance of the area finally won by the bitterest and nastiest kind of fighting. These operations had a large tactical

significance, too. It was in these operations that our amphibious doctrine was tested, that our techniques and weapons were improved, and our troops trained in the jungles and swamps of New Guinea and the Solomons. The narrow, reef-infested waters of the Solomons Sea and the Bismarck Archipelago ruled out the possibility of large-scale surface engagements, and there were no great fleet actions such as that at Midway, or those to take place later in the Central Pacific or at Leyte. Naval action against the Bismarcks Barrier was limited to destroyers and cruisers, and to PT boats. But it was a period of joint warfare in the fullest sense of the term, involving the co-operation of all services and of Australian and New Zealand troops. Unification was achieved on the field of battle long before the debate was finally resolved in Congress.

It is a merit of Captain Morison's volume that he has made the nature of joint warfare clear by describing the role played by land, sea, and air elements in the campaign to reduce Rabaul. With a first-hand knowledge of many of the operations, and with the insight gained from interviews with many of the leading commanders, Professor Morison has written a vivid story of the little-known operations which cleared the way for the return to the Philippines and the drive across the Central Pacific.

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The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II. By Robert H. Connery. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1951. Pp. 527. \$6.00)

This is an authorized but unofficial account of the Navy's top material organization during World War II and its relation with other industrial mobilization agencies of the Federal Government. Dr. Connery, Professor of Public Administration, Duke University, presents the many problems of the Navy in translating requirements into end items to the extent of a 100 billion dollar Navy, the administrative and organizational changes that took place, and the persons responsible for this achievement.

In the period 1939-40, the nation failed to realize the threat of war, was uncertain, wanted

peace, security, "business as usual" with so called "social gains." In this political climate the 1939 Mobilization Plan was not acceptable. Few re-organizational changes had taken place in the Navy with the result that the Secretary's position was not clearly defined and was confused in details, coordination was lacking with and between the several Bureaus.

With the appointment of Secretary Knox and his bringing in Mr. Forrestal as Under Secretary, a series of organizational changes began. Initially, the confusion and changes in the mobilization organization on the National level were reflected in the Navy's progress. Immediately following Pearl Harbor, the national and international as well as the Navy's material organizations were overhauled. The agency coordinating the Navy was the Office of Procurement and Material (OP&M) under Mr. Forrestal. With a revitalized Army-Navy Munitions Board and a War Production Board, certain features of the 1939 Mobilization Plan were seen.

In the war period that followed, OP&M, the new coordinating agency, had many problems. Effective progress reporting was established. Initial Bureau resentment gradually disappeared. The negotiated contract replaced the low bid type and necessitated close and forward pricing. To preclude excess profits, renegotiation was established. These aspects of procurement required many difficult policy decisions. Similarly, in production, the shortages of machine tools, facilities, and materials necessitated coordinated "progressing," "expediting," "scheduling," and "programming." Contractors and subcontractors had to be furnished working capital to produce and also assured of equitable settlement when contracts were terminated. All these industrial mobilization problems and their solutions are presented in scholarly fashion.

The Navy and Industrial Mobilization in World War II is an outstanding contribution in many respects. The student of industrial mobilization will find discussed most of the problems of the contractor, the technical service or bureau, as well as the top coordinating agencies for the military as well as the Nation. The dependency of strategy on logistics is clearly indicated. At the same time this work is an excellent case study in organization and administration in which the basic problems and useful techniques are well presented. In another sense, it is the story of the evolution

of the present Navy and the National Security Organization and of the balance between civilian and military control in the Department of Defense. Finally, it is a monument to the achievements of Mr. Forrestal, whose wisdom, farsightedness and patience contributed so much, not only to the Navy's effort in World War II, but also to the post war emergency of the National Security Organization.

The study is most timely for many of the same problems are arising in the present partial mobilization. While many lessons can be learned from a study of previous experience, Dr. Connery properly cautions against seeking a pattern. He says it only sometimes occurs and even then there are often many events happening unexpectedly or disjointedly from day to day which are inconsistent with it.

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The Question of Autonomy for the United States Air Arm, 1907-1945, by R. Earl McClendon, *Air University Documentary Research Study*, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University Library, 1950. 2 vols. Mimeograph)

Written primarily for the faculty and students of the Air University to provide background for problems arising "in connection with the present organization of the United States Air Force, and its relation to the other branches of the armed services," this study will be supplemented by a further work by Dr. McClendon on the post-war development of 'unification'. In the work at hand, the story moves in well-marked and familiar phases. Agitation for separation from the Signal Corps (1913-1918) merged into a full-blown movement for separation from the Army either by the creation of a separate cabinet post for aeronautics or, after 1923, by the creation of a department of national defense in which the air arm held a coordinate position. After a resounding defeat in 1920, the Air Service, most spectacularly in the person of Billy Mitchell, took to the hustings, yet won only minor concessions from the Air Corps Act of 1926.

Mitchellism did not die with the quashing of Mitchell; his heirs or successors became instead

more circumspect, more patient, and subtle: qualities they needed aplenty during the next two decades. By 1935 they were either wise enough or discouraged enough to accept, for the sake of the limited goal of a GHQ Air Force, an insidious command dualism by which the GHQ striking force and the Air Corps training, supply, and procurement agency reported separately to the Chief of Staff. At any rate, after four years of living with it they began increasingly to come into their estate.

From the record, it must be said that fortune conspired with the Army in its relations with its air arm. Had World War I lasted another year, the War Department, which had begun by expecting the Chief Signal Officer to organize and train a total of 368 combat squadrons, might well have lost control of its air components. After the Air Corps' disastrous attempt to fly the mails in 1934, if the Howell Commission had reported before the Baker Board report had been released, the pressure for a separate or coordinate air force might not have been overborne. If during World War II an enlightened War Department had not given the AAF a semi-autonomous position in the ZI and overseas which permitted both jobs to be done with reasonable efficiency, the nation might have been treated to an unedifying squabble which it could ill have afforded.

Without introducing anything startling by way of information or viewpoint, Dr. McClendon has written a very satisfactory and stimulating summary of an unwieldy topic, on many phases of which several additional volumes could be profitably composed. However, he might well have let his chapters stand on their own rather than explaining his organization as he goes along; also, he might note that *but* can be overused as a synonym for *only*. Principally, he should have paid more attention to the overseas experiences of the military air arm and to its functional as well as organizational and bureaucratic status in the U. S. forces. He discusses the independent role of the air force without discussing the theory of strategic bombardment; the GHQ Air Force without the rationale of continental defense; the use of air forces in conjunction with ground troops without the benefit of Mitchell's concepts of 1918, which the War Department did not wholly master until 1943. As a result, he does less than justice not only to the airman's arguments for the potency of his weapon, but to the Army's rebuttals which

were not without their own merits. The reader is sometimes left wondering what all the shouting was about.

This last stricture of course does not apply in the case of the faculty and students of the Air University and it ought not to obscure the excellence of a work to which the author has brought thorough scholarship and nice judgement.

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Saipan: The Beginning of The End, by Major Carl W. Hoffman, USMC, (Washington U. S. Marine Corps Headquarters, Historical Division 1950. Pp. 286. \$3.25.)

The capture of Saipan in June-July of 1944 was clearly the decisive battle in the Allied offensive against the Japanese Empire. Guadalcanal and Midway, it is true, were turning points in converting the Japanese from the offensive to the defensive in the Pacific. But it was the capture of Saipan that at last brought the Japanese homeland and the lifeline to the Netherlands East Indies within easy range of Allied surface and aerial attacks. This was, in the oft repeated words of Admiral Ernest J. King, the "Key to victory." Or in the equally descriptive words of the subtitle of this volume, it was "the beginning of the end."

Major Carl W. Hoffman, USMC, has written, and the Historical Division of Marine Corps Headquarters has published, the most complete and authoritative account of this battle to date. In fact, one is hard pressed to discover how it could be very much improved on. Major Hoffman has examined all of the extant Marine Corps records and the most important Army and Navy records in preparing this well documented study. In addition, he has interviewed or received critiques and suggestions from some 300 Army, and Navy and Marine Corps personnel who participated in the campaign. To add the last touch of authenticity, he himself was a company commander in the 2d Marine Division and was very much "there" to witness what was going on.

In 262 pages of text amply supported by maps and illustrations, this monograph traces in detail but with colorful narrative style the day-by-day struggles of the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions and the 27th Infantry Divisions to overcome the resistance put up by Saipan's fanatical defenders.

The activities of the Marines receive more space than those of Army troops, but this is inevitable not just because this is an official Marine Corps publication but because the Marines were in the fighting longer and in about twice the strength.

The action of the 27th Infantry Division is handled adequately and fairly. This last point is important because it was this operation that produced the famous "Smith-Smith controversy" that clouded Army-Marine Corps relationships for some time to come. Major General Ralph C. Smith, USA, was relieved of his command of the 27th Infantry Division at Saipan at the behest of the Fifth Amphibious Corps commander, Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, USMC. The specific changes were that the Army general had exceeded his authority by issuing orders to units not under his command and that the 27th Division's tardiness and unaggressiveness had unnecessarily slowed up the main three-divisional drive up the northern part of the island and thereby jeopardized the success of the whole operation.

Major Hoffman handles this delicate matter without a suggestion of special pleading. The general conclusion that emerges from his study is that the relief was warranted by the facts of the case. The author is careful to point out, however, that the Army troops involved in the northern advance faced extraordinary difficulties arising both from the nature of the terrain and the enemy defenses in their zone. Whether or not one agrees with the final conclusion that Holland Smith was justified in requesting Ralph Smith's relief, one is compelled to admire the complete objectivity with which the question is handled in this monograph. If there is any hint of service-connected bias it is not apparent to this reviewer.

Although the bulk of this study is rightly concerned with infantry activities, those supporting arms and service troops are by no means neglected. Artillery, close air support, naval gunfire, logistics and medical care all receive attention. If the spot light is kept mostly on the ground troops, that is as it should be. In their hands lay the ultimate issue of battle. This scholarly and thoroughly readable monograph is a fitting monument to their struggles.

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The U. S. Marines and Amphibious War, by Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1951. Pp. 648. \$7.50).

Their splendid performance in World War II wrote the name of the Marine Corps high in the estimation of the American people that it may be forgotten, if it was ever known, that the doctrine of the Marines as an assault landing force evolved very slowly. Here in a book of 636 pages is a carefully documented history of the evolution of the amphibian doctrine of the Marine Corps and the training preparation for the accomplishment of that doctrine. This is followed by chapters describing the empirical perfecting of the doctrine in those engagements in the Pacific in which the Marine Corps fought. A tactical account is given of each engagement and a description of the lessons learned and the steps taken to improve the deficiencies of each past campaign. The doctrine which they evolved was as effective as the well established courage of the Marine Corps. Due credit is given to the development of such weird gadgets as the LVT and the DUKW but the principals were established before the war and the refinements of logistics and fire support could be made only by large scale, actual experience. This book concerns itself with the application of the doctrine as practised by the Marine Corps and properly so, since the Marines' doctrine of amphibious assault was taken over by the Army, which also used techniques and equipment developed by the Marine Corps.

Never before in history has amphibious warfare been fought on such a scale as it was between 1942 and 1945, and here is the detailed scholarly account of the tactical techniques and the technical equipment which gave to American arms success in that phase of the War. It should be of interest to every fighting man.

WILLARD WEBB
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The Combined Boards of the Second World War, An Experiment in International Administration, by S. McKee Rosen. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. Pp. 288. \$4.00.)

Despite the steady expansion of Federal activities in the economic and social sphere during the past generation, the distinctive feature of our economic system continues to be the dominant

role of private enterprise. Normally, the basic decisions in the economic system as to what shall be produced, in what quantities and qualities, for whom and at what price, are determined by the relatively free interplay of individuals in the market place. But in the national emergencies of defense armament and war, it has been found necessary for government to make and carry out many of these decisions. This task places a tremendous administrative burden on the government, requires many new agencies performing new functions and exercising novel controls. The result is organizational and administrative problems of great magnitude and complexity, taxing and at times overwhelming the administrative resources of the government but giving rise to new and valuable experience and knowledge in the management of men and resources.

One of the most fruitful suggestions of the late President Roosevelt led in 1942 to the institution of a program for recording the administrative experience of the Federal Government in dealing with the defense and war emergency. Out of this program have come a large number of studies describing the problems and activities of such war agencies as the War Production Board, Office of Price Administration, and Office of Defense Transportation, as well as such permanent agencies as the Department of Agriculture and those comprising the military establishment. Much less familiar, not only to the general public but to students of government and administration, are a group of agencies established to coordinate the mobilization of economic resources on the international level, the *combined boards*, a term coined to describe the organizations by which Great Britain and the United States, with the addition in some instances of Canada, cooperated on the economic front. These boards, in the order of their treatment here, were the Combined Raw Materials Board, the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, the Combined Production and Resources Board, and the Combined Food Board. The origin, activities and career of each Board is in turn reviewed and the study closes with a valuable chapter on conclusions and generalizations drawn from this "experiment in international administration."

This volume is distinguished by qualities of clarity and brevity not always, or even often, found in studies of our war experiences. Although not an official study, the author writes with a background of personal experience as a govern-

ment official with the combined boards, an experience supplemented by research in their records. He has bridged in admirable fashion a notable gap in the historical record of our wartime experience.

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War and Human Progress. By John U. Nef.
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950. Pp. 464. \$6.50)

Take a professor of economic history, member of the Chicago University committee on social thought, author of one book on civilization, and of another on the British coal industry, and set him loose on the subject of war as a part of modern life, and you have this book. It bears heavy traces, in presenting its arguments, of his studies on the influence of coal production on industry, and also of the associations of its author with Quincy Wright of Chicago, who, some decades ago, initiated detailed studies on the changing popular attitudes toward war as a function of political society.

Well realizing that a long and complicated argument cannot be condensed into a tiny space without risk of garbling, we make bold to state that the thesis of this book appears to be as follows: It is not correct to declare as has Ruskin for instance, that war has promoted the advancement of human society into our present state of civilization. On the contrary, the author holds, economic progress has been checked by prolonged hostilities and has been most marked in the relatively extended periods of practical peace for the nations not too deeply involved in hostilities. He adduces as evidence the increase in metal production and in coal use in certain nations at certain times as compared with other nations and concludes that armament making did not stimulate production in times of war nearly so much as civilian needs stimulated it in times of peace.

There are a few subsidiary theses. He holds that the accepted Toynbee "Industrial Revolution" is inaccurately delimited by the years 1760 and 1832 and that far more important was what he calls "the early" industrial revolution of a century and a half earlier — a revolution marked not by factory production but by "out work" or contractual home production with materials provided

by the promoters. He holds further that with the spread of protestantism, the breakdown of religious authority, and the rise of Deism, the world has grown less and less Christian in its attitudes, more and more "total" in its wars, and therefore more destructive and wasteful. In Europe over the periods 1815-1854 and 1871-1914 there was comparatively "little fighting over long stretches of time" — he says — and that century was the time of the greatest industrial and mechanical development. He compares the relative tranquility of the Continent in the century from 1640 to 1740 and its industrial progress with the disturbed character of Britain with its Civil War and its subsequent conflicts during the same period when he indicates England made little industrial progress.

There are exceptions to his applications and therefore some holes in the argument; but it is a thesis at least interesting, as well as worthy of scrutiny and thought.

If there be anything to quarrel with in the book, it will be found in the author's occasional forthright anachronism of citation and extremely casual broadening of a phrase or an idea to cover a mountain of conclusion. Some of his citations are from appropriate basic documents; others appear trivial and not so trustworthy. On occasions he fills in with totally irrelevant facts.

Examples follows. Is it possible to prove a point concerning use of a weapon in World War II by citing a journalist's remark of 1942? (p. 373) "Some" scientists and engineers who came to this country do not prove that the United States was a general asylum from persecution. (p. 377) It is a silly example of "adventurous men in search of enterprise" to cite Mme de la Tour du Pin coming to "settle and farm in the lovely Hudson River country near Albany." (p. 379) It is sheer carelessness to say that Don Quixote "had nothing to tilt against except windmills" when we know that he also attacked sheep, robbers, and churchmen. (p. 136) When we are reading about the 18th Century, a point is not proved to us with an anecdote out of 20th Century Washington. (p. 261); nor by gluing on a fact about our 20th Century "merchants of death." (p. 284) Why cite a Henry Adams remark about the American civil war to describe a Napoleonic result? (p. 335); or drag in a post-World War II optimism to illustrate a post-Napoleonic war situation? (p. 336).

The concentration of thought of a serious reader is interrupted by such interpolations. It is the manner of a lecturing college professor striving to be entertaining to his classes, not that of a scholar presenting an important thesis. But in spite of these and other defects (most of which are indeed minor), his thesis deserves thought. It will at least puncture the completeness of the Ruskin theory that war is universally good in its effects.

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Planning in Practice, by Ely Devons, (London and New York: Cambridge University Press. 1950. Pp. 228. \$3.00.)

In this book the author carefully analyses and criticizes methods employed by the British Ministry of Aircraft Production (M.A.P.) in aircraft equipment for World War II.

Drawing on four years' experience in the planning section of M.A.P., the author explains in convincing detail the almost insurmountable complexities in the system employed, and discusses its principal failings.

Coordination between the M.A.P. and the Ministries of Supply, Production, Air, and the Air Section of the Admiralty in itself caused many misunderstandings and assumptions of low validity upon which aircraft programs were based. However, the everchanging types and requirements of aircraft necessary in modern war caused the greatest difficulties.

In addition to an explanation of the organizational position of M.A.P., the book includes an explanation of the British system of creating "aircraft programmes" approximately each six months. Separate chapters are devoted to the assessment of productive capacity, planning the supply of components, the engine programme, labor requirements, importance of controlled statistics in planning, and the major problem of coordination.

It is interesting to note that in late 1941 the Cabinet asked for such a large increase in the bomber program that it could not be accomplished with the skilled manpower available. This resulted in the "manpower budget" system. Although M.A.P. had direct control over aluminum and magnesium the author says, "Thereafter, the departments—at any rate N.A.P.—regarded the

labour that it was allocated as determining the overall size of its programme." Only 50% of the total labor force allocated to M.A.P. could be utilized in factories producing complete aircraft because of requirements for components.

Although the author points the spotlight on many fallacies in employing rules of thumb, misleading statistics, and secrecy of methods and assumptions between departments, he gives the impression that many of these non-scientific methods will always be necessary in an effort of this character and size. The book itself should be a potent factor in making all planners who read it more analytical of their own techniques and more conscious of the necessity for maximum inter-departmental understanding.

In the preface the author states he has omitted any consideration of the effect of personalities. It soon becomes evident that this refers only to specific personalities as the underlying theme of the book continually refers to human errors caused by pride, jealousy, departmental reputation, and false optimism. The reader gets the impression that these, and other human attitudes and failings will always be present in planning and therefore must be accounted for as well as corrected where possible.

The author agrees that many of his co-workers would not agree with his opinions, but they certainly raise important issues.

Recommended reading for personnel dealing with requirements, production, and logistical planning in general.

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Appeal to Arms, A Military History of the American Revolution, by Williard M. Wallace (New York: Harper, 1951. Pp. 274. \$4.00).

The reader should realize from the very first that the author has confined himself to but one of the several aspects of the American War for Independence; and this is proper, provided that the diplomatic as well as the social and economic features of the conflict are not entirely ignored by the reader. This good book, however, is a complete and meticulous account of the activities of the *ground forces* of some of the British population in North America in their rebellion against

the King. This war, in fact, as again shown by this author, was initially a simple colonial conflict instigated by the Radical (or Liberal or Whig) element of the overseas people, a great number of whom were of Scotch and not English background—a resolute minority—which culminated into a quasi World War, and which resulted in at least two very important consequences. These, of course, were the establishment of a new nation, and the drastic weakening of the powers of the British King not only in the United Kingdom but also in what remained of the first British Empire.

The author, who has availed himself of recently accessible sources of pertinent material abroad, and who shows an intelligent understanding of the older historical material, presents an accurate narrative of that seven years conflict which began as a civil war.

The two distinct phases of the war are properly stressed; the *first* phase, a fight to regain the ordinary rights of *Englishmen*; and, the *second* phase, the struggle for *Independence*. The author is undoubtedly correct in attributing the American success to the money and men received from France (the only European nation approached by Benjamin Franklin), which—unlike Spain, Holland and Russia—was of such substantial aid.

Throughout the book, the author indulges in "critiques": each battle, each decision is studied as to the errors committed. This in itself makes the book especially valuable reading for the military reader.

One cannot read this book without being impressed, as never before perhaps, with the extremely difficult problems encountered by the army commanders. With approximately a third of the *Americans* at one time or another during the conflict siding with the King, and perhaps another third ready to hop on the winning bandwagon, one cannot but be amazed at the stamina and stubbornness of the 'rebel' troops who constituted but a small percentage of the available man-power in the colonies. The author has succeeded in weaving into the story the various and different personalities of the commanding generals on both sides. Of these, Greene and Von Steuben, next to Washington, seem to have been the most outstanding. In the reading of the book, the greatness of Washington is again affirmed: although lacking in some military talents (such as found in Lee, decades later) he emerges, more than ever, as the really great man in American history. The author suggests the cause of the

lack of military aggressiveness of the British general Howe, in that he, a Whig himself, seemed to be constantly anticipating a reconciliation between the colonists and the mother country. And, although the author does not mention it, this hope persisted in many quarters up until 1781.

The author outlines the mobilization, the training, the discipline or lack of discipline, the skirmishes, sieges and battles of the war; no combat area is neglected. The expeditions into Canada and into the "West," as well as in the North and South are here fully covered. It is regretted that the author fails to go into the activities at sea to an extent comparable with his treatment of the activities of armed forces on land. Certainly, the author should complete his story of the great conflict, at least with a volume on the diplomatic aspect of the American Revolution. It is hoped that he will do so.

Dr. Wallace, the author, is a native of the state of Maine, was graduated from Wesleyan University in the early 1930s, spent some time in Europe as a traveler and student, and served two years in the armed forces during World War II. At present he is Associate Professor of Modern and English History at his Alma Mater. His present book is both interesting and scholarly, and contains references to much source material; there are thirteen chapters, with a short preface, and several maps and illustrations.

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The Nineteen Fifties Come First, by Edwin G. Nourse, (New York: Holt and Company 1951. Pp. 184 \$2.00.)

This is a very readable book about the necessity to curb inflation and thereby to maintain a sound dollar. In the author's discussion, it is developed that while every American gives his allegiance to individual freedom and enterprise, there has been a steady growth of pressure groups. These pressure groups are the various farm organizations, the labor unions, and the business groups that continually strive for special privileges and legislation for their selfish interests. In the end, each hopes to get out of the economy more than he puts in. This hope is in defiance of all scientific principles. Self-examination is suggested for each and every individual to determine whether the interests of the Nation are harmed by his own.

A good antidote for inflation thus caused is a

balanced national budget. However, no harm is seen in deficit financing in times of national trouble. A family that has sickness oftentimes goes into debt in order to pay the hospital expenses. This debt is soon repaid by subsequent savings in the family budget. The nation should do likewise. Upon the conclusion of World War II, the author believes that much larger surpluses should have been achieved in order to reduce the size of the national debt.

Of particular current interest is a chapter entitled "Militarism as a Way of Life." It concerns itself with the present period wherein this country may be involved in a prolonged period of limited mobilization. Two important questions are raised. "First, how much of a burden does the situation necessarily put on our country? Second, how can this burden be carried with maximum security and comfort and in such a way that it inflicts the least possible hurt on the economy?"

By wisely developing a sound program our national security can be greatly strengthened because "national security is an integrated whole, in which economic soundness is just as important as military force. National security rests on the dollar, the government bond, and the price index just as much as it does on the tank, the atom bomb, and the radar net." It is further pointed out that "the greatest thing we have to fear in the economy of the United States is a spreading fear as to the future of the dollar."

This book is recommended reading for all who entertain any such fear. It is written for the layman and should be required reading for all who are interested in the maintenance of a sound United States dollar.

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Brassey's Annual. The Armed Forces Year-Book, 1950. Edited by Rear-Admiral H. G. Thursfield. (New York: Macmillan, 1950. Pp. 363. \$9.00)

The 61st edition of *Brassey's Annual* is altered considerably with respect to its predecessors in both form and substance. It has lost its purely naval character and now appears as "The Armed

Forces Yearbook." The change is in keeping with the important principle of integration of the Armed Forces which is the basis of the defense organization in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Much of the information about the Navy, formerly included, has given way to matters relating to the Army and Royal Air Force, as well.

The Annual is now in five sections. The first is general in character, containing ten essays by well-known military writers on matters relating to strategy, policy and administration and various problems of defense. Rear Admiral H. G. Thursfield has an article in the Annual entitled "Teamwork," in which he emphasizes the need for inter-service collaboration and gives some good examples of the success achieved through teamwork. Captain B. H. Liddell Hart has contributed an excellent discussion of the objective in war, wherein he differentiates between strategy and grand strategy. He shows that the former is concerned with winning the political object of war and the latter is concerned with winning of the peace. He concludes that the "true aim is not so much to seek battle as to seek a strategic situation so advantageous that if it does not of itself produce the decision, its continuation by a battle is sure to achieve this." Colonel the Honorable E. H. Wyndham has contributed a very understandable summarization of the Atlantic Treaty and its relation to Western Defense. Other titles of interest are: "Statesmen and Fighting Men—The Central Direction of War" by Jules Menken; and "The Influence of New Weapons upon the Conduct of War," by Colonel the Honorable E. H. Wyndham.

The second, third, and fourth sections are devoted to the Navy, Army, and Air Force, respectively, and contain a survey of developments achieved in these services throughout the preceding year. An effort is made to portray, without partiality, and of course, with the usual lack of any official sanction, the development of material, the progress of training, and the conditions of service in each branch of the Armed Forces.

The fifth or reference section contains reproductions of important papers, statements and memoranda of government officials, including statistics and data on defense, service estimates concerning budgetary problems, national service, and service emoluments.

Brassey's Annual is a substantial contribution to a better understanding to defense problems of the day, particularly as they affect British security. It is valuable to civilians and military personnel alike as an up-to-date treatment of defense problems and as a collection of pertinent references related to defense matters.

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Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 1950-1951.

Compiled and edited by Leonard Bridgeman.
(New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1950,
\$20.00)

The forty-first edition of *Jane's All the World's Aircraft* follows the pattern of organization that has characterized its predecessors in this distinguished series. It is arranged in five major divisions. Part A consists of a condensed record of the air forces of all nations during the year just past, with information about their organization and equipment—a convenient summary for reference purposes. Part B contains a summary of information about civil aviation—a listing of aeronautical departments, associations, transport companies, flying clubs, schools, aeronautical publications, and the like. Part C is a compilation of available information about aircraft throughout the world, illustrated, and available data about construction, specifications, and performance. Part D is devoted to engines, both gas-turbine and piston. Part E is a scanty section devoted to lighter-than-air ships. In all sections, the information is arranged alphabetically by nations.

This work is the standard authority on aircraft. It brings together into one volume more information about all known aircraft—civil and military, experimental and production—than any other single source. In most cases its authority is to be relied upon, but occasionally the difficulty of obtaining information results in the release of insufficiently documented accounts of the construction and operation of aircraft. In the present volume, this dearth of information is particularly apparent in the accounts of aircraft of nations behind the iron curtain.

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***A Hook in Leviathan*, by Bradley D. Nash and Cornelius Lyde. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 1950. Pp. 234. \$3.00.)**

A Hook in Leviathan is hardly a "critical interpretation" of the Hoover Commission Report as its subtitle claims. It is rather an excellent resume of that document entirely acceptable to the thoroughly uncritical Citizens Committee for the Hoover Report. The authors, one of whom (Mr. Nash) "came to Washington as secretary to Herbert Hoover," have held a number of responsible government positions, though not qualifying as career public servants. They have had "unique opportunity to observe the Federal Government from a private citizen's point of view."

This reviewer, while making his declaration against sin, administrative or otherwise, is disturbed at the paucity of constructively critical published literature on the Hoover Reports of the nature and quality of Herman Finer's in the September and December 1949 issues of the *Political Science Quarterly*. The public does not know or is prone to forget, in the face of "Citizens Committee" publicity, that there were minority views on the Commission and that there is room for considerable difference of opinion on the means of attaining objectives. Substantial agreement on the "major findings of administrative sin" does not require acceptance of the assumption that "the paths to salvation . . . are set forth in the reports of the commission and of the task forces . . ."

In two hundred-odd pages the authors could do little more than summarize the two million words of the reports. It follows then that the treatment is for the general reader, not to say the tax payer, and not for the student of government or still less the expert in any single phase of governmental activity. Informed members of the armed services, therefore, will gain little from the ten pages of familiar generalizations on the Defense Department and the obvious problems of unification.

For those who will not find the time or opportunity to read the Hoover Commission's reports and studies, this book can be recommended as providing a useful summary statement of the malady of the Executive Branch and the Commission's prescription.

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SHORTER REVIEWS

Background Information on the Use of United States Forces in Foreign Countries. Report (127) of the 82nd Congress, 1st sess., House Committee on Foreign Affairs. (Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1951. Pp. 77.

This study was prepared by Messrs. George L. Millikan and Sheldon Z. Kaplan, consultants on the staff of the Committee at its direction. It discusses the following topics: The background and framework of action, the powers of government and precedents for our situation in Korea and in the commitment of troops to Europe. An appendix includes all "Instances of use of United States Armed Forces abroad from 1798-1945."

The Story of the Mexican War. By Robert S. Henry. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1950. Pp. 424. \$4.50)

The author has presented a comprehensive panoramic history in which the trees of significant events are clearly delineated against the forest of details presented. The perspective of the able Polk in Washington as well as the events in Mexico, New Mexico, and California are soundly judged in a documented volume which is well worth reading by military historians of this period and of the Civil War. Mr. Henry has continued his development of this subject in lectures such as "Rehearsal in Mexico," given before the Washington Civil War Round Table this March.

How to Get Ahead in the Armed Forces. By Ruben Horchow. (New York: Doubleday, 1951. Pp. 96. \$1.00)

Colonel Horchow (AUS rtd.), Chief, Manpower Analysis Section, AGO, Dept. of the Army, aided by other experts, has prepared a volume of general information on Tips for Recruits, Promotions, Commissions, and how to get the right job in military and in future civilian life.

United States Military Policy, by Blair Bolles (Major item in Foreign Policy Reports issued for 15 December 1950, Vol. XXVI, No. 15. Periodical published by Foreign Policy Assn., Inc., New York, N. Y.)

This is an effective review of U. S. military policy from 1948 through the halt in mid-1950 of previous subordination of U. S. military policy to budgetary policy.

The goal of U. S. military policy in general is cited as "... to restrain the Soviet Union, with the ultimate objective of 'facilitating and encouraging productive negotiation' between the USSR and the West." Weaknesses of military policy as considered include the recurrent problem of a large standing force versus a large body of resources, the problems on questions of alliances including North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the problems of UN military power as focused by U. S. Secretary Acheson in addressing UN General Assembly 20 September 1950 and the acceptance of his proposals by the General Assembly on 2 November 1950. The article concludes, in considerations of a more powerful and effective UN, with remark that "... by now it has become abundantly clear that military power is the most expensive form of political power."

The article is a useful and informative report on the period noted, up to President Truman's address of 15 December 1950 and his proclamation of the following day.

My First Eighty-Three Years in America. By James W. Gerard. (New York: Doubleday, 1951. Pp. 372. \$3.50)

Our Ambassador to Germany for the critical period 1914-1917 has written his autobiography at the age of 83. His enthusiasm for living is made vividly apparent in his descriptions of American scenes from the late nineteenth century to the present. The military historian will find few pertinent facts in this volume; but he will enjoy this entertaining book for the background it provides for current events.

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A BOARD OF OFFICERS CONSIDERS THE CONDITION OF THE MILITIA IN 1826

BY JOHN K. MAHON

THE MEN who bothered to consider the condition of the militia system in the United States in the 1820's knew that it was not all they wanted it to be. The system was considered, from time to time, in Congress and in the newspapers; but no one ever took any action. However, the Nineteenth Congress did bestir itself to direct the executive to prepare a complete system of tactics and exercise for the cavalry and artillery of the militia. A few of the states had cavalry and artillery manuals, but no such manuals were in general use. The preparation of the new ones was up to James Barbour, Secretary of War in 1826. Barbour had been Governor of Virginia during the War of 1812, and chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Militia Affairs for several years afterwards. His experience with militia, and a strong belief in states' rights, disposed him to favor a well regulated militia. He undertook his assignment with zeal, and seized on it as an opportunity to conduct a broad inquiry into the condition of the militia. President John Quincy Adams, preoccupied with the death of his father, and not greatly interested at any time in the militia, apparently had no part in the project which developed.¹

In July 1826 the Secretary began to act on his plans. On the 11th he sent out a circular letter to the governors of the states,

and to men whose experience with militia was considerable.² Next, he commenced to form a board of officers, some militia, and some regular, who had the knowledge necessary to prepare the cavalry and artillery manuals. Availability governed his choices; but he tried to obtain men who had had a good deal of experience with militia in action. The regular officers were simply directed to come to Washington; but the militia officers had to be invited. Barbour began to send out letters as early as July 13 for a meeting on October 1; but he was not sure of his personnel until the middle of September.³ Some of his first choices declined; indeed, the most enthusiastic member of the Board as it was finally constituted, was a second choice.⁴

The eight men, who made up the Board, met in Washington in early October. Five of them were in the regular army: Major General Winfield Scott, chairman; Lieutenant Colonel Enos Cutler, commander of the Third Infantry; Lieutenant Colonel Abram Eustis, commander of the Fourth Artillery; Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Taylor; and Captain Charles J. Nourse. These five had all served with troops (some of them militia) during the Second War with England. The other three were citizen soldiers: Major General Thomas Cadwalader, commander of a division of Pennsylvania militia; William H. Sumner, Adjutant General of Massachusetts; and Beverly Daniel, Adjutant General of

¹Adams made no mention of the project in his diary until the Board was assembled in Washington. He noted on October 26, that the members of the Board dined with him. Only General Sumner, for some reason, could not be present. Charles Francis Adams, ed., *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams*, 12 vols. (Phila., 1875), VII.

²*American State Papers, Military Affairs*, hereafter abbreviated as ASPMA, III, 393.

³These letters are in War Office Letters Sent, Vol. XII, MS, Ofc. of War Records, Natl. Archives, *passim*, 233-265.

⁴William H. Sumner, Adjutant General of Mass.

North Carolina. These three militiamen had had years of experience with citizen soldiers; and Cadwalader and Sumner had commanded troops in the field in the late war.

The Board began at once on the desired manuals, and quickly finished them; then it turned to the larger problem of the condition of the militia and the means of improving it in all of the twenty-four states. Some fifty replies to Secretary Barbour's circular were available for their consideration. None of them came from New Hampshire, Vermont, Delaware and Alabama; but seven each were from Virginia and Pennsylvania, six from Massachusetts, five from Connecticut, three from New Jersey, and at least one from every other state. These replies, plus other documents printed in connection with the meeting of the Board, constitute what is probably the finest single, printed source on the militia system to be found.⁵

The Secretary of War's circular asked nineteen specific questions; but not all of them were of first importance. We shall consider them more or less in the order of their significance. First, are volunteers generally more efficient than regular militia?⁶ Twenty-seven men, out of thirty-three who answered the question, said yes, three gave an equivocal answer, and only three gave a flat

no. This response makes it clear that, at least in the 1820's, volunteering produced better corps than universal military training (the principle upon which the militia system was based).

Several writers did not bother to answer the Secretary's question specifically; but, in their own way, commented on the relative quality of volunteers and standing militia. A few of their comments merit mention. Beverly Daniel (a member of the Board) wrote that volunteer units in the rural areas of North Carolina were usually raised during some sort of public excitement, and that they generally died out when the excitement had passed. This was not true, he added, in the cities.⁷ Westerners indicated that volunteer companies were scarce in their section; indeed, in some states (for example Missouri), non-existent.⁸ The harshest critic, a Virginia colonel, said that volunteers were invariably the spoiled sons of rich men, and not to be relied on in times of real danger.⁹ Other men considered them the best type of soldier to repel invasion if they were not required to serve longer than five or six months; for longer tours, the standing militia was better. The only Rhode Islander to reply to Barbour's circular complained that the volunteer companies in his state were too independent, and ought to be better integrated with the rest of the militia.¹⁰ A few men took exactly the opposite view; they said that some sort of volunteer system should replace the militia altogether.

Second in significance came the question: did the existence of volunteer units damage the standing militia? Only eight men, out of twenty-eight, said yes. Most of them based their answers on the belief that volun-

⁵Included in the Annual Report of the Sec. of War, Doc. 334, ASPMA, III, 388-488. Also printed in *H. R. Ex. Docs.* 2, 2d sess., 19th Cong., 269-506. The MS originals of these documents, with a few exceptions, are together in Ofc. of the A. G. Doc. File, Misc. Papers, box 4, Record Group 94, Ofc. of War Records, Natl. Archives.

⁶The mode of enlistment was the chief difference between volunteers and regular militia (hereafter often referred to as the standing militia). Men voluntarily joined the former; but membership in the latter was compulsory for men from 18 to 45. There were certain legal differences between the two types, which varied from state to state, and great differences in uniform and prestige; but most of the latter resulted from the difference in the mode of enlistment. For a more comprehensive treatment of the difference see, John K. Mahon, *The Citizen Soldier in National Defense, 1789-1815* [unpublished doctoral dissertation, U.C.L.A., 1950], Ch. X, 189-201.

⁷Beverly Daniel, Aug. 9, 1826, ASPMA, III, 401.

⁸John O'Fallon, A. G. of Missouri, Oct. 1, 1826, *ibid.*, 418.

⁹John W. Roberts, Aug. 6, 1826, *ibid.*, 420.

¹⁰N. Howland, Sept. 19, 1826, *ibid.*, 475.

teer companies lured the best soldiers out of standing units; but one or two claimed the damage was done on the parade grounds, where volunteers so outclassed the others that the latter lost all pride in their organizations and stopped trying to improve them. A few writers reversed this argument to the effect that volunteers set militiamen a fine example, which challenged, rather than discouraged them.

There were some other questions relative to volunteers: Did the laws of the states favor them over the standing militia? Thirteen men, out of nineteen, answered *no*, six, *yes*; but these totals prove very little since men from the same state gave opposite answers. The Secretary also asked if volunteer units ought to be allowed to make their own by-laws. The answers reveal that at least ten states already granted them that power to some degree. Four writers wanted to see it granted in their states; but eleven thought it too great a delegation. The answers to the questions on volunteers show that the writers generally favored volunteers over militia, and wanted to see them continue to expand. Aside from that, no pattern of thought can be seen. Some men (as has been indicated) wanted the two types of citizen soldier to be completely disassociated, others wanted them drawn closer together. Men from the same state frequently disagreed as to what the presence of volunteer units did to the standing militia.¹¹

Since the 1780's, reformers had been recommending that the militia be divided into two or three classes according to age. The idea was that the young men would be in a separate class, which would train more intensively and be called first in case of war.¹² Secretary Barbour included a question em-

bodying this old idea, and thirty-three correspondents saw fit to answer it. Twenty-two of them favored classification; but no three agreed on the age limits. Sixteen was the lowest minimum suggested, and thirty-six, the highest maximum for the first class. There was some opposition to classification in all parts of the country, but the strongest came from Massachusetts and Connecticut. These two states already had effective systems, and did not wish to scrap them for a plan which had never been tried, and which could as readily fail as succeed.

The letters sent to Secretary Barbour indicated pretty well the condition of the several state militias. The absence of even a scrap from New Hampshire, Vermont, Delaware and Alabama is good negative evidence that the systems in those states were imperfectly organized; but the positive evidence in letters from other states is more convincing. Such evidence came from the Adjutant General of Maryland, who flatly admitted the faults of the Maryland militia, and from a Kentucky brigadier, who wrote that the law of his state practically disbanded the system.¹⁴ The Adjutant General of Missouri also acknowledged weaknesses; but blamed the scattered population for them instead of the law.¹⁵ A Tennessean, who claimed to love the militia, lamented that it had been forgotten in Tennessee,¹⁶ and most of the correspondents from Pennsylvania noted that their organization was not effective. A New Jersey writer said the decline in his state was obvious; in twenty-five years the discipline had changed for the worse.¹⁷ Massachusetts and Connecticut writers, in contrast to most of the others, described strong organizations.

¹¹For an example of such a disagreement see Bernard Peyton, Aug. 5, 1826 and John H. Cocke, Aug. 1826, both of Va., *ibid.*, 395, 397.

¹²For a history of the attempt to adopt this reform see John K. Mahon, *op. cit.*, 127, 128, 239, 240.

¹³Richard Harwood, Aug. 1, 1826, ASPMA, III, 395.

¹⁴Sept. 18, 1826, *ibid.*, 418.

¹⁵See note 8.

¹⁶Newton Cannon, Oct. 22, 1826, *ibid.*, 419.

¹⁷P. J. Stryker, Aug. 9, 1826, *ibid.*, 450.

Secretary Barbour asked if the traditional three-month tour of duty for militia, when called into active service, had not proved to be wasteful of both life and property. All but one of twenty-eight men who answered agreed that such a term was too short; but they did not concur on a substitute. Ten thought a year, or even more, not too long; twelve favored six to nine months, and five offered no alternative. The lone dissenter said that citizen soldiers should never be withdrawn from their civilian pursuits for longer than three months.¹⁸ To avoid the economic dislocation caused by militia training, some men recommended that only the officers be trained. It would not hurt the economy for them to miss their work several days each year. Moreover, good officers, if need be, could produce competent soldiers in a few days. The majority of the writers, however, denied such reasoning, and said it would destroy the militia to completely excuse the rank and file from training.

One of the most important of the Secretary's nineteen questions was: are frequent musters useful? Thirty-four writers answered it, and only ten of them in the affirmative. Several even called the militia days "schools of vice," because of the drinking and gambling that went on. Others said the citizen soldiers learned nothing of value from their musters. "Amicus Patriae" from Kentucky, carried this to its ultimate; he asserted that in the War of 1812 militiamen again and again had had to unlearn the smattering they had picked up.¹⁹ The Massachusetts and Connecticut writers denied this; but as high an authority as the Adjutant General of the former state admitted that training days were becoming less and less useful every year.²⁰ The answers to this question indicate that militia days had lost the military char-

acter of the 1790's and the few years just after the Second War with England, and had become chiefly social occasions. This fact, coupled with what the correspondents said regarding volunteers, makes it clear that such vitality as existed in citizen-soldier affairs in the 1820's lay in volunteer units.

The letters to the Secretary reveal the failure of the Uniform Militia Act (passed by Congress in 1792) to create a uniform militia.²¹ Companies varied in size, among the states, from 20 to 250 men, and regiments from 300 to 1500.²² If such diverse units were ever called on to work together as a team, the results might well be as disastrous as in the War of 1812. There was no uniformity in the training given, for the United States Army Infantry Manual was costly and rare in the back country, and no standard artillery and cavalry manuals were in print. Even state manuals were not in use throughout whole states. To correct this condition, some writers urged the War Department to give suitable texts to militia officers everywhere; but South Carolina, unwilling to wait, undertook the expense of providing her officers with the regular army infantry discipline.²³

The critical matter of arms for citizen soldiers received attention from Secretary Barbour's correspondents. Connecticut writers proudly announced that enough arms for the control of emergencies were kept at all times in the state arsenal, and that, in addition, Connecticut men armed and uniformed themselves as the federal law required.²⁴ The report from New Jersey was not so good; Daniel Elmer, who commanded a brigade of 2000 men, wrote that his unit could produce only 375 firearms, of which 225 belonged to the state.²⁵ Poor as this showing was, some

²¹Act of May 8, 1792, *U. S. Stat. at Lg.*, 1, 271.

²²See note 20, 478ff.

²³John B. O'Neill, Nov. 3, 1826, ASPMA, III, 403.

²⁴Oliver Walcott, Nov. 30, 1826, *ibid.*, 405.

²⁵Daniel Elmer, Aug. 14, 1826, *ibid.*, 451.

¹⁸Ebenezer Huntington, Sept. 2, 1826, *ibid.*, 407.

¹⁹Oct. 7, 1826, *ibid.*, 453.

²⁰Wm. H. Sumner, Nov. 11, 1826, *ibid.*, 468.

of the western states was worse. A Kentucky brigadier reported regimental parades of 1000 men, with no more than forty or fifty guns among them. This report was typical, and disclosed the paradoxical fact that fire-arms for militia use were scarcer at the frontier than on the seaboard. In all states, except Massachusetts and Connecticut, arms were too scarce, and several writers insisted that there could never be a well-organized national militia until the federal government undertook to issue arms to all militiamen.²⁶ One man took violent issue with this viewpoint because, he said, the guns already issued by the United States under the Act of 1808 had been wasted.²⁷

Many of the men who troubled to reply to the Secretary's circular were serious students of military affairs. They had pondered Napoleon's campaigns and the War of 1812 and learned lessons from them. General Cadwalader of Pennsylvania, a member of the Board, pointed out the greatest American error during the war: the use of American citizen soldiers in the open field against British regulars. Jackson's Tennesseans, who had slaughtered the redcoats at New Orleans, he said, would have run like the Maryland militia at Bladensburg if they had been required to face the British without protection, and to maneuver against them in the open as the latter had had to do.²⁸ John G. Watmough, also of Pennsylvania, wrote a full scale tirade against the use of militia; but acknowledged that citizen soldiers had performed as well as regulars at New Orleans, Fort Erie and Sackett's Harbor. His explanation for the contradiction was that the men of New Orleans, Fort Erie and Sackett's Harbor had served so long, at the time of

their triumphs, they were no longer actually militiamen, but veterans.²⁹ One commentator said no commander, in either of the wars against England, had relied on militia, although several, for policy's sake, had claimed they did. Their claims created afterwards a false and dangerous reliance on militia. One or two men remarked how useless cavalry had been in the War of 1812, and recommended that, where it existed, it ought to be converted into horse-artillery because that arm had proved very effective in Napoleon's battles.

Miscellaneous ideas as to the use of citizen soldiers and their training are worth mentioning. Some writers thought volunteers were the type of soldier best suited to bear the first thrusts of an invasion. Two of them developed the idea of regional specialization, that is that all riflemen be drawn from the West, where even the small boys learned to shoot well, while the seaboard could concentrate on training the two arms best suited to repel attack from the sea, to wit, artillery and cavalry. All agreed that finer training was needed. Even the Governor of Connecticut—prouder than most men of the militia of his state—admitted that Connecticut's citizen soldiers were only the nucleus of an army until they had had more training and probably the stimulus of war.³⁰ A New Jersey writer set no store by the militia system except that it provided a mechanism with which an army could be raised in an emergency by compulsory means.³¹ John H. Cocke of Virginia wanted the federal government to erect and maintain an academy for militia officers in each of the four "grand divisions" of the country.³²

Cocke's recommendation deserves special notice because it was made by a southerner, and because it was typical of the southern

²⁶See note 23.

²⁷The Act referred to was passed Apr. 23, 1808, 11 *U. S. Stat. at Lg.*, 490. For a brief history of the issue of arms to the states under this act see John K. Mahon, *op. cit.*, 242-244.

²⁸Aug. 14, 1826, *ibid.*, 430.

²⁹July 31, 1826, *ibid.*, 432.

³⁰See note 24.

³¹See note 25.

³²See note 11.

attitude. The thing he proposed would have excited the bitterest sort of opposition from the states'-rights men, such as Luther Martin and Patrick Henry, of the 1790's. Martin and Henry had pointed out, and would have done so again, that the prime purpose of militias was to protect the sovereign states from arbitrary encroachments by the federal power, and they would have denounced Cocke's idea because it gave the United States decisive power over the only safeguard the states had against the United States. Cocke was not troubled by this threat, nor were other southerners. A North Carolinian said it was the duty of the federal government to help pay for militia training in peacetime, and a South Carolinian insisted that arms for the state militias must come from the War Department. Southern states'-rights doctrine was clearly not militant in 1826, at least where the militia was concerned. Perhaps it was not militant at all; but the militia could well have been a special case because of the presence of the Negro. Southern writers frequently stated that their section, on account of the slaves, needed an efficient militia more than the rest of the country. The South, therefore, was perhaps willing to accept help from any quarter to protect itself.

Several of the letter-writers were of national fame or of unusual military experience. One such was Oliver Wolcott, Governor of Connecticut. He had had some experience during the Revolution as a soldier, and a great deal of it afterwards as a statesman. He had succeeded Alexander Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury, and after that had tried to change the attitude of his state during the War of 1812. His letter was remarkable because of the perfect confidence he showed in Connecticut's militia, and the great pride he took in its high standard of training and equipment.³³

³³See note 24.

The testimony of another man from Connecticut, Ebenezer Huntington, is valuable because of his extensive military experience. He had served throughout the Revolution as a Continental officer, and for thirty-one years as Adjutant General of the state.³⁴ His view did not agree perfectly with that of Governor Wolcott. First, he believed that the terrain of his state was not well suited to horse-operation, and that Connecticut had far too much cavalry. Then he noted that there were as many as three hundred shifts in the makeup of the officer corps in a year, which definitely hurt the system. Western migration was the cause of some of the turnover, but not of all of it. His war experience had convinced him, Huntington said, that volunteers were always better than standing militia. Accordingly, he saw very little value in training days, and no use at all in trying to keep militiamen on active duty for longer than three months.

One of the notorious generals of the Second War with England troubled to write to Secretary Barbour from Virginia. This was Alexander Smyth who had made two abortive attempts to invade Canada in 1813 from the Niagara River.³⁵ After his more-or-less-comic-opera attempts he was dropped from the rolls of the United States Army, and passed out of the national picture. In 1813 Smyth had berated both volunteers and militia roundly; but by 1826 his attitude was somewhat softened. If the militia system were brought to the proper pitch, he said, volunteer organizations could, and ought to be, abolished. He favored classification, with the maximum age fixed at thirty-five, and an active tour of duty running from one to two years. No more than six weeks were necessary, he said, to make raw levies into efficient troops; so he favored abolishing the militia musters and training only officers.

³⁴See note 18.

³⁵Aug. 21, 1826, *ibid.*, 419.

Joseph Gardner Swift, a graduate of the first class at West Point who had risen to the rank of colonel and chief engineer of the United States Army at twenty-eight, and who had been breveted a brigadier during the War of 1812, also wrote to Barbour.³⁶ He said that the militia, during the late war, had shown how badly it was neglected by the state legislatures. The tradition of militia inferiority inherited from England, in his opinion, hampered the American system; but not quite as much as the serious lack of arms. He believed, along with a few other men, that dismounted drill and military history should be taught to boys in grade school.

William Theobald Wolfe Tone, whose long letter is among the others, had an unusually vivid background.³⁷ His father, one of the heroes of Ireland, was executed by the English in 1798. The son was in France at the time, and that nation, a friend of any enemy of Britain, gave him a military education. He served with distinction in Napoleon's armies, and, after Waterloo, migrated to the United States, where, in the course of time, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the regular army. The American service did not contain any cavalry, and Tone pled for the formation of one regiment, because it was the natural arm with which to repel invasion from the sea. Also it was the best force to use against Negroes and Indians. One regiment, he said, could become a cadre for many volunteer units in time of war.

John H. Hall, an inventor of firearms, also answered Secretary Barbour's query.³⁸ As early as 1811, he had constructed a workable, single-shot, breech-loading rifle, and since that date had been attempting to persuade the War Department to adopt it in place of the musket as the standard infantry weapon.

The most serious trouble with the militia, Hall said, was that the states exempted too many men from service, so that the rich escaped duty, but the poor were held to it. Next, he offered his own solution. Militiamen could not possibly learn in peacetime to maneuver as an army, without being away from their livelihoods more than they could afford; but they could, and ought to, learn to shoot accurately. The federal government could never afford to supply the citizen soldiers with arms; hence it should channel its efforts to enforce the provision of the Uniform Militia Act which required every man to arm himself. That done, it should urge the use of modern weapons and concentration on marksmanship. In support of his thesis, Hall cited the effects of the withering fire delivered by the Americans, against far better trained troops, at Bunker Hill and New Orleans. It is easy to see that Hall was a promoter of his own weapons; but not easy at all to say that his suggestions were wrong.

A very celebrated soldier of the War of 1812, Alexander Macomb, sent his comments to the Secretary.³⁹ Macomb was a West Pointer, and when in his twenties, had been the hero of the Battle of Plattsburg (1814). At the time of his writing to Barbour, he was chief of the Engineer Corps of the United States Army. His thought was toward ways to articulate the militia better with the regular army. The former, which he called "the great natural arm of the Republic" had failed in wartime, he said, chiefly for lack of good staff work. His solution for the future was that, in case of war, the several staff divisions of the Army should begin at once to act also for the militia. He had another scheme, too, for the long run improvement of both Army and militia. The Army should accept boys, aged 14 to 16, whose parents were willing to apprentice

³⁶Sept. 6, 1826, *ibid.*, 436.

³⁷No date, *ibid.*, 438.

³⁸Oct. 28, 1826, *ibid.*, 448.

³⁹No date, *ibid.*, 458.

them for a period of fifteen years, and train them as non-commissioned officers. By so doing, it would develop a body of properly trained non-comms, and, at the end of the apprenticeship, send out among the people a group of young men able to provide the militia with well trained leadership. It was not likely, in those days of expanding opportunity in business, and of declining danger from abroad, that the General's plan would have interested many people; but as the solution offered by one of the foremost American soldiers of the time, it is interesting.

The man whose experience sank deeper into the past than any of the other writers was Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts.⁴⁰ He had held a commission in the Massachusetts militia as early as 1766, and at that time had begun to be a student of military affairs. His discipline had been used to drill the Continentals, until replaced by Baron Steuben's in 1779. Washington chose him to be Adjutant General in 1777, and later, when Henry Knox left his cabinet in 1795, again called on him, this time to be Secretary of War. Pickering said, in his letter to Barbour, that there could never be a well-disciplined militia as long as all able-bodied men were required to serve. However, the militia was adequate to execute the laws and suppress insurrections, which, since there was no threat of invasion, was enough. He wanted volunteers to be encouraged, and the federal government to provide them with firearms. Without knowing it, he concurred with John Hall as to practice in shooting. The need for such training, he said, was particularly acute in the eastern states, because game, which had trained early Americans in marksmanship, had almost disappeared there. The musters were, in his judgment, useless.

A thoughtful essay by William H. Sumner, Adjutant General of Massachusetts,

concludes the correspondence as it has been published. If such a title fits anyone, Sumner deserves to be called the Clausewitz of the American citizen soldier.⁴¹ "The militia," he said, "is what is left after society is purified by army enlistments." Soldiers of the regular army did not need to be intelligent, but the militia did, and were. He wrote several paragraphs in praise of the potentialities of American citizen soldiers; but ended with a lament that the militia law of the nation was obsolete. It represented the needs of 1792, not 1826, and served to inhibit, rather than develop those potentialities. Sumner proved himself a good son of his section by representing the old argument that the sovereignty of the states depended on efficient militias; but he added a suggestion of his own. There could not be efficient militias without able adjutants general; so the states should look to their officers at home. The initiative in making the several militias uniform, however, rested with the federal government, and the states had a right to expect it to take steps which would enable the militias to work together in case of national peril. The state militias, efficient enough to act together, were the nation's great military reserve, which must not be neglected. If they could supply trained troops as soon as war broke out, the disasters and the excessive costs of the War of 1812 need never be duplicated. Militia, the writer said, was more than an instrument of war; together with schools and churches, it was a powerful moral influence on young men. It "... contributes to produce that just subordination in society which ... constitutes an orderly community." (This last could not have appealed to most of his contemporaries, who did not feel the need of subordination in society, just or otherwise.) In concluding his essay, Sumner expressed the ideal upon

⁴⁰Sept. 10, 1826, *ibid.*, 470.

⁴¹No date, *ibid.*, 478-488. The MS and the printed copy differ slightly; but not in any important points, only in wording.

which American reliance on militia was based: "The term citizen soldier accurately conveys the character of an American militiaman. . . . The citizen soldier of peace is to become the soldier citizen of war; but neither in war nor peace is the character of either the citizen or the soldier to be merged in the other."

The Board of Officers was able to complete and present a report to Secretary Barbour on November 28, 1826.⁴² The worst defect of the militia system, the Board said, was that, under the provisions of the obsolete Act of 1792, far too many men were held to service. A draft on all men aged eighteen to forty-five had been necessary in 1792; but it was not in 1826; indeed it produced far more men than could possibly be well trained. The Board stressed the impossibility of giving adequate instruction to men in thinly populated areas. It noticed the grave lack of firearms, the lack of a uniform system of instruction, and the states' habit of exempting too many men from duty. Then it offered some remedies. First, cut the whole number of militiamen from 1,500,000 to 400,000; give each state a portion of the 400,000 to raise in the way that suited it best, and vary the state quotas as population shifted. Second, employ an Adjutant General in the War Department to preside over militia affairs. Third, require the states to have units, from company to division, of uniform size (the Board recommended proper tables of organization). Fourth, distribute manuals for all types of training to every militia officer at federal expense. Finally, set up ten-day training camps for militia officers in each state every year. The United States would pay the trainees, and, if the governors requested it, would provide one qualified regular-army instructor for each camp. The Board estimated that the cost of the camps would range from \$200,000 (if

the trainees received \$1.00 a day) to \$318,000 (if the rate was \$1.50). This cost, the report said, might seem high; but measured in terms of protection to the nation, was in reality very cheap.

No sooner was the rough draft finished than Barbour carried it to President Adams, and requested him to include something about it in his impending message to Congress.⁴³ With his usual application, Adams went to work, and finished the report in two days. He approved the proposal to reduce the number of men obliged to do duty; but felt it doubtful policy to spend the large sums recommended to go into officer-training camps, and doubted if Congress would approve them.⁴⁴ Barbour pestered the President for several days about a paragraph on the Board's work. He was eager to show that the President was connected with the project, for Georgia newspapers (and perhaps others) were claiming he had started it without authority. Finally, on December 1 Adams read a noncommittal paragraph, which satisfied him, that was included in the message delivered four days later.⁴⁵

It was three months (February 27, 1827) before a committee of the House of Representatives reported on the work of the Board.⁴⁶ The committee made a few innocuous recommendations; but devoted itself mostly to generalizations and to a eulogy of the militia. It restated the belief that militia was the "bulwark of the nation," and iterated the ancient fear of a standing army. Finally, it recorded its concept of a proper defense for the United States: ". . . an inconsiderable regular army; a few durable fortifications; a considerable Navy; a well-

⁴³Adams' entry in his diary, Nov. 28, Charles Francis Adams, *op. cit.*, 189.

⁴⁴Entry of Nov. 30, *ibid.*, 191.

⁴⁵Second Annual Message, Dec. 5, 1826, James D. Richardson, ed., *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, 10 vols. (Wash., D. C., 1901), II, 361.

⁴⁶ASPMA, III, 599-602. Also printed in *H. R. Comm. Reports* 92, 2d sess., 19th Cong.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 388-392.

organized and disciplined Militia; good roads and other channels . . . to facilitate marches . . . [and] this Republic . . . will stand erect among the Nations for ages unlimited . . ."

The report of the Board was well publicized (even reaching the frontier papers by March 1827⁴⁷); but nothing was done to translate its words into action. There was no general inclination to do more than talk about the militia, and only a few men, apparently cared what happened to it. The obsolete Act of 1792 remained the basic law, and it went unenforced. The federal govern-

ment left the states to do as they liked about the Citizen Soldier, and the net result was that he was neglected. The factors in American society (whatever they may have been) which caused legislators and citizens alike to do no more than talk about the report of the Board, continued to operate on the militia system. The result was that it proceeded, almost without stopping on the way, toward extinction.

⁴⁷For an example see *Illinois Intelligencer* (Vandalia), Mar. 10, 1827.

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THE REPLACEMENT SYSTEM DURING THE CIVIL WAR

By ARMIN RAPPAPORT

AT THE OUTBREAK of the Civil War in April 1861, the regular military establishment of the United States numbered 16,363.¹ As in all previous and later wars, a citizen army had to be raised for the defense of the nation. From April 1861 until the last call made in December 1864, 2,800,000 men were mustered into the Federal service.² They came in as regulars, militia, and volunteers, preponderantly the latter. They served for varying periods, from 90 days to the duration of the war. The regulars entered United States regiments of infantry, artillery, and cavalry; the volunteers, and, of course, the militia, were organized into regiments by the States and sent into Federal service as State units, their officers being appointed by the governors.³ The problem which concerns us is how were the armies of the North, when depleted by the exigencies of war (deaths, wounds, sickness, desertions, and expired enlistments) maintained at effective strength? In other words, what system was used to replace casualties of war with fresh troops?

¹According to Frederick Phisterer, *Statistical Record of the Armies of the United States* (Supplementary Volume to Campaigns of the Civil War) (New York, 1883), p. 62. Statistics vary according to sources used. I have relied on Phisterer, and on the official figures furnished by the Adjutant General's Office printed in the *War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (128 serial volumes, Washington, 1880-1901), cited hereafter as *Official Records*.

²Phisterer, *Statistical Record*, pp. 3-6.

³Except general officers of volunteers who were appointed by the President.

VOLUNTEERS

On 15 April 1861, President Lincoln called for 75,000 militia for three months' service to suppress the rebellion.⁴ In a burst of patriotic enthusiasm, the loyal states supplied more than their quotas to defend the Union. A total of almost 100,000 men, including 104 regiments of infantry and some independent companies of cavalry and artillery, answered the call. Within one month, on 3 May, the President, to increase the nation's military strength, called for 42,834 volunteers which were distributed by quota among the loyal States and formed by them into thirty-nine regiments of infantry and one of cavalry.⁵

The problem of replacements arose almost immediately as the new regiments were raised, even before the army went into combat. Normal attrition, sickness and desertion began to sap the regiments in the field. At this point, a fateful decision by the Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, wrecked the possibility of inaugurating a smooth functioning replacement system for the volunteer forces of the United States.

Because the War Department was occupied with marshalling the 75,000 militia called on 15 April 1861, the President as-

⁴Series III, Vol. 1, pp. 68-69.

⁵General Order No. 15, 1861. On the same day, 3 May, the War Department, under Congressional authorization, ordered the Regular Army to be increased by 9 infantry, 1 cavalry, and 1 artillery regiments, a total of 22,714 men. See General Order No. 16, 1861.

signed to the Secretary of the Treasury the task of organizing the volunteers and regulars raised by the call of 3 May. Chase entrusted the task to three Regular Army officers: Colonel Lorenzo Thomas, Major Irvin MacDowell, and Captain Franklin. They recommended the formation of a three-battalion regiment, two to be in the line while the third served as a depot battalion for recruiting and drilling replacements for the regiment. Chase accepted the plan for the regular regiments but rejected its application to the volunteers on the flimsy ground that it was inexpedient to abandon the ten-company regiment familiar to most of the states.⁶ On 22 July 1861, Congress enacted legislation fixing the regiment of volunteers at ten companies.⁷ No provision was made for the regiment to recruit replacements for their depleted ranks. Re-inforcements for the volunteer army would be formed into new regiments.

In large measure, this situation indicated a victory for the States over the Federal government. One of the most powerful weapons of patronage in the hands of State executives involved the right of appointing officers, except general officers, in the new regiments. Had a system been adopted of re-inforcing the army by replenishing the old regiments rather than by raising new regiments, that power would have been seriously curtailed. Foreshadowed was a struggle between State authorities on the one hand and Federal military leaders on the other; a struggle between those who wished to fight the war with a truly national government as against one fought by an aggregate of individual states.

Meanwhile, the opening guns of the first battle sounded at Bull Run on 21 July 1861.

As the defeated Union Army streamed back to Washington it was clear that the war would be long and hard fought. The 186,000 men under arms⁸ would hardly be enough to surpass the determined and courageous Confederacy. Acting on Congressional authority,⁹ the President called for 500,000 volunteers to serve for varying periods from six months to two years.¹⁰ To the States was assigned the task of receiving and processing the volunteers for Federal service.

The tendency of the States was to form new regiments rather than shunt volunteers into the old regiments in the field.¹¹ Not only did the governors eagerly grasp the opportunity to exercise military patronage but the volunteers themselves chose rather to join a new regiment made up of men from their own areas and officered by their fellow citizens. Throughout the summer months, the Northern States formed their volunteers into regiments. Instead of completing one regiment before starting another, numerous units were simultaneously in process of formation. Skeleton regiments were everywhere. General Louis Blenker, in command of the Fourth Brigade, urged that permission be given him to consolidate skeleton regiments in New York and Philadelphia, independent of local, political, or personal influences. Regimental commanders would not permit their troops to join other regiments, he complained.¹² Most certainly, the

⁶U. S. Statutes, 37 Cong., 1 Sess., Statute I, Ch. IX.

¹⁰General Order No. 49, 1861.

¹¹Oliver L. Spaulding, *The United States Army in War and Peace* (New York, 1937), p. 265. The 700,680 volunteers raised by the States were organized into 521 regiments and 42 independent companies of infantry; 81 regiments, 3 battalions, 28 companies of cavalry; and of artillery, 6 regiments of light, 97 heavy, 3 battalions of light, 129 companies of light and 37 heavy. See Phisterer, *Statistical Record*, pp. 3-4, and *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, p. 1020.

¹²Blenker to McClellan, Aug. 27, 1861. *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 1, p. 458.

⁶Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington, 1912), p. 234.

⁷U. S. Statutes, 37 Cong., 1 Sess., Statute I, Ch. IX.

⁸Phisterer, *Statistical Record*, p. 62.

old regiments in the field, depleted by casualties from Bull Run, as well as by sickness and desertion, received no volunteers to replenish their ranks. Despite a War Department order authorizing regimental commanders to detail recruiting officers in districts where the units had been raised,¹³ there is no indication that recruits were obtained to maintain the regiments at strength.

To General George McClellan, commanding the Army of the Potomac, the problem of maintaining the strength of a regiment in the field was a vital one. He could get no replacements, however, as long as the States were holding their volunteers for new regiments. By the close of 1861, convinced that the whole system required overhauling, he proposed a plan which the War Department incorporated into a General Order dated 3 December 1861, to take effect 1 January 1862.¹⁴ This order prohibited the States from raising any regiments, companies, or batteries except upon special requisition of the War Department. Recruiting service for volunteer regiments in the field was placed under a General Superintendent for recruiting in each State, and a general depot was established in each State to receive, clothe, and instruct all volunteers. Commanding officers of regiments, batteries, and independent companies in the field below strength were ordered to report the fact to the Adjutant General of the Army, and then to requisition the required number of replacements from the Superintendent in the State in which the regiment had been raised.

On paper, this plan seemed to answer the problem of replacements for the old regiments. State pressure, however, continued in favor of holding recruits for new regiments and the War Department apparently

continued to authorize the formation of new regiments for, on 29 January 1862, McClellan had to urge Secretary of War Stanton to authorize no more cavalry regiments but rather to reduce the number already in service and increase the strength and efficiency of those retained.¹⁵

The need for reinforcements for the Union Armies became great in the Spring and Summer of 1862 as McClellan inched his way up the Peninsula to Richmond, and Grant pulverized the Confederate strongholds on the western rivers. On 2 July, the President called for 300,000 three-year volunteers. On 4 August, the States were ordered to furnish 300,000 nine-month militia, and instructed to organize this militia into new regiments; of the 70,000 militia actually furnished only 4,000 were diverted to old regiments.¹⁶

For the 421,465 volunteers who answered the call of 2 July, the Federal Government vied with the States. Despite the inducements offered by Washington, (e.g., payment of three dollars to anyone bringing a recruit for an old regiment as against two dollars for a recruit for a new regiment,¹⁷ permitting a recruit for an old regiment to select his company¹⁸) the States, retaining practically every volunteer for new regiments, organized 402 of them,—infantry, cavalry, and artillery.¹⁹

Again the Federal Government began making a strong bid to halt the formation of new regiments and to divert subsequent volunteers to old regiments or to regiments already organized but not yet filled. On 9 August, the War Department decreed that no new regiments would be organized after

¹⁵McClellan to Stanton, January 29, 1862. *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 1, p. 873.

¹⁶*Official Record*, Series III, Vol. 4, pp. 2-3.

¹⁷General Order No. 74, 1862.

¹⁸General Order No. 88, 1862.

¹⁹*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, pp. 1020-1021

¹³General Order No. 69, 1861.

¹⁴General Order No. 105, 1861. Also *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, p. 1020.

15 August.²⁰ On 13 August, the Adjutant General issued quotas to the States to fill their regiments in the field;²¹ in September he instructed regimental commanders to report directly to their respective States the number of recruits needed.²² Those States which did not fill their quotas with volunteers by 1 September were ordered to draft necessary recruits.²³ Further to encourage enlistments for old regiments, the bounty paid by the Government was limited to recruits enlisting for service in old regiments or to those already organized but not yet full, to veteran regiments that renewed their term of service, or to veteran volunteers going into old regiments.²⁴ In this instance, Stanton successfully resisted State pressure to extend the bounty for volunteers for new regiments.²⁵

The loyal States did not take kindly to these measures threatening their patronage prerogatives. Without new regiments, there was no opportunity to appoint officers. Ohio demanded and received permission to raise a few new regiments of one-year men.²⁶ Apparently the protests increased for, on 29 October, Stanton granted the States permission to organize into new regiments any drafted men in excess of those required to fill old regiments.²⁷ Indiana was assuaged;²⁸ Pennsylvania was not. Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General of the Army, reported to

Stanton from Harrisburg, on 1 November, that the governor of Pennsylvania did not approve of drafted men filling up old regiments, rather he believed that they should have the right of electing officers and having district organizations,²⁹ and that, furthermore, the newspapers and the draftees themselves were supporting the Governor.³⁰ The pressure on Stanton became too severe to resist, and "to avoid collision with State authorities"³¹ he instructed Thomas, on 7 November, not to enforce the order to fill the old regiments with draftees. A compromise to form drafted men into companies in Pennsylvania and leave the regimental organizations to Washington was vetoed by State authorities. Pennsylvania won the contest, State's rights emerged victorious and on 8 November, Stanton authorized Thomas to permit Pennsylvania to organize draftees into new regiments.³²

Despite the victory of Pennsylvania over the Federal authority, great headway had been made in replacing casualties in old regiments. Between 15 August and 21 November 1862, 49,900 draftees were furnished by the States for their regiments in the field.³³

Meanwhile, the War Department moved to revitalize the recruiting service as a means of insuring a flow of recruits into the regiments in the field. Regulations for the Recruiting Service, published 2 December 1862, designated each regimental commander as superintendent of recruiting for his regiment, —authorized to detail and dispatch recruiting parties to the district in the State where the regiment had originated. All those recruited were to be sent from the local district to the general depot established in the State,

²⁰General Order No. 99, August 1862.

²¹*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 2, pp. 402-408.

²²See Special Order No. 64, Eleventh Corps, Army of the Potomac, in 54th (N. Y.) MS Infantry Letter and Order Book, National Archives.

²³*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 2, pp. 380-381.

²⁴*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 2, pp. 380-381. Also General Order No. 108, 1862. Also Report of the Secretary of War for 1862-1863, p. 5.

²⁵*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 2, p. 704.

²⁶Stanton to Governor Tod, October 16, 1862, in *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 2, p. 670.

²⁷*Ibid.*, p. 695.

²⁸Governor O. P. Morton to Adjutant General of Indiana, W. P. Holloway, November 1, 1862 in *ibid.*, pp. 713-714.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 714.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 744.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 743.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 746. There is no evidence in the *Official Records* to indicate whether the Pennsylvania concession was extended to other states.

³³*Ibid.*, pp. 859-861.

where each recruit would be assigned to the regiment for which he was enlisted, and be escorted to the field by a regimental representative.³⁴

Raising replacements by detaching recruiting parties hardly proved effective.³⁵ From 1 December 1862, to 31 January 1863, only 9,727 recruits were furnished to the regiments in the field.³⁶ Sporadic and intermittent enlistments could hardly fill the gaps in the ranks decimated by battles such as Fredericksburg. The principal problem remained untouched. So long as the States retained control over the mass of volunteers who answered the calls made by the Federal Government, the War Department could not hope to use them as replacements in old regiments. The words of Governor O. P. Morton of Indiana to President Lincoln on 7 October 1861, that "in this contest the Government is compelled to lean upon the States for its armies,"³⁷ remained essentially true. The States formed the volunteers into new regiments; indeed, the volunteers themselves preferred to enter new regiments.³⁸ Thus, the Federal Government had to devise means to recruit an army which the States could not control.

To that end, a bill for enrolling and calling out the *national forces* was enacted by Congress on 3 March 1863.³⁹ The Act was "the first ever passed by Congress in which the Government . . . appealed directly to the citizens of the United States to create a large army without the intervention of the

authorities of the respective States."⁴⁰ The Act provided for the registration of all males between 20 and 45; those not exempted for physical infirmity or vital employment were to constitute a national force liable for military service. The key aim of the draft was to place the recruit under the Federal Government's control and assign him, as a replacement, to an old regiment.⁴¹

To centralize control, the War Department charged the Provost-Marshal-General with the administration of the draft and, to enhance his authority, made him head of a separate bureau of the Department. Colonel James B. Fry, the Provost-Marshal-General, divided the United States into districts under the supervision of Assistant Provost-Marshal-Generals appointed by himself. The plan was to call up a draft, collect the draftees at district headquarters, also called the "rendezvous," where they would be given uniform, knapsack, haversack, canteen, and blanket. Commanding Generals of armies and departments were ordered to inform the commander of the rendezvous of their State of the number of replacements needed, and then to detail three officers and six enlisted men from each three-year regiment to go to the rendezvous to pick up their draftees. The rendezvous commander was enjoined to lose no time in preparing the detachments and placing them en route as soon as the requisite numbers were assembled.⁴² State authorities thus no longer participated in the collection and assignment of recruits.

The Government seemed determined at last to seize control of the nation's manpower. Even the intermittent volunteer was

³⁴Official Records, Series III, Vol. 2, pp. 913-943.

³⁵Upton, *Military Policy of the US*, p. 258.

³⁶Official Records, Series III, Vol. 3, p. 36.

³⁷Quoted in Kenneth Stampp, *Indiana Politics during the Civil War* (Indianapolis, 1949), p. 115.

³⁸See President Lincoln's letter to Count A. de Gasparin, 4 August, 1862, in J. Nicolay and J. Hay, *Abraham Lincoln's Complete Works* (2 Vols., New York, 1894), II, p. 218.

³⁹U. S. Statutes, 37 Cong., 3 Sess., Statute III, Ch. LXXV.

⁴⁰Report of James B. Fry, Provost-Marshal-General of the Army, dated 17 November, 1863, in *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, p. 1046.

⁴¹See Fry's suggestions to Secretary Stanton in *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, pp. 180-181.

⁴²See War Department Circulars, 12 June, 3 July, 1863, in *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, pp. 345; 465-466.

placed under the district Assistant Provost-Marshal-General rather than under the State Adjutant General.⁴³ The prime object remained to replace losses in old regiments before permitting any new regiments to be formed.⁴⁴ In view of this new policy, General Sherman was greatly perturbed by a report that only 100,000 of a projected 300,000 draftees were to be assigned as fillers, the States being allowed to form the remainder into new organizations. "Organizing new regiments may satisfy a few aspiring men," he wrote to Grant on 2 June 1863, "but it will prolong the war for years."⁴⁵ Grant enjoyed the prospect no more than did his subordinate and promptly forwarded Sherman's letter to President Lincoln.⁴⁶ Lincoln lost no time in demonstrating the Government's firmness by assuring Grant that draftees would be used only as fillers in old regiments.⁴⁷

The Government had previously shown proof of its determination to subordinate every consideration to the maintenance of veteran regiments at full strength and effectiveness. Section 19 of the Enrollment Act of 1863 authorized the President to consolidate the companies of any regiment of volunteers reduced to half-strength and to discharge the Colonel, one major, and an assistant surgeon when the number of companies for an infantry regiment was reduced to five or less; and to discharge the Colonel, two majors, and an assistant surgeon for cavalry and artillery regiments.⁴⁸ This section of the Act very probably was designed to assuage the sensibilities of State executives

whose patronage prerogatives the Draft Act threatened. The additional companies required to return the regiment to strength would be formed by the States, and the officers to be replaced might be appointed by the State. Consolidation of companies, however, threatened to weaken the strength and effectiveness of the regiment in the field. Sherman strongly protested this consolidation on the grounds that the discharged veteran officers would be replaced by inexperienced ones and the new companies could not be completely integrated into the old regiment. A better way to augment the regiment and maintain its maximum effectiveness, he wrote the Adjutant-General, would be to add individual conscripts to the depleted companies and retain the experienced officers. "If this consolidation is effected," he concluded, "I have no hesitation in saying that my army corps is and will be paralyzed by the change."⁴⁹ This contention was not rejected by the War Department: in a reply to an inquiry from Governor Holbrook of Vermont regarding consolidation, Secretary of War Stanton emphatically reiterated the Government's objective to fill old regiments with drafted men and to consolidate only when absolutely necessary.⁵⁰

The nation's manpower was enrolled, in accordance with the Act of 3 March 1863, but the government chose not to draft until the volunteer method should prove inadequate. On 17 October 1863, the President called for 300,000 volunteers to be raised by the States for service with units in the field from their respective States. Failure by any State to raise the allotted quota by 5 January 1864 would set in motion the Federal draft machinery to supply the deficiency.⁵¹ The effectiveness of the Government's new policy

⁴³General Order No. 111, 1863.

⁴⁴E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-General to the Governor of Connecticut, 18 June, 1863, in *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, p. 378.

⁴⁵*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, pp. 386-388.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 388.

⁴⁷Halleck to Grant, 14 July, 1863, *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, p. 487.

⁴⁸General Order No. 86, 1863.

⁴⁹*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, pp. 164-165.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, p. 224.

⁵¹General Order No. 340, 1863.

of control over the recruit became apparent immediately. The volunteers answering the President's call followed the procedure provided for the draftees in accordance with the Enrollment Act. The Assistant Provost-Marshal-Generals collected the volunteers at headquarters of districts, equipped them, and sent them in detachments to the regiments which had requisitioned them. Of the 369,380 recruits furnished by the States,⁵² the vast majority entered old organizations as fillers. Only 40 new regiments were organized and those principally by key States such as New York, Indiana, New Jersey, and Connecticut, whose sensibilities the Federal government could not completely ignore.⁵³

The government continued to stand fast in the matter of filling old regiments before authorizing new ones, and State pressure appears to have been successfully resisted. On 7 January 1864, when authorizing recruiting for the Ninth Army Corps, the Provost-Marshal-General cautioned General Ambrose E. Burnside, commanding, to form new regiments only after the old ones had been brought up to strength and then only with special War Department authorization.⁵⁴ Similarly, Secretary Stanton wired Governor Morton of Indiana a categorical refusal to his request to send 25 newly organized companies to old regiments.⁵⁵ The greater part of the 212,193 men who answered the calls of 1 February and 14 March 1864 were allotted to old regiments. Only 26 new units were formed by the States from these calls.

Unfortunately, the Federal Government

could not resist State pressures indefinitely. State executives longed to regain their inoperative and dormant military prerogatives. Patronage is the life-blood of politics, especially at the approach of the national election. Key men in the Republican machines of the States could easily have threatened the national political leaders if their privileges were not restored. Whatever the reason, the Government in Washington weakened. In February, the record reveals, instructions were issued from the War Department to the governors of New York, Indiana, and Ohio (each a force in national politics) to raise infantry companies and form them into regiments.⁵⁶ On 23 April, the Government accepted an offer of 85,000 militia for one hundred days from Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Wisconsin—all in newly formed regiments.⁵⁷ To be sure, the troops were most welcome to General Grant, then starting his campaign to take Richmond but, if the men could be raised as militia and formed into new regiments, they could just as easily have been raised and assigned as individual replacements where their value would have been doubled.⁵⁸

While the Federal government, under State pressure, retreated from its firm replacement policy, the ruinous practices of pre-1863 days never returned. The call for volunteers in July 1864 yielded 386,461 recruits. Of this number, about 85,000 (22 percent) made up new units. Of the 212,212 volunteers who answered the last call for troops in December 1864, about 69,000 (32 percent) were formed into new organizations.⁵⁹ Despite the percentage increase of the December over the July call, the greatest

⁵²Phisterer, *Statistical Record*, p. 6. Their quotas having been exceeded, the scheduled draft was made unnecessary.

⁵³*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, p. 1203. Also General Order No. 366, 1863.

⁵⁴*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, p. 14. For a similar injunction to General W. S. Hancock, Commanding General, Second Army Corps, see *ibid.*, p. 16.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 56, 58 (28 Jan., 1864).

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

⁵⁷Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, II, 514-515.

⁵⁸Grant urged the War Department to send all new recruits into old regiments exclusively. See *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 2, p. 4871.

⁵⁹Phisterer, *Statistical Record*, pp. 6-7. Also *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, pp. 1025-1026.

evil incident to the formation of new units—putting green troops in the line—was somewhat ameliorated in the December quota. While a larger number of men went into new units, fewer new regiments and more new companies were formed.⁶⁰ Instead of a completely new regiment entering the line, fighting as green units, new companies were sent to the front and attached to old reduced regiments giving the new companies the benefit of assimilating battle experience from their veteran fellows and minimizing the evil effects of combat upon fresh troops. The Federal Government thus effected a compromise with the States. Governors had again the opportunity to exercise their privileges, on company level at least, while the United States field commanders did not have to accept completely green regiments. In 1865, authorization to States for raising militia was most frequently restricted to forming new companies which were attached to reduced regiments in the field.⁶¹

After the Draft Act of 1863, the control of the recruit never completely left Federal hands. Volunteers as well as draftees were, in the main, at the disposition of the War Department.⁶² The bulk of the recruits went into old regiments as individual replacements or in units, principally the former.⁶³ By the end of 1864, 21 depots were in operation under Federal control for collecting and for-

warding the recruits to volunteer regiments in the field.⁶⁴

REGULARS

There would have been no problem replacing casualties in regular regiments had the plan formulated early in 1861 been followed. It will be recalled that the committee which Secretary Chase had charged with organizing the volunteers and regulars called by President Lincoln on 3 May, 1861, recommended a three-battalion regiment—two to serve in the line and the third to act as a depot battalion to recruit and train replacements for the regiment. Chase accepted the plan for the regulars but rejected it for the volunteers. On July 29, 1861, however, in an act providing for the organization of the new regiments of regulars, Congress authorized a regiment of not less than two nor more than three battalions but mentioned nothing of a depot battalion.⁶⁵ As the new regiments took form, they consisted of 24 companies organized into three battalions.⁶⁶ Each battalion was treated as a separate unit and the depot plan was never tried.⁶⁷

There seems to have been no replacement machinery substituted for the depot battalion. No authority was given the regiments to detach recruiting parties from the field. Most probably the regiments simply became further reduced after each engagement. The

⁶⁰Seventy-six new regiments and 98 new companies were formed from the July call; the score for the December call was 56 regiments and 129 companies. See *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, pp. 1025-1026.

⁶¹See Provost-Marshal-General to Governor of Massachusetts, 23 Feb., 1865, authorizing one new regiment and 30 detached companies to be assigned to old Massachusetts regiments which had been reduced. *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, p. 1200. Also Stanton to Governor of Illinois, 19 Feb., 1865, *ibid.*, p. 1186. Also General Order No. 243, 1863.

⁶²Governor of Iowa to General O. O. Howard, 8 Oct., 1864. *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, p. 760.

⁶³Sherman to Stanton, 13 Sept., 1864. *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, p. 713.

⁶⁴The depots were located at Portland, Maine; Concord, New Hampshire; Boston, Mass.; New Haven, Conn. (also serving Rhode Island and Vermont); Hart's Island, and Elmira, N. Y.; Trenton, N. J.; Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, and Carlisle, Penna.; Baltimore, Maryland (serving also Delaware); Columbus, Ohio; Jackson, Mich.; Indianapolis, Indiana; Springfield, Illinois; Madison, Wisconsin; Fort Snelling, Minnesota; Davenport, Iowa; St. Louis, Mo.; Louisville, Ky.; Nashville, Tenn. See *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, p. 808.

⁶⁵U. S. Statutes, 37 Cong., 1 Sess., Statute I, Ch. XXIV.

⁶⁶Only the newly formed regiments were authorized the three-battalion organization. The long established ten regiments of infantry retained the 10-company, one-battalion system.

⁶⁷Spaulding, *United States Army*, pp. 249-250; also Upton, *Military Policy*, pp. 249-253.

first positive indication of a Federal plan to replace the casualties came on 8 October, 1862, when General Halleck directed an order permitting volunteers to enlist or be transferred with their own consent to regular regiments.⁶⁸ The following day, the War Department, in General Order No. 154, authorized commanding officers of regular regiments, battalions, and batteries in the field to appoint one or more recruiting officers for enlisting volunteers to fill the regimental ranks to legal standard. As an inducement to the volunteer, the order recalled that regular army commissions were open to enlisted personnel for meritorious action.

The success achieved by the regular service in attracting volunteers is not revealed by the published records. It is a fact, however, that State executives displayed considerable alarm at what they considered Federal poaching on their manpower preserves. The Adjutant-General of Indiana strongly urged Stanton, on 29 October, 1862, to revoke the order permitting Regular Army recruiting officers to solicit for their regiments among the volunteers. Other States exhibited the same attitude.⁶⁹ There is no record of an immediate reply by Stanton nor is there any evidence of further cries of distress by the States. As a matter of fact, the States had little to fear from the regular service, for the latter could compete with the State recruiting officers only with difficulty. Shorter terms of enlistment and greater local bounties made the volunteer service more attractive.⁷⁰

This last inequality, the Federal government sought to adjust on 25 June, 1863, by raising to \$402 the bounty for regulars enlisting for five years.⁷¹ Again the following

month, further to bolster the replacement machinery of the Regular Army, the War Department centralized all recruiting for infantry, cavalry, and artillery regiments under a Brigadier General of the Regular Army acting as Superintendent of the General Service with headquarters in New York City. Each regular regiment in the field was assigned to a depot commanded by an assistant superintendent of regimental recruiting and garrisoned by members of the Invalid Corps.⁷² Each regiment was given a district in its depot area for recruiting purposes. Fourteen depots were established at various points in the loyal States to receive, equip, and train recruits, and forward them to the units in the field. Regimental officers were detailed to represent the regiment at the depots, and recruiting parties from the regiments operated in their respective districts.⁷³

Still, the regular army could not successfully compete with the volunteer service for recruits. At the year's end, the Adjutant-General reported comparatively few enlist-

⁷²The Invalid Corps, renamed the Veteran Reserve Corps in 1864, consisted of men who by wounds or disease were incapacitated for further field service but who were still able to perform garrison or light duty. See *Official Records*, Series III, *passim*, for organization, functions, etc.

⁷³Depots were established at the following places:

Carlisle Barracks, Pa., First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Cavalry

Fort Independence, Mass., First Artillery, Eleventh Infantry

Fort McHenry, Md., Second Artillery

Fort Trumbull, Conn., Third Artillery, Fourteenth Infantry

Fort Washington, Md., Fourth Artillery

Fort Hamilton, N. Y., Fifth Artillery, Twelfth Infantry

Annapolis, Md., First Infantry

Fort Columbus, N. Y., Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,

Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth Infantry

Newport Barracks, Ky., Thirteenth Infantry

Fort Adams, R. I., Fifteenth Infantry

Fort Ontario, N. Y., Sixteenth Infantry

Fort Preble, Me., Seventeenth Infantry

Camp Chase, Ohio, Eighteenth Infantry

Fort Wayne, Mich., Nineteenth Infantry

See General Orders No. 245 (28 July, 1863 and No. 290 (19 Aug., 1863).

⁶⁸*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 2, p. 653.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, p. 694.

⁷⁰Report of the Adjutant-General, 1864, in *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, p. 807.

⁷¹General Order No. 190, 1863.

ments in the regulars.⁷⁴ Recruits, quite understandably, preferred to serve in companies or regiments made up of men exclusively from their own States and designated by State name. Pride in their sovereign State transcended national patriotism and loyalty. In addition, as previously noted, the real attractions of shorter terms of enlistment and greater local bounties⁷⁵ lured the prospective recruit to the State colors. Much solicitude was felt for the reduced ranks of the Regular Army, especially after State pressure forced the War Department on 5 January, 1864, to revoke Halleck's order of 8 October, 1862, authorizing volunteers to transfer with their own consent to regular regiments.⁷⁶ To counteract the effect of this measure, the Government, on 18 January, offered an additional bounty to any regular re-enlisting before 1 March, 1864.⁷⁷

February was a high point in the recruitment records for 1864, but in March the figures began their downward course.⁷⁸ By October, 1864, only 13,019 men (including 916 re-enlistments) had entered as replacements for the regulars, hardly a sufficient number to maintain the regiments at legal strength.⁷⁹ Indeed, seven regiments of infantry and three of artillery were so reduced as to cease operating as independent units.

By late 1864, the recruiting service for regulars underwent reorganization to conform to the reduced number of units. Two general depots, Fort Columbus, New York, for infantry, and Carlisle Barracks, Penn-

sylvania, for cavalry, replaced the 14 depots which had been in operation since July 1863. At these points, recruits were collected for the regulars and forwarded to the regiments in the field. Of the 14 depots, nine were retained and three new ones added⁸⁰ to serve as sub-depots and recruiting headquarters for the 12 infantry and two artillery regiments which still remained in service, which had not been so decimated as to lose their identity.⁸¹

The problem of furnishing replacements for the regular regiments parallels that which confronted the Federal Government in the matter of volunteers. Political considerations prevented the full development of the War Department's plans. The States successfully vied with the Federal Government for recruits, and thus again, localism triumphed over centralization.

TRAINING

The training of replacements, individual, company, or regimental, was haphazard at best. Neither the Federal Government nor the States operated with consistency. Volunteers were called only when desperately needed; hence, the objective was to put them into the field as quickly as possible; the extent of their training was relatively unimportant. Had the depot battalion plan been adopted in May 1861, the training of individual replacements would have been solved, for the depot would have passed trained men into the ranks of the units. Withal, the lack of training created no serious problem for

⁷⁴*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, p. 1110.

⁷⁵Towns and counties continually increased their bounties to attract recruits from other localities to meet State quotas.

⁷⁶See Assistant Adjutant-General Townsend to all mustering officers, 5 Jan., 1864, in *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, p. 6.

⁷⁷See General Order No. 25, 1864.

⁷⁸*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, p. 810.

⁷⁹It should be recalled that the regular infantry regiments, authorized in 1861 and consisting of 24 companies, were about 2½ times stronger than the volunteer regiments which had only ten companies.

⁸⁰Fort Richmond and Fort Wood, N. Y., and Camp Thomas, Ohio, were added; Carlisle, Pa., Fort McHenry, Fort Washington, and Annapolis, Md., and Camp Chase, Ohio, were closed.

⁸¹The First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Infantry and the First, Second, and Fourth Artillery regiments no longer existed as units and were provided no sub-depots. See Adjutant-General Report, 1864, in *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, p. 807. After the war, the regiments were reconstituted and brought up to strength. *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 5, p. 133.

the individual replacement. The new recruit caught on quickly in the old regiments under veteran sergeants. By association with experienced commissioned and non-commissioned officers, he soon became combat-wise, adept in the ways of the soldier, in the use of arms and health techniques. It was the recruit in the newly organized regiment of volunteers that presented the problem. Rarely with adequate training, he was sent to the front along with his green fellows. He required months to learn soldiering and generally was unsuitable for combat for a year.⁸²

Immediately at the outbreak of the war, the Federal Government made a strong effort to provide for the training of the militia called out in April 1861. When making that call, Simon Cameron, the Secretary of War, directed the governors of the States to establish rendezvous in their States to serve as assembly points and camps of instruction for the militia. There the militia regiments would receive instruction in drill, discipline, and tactics before being sent to Federal service.⁸³ When, on 6 August, 1861, the President called for 500,000 volunteers, the War Department immediately made provision for their training. On the 15th, Cameron designated four national camps of rendezvous and instruction (at New York City and Elmira, New York; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; and Cincinnati, Ohio) to handle the recruits that answered the call. The volunteers were to be sent by their respective States to the camp closest to their homes where Regular Army officers took charge of their training. Volunteer regiments were directed

to requisition trained troops from the camps. Thus a field commander could be reasonably sure of getting a trained volunteer unit.⁸⁴

This excellent plan by the Federal Government to create a uniform training system for volunteers met with the approval neither of the States nor of the Regular Army. Governor Andrew of Massachusetts demonstrated the typical State attitude when he wrote Stanton that he preferred his troops to be equipped, drilled, and trained at the home station.⁸⁵ Winfield Scott, General-in-Chief of the United States Army, opposed the plan on the grounds that the Regular Army suffered by the assignment of its officers to train and command volunteers. In the summer of 1861, the Adjutant-General ordered all Regular Army officers already in command of volunteers to return to their companies.⁸⁶

The four training centers soon fell into disuse. Newly formed regiments were organized, equipped, and inspected at the home station and then sent directly to the army to which they were assigned. Whatever training they received, therefore, was at the home station under command of the regimental officers.⁸⁷

In the matter of individual replacements for old regiments, the practice generally was to send the recruit to the regiment as soon as he was enlisted and was reported ready by

⁸⁴General Order No. 58, 1861.

⁸⁵*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 2, p. 245.

⁸⁶Upton, *Military Policy*, p. 235. This policy on the part of the professional officer persisted. As late as 1864, General George G. Meade refused a lieutenant of Engineers permission to assume command of a regiment of Volunteers because a lieutenant of Engineers was more valuable than a colonel of Volunteers. See *ibid.*, p. 236. Fortunately for the Northern cause, U.S. Grant's application for active Federal service went unanswered by the War Department and he was forced to seek a commission in the Illinois Volunteers. At least, he was made a colonel of Volunteers, whereas he would probably not have been offered more than a captaincy in the Regulars.

⁸⁷General Order No. 75, 1862.

⁸²*Memoirs of General William T. Sherman* (2 vols., New York, 1875), II, pp. 387-388. Also Sherman to Grant, 2 June, 1863, in *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, pp. 386-388. General George B. McClellan preferred that the recruit for the old regiment receive no training at his home depot. Contact with veterans made him a soldier in one-tenth the time, he claimed. *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 2, pp. 225-226.

⁸³*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 1, pp. 68-69, 229-230.

the rendezvous commander.⁸⁸ In December 1862, when the Government made a strong bid to channel recruits into old regiments by setting up new regulations for the recruiting service, it provided for the training of the replacement from the moment of his enlistment. The regulations provided for the recruit to be armed and assigned to a regiment at the depot and, before being sent to join his regiment, to be instructed in infantry tactics from the school of the soldier to that of the battalion, and to be instructed in the exercise of garrison and field pieces.⁸⁹

This practice, however, was soon changed. Along with the plans attendant upon the passage of the National Enrollment Act of March 1863, the Provost-Marshall-General suggested that the draftee be given his equipment, uniform, knapsack, haversack, canteen, and blanket at district headquarters and then sent immediately to the regiment to which he was assigned.⁹⁰ This recommendation seems to have been followed, for, throughout the remainder of the war, the individual replacement for the old regiments was given training before joining his regiment only while awaiting the unit's call.⁹¹ Most frequently, he lacked instruction when sent to the field.⁹² The regiment paid slight and indifferent attention to tactical and drill instruction.⁹³ The replacement had to get his training under actual combat conditions, whatever the cost.

CONCLUSION

It was indeed unfortunate that the plan

⁸⁸See Stanton to Governor Tod of Ohio, *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 2, p. 707.

⁸⁹*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 2, pp. 913-943.

⁹⁰*Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 3, pp. 180-181.

⁹¹War Department Circular No. 74, in *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, pp. 718-719.

⁹²See Major-General Benjamin F. Butler's remarks of 7 Dec., 1864, in *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, pp. 982-988.

⁹³MS Reports, Inspector General Office, 1864, 1865, in National Archives.

suggested by the committee appointed by Secretary Chase in 1861 was not accepted *in toto* by the War Department and put into immediate and permanent operation. The three-battalion regiment with one battalion to serve as a recruiting and training unit for the battalions in the field⁹⁴ would have solved the essential problem of replacing casualties with trained men and would have saved the Government millions of dollars.⁹⁵ Many leading historians of the Civil War and of American military policy, a number of prominent commanders, and at least one foreign military observer⁹⁶ lamented the failure of the Federal government to maintain the regiments at legal strength by the use of individual replacements.

Essentially, the problem was political. Maintaining old regiments would have meant no new regiments after the requisite number had been formed. Such a procedure would have denied the State Executives the exercise of their military prerogatives. The States jealously guarded their privilege of appointing officers for the new regiments. The continued formation of new units naturally increased their opportunities to discharge political debts.

Our Federal system, where the National Government shares authority with the component States, is assuredly a vital democratic safeguard and wisely provided for by the Founding Fathers. But in war, centralization of authority and undisputed power must be lodged in a single agency: the central government. This shift in power has ever been the bane of our Federal democracy.

⁹⁴General Butler proposed such a plan of organization. *Official Records*, Series III, Vol. 4, pp. 982-988.

⁹⁵See W. H. Carter, *The American Army* (Indianapolis, 1915), pp. 117, 141; also Upton, *Military Policy*, p. 417.

⁹⁶Ferdinand Lecomte, a Swiss Lieutenant Colonel, in *War in the United States. Report to the Swiss Military Department* (New York, 1863), p. 95.

THE BATTLING BASTARDS OF BATAAN

BY LOUIS MORTON*

STRATEGIC DECISIONS in war are normally based upon military and political considerations. Rarely do food, medicine, and morale enter into the larger decisions of war. But when on April 9, 1942, the 75,000 American and Filipino troops on Bataan surrendered, they did so with the bitter realization that starvation, disease, and despair—not the enemy—had brought them to defeat.

The war in the Philippines had begun on December 8, 1941, with a disastrous air attack against Clark Field, an attack which destroyed half the heavy bombers of MacArthur's Far East Air Force. In the tragic two weeks that followed, the Japanese continued to achieve astounding successes. By the 22d, they had attained aerial and naval supremacy in the Philippines, and had isolated the Archipelago from Australia to the south and from Hawaii and the United States to the east.

On that day, the bulk of General Homma's 14th Army came ashore at Lingayen Gulf and began its march to Manila. MacArthur's forces, which included the recently mobilized Philippine Army, were clearly unable to hold the enemy and were in danger of immediate destruction. Their defeat would mean the end of the battle and the loss of the Philip-

pinas, America's bastion in the Far East. To avert this disaster MacArthur decided on December 23rd to pull back his troops to Bataan and there establish a strong holding position. Under the most difficult circumstances and under constant pressure from a resourceful and determined enemy he completed the withdrawal in the short space of two weeks.

By this move, MacArthur achieved far-reaching results. The withdrawal averted the immediate destruction of his forces, delayed the Japanese timetable of conquest four months, and kept large Japanese combat forces tied up in the Philippines long after Malaya, Singapore, and the Indies had fallen. Undoubtedly, in the larger sense, the decision to withdraw to Bataan was a wise one.

But the 80,000 American and Philippine troops who reached the jungled mountain fastness of Bataan on January 6, 1942, did not view their situation in terms of grand strategy or the larger objectives of the war. They were trapped and there was no way out. To the east, west, and south was the sea; to the north was the enemy, who dominated both sea and air, effectively preventing communication with the outside world. Unless the trapped men received aid from Australia or the United States, they were doomed. There was no retreat from Bataan.

No sooner had the troops taken their posi-

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tion across the peninsula than they were faced with the tangible evidence of their plight. Almost the first official action on Bataan was a sharp reduction in the daily ration. With the 26,000 civilians who followed the Army into the peninsula, the Quartermaster had to feed 106,000 men—the population of a city the size of South Bend, Indiana. When he took inventory, he found he had only enough food for thirty days for so large a force. To make the supply last longer, he immediately cut the normal field ration in half. Theoretically, this would give the Americans 36 ounces of food a day, the Filipinos 32. Actually the troops on Bataan never received even that amount. Their ration varied from day to day and was based solely on the amount of food on hand.

The troops had been on Bataan scarcely more than a month when the daily ration dropped below 30 ounces; thereafter it decreased steadily. In March, when the final cut was made the ration furnished little more than enough to sustain life. The bareness and inadequacy of this diet are made strikingly clear in the ration for March 25th when the men received only $8\frac{1}{2}$ ounces of rice, $1\frac{1}{2}$ each of flour and salt, slightly more than one ounce of canned meat and canned milk, and one-half ounce of sugar. Altogether the food allowance on that day totalled $14\frac{1}{2}$ ounces, less than one-quarter of the 71 ounces normally provided in the ration.

On the 28th of the month, Wainwright wrote General Marshall that disaster was imminent unless supplies arrived soon. There was only enough food on Bataan, he declared, to last until April 15 "at one-third ration, poorly balanced and very deficient in vitamins." If, by that time, supplies did not reach him, Wainwright bluntly warned the Chief of Staff, "the troops there will be starved into submission."

Strenuous efforts had been made since

January to run food and supplies from the southern Philippines, the Indies, Australia, and the United States through the Japanese blockade. The results of these efforts were a tragic disappointment. The Quartermaster estimated that altogether only 5,000 tons of rice, 400 livestock, 1,100 tons of balanced rations—about a week's supply for Bataan—and 700 tons of native foodstuffs had reached Corregidor. By the end of February the mood of those officers familiar with the blockade running program was one of pessimism. "We knew," wrote one of them, "that we could expect no more supplies from that source."

Cut off from contact with the outside world, the Quartermaster made every effort to exploit the slender food resources of Bataan. Two rice mills were constructed by the engineers and foraging parties brought there the unhusked rice which stood ripe in the narrow rice belt along the east coast of the peninsula. Before the supply was exhausted a total of 250 tons had been collected. Since the rate of consumption was 15 tons a day, this impressive total amounted to only a 17-day supply.

Rice was the most abundant food on Bataan, and ultimately replaced wheat in the diet of the American soldier. Accustomed to potatoes and bread, he found rice, which had little nutritive value, a most unsatisfactory substitute. Without seasoning or other foods, it had little flavor of its own and tasted like "wall-paper paste." As one wit remarked: "Rice is the greatest food there is—anything you add to it—improves it." But it had one virtue none could deny; it filled empty stomachs and on Bataan that was a most important consideration.

While it lasted, fresh meat was issued to the troops at regular intervals, usually every third day. This meat was obtained

principally from the carabao, the Philippine beast of burden. In the absence of refrigeration, the carabao were kept in enclosures until a fresh meat issue was due, then quickly slaughtered and issued to the troops. Additional meat was obtained when the cavalry regrettably slaughtered its 250 horses and 48 pack mules.

For a time the diet included fresh fish caught by local fishermen who went out at night with their nets and returned before morning with their haul. Their activities came to an abrupt end when they found themselves the target of Japanese, as well as American gunfire.

To these sources of food must be added the amounts procured by the individual soldier. The Filipino was most adept at fending for himself in the jungle. On Bataan he could secure chickens, pigs, sweet potatoes, bamboo shoots, mangoes, and bananas. He could supplement his diet with dog and monkey meat; with the chicken-like meat of the iguana lizard, so relished by the natives; and with the meat of the large python snake whose eggs the Filipinos considered a great delicacy. On his own initiative he picked rice in the fields near him and threshed it in his foxhole. Oftimes patrols would return with sacks of milled rice.

The Americans soon learned that hunger is a great leveller and sought the meat of dogs—which tasted like lamb, iguanas, and monkeys as avidly as their native comrades-in-arms. After a varied diet on Bataan, one officer wrote: "I can recommend mule. It is tasty, succulent, and tender—all being phrases of comparison, of course. There is little to choose between . . . pony and carabao. The pony is tougher but better flavor than carabao. Iguana is fair. Monkey I do not recommend. I never had snake." To supplement this advice there is the judgment of another gourmet who declared "that mon-

key meat is all right until the animal's hands turn up on the plate."

The long and difficult supply lines on Bataan made the issue of even the most inadequate ration a real problem. The distribution of fresh meat was especially difficult. It had to be transported in open, unrefrigerated trucks during the heat of the tropical day on hauls lasting as long as twelve hours. The meat which reached the front line troops, therefore, was not always as fresh as it should have been. Sometimes an accident could have tragic results for the starved garrison.

A lucky hit by a Japanese bomber knocked out a freezing unit in the Corregidor cold storage plant and about 24,000 pounds of meat, almost one day's supply, had to be sent to Bataan for immediate issue. Five successive air raids delayed the loading of the meat, and the shipment did not reach Bataan until the next morning. Since it could not be unloaded during daylight, the meat remained on the barge the entire day. By evening it was unfit for distribution.

The difficult supply routes and the ever present threat of starvation were responsible for large-scale pilferage, hi-jacking, and hoarding, by civilians and troops alike. Supply trucks moving slowly along the narrow, tortuous trails of Bataan were ideal targets for hungry men with guns, or unarmed but starving civilians. Even the guards posted along the roads were not above temptation, and the closer the ration trucks came to the front lines the less food they contained. Despite threats of dire consequences, looting and hi-jacking continued throughout the campaign.

Many units had their own private reserves of food, secured in various ways, regular and irregular. The chief source of these caches was the supplies picked up at depots during the withdrawal and never turned in.

One unit, investigation disclosed, had a considerable quantity of food well guarded behind barbed wire; another had 8,500 C Rations in its private dump. In one case, the driver of a ration truck had accumulated 520 cans of tomatoes, 111 cans of evaporated milk, 297 cans of tomato sauce, 114 cans tomato juice, 6 cans oleomargarine, 12 sacks of rice and almost a sack of wheat. Some units obtained additional food by padding strength reports so that they could draw more than their share. One flagrant example was that of a division, with two regiments detached, which drew 11,000 rations at a time when its full strength could not have been more than 6,500 men. At one time 122,000 rations were being issued daily to the 80,000 troops on Bataan.

While such practices existed, the fare of units was uneven. Some ate well, others poorly, and it is a truism of warfare that the units to the rear always live best. "There is nothing quite so controversial as the Bataan ration," wrote one reflective officer. "Some units got corned beef, others none. Some had corned beef hash in lieu of fish. Some got eight ounces of rice, others 3.7. Some got flour in place of bread, some hard tack." But on one thing, the inadequacy of the ration, all were agreed.

The demand for cigarettes was never met. Never present in sufficient quantity for general distribution, they were doled out to the front-line troops from time to time. Nothing disappeared more quickly between the point of supply and destination. For smokers the loss was a heavy one, and created a real morale problem. When an inspecting officer drew out a pack of cigarettes at a front line position, he was immediately mobbed. Every Filipino within 50 yards left his foxhole and rushed to get one. In the three months the men were on Bataan, they received on the average less than one cigarette a day. De-

prived of the solace of tobacco and coffee, the soldier living on 14½ ounces of food a day could be very miserable indeed.

Adding to his misery and discomfort was the shortage of clothing and personal equipment. Regular Army units were comparatively well-clad but the Philippine Army had the scantiest supplies. As time passed, uniforms became more ragged and threadbare, offering little protection against the cold night, the rain, and the cruel thorns so abundant on Bataan.

Unit commanders were instructed to limit their clothing requisitions to the minimum required for replacement, without regard to normal army standards. Most did not receive even this minimum. In one unit, the uniforms were considered 90 percent unserviceable. Less than 25 percent of the enlisted men in this unit had blankets, shelter halves, or raincoats. Fully one-quarter were without footgear; the rest wore shoes so badly worn that under normal conditions they would have been considered unfit for use.

The consequences of the inadequate and unbalanced ration soon became evident in the high incidence of malnutrition and vitamin deficiency diseases. In terms of energy, the January ration had provided approximately 2,000 calories a day. The next month the figure declined to 1,500 and during March it was 1,000 calories daily, only one-fourth of that required to sustain the average working man.

This caloric deficiency, combined with the lack of important vitamins, produced alarming results. Serious muscle waste and depletion of fat reserve were evident in the thin bodies and hollow cheeks of the hungry men. Night blindness, swellings, diarrhea, and dysentery became common, and beriberi in its incipient stages was almost universal among the troops. The men had lost the capacity to resist even the most minor ail-

ment, and any disease, warned the Bataan Surgeon, would assume epidemic proportions.

His fears were soon justified in the rapid spread of malaria. For a time it was kept under control by prophylactic doses of quinine, but the supply was limited and its use, except for those actually stricken with the disease, was discontinued at the end of February. The consequences of this decision were apparent almost immediately in the increase of daily admissions to the hospitals. Within a week, the number jumped to 500. In the days that followed it showed no signs of abating and after a month was approaching the fantastic figure of 1,000 admissions daily for malaria alone.

Every effort was made to secure additional quinine. Some was brought to Corregidor by plane from Australia, and an attempt was made locally to manufacture a drug from the bark of a tree reputed to have the properties of quinine. Despite every expedient, it proved impossible to obtain a large enough supply to permit its use as a prophylaxis. A minimum of 3,000,000 quinine tablets a month was needed. The medical depot had on hand, at the end of March, only 600,000—enough for six days—and no prospect of getting more.

Nerve fatigue, too, incapacitated many of the men. The majority of the combat troops had received no rest in a rear area since the first Japanese attack on December 8th. Even reserve and service units behind the line had been subjected to heavy bombardment. The physical evidences of nerve fatigue were manifested in the increasingly large number of men who proved unable to stand the strain of combat. At first, stragglers could be rallied and sent back into battle. Later, the stragglers discarded their arms and equipment and refused to return to the front lines. It was only by the use of force that

commanders could get them back into combat. "They were surly and physically exhausted," reported the medics, "as well as mentally unequal to further combat duty."

The large and ever-increasing number of sick strained all medical installations to the utmost. The capacity of the two general hospitals on Bataan, designed to accommodate 1,000 patients each, was steadily increased until it reached a figure three times that number. But the sick rate continued to outstrip even this notable expansion, and admission to the general hospitals was finally limited to two types of cases: those requiring serious medical or surgical treatment, and, those in which the period of disability was expected to exceed 21 days.

All other patients were sent to medical battalion clearing stations which were converted into 300-bed hospitals. Under ideal circumstances, a clearing station is neither organized nor equipped to provide hospitalization. On Bataan, the circumstances were far from ideal.

As the number of sick increased, downward echelonment of hospitalization continued. Soon the collecting companies, originally intended to provide only emergency treatment to casualties, were converted into hospitals with 100 to 150 beds. Even with the addition of these units, hospital facilities proved inadequate, and patients with minor ailments were sent to battalion and regimental aid stations. By the end of March, the two general hospitals had about 8,500 patients, and another 4,000 were being treated in a provisional hospital. Undetermined numbers were ill in division clearing and collecting companies. One clearing company, 4,000 yards behind the front lines had 900 beds; another had 600. At the end, all medical installations on Bataan were bursting with patients.

The effects of disease and starvation upon

combat efficiency were disastrous. "It was," in the words of an inspecting officer, "an utter nightmare." The men of one regiment were so weak, wrote the commander, that they "were just able to fire a rifle out of the trench, and no more." A month after they reached Bataan, the men were only about 75 percent effective, six weeks later this figure dropped to 25 percent. After a three-month long starvation diet, incessant air and artillery bombardment, and the ravages of disease, the fighting capacity of the men was almost gone, their combat efficiency practically zero.

But the ability of men to fight can not be measured by physical standards alone. Where all men bore the signs of enforced privation and suffering, there was no question of separating the fit from the unfit. Only desperate necessity and the will to fight kept many on their feet. The Japanese knew this and made crude attempts to corrupt the spirit of resistance. Flying low over Bataan, their aircraft often dropped propaganda leaflets instead of bombs on the Americans and Filipinos below.

Appealing only to the basest emotions—race prejudice, jealousy, hate, avarice, and deceit—the leaflets had little effect on morale. As a matter of fact, men made a hobby of collecting them and exchanged duplicates to fill out their collections. "Majors Poole, Crane, and Holmes got me some," exulted Colonel O'Day, "including the red and white ribbon streamers attached to the beer cans and addressed to General Wainwright." This acquisition was particularly prized for the beer cans contained a demand for Wainwright's surrender.

Japanese radio propaganda was more effective than the leaflets. From Manila they broadcast to the Americans on Bataan a nightly program, much like that presented later by Tokyo Rose. Opening with "Ships

That Never Come In," the Japanese played popular recordings calculated to make the men homesick. "The damned Nips," wrote one officer, "have got a new propaganda program that does not help our morale any. The men joke happily, but underneath they are disquieted."

The one great hope that fortified all men was their belief that somehow large reinforcements and shiploads of food and supplies would break through the Japanese blockade and come to their rescue. This belief was based partly on the desperate desire to believe it and partly on MacArthur's message to the troops on January 15 when he had declared that help was on the way. "Thousands of troops and hundreds of planes," he had said, "are being dispatched." Though he had carefully stated that the date of arrival was uncertain, the hungry men, grasping eagerly at every straw assumed that they would come soon.

Their hopes were badly shaken when President Roosevelt, in his February 23d fireside chat, placed the Philippines in their proper perspective "in the big picture of the war." His listeners on Bataan could find no hope for relief in the President's message. Instead they heard about the global nature of the struggle, the desperate situation of the United Nations, the tremendous tasks facing the American people, and production figures for the future.

These men were not interested in the volume of production expected during the next two years. What they needed was food, clothing, and medicine, and they needed them immediately. One officer expressed the feelings of many when he wrote: "Plain for all to see was the handwriting on the wall, at the end of which the President had placed a large and emphatic period. The President had—with regret—wiped us off the page and closed the book."

When General MacArthur was evacuated to Australia shortly after the President's speech, most Americans realized that the end was near. On the basis of Japanese promises, the Filipino could expect ultimately to be returned to his home. For the American there was no such bright prospect. Death or capture and a long separation from home and country was his certain fate. He knew the worst now; all he could do was make the enemy pay dearly for victory. Meanwhile he made the best of his bad fortune, joked grimly about his fate, and hid his feelings under a cloak of irony. It was this spirit that found its expression in that song of hopelessness and defiance:

*We're the battling bastards of Bataan;
No mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam;
No aunts, no uncles, no cousins, no nieces;
No pills, no planes, no artillery pieces.
... And nobody gives a damn.*

When the Japanese began their final attack on April 3d, the men on Bataan were already defeated. Starved and disease-ridden, they were totally incapable of the sustained physical effort necessary for a successful defense. In five days the Japanese split and outflanked the American and Filipino lines and gained undisputed passage to the south where the hospitals with their defenseless patients were located.

Surrender or wholesale slaughter were the

only choices open to General King, and with a heavy heart he went forward on the morning of April 9 to arrange terms with the Japanese commander. He felt, he said later, like General Lee who on the same day seventy-seven years earlier, just before his meeting with Grant at Appomatox, had remarked, "Then there is nothing left to do but to go and see General Grant, and I would rather die a thousand deaths."

The battle for Bataan was ended, the fighting was over. The men who had survived the long ordeal could feel justly proud of what they had done. For three months they had held off the Japanese, only to be overwhelmed finally by disease and starvation. In a very real sense theirs had been a true medical defeat, the inevitable outcome of a campaign of attrition, of "consumption without replenishment."

Gallant foes and brave soldiers, the battling bastards had earned the right to be treated with consideration and decency but their enemies had reserved for them even greater privation and suffering than any they had experienced on Bataan. Ahead of them lay the horrors and atrocities of the death march and the nightmare of three long years of hardship and humiliation in a Japanese prison camp. The fate of Bataan had been sealed by prewar negligence; its fall was assured by the Japanese blockade. Famine and disease were the inevitable prelude to surrender.

NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

MOSBY RE-ACTIVATED IN 1951


BY RALPH W. DONNELLY

THE PHILOSOPHY of Joe Sweeney, "Jeb" Stuart's banjo-player, that "If you want to have a good time, jine the cavalry" guided the members of the Civil War Round Table of Washington on Saturday, April 28 as they relived the experiences and exploits of the 43d Battalion of Virginia Cavalry. More commonly known as "Mosby's Rangers," the unit and its activities were made real for the members of the Round Table by Virgil Carrington "Pat" Jones, author of "Ranger Mosby."

The members of the Round Table assembled at 1416 F St., N. W. to board a

Capital Transit bus for Mosby's Confederacy. With the crossing of the Potomac River there began a virtual barrage of anecdotes, stories, and military criticism of the War of '61-'65 which was only stilled by the first stop at Fairfax, Va. in front of the Episcopal Rectory. It was here that the Washington contingent was joined by the Northern Virginia detachment, headed by Mr. Jones.

Adjacent to the Episcopal Rectory is the house that figured prominently in one of Mosby's most fabled exploits, the nocturnal capture of General Edwin H. Stoughton.



Ranger Mosby Tour

Jones recounted Mosby's early war history, his beginnings in Northern Virginia, his feud with Colonel Percy Wyndham of the Union Army, and his capture and escape with Stoughton, thirty-two other officers and men, and fifty-eight fine U. S. Government issue horses.

Re-boarding the bus, we proceeded northwest on the Little River Turnpike (U. S. Route 50) past Chantilly, where General Phil Kearney was killed by Jackson's men, past Mt. Zion Church, Mosby's first rendezvous in January 1863, and cut through the Bull Run Mountains at Aldie Gap, guarded by the little town of Aldie nestled in the shade of the mountain. Here we stopped across the road from the old mill at the scene in March 1863 of the scattering of Federal forces withdrawing from Middleburg after abusing the old men of that town.

Leaving Aldie and passing through Middleburg, these modern mechanized Rangers turned left on a dirt road into Fauquier county and followed it for perhaps a mile. The road led through rural nothingness until a fine brick home was reached. This was the Hathaway house, used by Mosby as his stopping-point from time to time as well as being the Loudoun Valley home picked by him for his wife. It was at this house that Mosby escaped capture by the Federals by swinging into a tree from a bedroom window while the house was searched, returning to the house, undiscovered, after the search was over.

After looking over this fine example of an ante-bellum home, the group retraced their steps to the Little River Turnpike and resumed the journey westward. Several miles further on we reached Rector's Cross Roads, now known by the somewhat enigmatic name of Atoka. Again we turned left, then, after a short drive, turned right into a country lane leading to an old frame house with a

porch across the front. This was the old Ludwell Lake house where Mosby was seriously wounded on the night of December 21, 1864. As "Pat" Jones recited the story of Mosby's surprise, his wounding, and his subterfuge in concealing his identity, we were carried back by his words to that exciting day and event. On entering the very room where Mosby was shot, the time transition was easy to make while the service star in the window kept a liaison with the present.

* * * * *

It was just four days before Christmas in 1864 when Mosby attended the wedding of Ordnance Sergeant Jake Lavender at the home of Joseph Blackwell in Fauquier. It was the holiday season, and Mosby had double reason for feeling fine as he had just received permission to organize his command into two battalions and his own promotion to a full colonelcy on the 7th of the month.

Mosby had barely made his appearance at the scene of the wedding when his scouts brought word of the advance of a party of Federals on the Salem road, several miles distant. Accompanied by Tom Love of Company D, he slipped away from the scene of nuptial festivities to brave the cold drizzle which was turning to sleet. The Federals stopped on the Rectortown road, built fires, and gave every evidence of making camp for the night. Dismissing them as an active element for the night, Mosby moved on toward Rector's Cross Roads after having sent a local Ranger to alert Lt. Col. Chapman and Mai. Richards for a morning attack.

Near Rector's Cross Roads Love and Mosby picked up the light in the window at Ludwell Lake's home, a man known to be friendly to the cause and a father of a Ranger. The two cold and hungry men dismounted for an obviously quick visit as they left their finely appointed horses tied at the front gate. They were given a warm welcome and were

soon seated for a late supper when the sound of horses' hooves was heard in the yard. The thought flashed through the minds of all — these must be Yankees.

So it proved to be. The Federal party under Mosby's observation earlier in the evening had only paused to warm themselves and presumably to eat, not to bivouac for the night. The detachment of the Sixteenth and Thirteenth New York Cavalry Regiments under Maj. Douglas Frazar was plodding its way back to their camp when Cpl. Kane of Capt. Brown's advance guard spotted the two horses tied to the farm house gate, and the patrol stopped to investigate.

On the inside Mosby sprang for the door opening on what is today the back porch, motioned for the lights to be extinguished, and cracked the door long enough to identify the men who were filling up the yard. An instant was sufficient to confirm his worst fears, and he returned to the dining room (and here the stories differ somewhat) to be faced with a group of entering Federals. Outlined by the flickering light of the fireplace Mosby was silhouetted momentarily behind the window. That was long enough for the cavalryman covering the window from his mount in the yard, and a bullet crashed through the window catching him like a duck in a shooting gallery.

Mosby, struck by a ball in the abdomen, staggered into an adjoining bedroom, hid his uniform coat with its tell-tale insignia, and smeared his hot, oozing blood across his mouth in sufficient quantity to be able to work it up to a froth. The returning Federal officers and men questioned the Lakes as to the identity of the injured man. Receiving no satisfaction they interrogated the wounded Mosby directly. With all the flavor of a death-bed confession Mosby gasped that he was Lt. Johnson, Sixth Virginia Cavalry.

Major Frazar, unimpressed by the title of

lieutenant, and convinced he was talking to a dying man, left Mosby lie on the floor and withdrew. The other Federals, concurring, also left the building, taking with them Mosby's boots, pants, plumed hat, overcoat, and cape to be inspected at their leisure.

After the troopers had left Mosby returned to the dining room to be met with the same shocked surprise which must have greeted Lazarus. Recovering quickly, the Lakes sent Mosby by ox-cart with a Negro driver to the home of the widow Glascock, the first step on his path to safety and recovery. Mosby distrusted this driver, but he was delivered safely although the Negro went over to the Federals several days later.

Back in the Federal camp a horrible realization began to dawn upon Major Frazar and his brother officers that they had left the big catch slip through their fingers. The irate brigade commander, Colonel William Gamble, heaped the blame upon Major Frazar and his affiliation with *spiritus fermenti* that cold evening. Later ordering that all wounded rebels be brought in when found he made his final official dig at the unfortunate Major by excusing the absence of this order previously on the grounds that he had thought any officer ought to have common sense enough to do so without an order.

* * * * *

After again returning to the Little River Turnpike, we pounded down the highway to the little town of Paris, guardian of Ashby's Gap over the Blue Ridge, topped the rise, glided down the western slope, crossed the Shenandoah, and headed for Millwood, the scene of the abortive attempt to arrange for the surrender and parole of Mosby's men. Then we headed roughly north to Berryville and to the scene of Mosby's famous raid on Sheridan's wagon train, August 13, 1864.

Leaving Berryville we headed up the Valley to Front Royal, the scene of the exe-

cution without trial of six of Mosby's men by the Federal forces in September 1864. Taking time out for lunch at Front Royal, we had as guests for luncheon Mrs. Ferguson Cary, the daughter of "Syd" Ferguson, a Mosby man, and Miss Virginia Hale, a student of the local history of Front Royal and Warren County. Mrs. Cary related the experience of her father in capturing Captain Richard Blazer, commander of a picked unit from Crook's cavalry division.

Miss Hale gave a brief description of the Guard Hill affair and then reviewed the story of the execution of six Rangers by Federal troops in Front Royal on September 23, 1864. Miss Hale developed the interesting conclusion that General Custer has been unjustly blamed for the orders for the execution of Mosby's men and that the real culprit was Brevet Major General Alfred T. A. Torbert, Sheridan's Chief of Cavalry.

Careful search of the Official Records seems to confirm Miss Hale's conclusions which are at variance with the commonly accepted versions of the executions.

On September 22 the First and Third Cavalry Divisions under Torbert were operating up the Luray Valley in conjunction with Sheridan's attack on Early's forces at Fisher's Hill. The First was commanded by Brigadier-General Wesley Merritt, the Third by Brigadier-General James H. Wilson. Merritt had with him two brigades, the First, commanded by Brigadier-General George A. Custer (1st, 5th, 6th, 7th Mich. and 25th N. Y.) and the Reserve, commanded by Colonel Charles R. Lowell, Jr. (2d Mass., 1st, 2d, and 5th U. S. Regulars present). Torbert was blocked at Milford and fell back toward Front Royal. Merritt's report states that near Front Royal the advance of the Reserve Brigade encountered a body of guerrillas in the act of capturing an ambulance train. These were actually Mosby's men un-

der Captain Chapman. In the affray which ensued, Lieutenant Charles McMaster, 2d U. S. Cavalry, was mortally wounded, the Federals believing he was shot after being taken prisoner. Colonel Lowell in his report merely mentions dispersing a detachment of Mosby's men. The reports from two of Custer's regimental commanders (1st and 6th Mich.) do not mention any encounter with Mosby's men. Custer himself did not make any report covering September 23.

Just the Reserve Brigade under Colonel Lowell was engaged, and they presumably made the capture of the six Rangers. Following the chain of Army command Lowell's superiors were the commanding officer of his division, General Merritt, and the Cavalry Corps commander, General Torbert. *Custer, therefore, had no jurisdiction over the prisoners*, and the orders for their execution must have come from or been approved by Colonel Lowell or Generals Merritt or Torbert. Custer was undoubtedly present in Front Royal that day on the way to Cedarville with the rest of the division, and, conspicuous as he was in appearance, was probably assumed by the townspeople to have been in over-all command.

For years the Confederate story was that Custer ordered the execution of the six Rangers, but after looking at the records this does not appear to be correct. Miss Hale had shed new light upon an old belief.

After leaving Front Royal the Round Table members headed back to Washington via Manassas Gap. On reaching Marshall, Va. (war-time Salem) a visit was made to the stone erected at the site of the disbanding of the 43d Battalion Partisan Rangers. From here the path homeward led past the Manassas battlefield and out of Mosby's Confederacy and into the realities of the present. On disbanding in Washington, the Round Table chalked up Trip 1.

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Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

REVIEWS

The Purse and the Sword: Control of the Army by Congress Through Military Appropriations 1933-1950, by Elias Huzar. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1950. Pp. 417. \$4.50)

The Purse and the Sword is an historical analysis of the methods Congress employs in exercising control of the military. The principal source material is the hearings held by the Senate and House subcommittees dealing with appropriations for the Army.

The book opens with a discussion of the reasoning and intent of the founding fathers in providing in the Constitution for a standing army and in placing control over it in the Congress. These founders saw the need for a standing army to protect the nation's security but at the same time they felt civilian control of and limitations on the size of the standing army would be necessary to prevent any tendency toward militarism. Hence, the provisions giving the Congress authority over the size and composition of armed forces, and for appropriations of money to support them, as well as the provisions making the President Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and those for a militia. The militia was counted on to reduce the need for having a large standing army and to operate as a check on the growth of excessive power in the hands of the professional soldier.

The founders of the Government did not guarantee civilian supremacy over the country's armed forces, but of all the political instruments they devised to promote that end, the power of the purse was intended to play a leading role.

The principal purpose of this book is to examine how Congress has used the power of the purse to control the military, to identify weak-

nesses in the methods of control used and to suggest improvements that in the words of the author will result in a "tighter purse and a sharper sword."

The late Dr. Huzar presents the thesis that while Congress has legal authority to control fully the armed forces, in practice the control it exercises is far from complete. There are many reasons for this situation which the author treats at length, supporting his observations with numerous quotations from the printed hearings. Among the reasons referred to are the following:

1. By and large Congressmen do not have the experience and expert knowledge required to form judgments on military requirements independently, and do not have the time to acquire it.
2. Even the members of the subcommittees that deal with military appropriations have to rely on military administrators for information and advice.
3. Committees dealing with appropriations are bogged down with the detail of operations and procedures.
4. They do not have sufficient staff assistance.
5. Committees dealing with substantive matters and committees dealing with appropriation legislation are jealous of their prerogatives, resent any intrusions in what they consider their respective bailiwicks and often work at cross purposes.
6. Committees dealing with appropriations do not give enough attention to policies and programs underlying requests for appropriations.

In the opinion of the author, Congress has pursued ends different from those chiefly empha-

sized by the founders of the Government. Congress has stressed economy rather than liberty in dealing with military appropriations. The effectiveness of the power of the purse as a check on militarism is yet to be tested. So far, it has not been necessary to use that power as such a check, but there is no guarantee the necessity will not arise.

The means available to Congress for exercising control over the military through the power of the purse has not kept pace with the growth of the problem of controlling greatly enlarged and more expensive armies. Congress is forced to deal with a military establishment spending many billions of dollars in about the same way it dealt with the establishment when it was in the several hundred million dollar class.

Procurement of more defense for less money must always be a cooperative enterprise, but Congress has certain responsibilities it has not been able to meet to the best advantage. It is the responsibility of military administrators to prepare and justify their money requirements and to spend money granted wisely, but it is also the responsibility of Congress to appropriate for the right things in the proper amounts and to check up and see that moneys provided are used to the best advantage.

The concluding chapter of the book revolves about the following propositions:

1. Members of appropriation subcommittees are overworked and should have more staff help to analyze and appraise estimates of military services.
2. All appropriations for a fiscal year should be consolidated in one bill instead of there being a separate bill for each agency, so that the work of coordinating military and nonmilitary appropriations and of bringing total appropriations into balance with means available to the Government would be facilitated.
3. Appropriation committees should raise their sights and concentrate less on detail and more on policies and programs instead of devoting a major part of their time with the efficiency and expense of the military agencies.

The Purse and the Sword is a carefully prepared book with a great deal of substance. The job of analyzing, digesting and presenting the meat of some 18 years of Congressional hearings

on Army appropriations in a way that makes sense alone would entitle the book to recognition as a monumental accomplishment.

On the whole the book is thoughtful, interesting and timely. It deals with some of the most vital issues that face the country today. A number of the personages who have been taking leading parts in recent events affecting the national security have contributed to the book through their testimony at various times before Congressional hearings.

It has special value for officials of the Government who have responsibility for preparation, review or justification of budget estimates or execution of expenditure programs. While the book deals mostly with Army affairs, much of what it contains has application to other governmental activities. An official who reads the book should be better able to get along with Congressional committees before which he is called on to testify on official matters.

We believe the book will benefit those who read it, and for a long time to come will be a standard reference in the area with which it is concerned.

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Generals and Politicians, by Jere Clemens King. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951. Pp. 294. \$3.50)

In a period when the relations between military and civilian authority are the subject of heated and emotional debate that obscures fundamentals, a study dealing with similar conditions that once bedeviled the politics of another democracy is not only timely but valuable. Dr. King has presented such a study. It contributes much to our knowledge of politico-military relationships in time of crisis and deserves the attention of all thoughtful persons who are concerned with the problem of maintaining a proper balance between them.

In *Generals and Politicians* the author treats the struggle for power within France during World War I. The strain to which that country was subjected by the conflict exposed deep-seated antagonisms and suspicions in the body politic, as dangerous to national existence as the invading armies. Had hostilities ended in immediate and decisive victory as confidently expected by most Frenchmen, the struggle might never have devel-

oped. The Army, raised to new heights of popularity by glorious military success, probably would have become sufficiently powerful to assert undisputed control over policy and strategy. With the collapse of hope for a quick and complete victory and the growing realization that the allies faced a long and exhausting war of attrition, blind faith in the infallibility of military leadership passed. Eventually, instead of a Marshal of France, Frenchmen entrusted their fate to an "indomitable and indestructible Jacobin" whose name will be associated with the will to victory forever. The transition from military domination through gradual recovery of parliamentary authority to civilian dictatorship is the theme of the book. It could hardly have been otherwise in a country with such a tradition and political history.

The cleavages that developed were never clear-cut between generals and politicians. As often as not, they were between generals and between politicians. Millerand as Minister of War for example, supported the mediocre Joffre loyally, despite his cavalier attitude toward civilian authority, and Poincaré often opposed Clemenceau whom he distrusted. Many French generals, notably Sarraill, Nivelle, and Gallieni, questioned the decisions of the high command and the authority on which they were based, while the British generals, Robertson and Haig, seemed to accept orders from Clemenceau with better grace than from French generals.

Basically, the alignment of forces was a powerfully entrenched conservative element in the Army, predominantly royalist in sympathy, closely tied by political conviction to leaders whose thought was cast in an authoritarian mold on one hand; a less coherent officer group without anti-republican bias allied with political leaders whose devotion to representative government had been demonstrated time and again in staunch defense of the Third Republic against clerical and royalist attack on the other. Concerned with the fate of French liberalism and their own political fortunes they suspected every combination that appeared to threaten either.

Despite confusion, complexity and cross-currents, in French politics, the war inevitably thrust fundamental issues clearly into the political arena. Such matters as parliamentary investigation, governmental supervision of Army appointments, unity of command, and formulation of overall strategic plans, all involving the vital question of

supremacy in policy making were violently contested. The story is one of relentless and bitter conflict behind the scenes while a bloody struggle for survival was being waged on the battlefield. In the end the classical principle announced by Clausewitz almost a century earlier prevailed. Clemenceau, while refraining from interference with the high command in matters within its province refused to budge from his basic position that the military is subordinate to civilian authority.

If, as the author believes, a moral could be drawn from French experiences in World War I, it would probably be that nations should develop a good history, "a set of conditions in which an able civilian government maintained national interests by effective diplomacy closely supported by a capable military who were willing to remain in their proper place."

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Invasion 1944, Rommel and the Normandy Campaign, by Hans Speidel. Introduction by Truman Smith, Colonel, U.S.A. (ret.). (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1950. Pp. xvi, 176. \$2.75)

Rommel, The Desert Fox, by Desmond Young, Brigadier (ret.). Foreword by Sir Claude Auchinleck. (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950. Pp. xviii, 264. \$3.50)

Erwin Rommel's military career is the central theme common to both of these books. Mr. Young's book is a popular biography which relates his whole life in a manner both engaging and more than sympathetic. General Dr. Speidel's historical study is limited to the last phase of Rommel's career when he commanded Army Group B between the Netherlands and the Loire, during much of which the author was his Chief of Staff, and to his convalescence from the injuries sustained from an air attack. General Speidel gave Mr. Young some of the information on which the latter relies, and both have turned for data to Rommel's widow and son. Mr. Young's book has much warmth and emotion. General Speidel's is more objective in tone.

For each author Hitler is the villain and Rommel the hero, and the two books dwell at length on the part which Rommel played in the con-

spiracy to dislodge Hitler, erect a provisional government, make peace with the Western Allies, and save Germany from being destroyed in a hopeless war. General Speidel writes on this theme with greater detail and precision. They agree that Rommel was the one great popular figure around whom the German people could cluster in the revolutionary turmoil which would follow Hitler's overthrow, seemingly not well aware that Rommel was but the last in a long and disappointing series of military chiefs to whom the principal anti-Nazis had turned. Mr. Young appreciates as General Speidel does not that the Western Allies would not have suspended hostilities independently of the Soviet Union. Dr. Speidel states what Mr. Young denies — that Rommel was aware of plans to destroy Hitler by assassination — but shows that Rommel preferred to have Hitler hailed before a "people's court."

The injury which almost killed Rommel on 17 July saved him from the drastic choice which confronted Field Marshal von Kluge when the assassination plot had miscarried. Would Rommel have then been willing, in violation of his oath, to turn military force at his disposal against the Nazi leaders?

General Speidel's volume opens with a survey of the military situation and then explains the Allied success in Normandy and the Battle of France in terms of ineffective German organization, inferior defensive works, failure by the *Luftwaffe*, Hitler's persistence in preventing sound strategic dispositions and his reliance on new, mystery weapons. Rommel, the author declares, recognized what was wrong and struggled to overcome it while at the same time trying to bring about an end to the hopeless conflict.

Mr. Young's book, for all its charm seems untrustworthy. If the errors of fact and interpretation in one part of the book which has been carefully checked are typical of the whole, the best one could say of the book is that it may correctly show Rommel's personal traits but not the events in which he applied them. The author does not understand the complex chain of command in the Axis forces in the Mediterranean. He depicts Rommel as being called to Hitler's headquarters at the end of November 1942, when in fact he sought the interview and left his post without notice to his Italian superiors, intending to persuade the *Fuehrer* to remove the German forces at least from Italian Libya if not from all

Africa. Hitler instead sent Rommel to Rome with Goering to arrange there a more effective system for supplying and reinforcing the German units in Africa. Rommel did talk to Goering on the trip about African strategy: indeed he had persuaded Goering that Libya should be evacuated when they arrived, only to have Kesselring then reverse Goering's judgment before they went to see Mussolini and the *Commando Supremo*. If Goering behaved in Rome as Mr. Young describes, he also attended to military matters in a fashion which his informant, Frau Rommel, never knew.

The biography shifts from this conference in Rome to events in mid-February with a bare reference to the months intervening. Yet in those eleven weeks, Rommel retired into Tunisia in circumstances which subjected to a severe test the Axis partnership. He finally got permission to pull his army out of Libya but under restrictions designed to permit the proper strengthening of the Mareth Position, an obsolescent system in which he had little faith. Then he broke those restrictions and hurried the retreat in response to a British feint southeast of Tripoli. If Rommel failed to gain the necessary time for strengthening the Mareth defenses, he did enter Tunisia in time to launch, as he had urged, an attack in conjunction with the *Fifth Panzer Army* against the British First Army before the British Eighth Army should have followed him into Tunisia in strength. The *21st Panzer Division* had already passed to von Arnim's control when it arrived in Tunisia, and Rommel did not regain it until 18 February. The attack of 14 February was not directed by Rommel, who made a secondary effort against Gafsa while units under General Heinz Ziegler attacked Sidi bou Zid and Sbeitla. Only when the loss of Sidi bou Zid on 14 February had been followed by the evacuation of Gafsa, Sbeitla and Feriana did Rommel propose the operation which, under his command, began on 18 February.

Rommel's conduct of this battle, and of that on 6 March at Medenine showed beyond doubt that he should have been recalled from Africa much sooner. He wavered over some decisions and made some unwise ones; he lost confidence in success almost as soon as the operations began; he divided, and redivided, his forces; and he accomplished no significant adverse consequences to the Allied timetable. His temporary appointment

to command Army Group Africa on 23 February was an expedient in part to cover the fact of Axis failure beyond Kasserine and at Sbiba. Two weeks later Rommel was back in Europe and after reporting to Hitler, began a cure.

The discrepancies between the record and Mr. Young's treatment of these events make it unlikely that any of the volume can be accepted as a balanced and judicious account. When the book was about to be bound, Mr. Young had the misfortune to learn that Rommel's own narrative of his battles in northern Africa had been recovered from hiding. Instead of correcting the biography, he appended some excerpts of Rommel's story in translation. The whole has since appeared in Germany as *Krieg Ohne Hass* (Berlin, 1951). Mr. Young and his publishers were faced with a choice less momentous than that of Field Marshal von Kluge on 20 July 1944, and one which they could straddle, but it is apparent that a reliable biography remains to be written.

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The Siberian Intervention, by John Albert White. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950. Pp. 471. \$6.00)

Ghosts of a pregnant past march in review again in this exhaustive critical analysis of an almost forgotten page of history. The intervention in Siberia of the Allied Powers and the United States, during the period 1918-1922, was first obscured in the Western Front happenings of World War I, then lost in the post-war shufflings of power politics in Europe.

Yet the power politics played there, as it turned out, were highly important. This survey of all that happened east of the Urals—from the anabasis of the Czech legions to the ensuing Japanese encroachments from Sakhalin to Manchuria—provides a key to events of today in the Far Eastern arena, where American men are fighting and dying in an even more nebulous situation than confronted Major General William S. Graves' little American Expeditionary Force in Siberia thirty-three years ago.

It was in this vast area that the maggots of Soviet Communism thrived in Czarist Russia's stinking compost pile. It was here that Red Russian and White slaughtered and tortured with

equal ferocity. It was here that Imperial Japan made her first great bid for Far Eastern supremacy leading later to Pearl Harbor.

Above all, it was in this Siberian theater that Soviet dreams of empire gradually coalesced into a continuation of Czarist policy. This was a step-by-step operation, as the men of the Kremlin learned their way about. The blunderings of some European and American statesmen, assisted by half-baked politicians, probably went far to assist them.

While many books have appeared upon the Siberian intervention up to this time, they have nearly all been of partisan nature, as might be expected. For the first time we now have, gathered in one volume, a reasoned recital and appraisal of all or nearly all the factors concerned, beginning with the Russian Revolution of 1917.

"... The political and military collapse which went hand in hand with it," as Mr. White so well puts it, "created for the time being a vast power vacuum reaching from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean."

Here we have fitted into their respective places in the jig-saw puzzle, all that resulted in Siberia. Reactionary Kolchak and Horvath—the men who couldn't understand; the Cossack murderers Semenov and Kalmykov, and the legendary Baron Ungern von Sternberg with his sadistic executioner Sepailov, all strut the stage. Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin are there, as are Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson, Root and Churchill.

The Czech legions march and fight again, with wily, ambitious Gaida playing his double part. General Graves' headaches come into clear light, as he strove—successfully—to adhere to the famous "aide memoire" of Woodrow Wilson, against the snares put by Allied commanders.

Mr. White has done a good job in a wide field. One criticism might be made. It would appear that some pertinent mention should be included of the ill-fated and visionary North Russian expedition—the Allied Murmansk-Archangel adventure—which in its own small way unfortunately aroused the Russian people to patriotic resistance against what they considered to be Allied invasion of their homeland. It thus played into Soviet hands.

Since military affairs *per se* are naturally but a small part of this analysis of a vast diplomatic jungle it is suggested that the military reader—and all American soldiers should read this book

—have by his side Graves' *Siberian Adventure*, which gives in great detail our own operations from the Lake Baikal region to Vladivostok.

In Graves' book will be found the military background of two regiments which have covered themselves again with glory in Korea—the 27th and 31st U. S. Infantry. These two splendid regiments, the former along the trans-Siberian Railway, and the latter at Vladivostok and Khabarovsk in those early days first learned what it means to fight the Russ.

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Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II. The Counter Intelligence Corps School, Fort Holabird, Maryland, 1951. Pp. 83. No price.)

This excellent little book performs the useful service of surveying briefly the principal activities of the Counter Intelligence Corps during World War II. A few pages are devoted to World War I background, the revised organization after Pearl Harbor, and the counter intelligence program in the United States 1941-1943. The major portion of the book, about seventy pages, touches on operations of the corps in fifteen overseas areas. The story of counter-espionage operations in North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and France, is both interesting and informative. Apparently, there was less documentary evidence available about the conduct of counter intelligence detachments in some of the other zones of activity.

In general, the mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps was to protect American troops, equipment, and installations from enemy espionage and sabotage. To carry out the mission, the corps, by 1944, had recruited over 4,300 men, most of whom served overseas. C.I.C. personnel were selected with a degree of care and deliberation which was reflected later in the over-all accomplishments of the organization. Not enough emphasis was given to procuring and training linguists, however, and lack of fluency in foreign languages was a major weakness of the recruiting program.

Although the publisher has chosen to withhold the identity of the author, the reviewer understands that the volume was prepared largely by Captain Carmelo J. Bernardo. It probably was not an easy task to obtain access to the documents

necessary for the writing of a book of this kind and some of the source material obviously was not made available to the author. Despite some rather heavy-handed and amateurish editing, this book is, nevertheless, an able introduction to the scholarly study of the role of intelligence in World War II which Colonel Claud E. Stadtman and Captain Bernardo are preparing for the Chief of Military History.

The only obvious omission from the book is the failure to include a few paragraphs on the training school at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, where many hundreds of budding C.I.C. agents received their introduction to the principles of military intelligence and investigation. The reviewer also feels that the page and one-half of conclusions at the end of the book should be eliminated or revised. A prefatory page indicating the chief collections of official documents studied by the author would be valuable to military history specialists. These matters however, really do not detract from the general excellence of a book which will be our chief source of general information about the Counter Intelligence Corps until the definitive history of Military Intelligence is published.

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The People's General: The Personal Story of Lafayette. By David Loth. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951. Pp. 346. \$3.50)

In this rather impressionistic portrait of Lafayette, David Loth does not concern himself too much with the military side of a life devoted for the most part to political agitation of one kind or another.

Loth, apparently aiming at the American reading public, devotes considerable space to Lafayette in America, but hurries over the involved activities of his hero in the early days of the French Revolutionary Wars.

But when Lafayette took the field for France against the Allies, this "personal" story begins to fall apart at the seams.

The student of military history will find very little to interest him in this book. The general reader will probably find it of interest, but not of value.

ROBERT WALKER DAVIS,
Washington, D. C.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE¹

EDGAR ERSKINE HUME

Major General Edgar Erskine Hume, a trustee and distinguished member of the American Military Institute, died on 24 January 1952. His death, apparently due to a heart attack, was quite unexpected. Only recently at the Larz Anderson House he had officiated at the admission of Prime Minister Winston Churchill in the Order of the Cincinnati. General Hume was born in Frankfort, Kentucky, and received his formal education at Centre College of "Praying Colonels" fame, and at Johns Hopkins University where he received his medical degree in 1913. He was one of the most decorated medical officers in American military history, receiving decorations from all three armed services and from 39 foreign nations. In addition he held 23 honorary degrees from American and foreign universities, and was an honorary citizen of 40 Italian cities. Wounded in both world wars and in Korea, General Hume held important command posts in Italy, Austria, and the Far East, and was the first medical chief for United Nations forces. The author of some 300 books and articles, he was also the founder and national president of Delta Omega, and a member of numerous medical and historical societies. The American Military Institute mourns the passing of so brilliant a member and patriot.

JOHN WOMACK WRIGHT

In the passing of Colonel John Womack Wright, 2 February 1952, the American Military

Institute mourns one of its founders and early trustees. Colonel Wright was born in Kirkland, Missouri, 75 years ago, the son of Brigadier General Marcus J. Wright of the Confederate States Army.

Colonel Wright's nearly half century of Army service began after his graduation from George Washington University in 1898, when he was appointed 1st lieutenant in the Fifth United States Volunteer Infantry. He served on the staff of General Leonard Wood at Santiago de Cuba, and soon thereafter he received a permanent commission in the Regular Army. Colonel Wright retired from active service in 1940 but, with the outbreak of World War II, he was recalled to duty and served with the Historical Section of the Army War College until his final retirement in 1946.

Colonel Wright was best known for his co-authorship, with Oliver Lyman Spaulding and Hoffman Nickerson, of the military classic, *Warfare*, which was first published in 1924, and since has been issued in several editions. He also wrote *Military Notes on Cuba—1909*, *Bastioned Fortifications from 1500-1800*, *Organization and Services of Supply in the A.E.F.*, and co-authored the *History of the Second Division, A.E.F.*. In addition to these works, Colonel Wright also contributed to the *Journal* of the American Military Institute, the *American Historical Review*, and the *William and Mary Quarterly*. His brethren in the American Military Institute will ever recall him as one who deftly combined the pen and the sword.

MILITARY HISTORY COURSE

Dr. Hugh M. Cole, author of *The Lor-*

¹Items presented as of actual publication date, March 1952.

rairie Campaign, gave a course in Military History during the 1951 summer session at George Washington University, Washington, D. C. The five hours per week course through the hot June and July evenings was well attended, and demonstrated an increasing interest of both academic authorities and students in a hitherto long neglected field of knowledge.

UNIFORM INDIAN WAR PENSIONS

Members of the Order of Indian Wars will be particularly interested in House Report No. 1285, January 30, 1952, which carries the recommendation of Mr. Rankin of the Committee on Veterans Affairs that H. R. 5717 be passed. This bill provides for uniform pensions of a minimum of \$90 per month for 366 Indian War Veterans who served for 30 days or more in any Indian War or campaign through December 31, 1898. In instances where aid is required the monthly rate is fixed at \$120.

NEW EDITOR

The Board of Trustees of the American Military Institute, at the meeting of 26 July 1951, appointed Captain Victor Gondos, Jr., editor of *MILITARY AFFAIRS*. The successful administration of Lt. Colonel Milton Skelly, the preceding editor, was curtailed by his assignment to a new post in Iran. A past contributor to the Institute's Journal, Captain Gondos served on its editorial staff during the war years, and again when Colonel Skelly revived the Journal in 1950. The incoming editor holds degrees from the Universities of Michigan and Pennsylvania, has been affiliated with the Army Artillery Reserve for the past quarter-century, currently is National Historian of the Reserve Officers Association, and is a staff member of the National Archives of the United States.

AVAILABLE MILITARY AFFAIRS REPRINTS

As a service to its members, the American Military Institute is making available unbound, side-stapled reprints of recently published articles as long as the supply lasts. The following articles may be purchased from the office of the Secretary, 1115 17th Street, N. W., Washington 6, D. C. at the indicated prices:

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| Dater, Henry M., <i>Tactical Use of Air Power in World War II, The Navy Experience</i> . Vol. XIV, No. 4, 9 pp. | 20c |
| Huston, James A., <i>Tactical Use of Air Power in World War II, The Army Experience</i> . Vol. XIV, No. 4, 20 pp. | 55c |
| Maycock, Thomas J., <i>Tactical Use of Air Power in World War II, Notes on the Development of AAF Tactical Air Doctrine</i> . Vol. XIV, No. 4, 6 pp. | 20c |
| Noble, G. Bernard, <i>The Historian and the Federal Government: The Department of State and the Scholar</i> . Vol. XV, No. 1, 5 pp. | 15c |
| Grover, Wayne C., <i>The Historian and the Federal Government: The National Archives and the Scholar</i> . Vol. XV, No. 1, 6 pp. | 15c |
| Greenfield, Kent Roberts, <i>The Historian and the Federal Government: Accessibility of U. S. Army Records to Historical Research</i> , Vol. XV, No. 1, 6 pp. | 15c |
| Diament, Lincoln, <i>First Blood for the Infantry 1776</i> , Vol. XV, No. 1, 9 pp. | 20c |
| Kimmons, Neil, <i>Federal Draft Exemptions 1863-1865</i> , Vol. XV, No. 1, 9 pp. | 20c |
| Smyth, Howard McGaw, <i>The Command of Italian Armed Forces in World War II</i> , Vol. XV, No. 1, 15 pp. | 30c |

MEETING OF THE COMPANY OF MILITARY COLLECTORS AND HISTORIANS



Photo Courtesy of Washington Post

The second annual meeting of the Company of Military Collectors and Historians was held at the Corcoran Art Gallery, Washington, D. C., on 19 January 1952. The Company presented a splendid display of arms, equipment, and uniforms used in the American Civil War. Led by Institute Trustee Frederick P. Todd, a capacity audience enjoyed an illustrated discussion of these artifacts in the Gallery auditorium. On the stage, a unique note was added by three members of the Company (left to right

above, R. E. Gaylord, Ernest W. Peterkin, and William H. Carter) who, accoutred in Confederate and Federal uniforms, smartly executed the contemporary manual of arms including the firing of the muzzle loaders. Some fifty individual models of Union and Confederate muskets, rifles, and carbines, and thirty models of swords, sabers, and cutlasses were shown. Mrs. John Nicholas Brown presented a colorful collection of pictures, medals, and cutouts of the Imperial Guard of Napoleon I.

EDITORIAL COMMENT: QUO VADIS

TO YOU, faithful member of the American Military Institute, we wish to address a few words of explanation relating to the past two years of the history of **MILITARY AFFAIRS**. At the end of 1949, with the withdrawal of the full-time editor, publication of our quarterly was suspended until the end of 1950. Assuming office as Acting Secretary and Editor on 23 August 1950, Lt. Colonel Milton Skelly resuscitated the affairs of the Institute. As a result of a General Membership Meeting¹ held at the Pentagon, in November 1950, a voluntary Editorial Board of some sixteen members was assembled to support Colonel Skelly's efforts.

Publication was resumed in January 1951 with the issuance of the Spring 1950 number (XIV, 1), and the Summer and Fall numbers followed at bimonthly intervals (XIV, 2 and 3). Because of Colonel Skelly's transfer to Iran, in mid-summer 1951 the Board of Trustees appointed the present Editor. Since then, the Winter 1950 (XIV, 4, already in press) and Spring 1951 (XV, 1) numbers were issued. Again membership and subscription lists are gradually rising.

What of 1952? The publication objective is to resume our regular publication schedule in August by completing the four 1951 numbers and issuing Spring 1952 (XVI, 1) by June. Therefore, subscribers for 1952 will be billed in June rather than in January. We can accomplish this schedule provided: first, the working members of the Editorial Board continue to show the admirable zeal that has characterized their efforts for the past fourteen months; and, second, that you Brethren in the field assist us morally and materially with new members and subscribers.

Remember that **MILITARY AFFAIRS** is the sole scholarly publication in its field in America. If it did not already exist it would need to be created. We do not deal in "cheesecake." We are the outlet for the serious student, researcher, and writer in an area of human effort and experience that is both engrossingly interesting and astonishingly more important to the America of today, and of the foreseeable future, than was ever contemplated by those hardy souls who launched our enterprise some twenty years ago.

Yet in all that time of kaleidoscopic changes in the buying power of the dollar—the American dollar—our price has remained virtually the same. We have had a slight rise of only fifty cents, from three dollars to three and a half. It is very difficult to maintain such conservatism (or should we say, generosity), and we may be compelled to ask the Board of Trustees for an increase of rates. In the meantime, however (using the time-honored cliché of a promotional pitch), you can tell your prospective member or subscriber that he can get in under the wire for the current year at least. Thus the slogan is plain and simple: let each member get another member. Then, by means of documented articles on the distinguished past and the massive present of the American military saga we hope to contribute to your enlightenment and, above all, to the protection of the Nation's heritage of truth.

V. G.

¹See Proceedings of Meeting of General Membership, 3 November 1950, in **MILITARY AFFAIRS**, XIV, 3 (Fall 1950).

THE MILITIA FINE 1830-1860

BY LENA LONDON

CLOSELY ALLIED with the evil of imprisonment for debt was the compulsory militia system with its militia fine. In fact, so close was the connection between imprisonment for debt and imprisonment for the non-payment of the militia fine in the minds of the people during the pre-Civil War period that the clauses in the state constitutions ending imprisonment for the non-payment of militia fines in time of peace were included in the same section, and usually in the same sentence, that eliminated incarceration for debt. Indeed, in the New Jersey constitutional convention of 1844, the debate on the outlawing of the prison penalty for militia fines arose not during the discussion of the militia provision of the constitution, but during the deliberations on the section to abolish internment for debt. Furthermore, not only was the same punishment imposed for failing to pay the militia fine as for the non-payment of a debt; but, while in prison, the delinquent militiaman was classified and treated as a debtor. The insolvency statutes applied to him when he was thus confined in jail, just as they did to the delinquent debtor, according to the state laws dealing with the militia. The same persons participated in the reform movements to abolish both imprisonment for debt and for militia fines. The Prison Discipline Society of Boston in its annual reports handled the militia fine question as just another phase of the debtor problem. The same petitions, memorials, addresses, and resolutions of the working men which plead for the eradication of incarceration

for debt also asked for the abolition of compulsory peacetime military service with its hated militia fine.¹ "The objection of the working men to the compulsory militia system was at bottom the same as their objection to imprisonment for debt."²

Every able-bodied male citizen of military age was a member of the militia which met periodically for about three days a year for purposes of training.³ Congress in the act of May 8, 1792 establishing a uniform militia throughout the United States, in order to provide more effectively for the national defense, had specified "That each and every

¹John R. Commons and Helen L. Sumner, eds., "Labor Movement, 1820-1840," in *The Documentary History of American Industrial Society* (10 vols., Cleveland, 1910), V, 28-29, 119-122, 160-161; *Fifth Annual Report of the Board of Managers of the Prison Discipline Society, Boston, 1830* (Boston, 1830), 60-61; *Ninth Annual Report of the Board of Managers of the Prison Discipline Society, Boston, May 27, 1834* (Boston, 1834), 26-27; Ben: Perley Poore, ed., *The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the United States* (2 vols., Washington, 1878), I, 196, 538, 554, 1003; II, 1315; Francis N. Thorpe, ed., *The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the States, Territories and Colonies now and heretofore forming the United States of America* (7 vols., Washington, 1909), I, 392; II, 1125, 1138; IV, 1956; V, 2600.

²Commons and Sumner, eds., "Introduction . . .", *op. cit.*, V, 29.

³The period for which the militia was mustered for parade and drill varied in the different states from one to six days. In most states, however, it convened, on the average, for three days. "Militia of the United States," *New York Review*, VII (October, 1840), 284; Paul T. Smith, "Militia of the United States from 1846 to 1860," *Indiana Magazine of History*, XV (March, 1919), 22, 31-32; Helen L. Sumner, "Citizenship (1827-1833)," in John R. Commons, et al., *History of Labour in the United States* (2 vols., New York, 1918), I, 177, 180.

free able-bodied white male citizen of the respective states, resident therein, who is or shall be of the age of eighteen years, and under the age of forty-five years . . . shall severally and respectively be enrolled in the militia. . . ."⁴ And the various states in the Union passed legislation to carry out this Congressional enactment.

Every member of the militia was required to attend militia drills and parades with all the necessary arms and equipment which he had to furnish at his own expense. In the May 8, 1792 statute, Congress had stipulated that every militiaman was "to provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch with a box therein to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges, suited to the bore of his musket or firelock, each cartridge to contain a proper quantity of powder and ball; or with a good rifle, knapsack, shot-pouch and powder-horn, twenty balls suited to the bore of his rifle, and a quarter of a pound of powder;" and was to "appear so armed, accoutred and provided, when called out to exercise, or into service; except that when called out on company days to exercise only, he may appear without a knapsack."

Service in the militia was obligatory. Absence from a militia muster or appearing without the specified arms and equipment imposed the penalty of a fine. This fine was the crucial point in the militia system for it was the means used to enforce compulsory military service. If the fine was not paid, the militiaman's property was seized, just as in the case of distraint for debt; and, if he did not have sufficient property to cover the fine, he was sent to jail, just as he would be for inability to pay a debt. For example the 1822 militia law of Pennsylvania stated that if it was impossible to collect the militia fine "for

want of sufficient goods and chattels to pay the fine . . . against him, every such delinquent shall be committed by the proper collector to the custody of the sheriff or jailer . . . to be held . . . until he pays the said fine . . . or is discharged agreeably to the insolvent laws of the commonwealth."⁵

Yet the movement to end imprisonment for the non-payment of militia fines was more than merely a phase of the debtor problem. It was part of the humanitarian and democratizing reform temper of the times. It was certainly the main aspect of the attempt to abolish compulsory military training and to substitute a system of volunteers. It was tied up with the labor movement of the antebellum era when the working men, obtaining the right to vote, formed their own political party and got the older political parties to pay attention to their demands. It was, in addition, associated with the temperance crusade because drunkenness was prevalent at militia musters. It was affected by the work of the peace societies. Then too, it was connected with the campaign to attain greater religious freedom, for the Quakers regarded the militia fine as a tax or penalty on the liberty of conscience and consequently as unconstitutional.

During the first half of the nineteenth century, petitions from societies of Friends, asking to be exempt both from militia service and from the militia fine, were presented to state legislatures and state constitutional conventions. A good illustration of such a memorial is the one sent to the Virginia general assembly by the Friends of Dinwiddie County in 1810. In it the memorialists complained that the law required them to be "trained to arms" notwithstanding their "firm conviction that war is forbidden under the gospel." They asserted that their refusal to serve in the militia "subjects them to fines,

⁴I *United States Statutes at Large*, 271.

⁵Sumner, *op. cit.*, I, 222.

which . . . become in numerous instances extremely oppressive." The militia fine, they declared was an unconstitutional tax on their liberty of conscience. They, therefore, asked "that the laws imposing military requisitions and penalties for non-compliance" be modified in respect to the petitioners.⁶ A similar memorial from a Society of Friends was presented by Chancellor James Kent to the New York constitutional convention of 1821, but the request was rejected by that constituent assembly.⁷ Quakers also presented such a petition, with equally unsuccessful results, to the Pennsylvania constitutional convention of 1837-1838.⁸

It is interesting to note, however, that the local peace societies did not support the Quakers in their attempt to secure exemption from fines for non-attendance in the militia.⁹ But they did attack the existing compulsory militia as wasteful, useless, a burden on the poor, and a cause of vice.¹⁰ A typical exam-

ple of the work of the peace crusade in this field is the pamphlet published and circulated by the American Peace Society in 1831. It said that "military systems are injurious, and wholly at variance with the genius of this enlightened age." The money spent thereupon is wasted for it teaches the useless trade of war, that "art of human butchery" which is "legalized homicide." The military parades have "been the means of corrupting the morals of the people, spreading intemperance over the land, and ruining thousands . . . of our youth." The present militia laws are "oppressive," "burthensome," "unequal in their effects, and of course unjust" for the heaviest burden falls upon the poor. The author laments that "the farmer, whose crops are often irretrievably lost by only one day's neglect" must attend militia musters which are nothing more than a "drunken noisy revel," of benefit neither to the individual nor to the country.¹¹

The training day which in the early days had provided a festive and social event welcomed by all as a holiday to meet friends and exchange gossip, a change from the everyday dreary, monotonous, solitary life of the farmer, had in the nineteenth century become attended with such social evils that it was scored by many.¹² A committee of the Pennsylvania house of representatives reported on March 12, 1833 that

It may be taken as a point generally conceded, that no knowledge of the military art is or can be acquired, during the limited time allotted to trainings; and it is a matter of notoriety, that the crowd of idle and disorderly spectators attracted

⁶Niles' Weekly Register, XI (November 30, 1816), 211-212.

⁷Journal of the Convention of the State of New-York. Begun and Held at the Capitol in the City of Albany, on the Twenty-Eighth Day of August, 1821 (Albany, 1821), 220-222, 355; Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention of the State of New-York: Begun and Held at the Capitol, in the City of Albany, on the 28th Day of August, 1821, L. H. Clarke, reporter (New-York, 1821), 211, 230, 234, 297, 303-307; Reports of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of 1821, Assembled for the Purpose of Amending the Constitution of the State of New-York: Containing All the Official Documents, Relating to the Subject, and Other Valuable Matter, Nathaniel H. Carter and William L. Stone, reporters (Albany, 1821), 417, 455, 462, 572-573, 577-580.

⁸Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to Propose Amendments to the Constitution, Commenced and Held at Harrisburg, on the Second Day of May, 1837, John Agg, reporter (14 vols., Harrisburg, 1837-1839), I, 354-355.

⁹Merle E. Curti, *The American Peace Crusade 1815-1860* (Durham, N. C., 1929), 31.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 30. Another factor, besides the peace societies, which fostered a pacific spirit antipathetic to compulsory military training in time of peace was the very existence of long intervals of peace between the War of 1812 and the Mexican War, and between the latter and the Civil War. Moreover, in New England, there was the additional influence of the unpopularity of our aggressive war with Mexico against which religious ministers and

statesmen, like Charles Sumner, delivered forensic tirades. H. Telfer Mook, "Training Day in New England," *New England Quarterly*, XI (December, 1938), 694-695; Smith, *op. cit.*, 22; Cyril B. Upham, "Historical Survey of the Militia in Iowa, 1838-1865," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, XVII (July, 1919), 305.

¹¹A Poor Man's Son, *Remarks on the Militia System* (New York, 1831), 2, 5-6.

¹²Mook, *op. cit.*, 696-697; Smith, *op. cit.*, 31.

by them in populous districts is a serious evil; that the time lost or mispent is of immense value; and that the temptations to form habits of idleness and dissipation are great and numerous.¹³

The excessive consumption of liquor at militia musters resulted in more than just inebriation. Disorderly conduct and riots were often the outcome. Hence, the religious leaders in the community and members of the temperance movement raised their voices in protest. Business groups, with the exception of the liquor merchants, lent their support to the growing criticism of the drill day since they disliked the disruption of their daily routine. Farmers resented the valuable time, and workers the wages, lost because of attendance at the militia. And newspaper editors attacked the "worse than useless" training "distinguished by its absurdity and its gross deflection of public morals."¹⁴

Nor were the military men satisfied with the existing militia. William H. Sumner, the adjutant general of Massachusetts, argued that the slight instruction afforded the militia on their occasional meetings was "of no advantage" and that the requirement that militiamen arm themselves was unjust for the poor, by contributing the same toward the defense of the country as the rich, were sustaining an unequal weight. At another time Sumner elaborated upon the oppressive burden placed upon the poor man by saying that not only must he forfeit pecuniary penalties for not attending the muster on account of accident or occupation but "He must, also, support himself while attending the company and battalion trainings, and

defray the incidental and necessary expenses of travel and attendance at the public reviews."¹⁵

The pecuniary penalties mentioned by Sumner referred to the militia fines. In some of the states the fines were exceedingly high. For example, in New York the fine was \$12. Opponents attacked the fines on two main grounds. In the first place, they were unjust because they imposed the same burden upon poor and rich alike; secondly, those who were too poor to pay them were punished by imprisonment. Thus the system, in practice, provided exemption for the rich who were able to pay the militia fine and imprisonment for the poor who were unable to pay it.¹⁶

Since the militia fine vitally affected them, it is not surprising that the workers, who in this pre-Civil War period obtained the right to vote and organized short-lived political parties, should take a decided stand on this subject. "Where," asked the workers, "is the equality, where the justice, of levying the same fine for absence, upon the man who earns one hundred and fifty dollars a day, and the one who earns as many cents?" In New York where the fine for non-attendance was \$12, it was estimated that the poor man lost 3/313 of his annual income thereby while the man living on the interest of \$100,000 would lose only 1/417 of his annual income; in other words, the poor man lost four times as much, in ratio to his revenue, as the man worth \$100,000.¹⁷

The Working Men's Party of Philadelphia denounced both imprisonment for debt and

¹³Pennsylvania House of Representatives, *Report of the Committee on the Militia System* . . . (Harrisburg, 1833), 3.

¹⁴Mook, *op. cit.*, 693-694. In New England, licenses for retailing liquor on these occasions were granted by the town selectmen. The profit to be made from this thriving business is attested to by the fact that in the town of Fair Haven, Vermont, in 1802, three of the selectmen awarded such licenses to themselves. *Idem*.

¹⁵William H. Sumner, "An Inquiry into the Importance of the Militia to a free Commonwealth," *North American Review*, XIX (October, 1824), 279-280; [Henry Lee], *The Militia of the United States. What It Has Been. What It Should Be*. (Boston, 1864), 28. For similar views by others, cf. *Ibid.*, 26-27, 30-31, 69.

¹⁶Commons and Sumner, eds., "Introduction . . .," *op. cit.*, V, 29; Lee, *op. cit.*, 29; Helen L. Sumner, *op. cit.*, I, 177, 180.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, I, 177, 180, 281-282.

the militia system in its "Address of the City and County Convention to the Working Men of the State," printed in 1830. In place of the compulsory militia, the address urged the adoption of a voluntary militia maintaining that "the discipline, and the effective power of a soldier proceeds solely from a becoming spirit, which cannot exist when he is coerced into the ranks." The address asked whether the existing militia system was "not a heavy tax upon the state without the shadow of a benefit? Does not a compliance with its provisions cause annually great inconvenience, and promote scenes of debauchery, collecting the depraved and the vicious, and contributing largely to a continuance of their degradation?"¹⁸

At a mass meeting held in New York City on December 29, 1829, the Working Men's Party endorsed an address and a set of resolutions in which both incarceration for debt and compulsory militia service were condemned. In regard to the militia, the address asserted that the "present militia system, . . . puts in requisition seven-eighths of our producing classes, on an average, more than three days a year, or subjects them to excessive fines and imprisonment, . . . The annual expense of this system in time and money, . . . more than a million dollars, . . . operates to our detriment as citizens, without benefiting us as soldiers. . . ."¹⁹

This attempt to abolish imprisonment for the non-payment of the militia fine went hand in hand with the effort to eliminate imprisonment for debt; and, as such, was part of the general trend towards humanitarian reform characteristic of the antebellum era. Humanitarians were leaders in the movement to end internment for debt. Ministers and professional men not actively engaged in business formed a large propor-

tion of this group. One of their most potent instruments was the Prison Discipline Society, founded in Boston on June 30, 1825 "to promote the improvement of Public Prisons." Although this was not the first society of its sort, it was the most effective one during the years 1830-1860, and its example inspired the establishment of similar associations in other states.

The Prison Discipline Society's annual report for 1830 in describing the debtors in the jail at Berkshire, Massachusetts, during an eighteen-month period in 1828-1829, tells of six persons committed for six days for failing to pay military fines ranging from fifty cents to three dollars. Another excellent illustration of the evil of imprisonment for militia fines was the story of the sick, familyless, young worker earning ten dollars a month who, on October 15, 1833, the day of the prison inspection, had been incarcerated for four days in the Leverett Street Jail in Boston for a militia fine which, together with all the costs, amounted to eight dollars and fifty cents.²⁰

It is noteworthy that New Jersey, the state in which the condition of interned debtors was deemed the worst in the United States by the Boston Prison Discipline Society, was not only the first to abolish completely incarceration for debt, except in cases of fraud, by constitutional provision,²¹ but was also the first to use that method to outlaw imprisonment for the non-payment of militia fines in time of peace. The annual report of the Society for 1831 had stated that

On this subject we know of nothing worse, in

²⁰*Fifth Annual Report of the . . . Prison Discipline Society . . .*, 60-61; *Ninth Annual Report of the . . . Prison Discipline Society . . .*, 26-27.

²¹The twelfth provision of the Declaration of Rights at the end of the 1836 constitution of Texas declared "No person shall be imprisoned for debt in consequence of inability to pay." But Texas in 1836 was an independent republic. Poore, ed., *op. cit.*, II, 1763; Thorpe, ed., *op. cit.*, VI, 3543.

¹⁸Commons and Sumner, *op. cit.*, V, 114, 119-120.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, V, 157, 160, 161.

the whole length and breadth of the land, than in New Jersey. The number committed to prison for debt, according to the population; their filthy and neglected condition while incarcerated; the small sums for which it is done; the expense to some of the counties of this most fruitless mode of collecting debts; the leaving of debtors in prison without any provision by law for their support; — these things cannot remain. The laws of New Jersey, says a humane sheriff of one of the counties, provide food, bedding and fuel for criminals; but for debtors, nothing is provided but walls, bars, and bolts.²²

The Prison Discipline Society was right. Such things could not, and did not, remain. In New Jersey's 1844 constitution, section 17 of article one stipulated that "No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any action or any judgment founded upon contract, unless in case of fraud; nor shall any person be imprisoned for a militia fine in time of peace." The example thus set by New Jersey was copied by three other states before the Civil War: Iowa, California, and Michigan inserted into their constitutions a clause abolishing imprisonment for the non-payment of a militia fine in time of peace at the end of the provision ending imprisonment for debt.²³

As in the case of the movement to eliminate the prison penalty for debt, the abrogating of imprisonment for militia fines did not become one of the conspicuous demands of the working men until 1830. Indeed, the first time they made an issue of it was in 1828. In 1829 and 1830 they memorialized state legislatures to modify or repeal the militia laws. On September 25, 1830, the *Mechanics' Free Press* of Philadelphia reported to the workers that the candidates for the legislature had pledged "to use their utmost efforts, if

elected, to modify the present oppressive militia system, which annually squanders your wealth and toil in useless riot and extravagance." Also in the same issue of that paper, Stephen Simpson, the candidate for Congress, expressed his opposition to the existing militia as a "disgrace to our State." The abolition of compulsory military service along with the militia fine and the outlawing of internment for debt were two of the main planks in the platform of labor, whose major demands were the same throughout the Union. The ending of imprisonment for debt and for militia fines was advocated by the working men in the cities of New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, South Carolina, Ohio, and Indiana in their press, mass meetings, and conventions.²⁴

As early as 1830 some states abolished military parades. In 1831 the Delaware legislature abolished its militia law altogether.²⁵ President Andrew Jackson in his annual message to Congress on December 4, 1832 declared that the whole subject ought to be thoroughly examined since under the present militia system "Much time is lost, much unnecessary expense incurred, and much public property wasted. . . . Little useful knowledge is gained by the musters and drills as now established. . . ."²⁶

Jackson was not the only President to bring the matter to the attention of Congress. Every President from Washington to Van Buren had done so. In his letter to the citizens of Elizabeth City, Virginia, dated July 31, 1840, President Martin Van Buren asserted that

The organization of the militia thus established

²²*Sixth Annual Report of the Board of Managers of the Prison Discipline Society, Boston, May 24, 1831* (Boston, 1831), 66. An extract of the letter referred to, is reprinted in the *Fifth Annual Report of the . . . Prison Discipline Society . . .*, 49.

²³Poore, ed., *op. cit.*, I, 196, 538, 554, 1003; II, 1315; Thorne, ed., *op. cit.*, I, 392; II, 1125, 1138; IV, 1956; V, 2600.

²⁴Helen L. Sumner, *op. cit.*, I, 221-223, 96-299.

²⁵*Ibid.*, I, 329-330.

²⁶James D. Richardson, ed., "Fourth Annual Message," *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-1902* (Washington, D. C., 1903), II, 603.

[in 1792] has been in force nearly fifty years. It varies in many essential particulars from that recommended by general Washington, and has been regarded ever since its adoption, as defective in an eminent degree, as well by the successive presidents of the United States, as by all persons, whose habits of life and opportunities of personal observation have fitted them to form sound opinions upon the subject. Its improvement was therefore an object of unceasing and anxious solicitude on the part of general Washington, and almost every successive president commenced his career with calling the attention of congress to the subject, and closed it with expressions of regret that these recommendations had proved unavailing. General [Lewis] Cass, when secretary of war, stated, in an official report, that this subject had been presented for consideration no less than thirty-one times in official executive communications, commencing with the inaugural address of president Washington. The principal objections to the present system appear to arise from the great and unnecessary extent of the enrolment of the militia held to actual service and who are required to muster and do duty a certain number of days in the year, and for the want of adequate means or inducements to secure a proper instruction; by reason of which this heavy tax is not only rendered in a great degree useless, but is also unreasonably burdensome.²⁷

In compliance with a request from the committee on the militia of the House of Representatives, made in the previous session of Congress, Secretary of War Joel R. Poinsett submitted a plan for the reorganization of the militia on March 20, 1840. "Every day that they are mustered for inspection or exercise, abstracts at least one million of dollars from the earnings of labor," he asserted, "without adding any thing whatever to the military efficiency of the country, and too often affecting injuriously the moral condition of those who are assembled for the purpose." Poinsett's project called for the division of the militia into three categories: the mass, the active force, and the reserves. The mass was to include every able-bodied, white,

male citizen, between 20 and 45 years of age, who was to be enrolled in the militia but was not to be trained in time of peace. Only 100,000 men, between 21 and 37 years, were to be trained in time of peace, and were to constitute the active force. These men were to be volunteers, or where necessary, were to be drafted. After four years, they were to be transferred to the reserve class where they would serve another four years. One-fourth of the active force was to be thus transferred annually, and one-fourth of the reserves was to be discharged every year. During the training period, including the time when going or returning from the rendezvous, the militia was to be considered in the service of the United States and was to receive the same pay, rations, and camp equipment as members of the regular United States army. Every member of the active force who absented himself from the militia muster was to be subject to a fine, and the punishment for failing to pay the fine was seizure and sale of the property of the delinquent or imprisonment till such fine was paid. The most notable features of this plan were the substitution of volunteers for compulsory service in peace-time, the payment of militiamen during musters, and the calling of the militia into the service of the United States for training purposes.²⁸

The committees of both houses of Congress objected to Poinsett's program on the ground that it was unconstitutional, since the United States Constitution reserves to the states the right to train the militia; and the militia can be called into the service of the United States only for the three purposes specified in the Constitution, and not for the

²⁷*Niles' National Register*, LVIII (August 22, 1840), 395.

²⁸*Militia of the United States in Senate Document No. 531 and 560, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. Appendix to the June 6, 1840 minority report on the militia, H. R. Report No. 585, 11-26, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. A letter by Poinsett explaining his plan is printed in Niles' National Register*, LVIII (July 11, 1840), 295-298.

purpose of training.²⁹ The reports of these Congressional committees, in addition to urging the states to take action to remodel the militia, painted a poignant picture of the defects of the existing militia system.

The Senate committee report was made by Clement C. Clay of Alabama and emphasized the lack of adequate arms and equipment to train the militia. The annual sum of \$200,000 apportioned by Congress for this object under the 1808 statute was miserably insufficient.³⁰ The expense necessary for this purpose while every man was subject to compulsory militia service was too large for Congress to undertake. The report pointed out that

The [1808] act has now been in operation a period of thirty-two years, and the whole number of small-arms, and field artillery, distributed among all the States, since its passage, would, perhaps, not be more than sufficient to supply the militia of the State of New York. This is sufficient to prove the total inadequacy of the existing law to supply the wants of the whole body of the militia throughout the Union, within any reasonable time. Without arms it is impossible to train men to the use of them; and for the men to procure them, of that uniform and proper quality, which is almost essential to the purposes of discipline, would involve individual burdens, regarded as oppressive by those who constitute the mass of the militia.³¹

The majority report of the House committee on the militia, submitted by George M. Keim, a major general in the militia of

Pennsylvania,³² agreed that "the people entertain an aversion to any kind of conscription for military purposes, unless an exigency requires it." The committee concurred with the findings in the report made in 1826 by the Secretary of War, James Barbour, that "the musters and trainings of the militia, and the legal obligation to provide themselves arms and accoutrements, operate as heavy burdens upon the productive class of the community, without the acquisition, except in populous cities, of any adequate instruction or efficiency. Militia musters in thinly populated districts, they say, are hurtful practices, instead of salutary exercises, promoting martial knowledge." The committee also quoted with endorsement the statement of Secretary of War Lewis Cass, in his November 30, 1835 report to the President, that "It is in vain to expect that the whole adult male population of the country can or will furnish themselves with the articles required by law, or that their collection, for any number of days they can afford to devote to this object, and under the usual circumstances of such assemblages, can produce any beneficial effect to themselves or their country." The committee concluded, however, "that nothing can be done effectually upon the subject by Congress, unless the foundation for it shall be laid by the previous action of the States."³³

The minority of the House of Representatives committee had as its spokesman Philip Triplett of Kentucky, who was a delegate to the convention which revised that state's constitution.³⁴ Their report stressed the heavy financial burden imposed upon militiamen,

²⁹Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution empowers Congress "To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;" and "To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."

³⁰II U. S. Statutes at Large, 490.

³¹Senate Document No. 509, 26th Cong., 1st Sess.; Niles' National Register, LVIII (August 8, 1840), 365-367.

³²For a brief historical sketch of George May Keim, see *Biographical Directory of the American Congress*, 1169.

³³H. R. Rept. No. 584, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. The majority and minority House committee reports are summarized in "Militia of the United States," *New York Review*, VII (October, 1840), 277-305.

³⁴*Biographical Directory of the American Congress*, 1628.

and denounced both the militia fine and the prison penalty for its non-payment. The militiamen had to pay their own travel expenses to and from the militia musters. "Unfortunately, this part of the burden falls heaviest on the counties remote from the large cities, being those counties and portions of country which are the least able to bear the expense and loss of time. Select the most central position in each State for the place of rendezvous of this army, and . . . each of the militiamen from the remote counties [will] have to travel, at his own expense . . . from two to three hundred miles. . . ." The militiamen had to arm themselves, and accoutrements the law required of them could not be purchased for less than twenty dollars. It was estimated that in each militia company of eighty men there would be twenty "who cannot raise this twenty dollars to buy the musket and trappings," not counting the other necessary expenses, "without selling some article of property necessary to the support of themselves or families, . . . ; and that, of this twenty, there are ten who cannot raise twenty dollars, within the time prescribed, at any sacrifice, however willing they might be to part with their all, to comply with the laws of their country, unjust and cruel as they might think the requisition." These ten men are then fined. "But the same inability to raise the money, which prevented his purchasing a musket and trappings, will deprive him of the power to pay this fine and costs assessed by a court-martial." For this contingency, the prison penalty is provided. According to the Poinsett scheme, said this minority report, "there will be one-eighth or one-fourth as many prisoners confined in jail as there will be militiamen instructed, disciplined, and improved in military knowledge." Moreover, these militiamen must pay the cost of the judgment and the issuing of the execution as well as the marshal's fee for travelling

to the place of the delinquent and serving the process of execution. These costs might increase by more than one-half the amount of the original fine. For example, if the judgment was for a fine of \$20.00, the cost of rendering the judgment would be \$2.50; the marshal's fee for travelling 200 miles to where the delinquent lives, at 5c per mile, would be \$10; and, for serving the process of execution, \$2.00. Hence, the total amount of property that would be subject to seizure and sale would be \$34.50. If the offender had \$34.50 worth of property, that could be distrained, then there were additional fees "for keeping the property in his [the marshal's] possession, or taking bond for its forthcoming, and for selling the property." If the poor culprit did not have sufficient goods against which the fine, plus costs, could be levied, he was committed to the debtor's gaol and had to pay the jail fees. "If we estimate the number of delinquents at one in every militia company who will not be able to pay their fines, &c., otherwise than by being imprisoned . . . , the number of prisoners, and the length of time they must endure their confinement, presents an amount of human misery, which, neither as legislators nor as men, we can look upon without a rigid inquiry whether the end to be obtained justifies the means." This report came to the conclusion that it was necessary to train the militia, "but the authority of doing this is reserved to the States, respectively, by the Constitution;" therefore, it was "necessary to induce the several States to perform this duty."³⁵

The suggestions in these Congressional committee reports were adopted by several states which remodeled their militia. Indiana in 1840 passed a statute dividing the militia into an active and a reserve force. Compul-

³⁵H. R. Rept. No. 585, 26th Cong., 1st Sess. *Niles' National Register*, LVIII (August 22, 1840), 397-399.

sory military service was abolished by legislation in Massachusetts in 1840; in Maine, Vermont, and Ohio in 1844; in Connecticut and New York in 1846; and in New Hampshire in 1851. In place of the obligatory militia training, the new laws provided for volunteer companies. In some states, a small commutation charge was made in lieu of military duty. In Ohio, this amounted to 50c; in New York, to 75c. The money thus collected in New York was used for the support of the volunteer independent corps. *Niles' National Register* was jubilant over the abolition of the compulsory militia law in New York. "We congratulate the people of this commonwealth warmly and heartily upon their emancipation from mock military duty. The bill which cuts up the miserable system of militia oppression, has become a law."³⁶

The states took up the question of revising the militia system in their constitutional conventions as well as in their legislatures. On the floor of Rhode Island's constituent assembly of 1842, James F. Simmons, a successful manufacturer of yarn who had entered the United States Senate the year before, bluntly asserted that "For fifteen or twenty years, the militia trainings have been mostly a farce, nothing but an exhibition of rags, caps, and broomsticks. And with the exception of a few chartered and volunteer companies, the militia were not to be relied on."³⁷ Yet Rhode Island in 1842 did not outlaw incarceration for militia fines.

³⁶Mook, *op. cit.*, 695; *Niles' National Register*, LXVI (April 6 and 20, 1844), 86, 114; LXX (June 6, 1846), 213; Smith, *op. cit.*, 25-26. New Hampshire's legislature in 1845 passed a bill abolishing musters, but it did not receive the governor's approval because it was adopted too late in the session to enable him to give it adequate consideration. *Niles' National Register*, LXVIII (July 12, 1845), 292.

³⁷"Debates and Proceedings in the State Convention Held at Newport, September 12, 1842, for the Adoption of a Constitution of the State of Rhode Island," *Journal of the Convention Assembled to Frame a Constitution for the State of Rhode Island, at Newport, Sept. 12, 1842* (Providence, 1859), 46.

Militia musters were also condemned in Ohio's constitutional convention of 1850-1851. William S. Bates, a Quaker physician who had been born in Virginia but had spent 23 of his 44 years in Ohio, asked his colleagues: "What is to be gained by these musters? I ask any gentleman to point me to a single individual who has gained any knowledge of military science or tactics upon the muster field of this country? But on the contrary are they not always productive of scenes of immorality, disorder, and confusion?"³⁸

Benjamin Stanton declared that 'no man in his senses, who was not wholly unacquainted with the subject could believe that military trainings in time of peace were of any use whatever.'³⁹ Isaiah Morris, saw no advantage in "those corn-stalk militia musters,"⁴⁰ maintaining that men taken out of the cornfield made better soldiers than those taken from the muster-field. George J. Smith, a native Ohio lawyer, described militia musters as "entirely useless . . . if not demoralizing in their character." He wanted to substitute a system of volunteers. Nevertheless, despite these views, the revised fundamental law framed by this convention provided only for the regular militia, contained no mention of volunteer military organizations, and did not abolish imprisonment for the non-payment of militia fines.⁴¹

³⁸*Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Ohio, 1850-51*, J. V. Smith, reporter (2 vols., Columbus, 1851), I, 3, 454.

³⁹*Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Ohio, 1850-51*, I, 5, 455.

⁴⁰This derogatory sobriquet was used frequently because some of the militiamen wore cornstalks in their hats or caps. It was said that they carried corn-stalks in place of guns, but this was doubtless untrue. David Turpie, *Sketches of My Own Times* (Indianapolis, 1903), 31-32; William F. Vogel, "Home Life in Early Indiana," *Indiana Magazine of History*, X (1914), 319.

⁴¹*Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Ohio, 1850-51*, I, 5, 449, 456, 462; II, 862.

In Indiana's second constitutional convention, it was proposed that volunteer companies be organized in time of peace along with the regular militia. The proponents of the measure asserted that such volunteer companies had been useful and efficient in all the wars in which the country had engaged. The opponents, on the other hand, claimed that during peace "they grow like mushrooms" but when war comes they "die away in like manner." The suggestion was not adopted by the Indiana convention which continued the old militia system in the 1851 revised instrument of government, and did not end incarceration for militia fines.⁴²

Likewise, in New Jersey's constituent assembly of 1844 the existing militia was remonstrated against. William B. Ewing condemned "the whole militia system, as rotten from its foundation, and injurious to the morals of the state." He moved that the entire militia article be stricken from the constitution, and then withdrew his suggestion. The majority of the members concurred with Peter I. Clark, a lawyer who was a colonel in the militia, that "whatever objections we might have to the manner in which the militia had been organized, yet the maintenance of a militia system was a point not to be omitted in our system of state government." As a result, the militia was retained in New Jersey.⁴³ Imprisonment for the non-payment of militia fines, however, was abolished in time of peace.

During the New Jersey convention's discussion of the outlawing of internment for debt, the Quaker, Charles Stokes, inquired whether the term debt included fines since he

favored the abolition of imprisonment for militia fines. He explained that "There are many persons in my section of the country who are conscientiously opposed to this [militia] system, and as they have no property to satisfy a fine, they are taken and shut up in prison and are at the mercy of militia officers to order their release."⁴⁴

In his reply, John R. Thomson said that "a fine was a debt." The chief justice of the state supreme court argued that persons owing fines imposed as a punishment for some crime should not be released from jail on the basis of being delinquent, insolvent debtors. Chief Justice Joseph C. Hornblower stated that "many persons are indicted for robbing hen roosts or for assaults and batteries, and punished by fines—and I cannot consent that they shall be placed on the same footing with an honest but unfortunate debtor."⁴⁵

The majority of the assemblage agreed with Hornblower. Hence, they incorporated into the constitution a provision that there was to be no imprisonment for debt "founded upon contract" except in the case of fraud. Yet the convention heeded the plea of Stokes. The constituent assembly unanimously adopted the amendment offered by Hornblower, "nor shall any person be imprisoned for a militia fine in time of peace."⁴⁶

It is clearly apparent from this debate in the New Jersey constitutional convention

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 163, 424. Charles Stokes was a farmer, surveyor, director of an insurance company, assemblyman, master in chancery, and author of numerous philosophical essays and historical sketches. Stokes, being a member of the Society of Friends, asked for and received the unanimous consent of the convention to be excused from voting on the constitution because of his religious scruples against the military system established by that instrument of government. Nonetheless, Stokes believed the document excellent; and though excused from voting upon it, he signed the constitution. *Ibid.*, 606, 632, 642; Francis Bazley Lee, *New Jersey as Colony and as State: One of the Original Thirteen* (5 vols., New York, 1902), III, 195, 280, 283.

⁴⁵*Proceedings of the New Jersey State Constitutional Convention of 1844*, 163-164, 424-426.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 424-429.

⁴²*Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the Convention for the Revision of the Constitution of the State of Indiana, 1850*, H. Fowler, reporter (2 vols., Indianapolis, 1850), II, 1337-1339, 1355, 1359, 1426, 2075.

⁴³*Proceedings of the New Jersey State Constitutional Convention of 1844*, New Jersey Writers' Project of the Work Projects Administration, comps. and eds. (Trenton, 1942?), 347, 637-638.

that the question of outlawing the jail sentence for the non-payment of militia fines was not merely a military matter but was tied up with the problem of prohibiting the prison penalty for debt.

The precedent established by New Jersey in 1844 was followed by three other states before the Civil War. Iowa in 1846,⁴⁷ California in 1849, and Michigan in 1850 abolished imprisonment for militia fines in time of peace in their fundamental laws.⁴⁸ Unfortunately, however, no discussion of this

subject and no indication of the reasoning or the motives prompting the members of these constitutional conventions to take this action appear in the official journals or official records of debates of these august bodies nor is this information available in the compilation of contemporary newspaper accounts of Iowa's 1846 convention.⁴⁹ Nonetheless, the very fact that the provision ending the prison penalty for militia fines in these constitutions was incorporated into the same section, and even in the same sentence (except in Michigan), after the clause outlawing incarceration for debt demonstrates that these two subjects were associated as one issue by the framers of these documents.

⁴⁷Iowa's sixth territorial legislature, in its 1843-44 session, repealed "all laws or parts of acts which now require militia drills, musters, trainings, inspections or reviews, in time of peace." This act, however, was annulled by the next general assembly. The eighth territorial legislature, by the statute of January 3, 1846 abolished all laws "allowing compensation to any military officer, for any military services whatever." The state constitution adopted that year provided for a militia but prohibited the prison penalty for militia fines in peacetime. Upham, *op. cit.*, 355-359. Upham, though, offers no explanation for the militia fine provision in the constitution.

⁴⁸Iowa in 1846 and 1857 as well as California in 1849 provided that "No person shall be imprisoned for debt in any civil action on mesne or final process, unless in case of fraud; and no person shall be imprisoned for a militia fine in time of peace." Michigan asserted that "No person shall be imprisoned for debt arising out of or founded on a contract, expressed or implied, except in cases of fraud or breach of trust, or of moneys collected by public officers or in any professional employment. No person shall be imprisoned for a militia fine in time of peace." Poore, ed., *op. cit.*, I, 196, 538, 554, 1003; Thorpe, ed., *op. cit.*, I, 392; II, 1125, 1138; IV, 1956.

⁴⁹Benjamin F. Shambaugh, ed., *Fragments of the Debates of the Iowa Constitutional Conventions of 1844 and 1846 along with Press Comments and Other Materials of the Constitutions of 1844 and 1846* (Iowa City, 1900); *Journal of the Constitutional Convention of the State of Iowa, in Session at Iowa City, from the Nineteenth Day of January, A. D., One Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty-Seven, to the Fifth Day of March of the Same Year, Inclusive* (Muscatine, 1857); *Debates of the Constitutional Convention; of the State of Iowa, Assembled at Iowa City, Monday, January 19, 1857*, W. Blair Lord, reporter (2 vols., Davenport, 1857); *Report of the Debates in the Convention of California, on the Formation of the State Constitution, in September and October, 1849*, John Ross Browne, reporter (Washington, 1850); *Report of the Proceedings and Debates in the Convention to Revise the Constitution of the State of Michigan. 1850* (Lansing, 1850).

THE UNITED STATES NAVY AND THE RISE OF THE DOCTRINE OF AIR POWER

BY ASHBROOK LINCOLN

IT IS NO USE thinking of this war in terms of the last war. The power of the air has greatly affected — some believe it has decisively affected — the movements of fleets and armies. We must not exaggerate this new factor — I find myself almost resenting the exaggeration of this new factor — but neither must we refuse to give it its deadly due.

So spoke Winston Churchill in the House of Commons shortly after the British Navy had suffered one of the most bitter defeats in its history, a defeat by air power. Norway had fallen, and its fall was largely the result of the failure of the Royal Navy to cut the German communications in the Skagerrak, thereby enabling the German Luftwaffe to win a startling victory.¹

From the Armistice in 1918 to the beginning of the Second World War the chief question which vexed naval, military, and aerial experts throughout the world was the possible effect of aircraft on seacraft. A battle of words between two distinct groups, persons of equally extreme and intolerant attitudes, ensued. Each side emphasized data supporting its own views and ignored contrary evidence. The leading American advocates of air power were convinced of the possibilities of the aircraft and did "exaggerate this new factor." Like Churchill, high American naval officials resented the air enthusiasts'

statements and accusations and did not give the new doctrines their "deadly due." The air enthusiasts, confident of their monopoly on insight, enlivened their claims by exaggerating them. These exaggerations served to make high naval officers more conservative by putting them on the defensive.²

The advent of the airplane was the most revolutionary development affecting naval strategy and tactics since the introduction of steam and armor on warships.

World War I had greatly stimulated technical progress in aviation. After the armistice numerous experiments were continued. During the next few years the airplane developed rapidly, as improvements were made increasing the airplane's speed, maneuverability, range, reliability, and carrying capacity. New devices aided plane development, including flaps on the edges of the wings reducing landing speed, mechanisms enabling planes to rise to greater altitudes, retractable landing gears, new navigation instruments, and all-metal wings. Improvements in aerial bombs, torpedoes, machine guns, and bomb sights added to the destructive capacity of the airplane.

By 1920 the cumulative effects of technical progress began to be felt. The result was the rise of a new school of thought. The airplane would drive the battleship from the sea and replace it as the navy's principal offensive weapon.

Shortly after the World War, Admiral

¹Bernard Brodie, *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* (2nd edition), 175.

²Brodie, *op. cit.*, 176.

Lord Fisher of the British Navy was one of the most enthusiastic advocates of air power. He believed, "Air fighting dominates the future war both by land and sea."³ Later he was even more outspoken, "it is clear as daylight that future war at sea precludes the use of any vessel that cannot go under water, because aircraft will compel it." He predicted, "unless warships can get under water, they will be blown out of the water."⁴ Admiral Sir Percy Scott agreed, "the battleship is dead." The great fighting machine of the future will be the airplane, which will develop rapidly."⁵

The chief advocate of this revolutionary doctrine in America was General William Mitchell, the commander of the air units of the First Army in France, and later Chief of Air Service of the group of armies in the Argonne offensive. On December 5, 1919, he appeared before a House Committee on aviation under the chairmanship of Fiorello La Guardia. Mitchell declared an adequate air force alone could prevent hostile invasion. He predicted an air force would soon be superior to a navy for national defense.⁶ On February 3, 1920, he again appeared before this committee with diagrams and charts. The fiery aviator described a three-fold aerial attack which would be made against an hostile fleet after the enemy pursuit aviation had been defeated. First, low flying planes would sweep the decks with machine gun fire and small bombs would be dropped to interfere with anti-aircraft defense and the handling of the warship. Under the cover of this attack bombing planes would drop one-ton bombs. The third phase would be an attack by torpedo planes. Believing that no fleet

could survive such an attack, Mitchell predicted it would be "only a very short time before a navy will have to get under the water and stay there."⁷

A few months later, in a magazine article Mitchell wrote "future control of the sea depended on the control of the air." The solution of the control of the sea, he concluded, was not in a "great battleship and its accessories, but in the provision of a suitable air force and its accessory airplane carriers."⁸

Another enthusiastic advocate of the possibilities of air power was Admiral William F. Fullam, formerly superintendent of the U. S. Naval Academy and Commander of the U. S. Pacific Fleet. Under the pen name of "Quarterdeck" this far-sighted admiral wrote numerous articles for the *New York Tribune* which were widely published and quoted. Fullam foresaw "a complete revolution in naval architecture" as a result of the advent of airpower and the submarine which would drive the dreadnoughts and battle cruisers from the sea.⁹ Sea power, the admiral contended, could not exist alone. "The fleet must at all times control—completely control—the air above itself." When a fleet lost control of the air above, it could not long exist, nor could sea power defy air power unless the design of the surface vessels was radically changed. "Sea power," he concluded, "will be dependent upon air power."¹⁰

Admiral Fullam also maintained that aircraft would be an essential defensive weapon.

⁷66 Cong., 2 Sess., *Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Military Affairs—United Air Service*, 588-91.

⁸William Mitchell, "Aviation over the Water," *Review of Reviews*, October, 1920, v. 62, 391-6. See also William Mitchell, *Our Air Force, The Keystone of National Defense* (published in January 1921), Chapter XIV, "Aviation over the Sea." Also *New York Tribune*, January 23, 1921, VII, 2.

⁹William F. Fullam, "Battleships and Air Power," *Sea Power*, December, 1919, v. 7, 274.

¹⁰*New York Tribune*, November 5, 1920, 12; William F. Fullam, "Future Naval Warfare," *Sea Power*, December, 1920, v. 9, 281-2; *Cong. Rec.*, v. 60, 2987.

³*Congressional Record*, v. 60, 2987.

⁴*Aviation*, January 1, 1920, v. 7, 469.

⁵*U. S. Air Service*, December 1, 1919, v. 2, 11.

⁶66 Cong., 2 Sess., *Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Military Affairs—United Air Service*, 44: 47.

He drew a picture of an invading fleet nearing the American coast. This attacking fleet could not carry across the Atlantic or Pacific a force large enough to retain control of the air if the United States had an adequate air force prepared for defensive action. The position of the fleet could be fixed and constantly reported by scout planes and a stream of bombing planes dispatched from bases on the coast to drop their destructive bombs on the invading fleet and return to their bases for more.¹¹ The defenseless transports, loaded with thousands of men, would be subjected night and day to a rain of bombs as well as being endangered by mines, torpedo planes, and submarines. The transporting fleet would be destroyed. Air power would forbid the transportation of great armies overseas in the future.¹² Consequently, the United States might dismiss all fears of attack, Fullam concluded, except by an overwhelming fleet of aircraft.¹³

In 1919 and 1920, General Mitchell and Admiral Fullam had clearly outlined the doctrine of air power, but this challenge to sea power went comparatively unnoticed until 1921. During the last week of January, 1921, two events focused public attention upon the importance of air power. The first was the publication of photographs taken when the United States Navy was experimenting with the effect of bombs upon the U.S.S. *Indiana*. The second was another appearance by General "Billy" Mitchell before a House investigating committee.

Bombs had been placed at various places upon the twenty-six year old 10,000-ton battleship *Indiana* to determine their effect when exploded, and dummy bombs loaded with sand had been dropped from the air. The photographs of the results of the test

were first published in England in the *London Illustrated News*. The United States Navy had considered them secret and had not revealed the results of the tests to the American public,¹⁴ but somehow the English paper had secured the pictures and had "scooped" the American press. Six weeks later, on January 23, the New York *Tribune* printed seven pictures showing the great damage done to the old American battleship. In the accompanying article the *Tribune* criticized the Navy Department for not releasing any information concerning the bombing tests and called for a "free and thorough discussion as to the effect of new weapons upon naval warfare." Referring to the damage done to the *Indiana*, the *Tribune* declared that there could be "no doubt that the forward magazine would have blown up had the ship been in action at the time, thus completely destroying the ship."¹⁵

The testimony of General Mitchell before the House Appropriation Committee on January 28, 1921, also called attention to the possibilities of air attack. Drawing a vivid picture of the coming war in the air, he clarified his earlier reviews. Enemy aerial forces attacking from carriers could make gas attacks on American centers of communication. New York, for example, could be wiped out if an enemy force were able to drop 200 tons of phosgene gas every eight days. The only protection against such an attack would be an adequate air force, and Mitchell asserted that a protective force could be acquired with the expenditure of only \$45,000,000, the cost of a single battleship.¹⁶

Mitchell also struck a blow at naval thinking. He said that naval line officers regarded

¹⁴Isaac Don Levine, *Mitchell, Pioneer of Air Power*, 206-7.

¹⁵New York *Tribune*, January 23, 1921, VII, 2; January 27, 1921, 10.

¹⁶"Brig.-Gen. Mitchell's Startling Testimony," *Aviation*, February 7, 1921, v. 10, 164-67. Also *Army and Navy Journal*, v. 58, 640.

¹¹*Sea Power*, December, 1919, v. 7, 275.

¹²New York *Tribune*, November 5, 1920, 12.

¹³*Sea Power*, December, 1919, v. 7, 278. See also *Army and Navy Journal*, v. 58, 295.

the battleship as the "mistress of the sea," while actually she was just as helpless against air attack as "the armored knight when the firearm was brought against him." He declared the Army Air Force could "either destroy or sink any ship in existence."¹⁷ "We can hit very often," he declared, "because if necessary we will come down and lay the bomb on the deck." When a committee member questioned his statements, Mitchell replied, "Give us warships to attack and come and watch it. If you want a demonstration of the effect of bombardment against a naval vessel, we are prepared to give you that demonstration . . . tomorrow if necessary."¹⁸

This spectacular speech was discussed extensively in the press and went far toward awakening the public. The *Times* believed the horrible enemy air attack predicted by Mitchell might occur if America's air defense were neglected. This influential newspaper urged some old warships be turned over to Mitchell for a thorough bombing test.¹⁹

The New York *Tribune* declared "in truth, the country owes General Mitchell a vote of thanks" for his "frank and fearless testimony" on the importance of aviation in future warfare.²⁰ According to the magazine *U. S. Air Service*, Mitchell's testimony had

. . . created as much stir as if a bomb filled with enough T.N.T. to sink a battleship had actually been dropped half way between the war and navy department buildings. General Mitchell may have exaggerated the danger to which battleships are exposed from aircraft attack, but he has succeeded by the only possible method in focusing attention on a vital point and arousing the forces of reaction and content.²¹

The challenges hurled by General Mitchell and Admiral Fullam against the laboriously established theories of sea power met bitter

opposition from naval conservatives, who had been reared on the tradition that the decisive units of naval combat were battleships. For years the admirals worked to get Congress to provide a great fleet of battleships until finally, in 1916, such a fleet had been authorized and the building actually commenced. No wonder they protested volubly when the air enthusiasts asked that the 1916 building program be cast aside. To most naval experts the idea that an air attack might sink or even put a battleship out of action was incredible. Advocates of air power also wished to rely upon an air force as the first line of defense; this constituted heresy in a nation which had always been led to believe the navy to be the first line of defense.

The challenges of the air power advocates caused Senator William Borah to demand an investigation of what constituted a modern fighting navy. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels asked the General Board, the highest navy advisory and policy forming group, to consider and report upon the question of the mainstay of future naval strength.²²

On February 2, 1921, the General Board reported that it believed the battleship would remain the "backbone" of the fleet and the "basis of sea power." "From the period of the ancient galley to the present time the strength of navies has always been based on the number and power of its ships of the fighting line, that is, of its battleships." The Board pointed out that there had already been several challenges to the supremacy of the battleship, but each had been successfully met. In the early eighties it had been predicted that "a single torpedo launched from a boat costing less than \$100,000" would destroy a battleship costing millions, but "increased underwater protection, torpedo

¹⁷*Aviation*, v. 10, 165.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 167.

¹⁹New York *Times*, January 31, 1921, 8.

²⁰New York *Tribune*, February 1, 1921, 10.

²¹*U. S. Air Service*, v. 5, 7-8.

²²Secretary of Navy Files, National Archives, 8557-283, Daniels to General Board, January 22, 1921.

defense batteries, and larger, faster, better destroyers which took permanent place in the auxiliary forces of the fleet" minimized that threat. During the World War it had been predicted that the submarine would spell the doom of the battleship, but the use of destroyers and other speedy vessels with depth bombs and listening devices met that challenge. It was a rule of warfare that "means of defense move in parallel line and at about the same speed with those of offense." The Board then confidently predicted that a means of defense would be found to meet this challenge from the air and that airplanes like their dangerous predecessors will continue to be only adjuncts of the fleet."²³

A report on the bombing of the *Indiana* by Captain W. D. Leahy, Director of Naval Gunnery, also upheld the battleship. The future Chief of Staff to President Franklin D. Roosevelt stated that the "damage to material from aerial bombs was local" and that "the entire experiment pointed to the improbability of a modern battleship's being either destroyed or completely put out of action by aerial bombs." Leahy also stated that the percentage of hits scored on the *Indiana* was only eleven per cent. Battleships, he asserted, had made ten to fifteen per cent hits with 12 to 14 inch projectiles which could cause more damage than any bomb then in existence.²⁴

Other high-ranking naval officers in testimony before Congressional committees, in public speeches, and in published articles, supported the General Board's report and minimized the accuracy and effectiveness of aerial bombardment. Since anti-aircraft fire would keep the attacking planes very high above the target, Admiral Henry Mayo,

World War Commander of the Atlantic and European Fleets, believed that a hit would be unlikely. Even if a bomb did hit its target, Mayo was sure it would not pierce the armor plate or destroy the turret.²⁵ Admiral Charles B. McVay, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, asserted no bomb developed could "carry sufficient explosives to do other than local damage to a battleship." He was confident "airplane development had not reached the stage where there was a serious menace to the modern fighting vessel."²⁶ Admiral David W. Taylor, Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, scoffed at the idea that airplane development had rendered the capital ship in any sense obsolete. The battleship would continue to be the most potent unit of the fleet.²⁷

The highest civilian officials in the Navy Department also fought against the doctrines expounded by the advocates of air power. Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels criticized Mitchell's attempt to qualify before Congress as a "naval expert" and termed his testimony "wholly absurd." He said he knew of no developments of the World War or of any later experiment that would justify a conclusion that battleships were rendered practically useless by aircraft development. The Secretary added that he would gladly stand bareheaded on the bridge of a battleship and steer it while Mitchell dropped bombs to his heart's content. If the battleship used its defensive weapons, Mitchell would soon discover that when he tried to drop bombs he would be "blown to atoms long before he gets close enough to drop salt

²⁵*Army and Navy Journal*, v. 58, 784.

²⁶66 Cong., 3 Sess., House Appropriation Committee, *Hearings on Naval Appropriation Bill for 1922*, 154-5.

²⁷*The Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 2, 1921, 1. For the comments of Admiral Hugh Rodman, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and Captain J. J. Craven, Director of Naval Aviation, see *Army and Navy Journal*, v. 58, 648, 727, and 821.

²³*Cong. Rec.*, v. 60, 2826-7.

²⁴66 Cong., 3 Sess., House Committee on Naval Affairs, *Hearings on Sundry Legislation*, 1920-21, 686. Hereafter cited as *Sun. Leg.*

upon the tail of the navy."²⁸ Franklin D. Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy under Daniels, agreed. He declared that "the day of the battleship has not passed, and it is highly unlikely that an airplane or a fleet of them could ever successfully attack a fleet of navy vessels under battle conditions."²⁹ A few months later Harding's Assistant Secretary of Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, asserted that the advocates of air power treated "figments of their imagination as facts." He believed that the capital ship was still "the body of the navy" and that the air force would be only "an apt auxiliary arm."³⁰

Early in February, 1921, the advocates of air power were reinforced by Admiral William S. Sims, Commander of the American forces overseas during the World War and President of the Naval War College from 1919 to 1922. Admiral Sims, for years a strong supporter of the capital ship, had recently become converted to the doctrine of air power. He told the House Committee on Naval Affairs so important was an air force that a fleet without air support would be of little use in a contest with a fleet adequately supplied with an air force.³¹

Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, the inventor of the torpedo plane, also spoke enthusiastically on the possibilities of aviation.³² Fiske believed aviation was "destined to bring a revolution in warfare in comparison to which the revolution brought about by the invention of the gun was like a vaudeville performance."³³

General "Billy" Mitchell explained to the

committee the numerous difficulties encountered in obtaining better bombs. He complained that the procurement of bombs was frequently blocked because it "could not be shown that such a bomb had killed somebody in the Civil War."³⁴ The spirited aviator vigorously disagreed with Captain Leahy concerning the results of the *Indiana* bombing tests. A small bomb containing only 214 pounds of T.N.T., placed about sixty feet below the surface and about twenty-five feet away from the stern of the *Indiana*, had bent her shaft and rudder, causing her to begin to sink. He also argued that a larger bomb had torn up the deck, cracked up the eight-inch armor, thrown the turret off its mounting and smashed up the ammunition hoist. This destruction, Mitchell believed, would have put the *Indiana* completely out of action.

The impetuous aviator did not stop here, but went on to discuss in detail the vulnerability of all battleships to aerial bombardment.

Direct hits on decks and superstructures will break every electric light globe on the ship, throwing her into absolute darkness below the decks; disrupt telephone, radio, and interior communication systems, fill fire-rooms, engine rooms, and all compartments with noxious gases; cause shell shock to the persons within a radius of 300 feet, disrupt ammunition hoists, dislodge or jam turrets, kill all persons on upper decks, cause fires to break out and explode antiaircraft ammunition. Detonation of bombs beneath the waterline will sink or disable battleships.³⁵

Direct hits were not necessary to sink a battleship. The most effective weapon was "the water hammer, or water impelled with great force by an explosion under the bottom of the vessel," which, Mitchell believed, "would certainly cave in the bottom, spring

²⁸New York Tribune, Feb. 8, 1921, 1; Levine, *op. cit.*, 215. See also Alexander P. de Seversky, "America's Half-Honored Prophet," *Esquire*, Dec. 1942. This is a very interesting collection of newspaper clippings tracing Mitchell's fight for air power.

²⁹New York Times, May 5, 1921, 3.

³⁰The Christian Science Monitor, July 23, 1921, 6.

³¹Sun. Leg., 1920-21, 664-5. See also Elting E. Morison, *Admiral Sims and the Modern American Navy*, 504.

³²Sun. Leg., 1920-21, 704.

³³Army and Navy Journal, v. 58, 335, 671.

³⁴Sun. Leg., 1920-21, 715-16; *Aviation*, v. 11, 133-34.

³⁵"What General Mitchell Claimed," *Aviation*, v. 11, 133-4; *Sun. Leg.*, 1920-21, 712-13, 715-16.

the seams, and cause the vessel to sink."³⁶ Given proper facilities, airmen were sure they could sink any vessel, armored or unarmored, that came within two hundred miles of the shore. Aviation should be given a fair chance to develop and to demonstrate what it could do.³⁷

The press received Mitchell's suggestion favorably and requested the challenger be given a chance to prove his claims. The navy, however, was unimpressed and opposed further bombing tests. On February 1, Admiral Robert Coontz and Admiral David W. Taylor told the House Committee on Naval Affairs that the matter had been sufficiently tested and there was no need of further demonstrations of relative efficiency of the airplane and the battleship.³⁸

The navy soon changed its position, possibly because of a desire to prevent General Mitchell from directing the tests. On February 7, 1921, Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels wrote to Secretary of War Newton D. Baker that the navy contemplated conducting bombing experiments on naval vessels simulating actual warfare. In view of the discussion of the importance of aircraft in the United States and abroad, he suggested that the experiments be carried on jointly by the army and navy. The offer was accepted by the Secretary of War, and the Joint Army and Navy Board was asked to study the problem and make recommendations.

On March 1, the Joint Board recommended that the Army Air Service be authorized to participate in the experiments with the naval air service. The tests were to be conducted under the direction of the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet. The targets were to be a submarine, a destroyer, a light cruiser and two battleships, and the

tests were to determine the effect of aerial bombs and the number of hits which could be made by airmen. First, small bombs were to be used. After hits were scored a Board of Observers was to determine how much damage had been done and what lessons could be learned. Attacks with larger bombs up to the largest were to follow, and after hits were made, the ship was to be inspected to estimate the damage done and the bombs' efficiency.³⁹ A number of important questions were to be settled. Could airplanes locate vessels operating off the coast? Could bombs from aircraft hit a vessel underway and capable of maneuvering? Could aircraft put warships out of action or sink them?

The first test was conducted with *U-117*, a former German submarine. On June 21, 1921, three naval seaplanes dropped 163-lb. bombs on this small craft. With the first discharge of three bombs, a hit amidship of the target made havoc of the deck. More bombs were dropped. The submarine sank in sixteen minutes.⁴⁰

The second test occurred on June 29, with the U.S.S. *Iowa* as the target. The old battleship moved under her own power without pilot or crew, directed by radio from a nearby vessel. Theoretically she represented an enemy vessel seeking to elude detection and destruction while trying to reach Chesapeake Bay. Upon receipt of a "warning" that a "hostile" ship was approaching the coast, a group of twenty-five navy and marine corps planes was sent out to search an area of 25,000 square miles northeast of Cape Henry. The slowly zig-zagging *Iowa* was soon sighted. Twenty-two planes then

³⁶"Battleships to be Bombed," *Aviation*, v. 10, 328-29; *Army and Navy Journal*, v. 58, 742.

⁴⁰*New York Times*, June 22, 1921, 1. For a description of the ships and the official report see "Report of the Joint Board on Results of Aviation and Ordnance Tests Held During June and July 1921," *Cong. Rec.*, v. 61, 8622.

³⁶*Sun. Leg.*, 1920-21, 715.

³⁷*The Christian Science Monitor*, January 31, 1921, 1.

³⁸*Ibid.*, February 2, 1921, 1.

dropped eighty-five dummy bombs loaded with concrete. Only two hits were scored. This was not an impressive performance, but bombs loaded with concrete had a tendency to hurtle instead of dropping straight.⁴¹ The airmen proved, however, that they could locate an incoming "enemy" battleship and could quickly concentrate planes against it.

On July 13 the army airmen had their first chance. The former German destroyer *G-102* was bombed by planes carrying small 30-lb. bombs. The first real hit threw her funnels and her bridge in a shattered heap. The second struck amidships and "wrought such destruction that the destroyer lunged forward, kicked her stern in the air and was out of sight in two minutes."⁴²

The fourth test was conducted with the former German modern light cruiser *Frankfurt*. Fifty-seven 250 and 300-lb. bombs were dropped, but the vessel remained intact. Naval conservatives again became optimistic. They believed she would not be sunk, and preparations were made to turn her over to a wrecking crew. However, when six Martin army bombers appeared with 600-lb. bombs the situation soon changed. In a few minutes a bomb fell alongside, exploded, and lifted the *Frankfurt* out of the water. Ten minutes later the cruiser sank.⁴³

The airmen had proved that they could sink unarmored warships—submarines, destroyers, and cruisers. But a battleship was something else. Five times as large as the *Frankfurt*, a battleship with its many layers of armor and its watertight compartments presented a formidable target.

The most important tests were conducted with the ex-German dreadnought *Ostfries-*

land, anchored fifty miles off Cape Hatteras. After extensive tests with small bombs, larger ones were used in the morning of July 21. Five 1100-lb. bombs were dropped, and three direct hits were made. The superstructure was damaged considerably. Later in the day the veteran of *Jutland* was subject to attack by 2000-lb. bombs, the largest then available. General Mitchell instructed the Army airmen not to try for a direct hit, but to drop their bombs "close by" the target in order to create a "water hammer." The fourth bomb fell in the sea close in along the port side. It rocked and lifted the warship and "threw up a heavy fall of water in the deck like Niagara over the starboard side." The two big guns in the after turret disappeared. High naval officials watching the tests, however, were still convinced that it was impossible to sink a battleship from the air.⁴⁴

Their belief was soon dispelled. The fifth bomb also fell close to the port side, exploding with terrific effect, and sending a great sheet of water all the way across the deck. The sixth bomb dropped off the starboard side. The bow of the *Ostfriesland* rose. She turned turtle, then began going down, stern first.⁴⁵

The sinking of the *Ostfriesland* definitely proved that a battleship could be sunk by aerial bombardment alone. The effectiveness of the "water hammer" was demonstrated. For Mitchell it was a great personal victory. The challenger, who in February had been regarded as a fanatic, acquired a large popular following.

The bombing tests did more than anything else since the World War to emphasize the importance of aircraft as an offensive and defensive weapon. The sinking of the *Ostfriesland* made front page news and was the

⁴¹New York Times, June 30, 1921, 1; Cong. Rec., v. 61, 2625.

⁴²New York Times, July 14, 1921, 1; "Bombing of Warships Proves Air Power," *Aviation*, v. 11, 96-8.

⁴³New York Times, July 18, 1921, 3; "Bombing of Warships Proves Air Power," *Aviation*, v. 11, 96-8.

⁴⁴New York Times, July 22, 1921, 2.

⁴⁵*Idem*; "Ostfriesland Sunk by 2000-lb. Aircraft Bombs," *Aviation*, v. 11, 130.

subject of widespread editorial comment. Newspaper and magazine writers were aroused to the possibilities of aircraft, and articles appeared presenting both sides of the controversy. The *New York Times*, the *Tribune* and the *World* sided with the airmen, but the *Chicago Tribune*, the *New Orleans Times-Picayune* and the *Washington Star* were more conservative. Forty-six other papers were also divided in their opinions.

The *Ostfriesland* was sunk, but the controversy concerning the relative merits of the battleship and aircraft was still not only afloat but even more bitter. Neither of the antagonists was willing to surrender any of its preconceived opinions. The airmen were elated and stressed the fact that the battleship had been sunk just as they had predicted. The battleship, therefore, was obsolete.

The sinkings were severe blows to conservative naval officials, but they refused to admit that the battleship was obsolete. They argued that the weather was ideal and the targets stationary, and that the approaching planes were not harassed by anti-aircraft fire or defensive planes. Under battle conditions the results would be different, they maintained. They also pointed out that the *Ostfriesland* was an old warship, and that a modern dreadnought would have elaborate compartmentation, heavier armor, and extensive pumping systems, infinitely increasing its resistance to air attack.

Secretary of Navy Denby was evasive, merely paying tribute to the courage and skill of the airmen and calling the tests "one of the most remarkable series of experiments ever conducted." He pointed out that the *Ostfriesland* had withstood a "terrific pound-

ing" for two days.⁴⁷ Assistant Secretary of Navy Theodore Roosevelt was unimpressed. He stressed the ideal conditions of the bombing and declared: "I once saw a man kill a lion with a 30-30 calibre rifle, under certain conditions, but that does not prove a 30-30 rifle is a lion gun."⁴⁸ He said that the tendency was to over-emphasize the achievements of the airmen, and to underestimate the advantages of the battleship.⁴⁹

On August 20, the official report of the Joint Army and Navy Board on the bombing tests was published. It emphasized the fact that the ideal conditions of the tests favored the airmen — the targets were stationary, the planes were immune from anti-aircraft fire, and nearly perfect flying conditions prevailed. Therefore, the percentage of hits was greatly in excess of that to be expected under battle conditions. The Board cautiously admitted that "Aircraft carrying high-capacity high explosive bombs of sufficient size have adequate offensive power to sink or seriously damage any naval vessel at present constructed, provided such projectiles can be placed in the water close alongside the vessel." The report also conceded that it would be "difficult, if not impossible" to build a vessel strong enough to withstand the destructive force of the largest bomb. In spite of these factors, the battleship was

The backbone of the fleet and the bulwark of the Nation's sea defense, and will so remain so long as the safe navigation of the sea for purposes of trade or transportation was vital to success in war.

The airplane, like the submarine, destroyer, and mine, has added to the dangers to which battleships are exposed, but has not made the battleship obsolete. The battleship still remains the greatest factor of naval strength.

The development of aircraft instead of furnish-

⁴⁶*New York Times*, July 23, 1921, 6; *N. Y. Tribune*, July 23, 1921; *Literary Digest*, Vol. 70, Aug. 6, 1921, 17; *N. Y. World*, July 23, 6; *Chicago Tribune*, July 25, 6; *N. O. Times Picayune*, July 22; *Washington Star*, July 24, 2.

⁴⁷*New Orleans Times-Picayune*, July 22, 1921, 2; *New York Times*, July 22, 1921, 2.

⁴⁸*The Christian Science Monitor*, July 22, 1921, 6.

⁴⁹*New York Times*, July 22, 1921, 2.

ing an economical instrument of war leading to the abolition of the battleship has but added to the complexity of naval warfare.⁵⁰

The comments of naval conservatives and the Joint Board, of course, aroused the champions of air power. Admiral Fullam asserted that it must be remembered that battleships would be seriously threatened by the probability of having their supporting forces of unarmored ships, such as destroyers, light cruisers, colliers, supply ships, repair ships and ammunition ships "bombed, gassed, torpedoed, or mined off the sea." Even if the battleships themselves managed to remain afloat, they would be helpless without supporting forces. They would be open to submarine attack and would be without coal, oil, provisions and other necessities in operations overseas. The surface fleet, Fullam contended, should, therefore, "control the air above it."⁵¹

Admiral Sims also disagreed vigorously with the Joint Board's report. "The battleship," he argued, "was no longer the backbone of the navy," because it had "no defense against airplanes and no offensive power against airplane carriers which have speed enough to keep away." "Command of the air," he continued, meant "the command of the surface whether it be land or sea."⁵²

On September 14, General Mitchell's dissenting report on the bombing tests was unexpectedly published. It had been submitted to his chief, General Charles T. Menoher, in the form of a confidential memorandum, which was not to be made public. It reviewed the arguments for air power and flatly contradicted the Report of the Joint Board. Battleships under war conditions with magazines loaded, full steam up, would be even easier to put out of commission than the tar-

gets used. Nor would conditions of weather affecting the air or sea alter this statement. Aircraft could operate just as efficiently as seacraft under any weather conditions. The over-enthusiastic aviator declared his "First Provisional Brigade could have put out of action the entire Atlantic Fleet in a single attack."

His next statement caused a still greater sensation. He wrote that enemy forces with air superiority could capture the islands and coastal points along the United States. Using these as bases, land planes could make gas and bombing attacks against Chicago, St. Paul, Omaha, Kansas City, and other cities of the Central West.⁵³

During the last part of September, 1921, General Mitchell and his men had another opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of air attack upon battleships. The twenty-one year old, 11,552-ton battleship *Alabama* was given to the Army Air Service for a target. It had already been demonstrated that warships could be sunk, "but obviously, if the system of fire control, communication and mechanical installations of vessels can be disrupted and the nervous systems of human beings who man seacraft can be shattered, the efficiency of the craft is destroyed without necessarily sinking it."⁵⁴ Wooden boxes were placed at various posts on the *Alabama* to represent the personnel.

In the first tests four airplanes dropped 100-lb. phosphorus gas bombs. Practically every box was scarred or discolored by the gas, showing that if the ship had been manned her crew would have been disabled by choking chemicals.⁵⁵ In the last experiments, on September 26, 1100 and 2000-lb.

⁵⁰Cong. Rec., v. 61, 8623-5.

⁵¹William Fullam, "Air Menace to the Navy," *New York Times*, August 28, 1921, VII, 1; *New York Tribune*, September 13, 11.

⁵²*New York Times*, November 19, 1921, 18.

⁵³*New York Times*, September 14, 1921, 1.

⁵⁴*New York Tribune*, September 18, 1921, 7; Air Service Communique found in "Bombing Tests of the U.S.S. *Alabama*," *Aviation*, v. 11, 398.

⁵⁵*New York Times*, September 24, 1921, 12; *Aviation*, v. 11, 396-7.

bombs were dropped. The first 2000-lb. bomb hit at the base of the main mast, tearing off the mast and destroying the superstructure. The *Alabama* turned over at a 45-degree angle and went down in thirty seconds.⁵⁶

In the official report to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Naval Board of Observers it was declared that in order to protect the battleship, anti-aircraft batteries should be brought up to the highest point of efficiency. The board decided that aircraft were the best defense against air attack; therefore, aircraft carriers were "absolutely necessary."⁵⁷

The advocates of air power were more convinced than ever that the airplane would be the dominant factor in future wars on land and sea. The airplane was a gun, "the most powerful and effective gun, with the greatest range, the heaviest projectiles, the greatest variety of offensive and explosive agents in history." Command of the air meant command of the surface below. The next war, on land or on sea, would be won by the nation that commanded the air.

The air enthusiasts believed that the bombing tests had conclusively proved their case. Airplanes had quickly located the *Iowa* and had speedily concentrated upon it. Aircraft had easily sunk four former German warships—plus one old American battleship. Not even modern battleships could survive an air attack. The tests proved, moreover, that the percentage of hits would be high. The fact that the experiments were not conducted under actual battle conditions made no difference. The targets would have been sunk or put out of action even sooner had the ships been under way with engines and boilers in operation, magazines filled, ammunition, tor-

pedoes, and depth charges around the decks and steering gears vulnerable to attack. It was impossible to defend a warship with anti-aircraft fire. Battleships, therefore, were no longer the "backbone" of the fleet, for any ship afloat could be sunk by aerial attack. Instead, the aircraft carrier would be the capital ship of the future.

Air power would also revolutionize coastal defense. The existing coastal defenses would be useless against hostile aircraft. On the other hand, should the United States provide itself with a strong air force, an invading fleet which was not in constant command of the air above itself would be destroyed, disabled, or driven off if it came within 100 miles of the coast.

The air enthusiasts had succeeded in arousing the press and the public to discuss the question of airpower. The press throughout the United States devoted a large portion of its news columns, editorial pages and Sunday magazine sections to the controversy; the scientific magazines *Aviation*, *Aeronautical Digest*, *Aerial Age*, *U. S. Air Service* and *Scientific American* ran numerous articles on the possibilities of aircraft. Naval experts expressed their views in *Army and Navy Journal*, *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* and *Sea Power*.

Both sides of the question were presented in the popular magazines *Outlook*, *Review of Reviews*, *Literary Digest* and *World's Work*. The question was excitedly discussed in public gatherings and on the floor of Congress.

The doctrine of the superiority of air power gained many supporters. The testimony, speeches and articles of Admirals Fullam, Fiske, and Sims, and the reports and activities of General "Billy" Mitchell, the spectacular accounts of the various bombing tests appealed to the public. The fight of this zealous and far-sighted group for increased air appropriations gained editorial support of

⁵⁶New York Times, September 27, 1921, 19; *Aerial Age*, v. 14, 130. *Aviation*, v. 11, 396-7.

⁵⁷The official report of the Naval Board includes 130 photographs taken during the *Alabama* tests. These were seen with permission of the Navy Department at the Office of Naval Records and Library, National Archives, Secret and Confidential Files, 111-67:3.

many influential newspapers throughout the United States, and many people became convinced of the enormous potentialities of the airplane. The air enthusiasts also gained support from many of those who favored economy in naval expenditures. To some, air power seemed a cheap means of national defense, while to others, it was an argument against the construction of the expensive battleship and the navy's proposed large expenditures on warship construction and maintenance.

However, the results of the agitation of the air enthusiasts were disappointing. The Navy Department only half-heartedly exerted its influence for more appropriations for aviation or for aircraft carriers.

Later under the able direction of Admiral William A. Moffett the navy began to appreciate the potentialities of naval aviation. More bombing tests and further investigation, however, were to be made before real progress was achieved toward the acquisition of a strong naval air force.

Oldest Helmet Found

"**A** HELMET, known as an archer's or arquebusier's salade, ploughed up recently by an Indian on the site of San Gabriel del Yunque, New Mexico," the National Park Service informs us, "has been judged to be the oldest piece of European armor yet found in the United States." Harold L. Peterson of the Park Service's History Division, and a member of the A.M.I., received the helmet for identification from Mrs. Marjorie Lambert, archeology curator in the New Mexico Museum. The helmet as received was badly corroded and very fragile. Although San Gabriel was established in 1598, the helmet is

believed to be much older. "Since virtually nothing but oxidation remained," writes Peterson, "the helmet was soaked in tepid water to loosen clay and dirt and to leach out salts. " After loose material was removed with a very soft brush, a washing with a neutral detergent followed. Immersed in melted wax for fifteen minutes, the helmet was thoroughly dried in an oven in which the temperature was gradually raised to that of the melted wax. The wax serves as both a preservative and an adhesive. The ancient helmet will be returned to New Mexico in much better shape for preservation and display.

ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN SICILY, 1943

BY HENRY M. ADAMS

THE COMBINED British-American operation, known as AMGOT, Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory, took its first physical form between June 1 and July 15, 1943, at a camp and training school located high atop a mountain on the outskirts of the French Algerian resort town, Chr  a. The personnel assembled at this secret rendezvous consisted of U. S. and British officers. The school and training program was organized on a four-week basis. It was then repeated until the middle of July, and continued through the winter of 1943-44 at Tizi-Ouzou, a village some forty miles east of Algiers. During six weeks at Chr  a combined groups of British and U. S. officers departed at intervals under strictest secrecy for assigned duties, as simultaneously new increments from England and the United States arrived. It was understood that we were preparing for duty in Italian speaking lands, but security prevented us from knowing with certainty which lands until the invasion of Sicily, July 10, 1943. Rumor and guess, however, had approached the truth, hidden under the code name, "Horrible," sometime after the seizure of Pantelleria, June 11, 1943.

At Chr  a the theoretical morphology of military government for Italian territory was set up and clothed in Italian costume. Each day lectures on all pertinent aspects of Italian life and history were delivered, Italian language classes held, and discussion groups fought out the organization of military government in the image of conflicting personalities and directives.

Each discussion group was in origin a divisional organ of military government to which personnel were assigned, policy directives sent, and Italian material applied. The administrator's group, Civil Affairs Division, studied the powers and duties of the commune governor, the Podesta of Fascism, Il Sindaco of pre-Fascism, and the procedural relationship to him of the military government officer, called in the days of AMGOT, the CAO, Civil Affairs Officer.

In similar manner the public safety division set up the police and prison organization of military government, integrating with it the Italian police and prison system, and clarifying procedural interrelationships. All other divisions, the legal, the finance, the supply, the public health, and the enemy property, followed the same pattern, not only as to purpose and effort, but also as to conflicts of personalities and political intrigue.

Coordination of the activities of these divisions of military government was achieved partly through headquarters directives and partly through integrating lectures and meetings of the heads of the divisions. From time to time important visitors such as General Eisenhower, General Browning, Lt. Col. Holmes added the zest of actuality to the imaginary world of military government in the process of becoming.

In spite of the serious efforts of the informed instructional staff who presented their material carefully, only a minority took to heart the importance of this knowledge as a basis for efficient action in military govern-

ment. Not only did the majority fail to take the instruction seriously, but they failed even individually to bother to read the ample written material at their disposal. The majority considered that their worldly experience and natural abilities were sufficient to handle the job. It didn't make any difference if ninety percent of the Italians were of Roman Catholic faith, if the Fascist wheat storing and distribution system of the Amassi was good in itself and to be retained or re-established, or if regionalism was an important element of Italian political tradition—innate practicality and common sense would produce efficient administration.

At no time did the inspirational, creative heat of idealism warm the efforts of the divisions. There was plenty of heat, but it came from the African sun, the battle of words, and the conceit of common sense. There was plenty of coldness, too, of boredom, of scorn, and of despair.

With the invasion of Sicily we shifted our minds from the general to the particular, and received specific assignments. I was to be with the Public Safety Division in the city of Palermo, so I turned at this eleventh hour to a careful study of that famous city.¹

By the 28th of July I was in Palermo, and late the following morning assembled with other AMGOT officers for the city of Palermo, the Province, and the HQ of the Provincial Military Government. There was no time to cut orders in the military fashion, only time to assign and verbally order out the officers to their tasks. When Poletti spoke to the group it was administration in action. The job to be done was greater even than expected, as the number of personnel was less. The first list read consisted of seven officers, British and U. S.; I was included.

We were ordered out under the delicately combined command of Major Foster (U. S.) and Major Downer (Br.).

Several hours later at Cefalù we discussed together the instructions of the Majors. They were few, vague, and general. Major Foster was to organize the administration of the eastern and southeastern sections of Palermo Province. Each of us would be assigned an area to administer. We would coordinate our administration through Major Foster who would keep in touch with Palermo from Cefalù. We had only one small-scale map which Major Palmer had acquired from a traffic MP on the way out of Palermo. On the basis of this map, assignments were made. I was to be in charge of Petralia Sottana, Petralia Soprana, Castellana, and Polizzi Generosa. A truck was scheduled to pick us up and take us to our posts in the interior. When it would arrive was not known. We would each be supplied with C rations for ten days. In the mountains, AMGOT officers who were spearheading under the command of a British major would be contacted. In all probability they had briefly accomplished the first tasks of military government and would move on, being replaced permanently by us. We were somehow to get back to Palermo and report on the 9th of August. That was all. No one knew anything more. Such was the opening gambit, made according to a tattered road map devoid of terrain features, and on our combined memories of mountainous central Sicily, not of the city of Palermo.²

In the blazing noon-day sun of the 31st day of July I arrived in Petralia Sottana in the midst of the chaos and confusion of a town taken a few days before by elements of the First Infantry Division. Forward area installations were being set up in the surrounding mountainous countryside, as well as in the town.

¹Chr  a, *Military Memoranda, Orders, Directives, Correspondence and Personal Notes*, June 1 to July 15, 1943.

Entering upon my duties as permanent CAO of the area, I inherited from the AMGOT spearhead officer, Captain Conklin, lodgings, unfinished business, and an interpreter. From CIC agents I acquired an analysis of the situation. From the Military Police I learned of the disposition of the military units in the area.

The following morning, August 1, I went to the *municipio* and took up the work where Captain Conklin had left off. The problems of internal office organization, of contacting important officials, and of ordering reports required immediately as well as verification of orders carried out, were on my agenda. The incumbent Fascist mayor had to be removed. By noon this was accomplished, and I instructed the new mayor, Signore Filiberto Calascibetta, to organize his staff and be able to defend his selection of personnel before me on the basis of our proclamation, ordinances, and regulations. I made clear to him that furtherance of the military effort was the first priority of military government, and secondly, the rehabilitation of economic life to that end. He was to work closely with me on these objectives. He understood and agreed to accept the thankless, arduous task of serving as mayor in inauspicious times, under tragic conditions.

The establishment of military government in Petralia was now continued in detail and

on a long-term basis.³ The preliminary steps which had been taken—proclamations posted, weapons and radio transmitters turned in, necessary arrests made, facilities closed as ordered, curfew and other restrictions on civilian travel imposed, and information to that effect made known to the civilians—were verified.

The re-organization of municipal administration began with the mayor. Other changes of personnel continued as all agencies of the government were cleared of Fascist party influence and dissolved or reconstituted afresh as prescribed by orders.⁴ The civil Fascist control from Rome was replaced by military government control. Local governmental affairs were exercised by the local officials under the supervision and command of the CAO who possessed great powers and responsibilities. He in turn served as the agency to which the local civil officials turned in all matters, as well as through which the higher echelon plans and centralized controls were executed.

The civilian police, the famous Carabinieri Reali, were reformed, maintained, and supported as the one existing agency to maintain law and order. Its traditional reputation of good character and training, of loyalty to the House of Savoy, of respect by the people, and of indifference to transitory governmental forms, were understood to be the basis of its reliability, stability, and our use.

Good relations with the representatives of the Roman Catholic Church were established on the basis of its tradition, stability, and cultural position, independent of contem-

²Palermo, *Military Memoranda, Orders, Directives, Correspondence and Personal Notes*, July 28, 1943 to January 15, 1944; Chr  a, *op. cit.* Because of undue secrecy at Chr  a, the dividing of AMGOT field personnel into spearhead officers and permanent administrative officers was not fully grasped until the theoretical plans materialized. An AMGOT spearhead officer was one who came ashore in the invasion with tactical forces, divisional and higher echelons, and remained with them repeating the temporary organization of front line civilian communities as the line moved forward. Some permanent administrative officers served as spearhead officers until they reached their assigned destination, but most were despatched in groups and rushed directly to the relief of the spearhead as permanent organization followed close on to capture of enemy territory.

³Petralia, *Military Memoranda, Orders, Directives, Correspondence and Personal Notes*, August 1, 1943 to January 15, 1944.

⁴Petralia, *op. cit.*; AMGOT, *Sicily Gazette*, No. 1, July 1943, No. 2, September 17, 1943; AFHQ Press 397, Proclamations and General Orders of AMGOT in English and Italian, Proclamation No. 7, hereafter cited as *Sicily Gazette* No. 1 or No. 2.

porary Fascist relationships.

The cleansing of the legal, penal, and educational systems was begun, to allow as quickly as possible for the opening of the lower courts, the prisons, and later the schools. The postal and telephone systems were closed for an indefinite period, so that official communication passed, by courier, through military government channels, and ordinary civilian communication ceased for reasons of military security. Banks were temporarily closed, bringing to an end all financial transactions and shifting the basis of economic life to credit and barter until such time as investigation of the banks' resources and personnel had been completed, and Fascist funds and accounts of individuals and agencies segregated and blocked, when they were reopened for limited, specified transactions.

The existing governmental agencies of control over the economic life of the community were, with some exceptions, maintained, shorn of Fascist personnel until such time as reforms could be accomplished and experience could show their value or lack of value to our objectives. Price control, rationing, and food collecting and distributing systems were continued, or if broken down, re-established. Prices of commodities, including labor, were frozen as of the date of the invasion, the objective being to maintain the economic *status quo* existing just before our arrival, and on this basis make the necessary adjustments as the impact of our presence and the war occasioned. Some Fascist agencies, like that controlling labor, ended immediately. Some, like the grain collecting system, the famous Amassi system, remained.⁵ Some, like the price policing agency, the Guardia Finanza, were forbidden to function, and then later found necessary for price

supervision, and re-established. Some, like the meat collecting system, the hated Raduno, were re-instituted to obtain the necessary meat supply and break the existing black market in meat, but were found unworkable.

The production and processing of food, the reopening of essential private and public enterprises, the rehabilitation of essential trade and transport, and the re-establishment of health and welfare agencies, all were to be accomplished on a basis of priority needs within the framework of military government objectives. Finally, the preservation of the cultural heritage in the form of libraries, monuments, and other works of art, was an important consideration from the first, even though it seldom took first place among the immediate needs.

At the earliest opportunity a general survey of the facilities of the community was undertaken, and a large amount of information secured. Essential agencies were located: the police station, the jail, the fire station, the hospital, the water and electric power installations, the flour and *pasta* factory, the bank, the court, the schools, the cathedral, the important bus garage, the grain storage and other warehouses, the bakeries and food shops, and living accommodations. Essential information was obtained concerning the former population figures, the present number of inhabitants, natives and refugees, and the origin of the latter; the number of policemen, firemen, doctors, and nurses in the community; the capacity of the jails, schools, hospitals, dwellings, warehouses, garages, halls, barracks, and their condition for occupancy; the extent and quality of the food, water, and medical supplies; the resources of power, electricity, water, gas, gasoline, oil, of transport, of industry, and of repair and maintenance for buildings and vehicles; the financial condition of the commune, its cash on hand, and the size of its debt; and lastly, the

⁵Chr  a, *op. cit.*; Petralia, *op. cit.*; Sicily Gazette, No. 1, Proclamations 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11.

personnel and pay of public officials, grain supplies in the Amassi, vehicle and radio receiving set registrations, and relief needs.

With Petralia Sottana as headquarters, I visited the other towns during each week according to a rotating schedule. In each, the procedures, duties, and responsibilities were the same; the problems and results, however, often dissimilar.

Under my jurisdiction was a mountainous area of 24 square miles, with an estimated total population, including refugees, of 43,000 civilians. The civil administration of each town was headed by a non-salaried mayor who was assisted by a career secretary, a communal treasurer, and a police chief. Later, a mayor's council, *junta*, was added officially.

From time to time other agencies of the commune, both public and private, attained major importance. The record office was able to furnish data on wheat assessments, cattle and mule, vehicle and radio-ownership, and other registrations. The local grain-storage managers, Amassi heads, furnished wheat production records. The veterinarian was essential for meat inspection, butchering, sale and identification of cattle and mules. A refugee physician became important to the community as head of the hospital and supervisor of public health. The regional engineer, the only man schooled in the complicated water system of the Madonie mountains, found himself in demand in the early days as never before, because the Army, in taking half the supply of water, threw the system out of gear. The town crier and the printer, the priest and the school director, the bakers and bankers, the judge and the flour mill owner, the refugees and the orphans, the aristocrats and the ubiquitous peasants — all were one day or the next of major concern.

Financial transactions of the commune and of AMGOT were handled at first by the

CAO in his capacity as Finance Officer, then later through the branch of the Banca d'Italia in Petralia under the supervision of the CAO, and finally, except for financial records kept by the CAO, through the Banca d'Italia, supervised from Palermo by Sicilian officials.

Legal matters were handled through the AMG Summary Court set up in Petralia by the CAO in his capacity as Legal Officer. The court's power extended over Italian law as well as AMG law, but the few cases of the former were held over until at an early date the Italian law court having jurisdiction in the area and located at Polizzi was authorized to open its penal section under the supervision of the CAO.

Besides the establishment of AMGOT control and supervision of the administration, the welfare, and the economic rehabilitation of the community, the CAO had to maintain liaison with the Army and communication with higher echelons. Liaison pertained to military needs involving civilians, such as the requisitioning of mules, the registration and parole of released Italian PWs entering the area, the purchases of thousands of eggs and occasionally meat by the Army, the billeting of troops, and the enforcement of military orders. Communication with higher echelons involved, on the one hand, the reception of countless reports, orders, directives, instructions, military letters, and commands funneled through the provincial HQ to the CAO in the field by motorcycle courier once, and sometimes twice a week, from AFHQ Algiers, 15th Army Group HQ, IBS HQ, HQ of other 7th Army units, AMGOT HQ of other provinces, AMGOT administrative HQ, and later Region I HQ which coordinated inter-island communications; on the other hand, the replies from the CAO returned through the same channels. Most of these, except for reports required of civilians, had to be handled by the CAO alone because

of their nature, even though he used civilian secretaries on all possible occasions.⁶

Such was the work of the military government officer in the field in the forward area. Swiftmess marked, and urgency pressed out each action, each thought, and each decision. Without respite the minutiae of things to be done, of problems to be solved, crowded in upon the responsible administrator. Pressure of responsibilities drove him restlessly through each day and far into the night consuming his energy as fire consumes oil. Multiplicity, change, and frustration, mirroring the world of the civilian and the military, filled each day tense—with activity. Danger, often present, and rest, usually absent, were the only inconstants among the factors which set the tone of military government work in the forward area during war. A British major, long with the career police of His Majesty's Government, said, after a few weeks of the arduous toil, "Never before in my life have I been asked to do the work of a hundred men."

In Palermo, as ordered on the 9th of August, I learned for the first time the actual organization, which reflected the theoretical paper plan, of AMGOT in Sicily, and of Palermo Province. General H. R. Alexander, representing AFHQ, was General Officer Commanding the Allied Forces, and Military Governor of Sicily. His deputy, commanding AMGOT, was Francis Baron Rennell of Rodd, Major General, Chief Civil Affairs Officer (CCAO). Under him were the Senior Civil Affairs Officers (SCAO) commanding the administration of AMGOT in each province. And assisting the SCAO in each province were the Civil Affairs Officers (CAO).

⁶*Personal Conference Note Book*, Conference I. August 9-10, 1943. AMGOT Administrative HQ handled the personal affairs, mail, movement orders, records, and other matters characteristic of army personnel administration.

Lt. Col. Poletti was the SCAO of Palermo Province. His staff was made up of a deputy and other personal aides, the chiefs of divisions, and the CAOs who, administering AMGOT in the field, were each called upon to perform all the tasks of the divisions. Integration of administration was achieved by fortnightly Sunday conferences of CAOs, the first of which was held at the Prefettura in Palermo on August 9-10, 1943, under the chairmanship of Lt. Col. Poletti.

The purposes of the conferences under the direction of Lt. Col. Poletti and his successors, were to coordinate the administration of the CAOs in the field and maintain uniformity, singleness of purpose, and cooperation, by thrashing out the problems democratically around a table, to issue new instructions, gain first-hand information, answer questions and clarify policy, and to present through the chiefs of each division the objectives of the next two-week period. It was exhausting work, but excellent administration.

"Act!" the Colonel used to shout at us, "Act! Don't think. Take action, any action, even if it's wrong, but whatever you do be sure to take action. We can correct a wrong, but not a failure to act."

And we did act, but it had nothing to do with bells. The purpose of military government during war was and is to further the military effort by controlling civilian life so that it will not endanger, but rather assist the military effort. To this end we worked.

The nature of the problems in the field, over and above the establishment of military government as directed by official policy and orders, varied according to the particular conditions of the area. Agricultural Petralia presented different problems from those of coastal Palermo; production in the one, starvation in the other.

In spite of local variations there were basic civilian problems common to all areas, the

restoration of transport, the production and distribution of food, the providing of medical and relief needs, and the maintenance of economic controls. These were of the greater magnitude and were attacked simultaneously.

There were also variations in the organization of military government within each province. For example, Caltanissetta, Ragusa, and Messina were administered from their capitals only, the CAOs functioning out of the capitals daily on circuit instead of being stationed permanently in local areas as in Palermo Province. Each provincial SCAO used whatever technique of administration he considered suitable.⁷

Great administrative difficulties were found in the attempts to secure uniformity, cooperation, and integration between military government areas, local and provincial. Locally each CAO, in his sovereignty, tended to exaggerate his own importance and the welfare of his bailiwick to the point of conflict with his neighbors. The tendency to hold onto, to keep secret, and to guard jealously what resources one had, proved difficult to avoid, and put the CAOs on the defensive against each other. This stimulated the converse tendency to penetrate the secrets of one's neighbors and gain access to a share of these resources for one's own community, a practice in which the Sicilians joined through habit and custom. Rivalry and reprisal were at the expense of the general welfare. This but reflected the traditional individuality and selfishness, and at times, animosity of the Sicilian communes. Neighboring Castelbuono with a two-day bread supply called upon Petralia for wheat, which was sent, with a request for olive oil from San Mauro, a commune under the jurisdiction of the CAO of Castelbuono.

⁷The author's conversations on AMGOT organization with Public Safety Officers, Lt. Hahn, Caltanissetta Province, Lt. Maki, Ragusa Province, and Lt. Krupski, Messina Province.

The latter claimed there was no oil. Up went the cockles of "*piccolo Parigi*."⁸ no oil from them, then no wheat from us. The starvation of Palermo only put the mountaineers on the defensive for fear of no bread for themselves.

Or again, a truck from Petralia seeking fruit and vegetables from the Conca d'Oro would be seized and confiscated at a road block in Misilmeri because its permit lacked a local requisite of the sub-urban regulations, determined that morning and not yet known even at HQ, or perhaps Misilmeri needed a truck. Days would be required to liberate the truck through Provincial HQ, while Petralia police awaited a chance for reprisal against Misilmeri.

At a higher level, Palermo Province sought wheat of Caltanissetta Province, the dominant wheat area of the island, but so did the eastern provinces of Messina, as well as others. Like Petralia, but on a larger scale, Caltanissetta found herself on the defensive to meet the heavy drain of wheat. On the other hand, the inter-provincial problem of distributing the abundant supply of olive oil in Ragusa Province among the provinces in great need, like Palermo, was never solved.⁹

Along with all this went the reconstruction of the civil administration, both municipal and provincial. Reconstruction had begun with the local military government control of the commune, centralized through military government in Palermo. As the provincial agencies in Palermo were re-constituted, the

⁸*Ibid.* Because Petralia Sottana was a mountain resort town for both winter sports and summer rest, and frequented year 'round by wealthy citizens of Palermo, it was affectionately called "*piccolo Parigi*."

⁹*Ibid.* The author's conversations in December with Lt. Maki of Ragusa Province concerning economic resources and inter-provincial distribution. The latter claimed Ragusa had a whole year's supply in reserve, besides the current supply. Palermo, on the other hand, went without, though there were isolated cases of fortunate families having small stocks, and of course some black market evidence.

provincial military government in Palermo would tie in the local agency with the newly established provincial agency, and centralized control and responsibility would pass to the civilian administration. Fortnightly progress was clearly revealed.

By the 10th of August at Palermo, the Consorzio Provinciale, directing the Amassi, had been reconstituted, and local Amassi reports were sent henceforth weekly to it, via AMGOT Provincial HQ. The Carabinieri Reali were again centralized with the appointment of Major Renaldi to provincial command. Local relief of all kinds, including pensioners, was integrated through the reconstituted provincial agency of ECA (Ente Comunale Assistenza).

By the 5th of September at Palermo taxation had passed under provincial control, banking affairs centralized under the reopened Banca d'Italia, and provincial doctors had been named (Signori Savoya and De-Grazia).

By October 10th at Palermo, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry had been revived, the Provincial Labor Office organized under Professore Solario, the education board (Provvediatore agli studii) reborn, a new provincial agency for public welfare set up, and communal budgetary finances centralized under the provincial government in the office of Signore Gargano at the Prefettura. By November 15th public health had become unified under a provincial Public Health Council.

Lastly, on the 21st, the Regional AMG of Sicily at Palermo was able to announce the names of ten Sicilian officials and departments for the civil administration of the entire island. Simultaneously, instructions were given to all the mayors of the province to assemble at the Prefettura on Tuesday, November 23rd, for the first conference on civil administration under the newly ap-

pointed governor of the province, later of the island, Il Prefetto Musatto.

Along with the gradual assumption of greater responsibilities in administration by Sicilians, which marked the progressive reconstruction of civilian administration, went gradual changes in the organization of AMGOT.

The surrender of Italian arms on the eve of Salerno, September 7th, 1943, and the subsequent status of co-belligerency achieved by Italian nationals, changed AMGOT to AMG as "occupied territory" technically lost its meaning. It was far easier for the Sicilians, already pleased that they were out of the war, to rejoice in their newly acquired status than it was for the military government officer to adjust himself to the psychology of a new day. Co-belligerent or not, the tasks and the difficulties were the same, before or after the champagne.

In October the Regional Military Government HQ took form in Palermo, for the control of the island. This process resulted in some confusion as personnel were shifted about. At the same time a new organization, the Allied Control Commission, began to send its representatives to investigate AMGOT at work on the job. The source was the same as that out of which we had come, but we no longer recognized our mother under her new name, as personnel of Sub-Commissions, and Sub-Sub-Commissions visited the AMGOT offices of chiefs of divisions, ostensibly to learn, but often to instruct on matters the Commissioners had yet to experience. The new forms, the new verbiage, the new faces, the vast horde of ACC inundated the club and mess of AMGOT Provincial HQ, the fortnightly rendezvous of workers from the field, making of it a foreign citadel, and driving the old guard back to their jobs among their Sicilian co-workers where everybody understood everybody. By a change of

address on November 7th, AMGOT in Sicily became ACC, but the problems and difficulties continued as before.¹⁰

On December 9th another change, consolidating areas and reducing personnel, added to my jurisdiction the communes of Alimena, Bompietro, Gangi, and Geraci, more than doubling the area and population, and reducing the CAOs of the province to twelve, exclusive of the five officers in charge of the city of Palermo.

¹⁰The character of the change is perhaps pointed up by the joke current at the time among the "old guard."

"Have you heard?"

"What?"

"Sicily has just been invaded."

"Germans? Where?"

"No, ACC."

On the 19th instructions were given to CAOs to prepare a check list of duties of the CAO on handing over their posts to replacements, indicating further changes not far distant.

On the 7th of January, 1944, in Petralia, I was informed by several of my Sicilian co-workers, through their remarkable grapevine, that I was being recalled to Palermo. Three days later, a British officer arrived at my headquarters with a letter order verifying the Sicilian intelligence. The next few days were devoted to familiarizing the officer with his new tasks, after which I proceeded to Palermo, bringing to an end five and one-half months of work with AMGOT in Sicily, August 1, 1943 to January 15, 1944.

EDITORIAL NOTE TO OUR READERS

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THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

Reviews

A Soldier's Story, by Omar N. Bradley. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951. Pp. 618. \$5.00).

We must start with the truth that the personal military reminiscences of the officer who commanded the 12th Army Group in Europe, consisting of the First, Third, and Ninth Armies, must be a volume of great importance and value. Even if it is not — and it is not — a full, detailed, and balanced narrative of great operations, it contributes of necessity to military history.

In presenting his extremely personal story, the reader does obtain some understanding of the background of important decisions made by the author. General Bradley quotes conversations with his staff at length using first names and nicknames almost as a habit. Yet since this account was reduced to a third of its length for publication many looked for details are necessarily omitted.

After a few introductory pages on how he came to go overseas the book takes General Bradley to North Africa, and into Sicily as II Corps commander under General Patton as Army commander. It takes 150 pages to get him to England and the invasion planning which he picked up from Gerow's V Corps and the Morgan-Baker staff at COSSAC and carried through in detail for the First Army. The relationships with General Patton are dwelt upon in some detail. The striking thing is that, although Bradley apparently was often irritated at Patton, the two worked together splendidly. Patton had been his superior in Sicily and became his subordinate in France and accepted the situation so well that Bradley calls him the "most unhesitatingly loyal of all my com-

manders."

Another personal relationship is made plain, the extreme trust and confidence which General Bradley placed in the one whom he nevertheless called "the nervy and ambitious Collins." It seemed always to be Collins' VII Corps of First Army which drew the difficult assignments and accomplished phenomenal results. He had the task of making a quick capture of Cherbourg against what appeared to be great handicaps. He was then shifted to effect the St. Lo breakthrough, and it was his Corps which, supported on the right by Patton's rampaging Third Army, swung around like a reaching arm to create the Falaise pocket.

Although not mentioned in this book, an illustrative incident needs to be told here. First Army under Bradley planned the St. Lo breakthrough in detail, and the approved COBRA plan was handed to Collins to execute. Collins' VII Corps order for the attack varied from that plan in many important particulars, and there never was specific written authority granted or even asked to "cover" the subordinate if things went awry. General Collins and Bradley had such personal confidence in one another that such a problem never arose. Students of American history will recall that such confidence was not always the situation in our past great wars.

Of all of the purely personal relationships which will attract attention from the pages of this volume, those with Field Marshal Montgomery must attract attention. To that famous and accomplished British officer, General Bradley initially pays high tribute. He credits him with allowing a freedom of action to First Army in Normandy that is very unusual for a superior commander. He credits him with unhesitatingly bearing the

much heavier burden of offensive holding actions at Caen while the Americans were aiming at the spectacular St. Lo breakthrough. He credits him with fine cooperation in the closing days of the whiplash operation to the Seine. But Bradley went on to say, however, that his "fondness for Monty often ran thin during the European campaign," and he had to "conceal our irritation" when he quite often during the war "disputed Monty's views, challenged his decisions, and questioned the wisdom of his moves," but the two never "opposed one another with the asperity some gossipers liked to think existed."

In only one portion of this book does General Bradley extend himself in self-justification; that is in the passages concerning the German counter-attack into the Ardennes. He frankly states that he was taking chances in leaving the line there so thin, but insists he would take them again, for caution was not his metier and caution did not breakthrough in Normandy nor sweep past Paris. He does, however, devote considerable space to attacking First Army's claim that First Army had warned of the danger. He says that he did not read the detailed intelligence reports of subordinate Armies but only those of his own G-2 and that in his conversations with Army commanders the danger was not mentioned. He does quote the First Army estimate of December 10th that the enemy could hit "with air, armor, infantry, and secret weapons at a selected focal point at a time of his own choosing" but he constantly shifts from these final "conclusions" to the preliminary discussions which suggested that a counterattack might be expected farther north and after the Roer had been crossed. The full text does not read the way Bradley extracts it. When he quotes from the December 15th G-2 estimate of First Army he omits the indication that troops for the German areas "between Duren and Trier" were continuing to arrive — this was directly on the vital Ardennes front. General Bradley brushes off the First Army protests by saying that the "brilliant and skilled" G-2 of First Army was "often a pessimist and an alarmist" and by saying that "some officers of First Army . . . had not yet convinced their own Army commander that disaster lay around the corner," for General Hodges himself did not speak of the threat, nor had they sufficiently convinced Bradley's own Army Group G-2.

This puts quite a different picture on the canvas than that held by First Army. The day before

the attack, First Army's G-2 had stood before the wall, pounded his fist on the map, and said: "Watch the Ardennes, watch the Ardennes." We at First Army had heard a tale of the possibility of a threat being conveyed to General Bradley late in November, of a conference held by General Bradley at Army Group at that time, and of a decision not to sit on the defensive but to leave that part of the line weak and go ahead with pressure elsewhere. Army Group had several divisions, both infantry and armor, out of line, able to be moved to meet an attack or to exploit a success. When we felt the attack and saw those fast moving units moving, we began to feel, like Patton, that the enemy had stuck his head into a meatgrinder, and we were full of admiration for the sound tactical decision General Bradley had made in view of the circumstances. After all, we know now that that was where we chewed up Hitler's new large force and really won the war. But, after all, if Bradley says he did not think there was any threat, that he discounted Dickson, was never warned by Sibert, nor approached on the presumed peril by his Army commanders, that is the history as General Bradley saw it. The tale of the November conference is therefore probably apocryphal. Facts like these are reasons for publishing the personal memoirs of commanders. His protestations take away from him the credit which our tale would have given him for a very sound and important decision and leave him in the position of really being surprised. If that is to his discredit, the new version redounds still more to his credit in that it shows that he was unperturbed by the surprise and was just that much more skillful in handling the difficult situation.

ELBRIDGE COLBY

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Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander, South-East Asia, 1943-1945, by Vice-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma. (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1951. 17 shillings, 6 pence. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951. Pp. 280. \$12.00).

Admiral Mountbatten's *Report* to his ultimate superiors, the Combined Chiefs of Staff, is the most comprehensive and elaborate report of a commander to his superiors which this reviewer has yet seen. The cartography is superb, the

appendices many and lengthy, and the explanatory footnotes numerous and well-chosen. Technically, it is an excellent piece of work, and is a valuable contribution to the British point of view on the war in Southeast Asia. But it has its limitations in that it is an official report, written by an officer still on active duty, and so there are omissions when Admiral Mountbatten discusses his British colleagues. The account is much more complete in its treatment of Admiral Mountbatten's relations with his acting Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, the late General Joseph W. Stilwell, U.S.A.

With that caution in mind, the student of the late war in Southeast Asia can make most profitable use of Mountbatten's *Report*. The scheme of presentation is logical and comprehensive. It begins with a lucid explanation of the involved command situation in Southeast Asia, then sets the pieces on the board with a description of the terrain and the opposing forces. The attempts to develop an aggressive Allied strategy towards Burma, which resulted in three-cornered differences of opinion between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Stilwell, the Prime Minister and SEAC, and the British Chiefs of Staff are described in detail. But the fighting was well under way before the planning was agreed on, and so the narrative tells of the abortive Japanese attempt to eliminate the British base at Imphal, the U Operation.

Simultaneously, General Stilwell's forces in North Burma were seeking to take Myitkyina to broaden the air route to China, and to clear the Japanese from the trace of the Ledo Road. Stilwell's actual seizure of the Myitkyina airstrip came as a surprise to Mountbatten's headquarters and made acute the issue of a directive to Mountbatten on future operations. The directive finally issued, Southeast Asia Command could proceed to exploit the defensive success gained at Imphal in Manipur State, India.

The clearing of the Japanese from Central and South Burma by the Indian and British formations under Southeast Asia Command was a triumph of daring improvisation made possible by air supply. The implications of a major offensive largely supplied by air are of great interest to the student of war; Mountbatten's account of how it was done deserves attention.

As a study in the command problems which confront a supreme Allied commander the *Report* is deficient because it goes little beyond organization. It may be that some day Lord Mountbatten

will be free to tell of his experiences in directing a team of four commanders-in-chief of three services and two nationalities, all senior to him, and three of them engaged in operations with which Mountbatten had had no service experience. His *Report* is a long step towards a full account of how he made a winning team of so many heterogeneous elements.

RILEY SUNDERLAND

Office of the Chief of Military History
Washington, D. C.

The Assault on Peleliu, by Maj. Frank O. Hough (USMCR), Historical Division, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps. Foreword by the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Preface by the Director of Marine Corps History; maps and photographs. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950. Pp. 209. \$2.50).

There is an old canard believed by an unfortunate number of Army people that the tactics employed by the U. S. Marine Corps are different from those of the Army; that the Marines favor the costly frontal assault instead of maneuver. And the same Army people, to prove their point, prattle happily about Tarawa, Iwo, and Peleliu. The fact is, of course, however unfortunate the fact might be, that Marine divisions in the Pacific during World War II often received assignments where nothing but the bloody frontal assault was possible. (Similar assignments were not unknown to Army divisions.) A case in point is Peleliu Island, in the Palaus of the western Carolines. As *The Assault on Peleliu* makes amply clear, the important objective was Peleliu's airfield, on the southwestern shore of that island. For variety of pressing tactical reasons, there was no choice but to land on Peleliu's southwest shore, almost at the airfield's edge.

And so, on 15 September 1944, the 1st Marine Division landed opposite Peleliu's airfield. It was a costly job. For one thing, pre-assault aerial and naval bombardment had not been too successful, concerning which fact Major Hough may be overly critical. As Major Hough points out, photographic coverage left much to be desired—and the naval fire support vessels were hard put to find targets. The Japanese were too well placed in strong positions boasting both natural and artificial camouflage.

Be that as it may, the 1st Marine Division had

decided the issue on Peleliu by the end of the first week. It had secured the airfield and extremely rugged high ground immediately to the north, and, in the opinion of this reviewer, could have held that area against strong attack, especially since the Japanese on more northerly islands of the Palaus had no intention of sending strong reinforcements to Peleliu. But the 1st Marine Division could not finish the job. Fighting against stubborn resistance against Japanese firmly entrenched in incredibly rough terrain, the division had lost practically one infantry regiment, and the other two had suffered heavy casualties also. Therefore, the 321st Infantry of the 81st Infantry Division was sent to Peleliu from Angaur, just to the south, where the Army regiment had done a fine job in its first combat. With these reinforcements, the 1st Marine Division continued the action on Peleliu until 15 October, by which time most of the Marines had been relieved by 81st Division units. On the 20th, command passed to the Army division, the siege operations of which Major Hough treats in adequate summary to complete the picture of the reduction of Peleliu.

The Assault on Peleliu is a refreshingly objective volume. Major Hough does not hesitate to criticize overconfidence on the part of the 1st Marine Division's staff, nor does he pull his punches in criticizing the division commander for not calling for Army reinforcement until practically forced to do so by the corps commander, a Marine officer himself. The author is generous to the 81st Infantry Division, giving credit where credit is due. The strategic background material might have been expanded, but there is sufficient to describe the place of Peleliu in the Pacific war. There is an excellent concluding chapter which delves into the pros and cons of the Peleliu operation, both strategically and tactically. There are no major errors of fact, although Major Hough's interpretation of Japanese sources is open to question at one or two minor points. The writing is outstanding—the story moves and commanders' problems are crystal clear. It is unfortunate that so important a volume is paper bound and it is also unfortunate that there is no index.

All in all, if *The Assault on Peleliu* is an example of heinous Marine Corps publicity, let's have more of it.

ROBERT ROSS SMITH
Office of the Chief of Military History
Washington, D. C.

The Struggle for the Mediterranean 1939-1945, by Raymond de Belot, Rear Admiral, French Navy (ret.). Translated by James A. Field, Jr. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. Pp. xix + 278. \$4.00).

This study is a general survey with emphasis laid on Axis actions in the area. It has been arranged in five parts: the fall of France, the duel between Great Britain and Italy, Germany's entrance into the Mediterranean war; the loss of Africa by the Axis; and finally, the Allied invasion of Mediterranean Europe. The author based this volume on a considerable number of British official reports, a large number of Italian and English memoirs and secondary accounts, and a few translated German materials. He also gained some impressions from French and other eyewitnesses.

There are, however, quite a few errors of fact which for the sake of the reader should be pointed out. It is by no means certain, as is asserted (p. 3) that Ugo Cavallero was murdered by the Gestapo. The picture of the Italian High Command in the Badoglio period (pp. 45-46) is incorrect. Badoglio had no authority over the staffs of Army, Navy, and Air Force but was restricted to the role of adviser to Mussolini. The O.K.W. did not in fact exercise overall control of the three armed forces in Germany (p. 46): O.K.H. and the Eastern Theater were outside its sphere. Cavallero did not remain chief of the *Comando Supremo* until the fall of Mussolini (p. 88): he was succeeded by Vittorio Ambrosio on February 1, 1943. At the Feltre Conference Keitel did not say that Germany could send no reinforcements to Italy (p. 219). This is merely the Italian post-war story. Keitel, in fact, offered two full German divisions if Ambrosio would accept certain stipulated German conditions. Castellano met the Allied representatives at Lisbon on August 19th, not the 12th as is stated (p. 222). The Long Terms of armistice were signed on September 29th, not the 20th (p. 224).

On pages 224-226 there are a series of misstatements and misinterpretations. It is not true that German troops began flooding into Italy on July 26th or that "a dozen divisions" arrived "within the space of a few days." In a month's time beginning July 31st Germany managed to move eight additional divisions into northern Italy. There was no German plan STUDENT. The reference is to General Kurt Student, entrusted on July 26th with the initial plan SCHWARZ. Here

the author reproduces the confusion of his source: *Brassey's Naval Annual 1948*, p. 349. Jodl and Kesselring did not expect an Allied landing on the Ligurian coast: this was merely the excuse for the movement of German forces toward the base of the Italian fleet. Rommel did not wish to hold Sicily or Southern Italy. He urged withdrawal to the northern Apennines or even to the line of the Po. The views attributed to Rommel are those of Kesselring. Rommel and Kesselring did not carefully plan their counterstroke: they executed Plan ACHSE which was drawn up in O.K.W.

The decision for AVALANCHE was not made in August at the Quebec Conference but was made by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on July 26th (p. 233). The situation at Salerno was not saved, even in part, by the arrival of the British Eighth Army (p. 238): the battle was decided before that army arrived. The U. S. Fifth Army entered Rome on June 4th, not the 7th (p. 252).

These errors largely flow from the limitations of the materials which the author used. The book nevertheless is admirable and the author writes with understanding, insight, and a large measure of objectivity. He shows a firm grasp of the strategy of each side in the Mediterranean and clearly portrays the long, bitter fight which the Italian navy made before its final surrender. These sections and chapters which set the Mediterranean naval war in its true perspective are the best parts of the work. After the flippant treatment of the same theme by Admiral Franco Maugeri's *From the Ashes of Disgrace* it is a welcome relief to see this splendid book available in English.

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The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, Volume 3, 18 June 1779 to 30 September 1780. Edited by Julian P. Boyd and associates. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951. Pp. xxxiii + 672. \$10.00).

This third volume of the Jefferson papers has a special interest for readers concerned with military affairs: for almost 700 pages the wartime governor of a state perilously open to invasion can be followed as he struggles to organize his government for victory. Governor Thomas Jefferson de-

scribes the problems of a civilian administrator caught in the confusions of civil war.

As part of a monumental publication program that eventually will produce over 50 volumes, this book includes Jefferson's own letters and papers, plus a great number of the communications addressed to him, for the period from June 1779 to September 1780. Under the plan of the series, volume 3 is a chronological sequence of papers without organization, but the time covered gives it substantial unity through Jefferson's concentrated interest in the problems of war. Also in accordance with the plan for the series, there is no index in this volume; although indices will be issued eventually, the lack of a satisfactory guide now limits the usefulness of the book.

During 1779 and 1780 the government of Virginia was in a dangerous state; the rebel commonwealth lay open to attack from a British army under Lord Cornwallis, as well as naval forces and Tory-Indian raiders. Under the circumstances, the civilian administration had no choice; Jefferson and his associates worked feverishly to build up the state's military forces. Innumerable logistical problems were the governor's constant concern, at the same time that he was expected to help direct the higher strategy of the war and administer the government of a state. While supervising the regular peacetime machinery of law and order, Jefferson had to seek for soldiers, try to arm them, and pray they would fight when they met the enemy. Militia who "ran like a torrent and bore all before them," merchants "who will let us have nothing, but for ready money which we have not," private shipowners who lured sailors away with promises of higher pay—all these were part of the Revolutionary War that Thomas Jefferson fought. Sometimes one miscarriage cancelled another; as the governor wrote an unhappy officer, "The subsequent desertions of your militia have taken away the necessity of answering the question how they shall be armed?"

Washington, John Adams, General Gates, Timothy Pickering, and George Rogers Clark made their appearance among the governor's correspondents in this volume, while Madison and Monroe begin their long series of exchanges with Jefferson. The single outstanding picture that emerges, however, is the incomplete but intimate self-portrait of Thomas Jefferson as a frequently

harrassed, occasionally uncertain, but always conscientious administrator of military matters.

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The Baton: An Historical Study of the Marshalate, by Wilfred Charles Rundle. (London: William Clowes and Sons Ltd., 1950. Pp. 81. 7 shillings 6 pence).

One of the virtues of this little book is that it can be read at a single sitting; its chief defect, however, is that it is far too short for any attempt to deal with such a vast and fascinating subject as the origin and history of the Marshalate. It is actually an enlarged article fit for use in an encyclopedia. But until another writer comes along with a more elaborate work, this little volume will have to do.

Mr. Rundle, who is a Master of Arts, Lincoln College, Oxford, and also a member of the Honourable Artillery Company, traces the Marshalate back to feudal times, in the armies of England and on the Continent. He next considers more recent military history, devoting brief surveys to the history of the Marshalate in the armies of France, Austria, Germany, Great Britain, and in what he calls "other Countries," the outstanding other country being, of course, Russia.

Turenne, Soult, Bazaine, Foch, are examples of French marshals, covering about three centuries, that are given brief biographical treatment in the book. Among famous Austrians, or Imperialists, are Tilly, Wallenstein, Eugene, the Archduke Charles and Radetzky, the latter fortunate enough to have a march, by Straus, named after him. Prussia produced, in addition to the "old Des-sauer," those two grim military men, von Blucher and von Moltke. Russia must be considered because of the great and colorful Suvorov, though it is polite and only fair to mention Kutusov and Barclay de Tolly.

The British Field-M Marshals are numerous and some of them really first-class soldiers. Wellington, Wolseley, Roberts, Kitchener, French, Haig, Allenby, will all find honorable places in Valhalla, though Haig may have to sit at the foot of the table.

At the end of the book an appendix of British Field Marshals fittingly closes the volume. This

list starts with the Earl of Orkney in 1736 and ends with Sir William Slim in 1949; 117 names are included. The greatest British soldier, Corporal John Marlborough, was born a few years too soon to make the list.

Most certainly, this slender volume should be in every private's knapsack.

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American Campaigns, by Matthew Forney Steele. (Washington, D. C.: Combat Forces Press, 1951. Pp. 338. \$6.00).

What a pleasure to renew acquaintance with an old friend all dressed up in becoming new raiment! There is nothing new which this reviewer could say about the military student's appreciation of Colonel Steele's work. It has all been said many times before and, possibly, the best summation occurs in the Note inside the cover of this present volume—"Colonel Steele's enduring work is still far and away the best study of American battles ever published."

The author, who reached his ninetieth birthday on 19 June 1951, can't help but feel a sense of pleasure and gratification in this new edition of his work. Here we have a conveniently-sized volume, easy to handle, printed in clear type that meets the eye pleasantly, with the textual material arranged skillfully throughout. To this pleasing set-up is added a map volume whose improvement was made possible through the cooperation of Colonel (Professor) Thomas D. Stamps, Head of the Department of Military Art and Engineering at the U. S. Military Academy. The Civil War period maps used at West Point appear in the new map volume accompanying Colonel Steele's text and are a fitting and welcome addition thereto.

If this new format for an old text emphasizes any one thought above all others it would seem to be the hope that someone equally gifted would take up where he leaves off after the Spanish-American War, and bring us down to date. The contrasts which must necessarily be revealed in tactical doctrine could be presented in a useful, interesting, and informative manner.

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The Armed Forces Officer, prepared by the Department of Defense. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950. Pp. 267. \$1.50).

"A highly rewarding book for an officer in any of the Services . . . something new in books on leadership." So says the U. S. Army *Combat Forces Journal* which with the *Marine Corps Gazette* and the U. S. *Naval Institute Proceedings* has done a worthy service in directing attention to this otherwise unnoticed but most deserving volume. For in it the older officer of the Armed Services portrays for the younger his concepts of patriotism, devotion to duty and pride in accomplishment, written in his own language and from the depths of his own experience. Here are set forth the precepts of that heavy trust, *Command*. The problems of leadership are treated from the common sense approach, not the psychological and the attitudes expressed are those of the experienced officer, not the social scientist. When the book does get involved in psychology, it is concerned primarily with the group and it stresses training rather than selection in preparing men for the work they have to do. *The Caine Mutiny* by Herman Wouk could be used as an excellent supplementary case study for this book.

The presentation indicates hurried preparation and printing. The research that must have gone into this book deserves better treatment. There is neither an introduction nor a preface. There are no footnotes or other reference to the large number of quotations used. There is no index. These omissions limit its usefulness as a manual or as an introductory work to the further study of leadership. The style is stilted even to the point of talking down. A book for young officers of all services should include definitions of strange terms.

The title appears to be poorly chosen since this is a book for officers, not about them. It is addressed primarily to officers of the *combatant* arms of all Services; others will find it of inspirational but of little practical use. One choice for a better title would be: *On Being a Combat Officer*.

There is nothing wrong with this book that a revision cannot rectify. In the meantime it is the biggest buy for the money in military literature today. The last Chapter, "Americans in Combat"

is worth alone the \$1.50 the book costs.

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The Caine Mutiny, by Herman Wouk. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1951. Pp. 494. \$3.95).

This lucid story portrays the development of Ensign Willie Keith, U.S.N.R., from callow youth through more than his share of tribulations as a junior officer, to the ultimate attainment of maturity, self confidence and manhood.

Many officers, regulars included, will sympathize with Ensign Keith regarding his initial impressions and subsequent life in the old destroyer-minesweeper. *Caine* belonged to the category of ships which served valiantly in World War I; and after a quarter century of neglect had acquired a state of decrepitude that is commonly and accurately described as rust-bucket.

Captain Queeg will of course be a controversial figure among various readers. He is not representative of U. S. Naval captains of any era, as the author is careful to point out. Queeg must be regarded as the composite individual embodying most of the thoroughly objectionable human traits. On this basis, it is not difficult to reconstruct him and to recognize Queeg-like traits, with some nostalgia, in old "sun-downers" who have commanded ships since we have had a navy. Junior officers in spite of themselves and the Queegs have gained something in the development of strength of character through this enforced and sometimes unhappy association.

The author shows a keen appreciation for the many imponderables which make up the pulse of the ship. This is evidenced by the pride shown by the crew in Captain DeVriess's technical competence and effortless ship handling ability, as opposed to their immediate recognition of Captain Queeg as a petty tyrant; the latter before most of the officers had correctly evaluated the new captain. The instinctive respect accorded to Lt. Keith by the crew after his demonstration of leadership and courage, under fire at Okinawa, very appropriately marks the accession of Willie Keith to maturity.

The wardroom, officer by officer, could have

been taken at random from any one of a hundred similar ships of the U. S. Navy during World War II. The intellectual, who knew it all; the plodding Lt. Myrak; the bewildered ensigns, are well cast; and the impartial reader will concede that Captain Queeg had problems which were far greater than any of those encountered by the individual officers.

To the author's everlasting credit, he has handled the story in such fashion that the seamy side of the navy has been exposed without detracting from the solid bed-rock foundation of naval tradition and competence which is never far in the background of U.S.S. *Caine*.

The quality of the narrative, the technical accuracy shown in describing ship operations through the several Pacific campaigns; and the character sketches of *Caine's* officers and crew are skillfully combined into one of the outstanding sea stories of World War II.

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Peace Can Be Won, by Paul G. Hoffman.
(New York: Doubleday & Co., 1951. Pp. 188.
\$2.50).

The concern of this book is the formulation of a sound and practical program for the handling of the current international relations of the United States. Since this major policy problem is under intense discussion today within and without the Government, the subject is especially timely. The extent to which this country should be international rather than isolationist, and the amount of the taxpayers' money which should be spent by executive agencies or for assistance to other countries in the fight against Soviet communism are two major included questions. These occupy much of the time of the Congress, executive agencies of the Government and private organizations. This book gives one man's answer to the problem, but it is the answer of a man who is qualified to make sound appraisals and reach logical conclusions. His record as a successful domestic businessman, reinforced by recent experience as Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Administration, make him uniquely capable of viewing international problems both as a business executive and as a Government servant.

Mr. Hoffman's central theme, which he credits

basically to Mr. Bernard Baruch, is that if we are to attain a peace which has any stability we must work at attaining that peace, and in doing so outline a positive program. While peace is our aim, it is in itself such a dull and intangible thing that people are not inclined to be enthusiastic over the effort required in attaining it. Peace must be waged in the same manner as war is waged. The author sets up his recommended programs for waging peace, including the organization for the handling of international economic aid and for the worldwide dissemination of information. In addition, he includes his total estimate of the annual cost of his program.

The book's organization is based upon the parallel between waging a war and waging peace. After outlining the failures of United States policy in the past and the position of international leadership into which the United States is forced at present, the book continues the discussion under familiar topic headings of military, economic, political and information. The last two chapters concern Mr. Hoffman's estimate of the cost of winning the peace and his conviction that the free world can win. However, he concludes that we can win only if we are to grasp the opportunities which are available to us and if we apply with hope and with the necessary great effort, the skills we have and the products of the sacrifices which we must make.

There are cautions which this nation must observe in avoiding certain dangerous pitfalls in our conduct of international relations. Mr. Hoffman strongly points out the dangers to our success which result from a dictatorial attitude or the use of any display of power in dealing with nations which we hope to build into firm partners in resistance to Soviet attempts at world domination. It is evident that he speaks with sincerity and conviction when he expresses his feeling that the results of the Economic Cooperation Administration personnel had done the most to achieve a joint understanding. He brings out clearly the fallacies of the preventative war concept. He is also logical and timely in pointing out the self defeat which must accompany the major waste of effort which follows from the search for scapegoats upon which to place the blame for past failures of our international policy.

The volume is not a scholarly treatise. It contains the plain and simple words of a businessman expressing his thoughts and convictions. Although

Mr. Hoffman states that much assistance in writing the book was received from his associates in Economic Cooperation Administration, much of it is obviously his own.

For the average voter, confused as he must be by the conflicting statements which appear daily on the radio and in the press, this book will be of great value. It dispassionately outlines for him,

in language which he can accept, our present international situation. It gives him one sound basic program which has a chance of working. It deserves to be widely read.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE¹

THE QUESTION SO MANY ASK

At a military history meeting in the Whit-tall Pavilion of the Library of Congress, on 13 March 1952, Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, formerly an ETO military historian, again presented his absorbingly interesting paper (first read at the American Historical Association Meeting in New York in December 1951) entitled, "Why the Russians Got Berlin and Prague." The author's researches, based on top echelon documents and interviews with General Eisenhower and others, show that the Supreme Commander never received a political directive to govern his movements either to occupy or to stay out of those two capital cities. His decision to stay out was taken solely on military grounds, despite strong protests from the British who wanted Montgomery's Army Group reinforced for an immediate dash on Berlin. Probably because Intelligence overemphasized the staying power of the enemy, Eisenhower cast the die for staying on the Elbe, and deploying strong forces to the North to take the Hamburg-Luebeck area, and the Third Army to the South to prevent a last ditch resistance from developing in the so-called mountain redoubt area of Bavaria and Austria. The most interesting feature of the evening was Dr. Pogue's description of the nature and amount of evidence collected in his quest, and how he arrived at the apparently foolproof conclusion of the lack of a political directive to the head of the allied armies at that most critical juncture of events.

MICROFILM OF WORLD WAR II CONFERENCE
AVAILABLE

The New York Public Library, reports

C. E. Dornbusch, microfilmed the documents relating to the conference held in the Netherlands on the subject of the history of World War II in the West. The conference met in Amsterdam, 5-9 September 1950, under the auspices of the Netherlands State Institute for War Documentation, and 157 participants from 13 nations attended. The Military History Committee (with Army, Navy, and Air Subcommittees) was one of four main committees before whom 38 papers were presented. Famed British historian Arnold Toynbee contributed two papers, one on the research program of Chatham House, the other on history as a scientific problem. Colonel C. P. Stacey presented the historical program of the Canadian Army. The United States armed forces historical programs were described by the following participants: Allen F. Clark, the Army program; Admiral John B. Heffernan, the naval phase of the war; Henry M. Dater, naval aviation; and Albert F. Simpson, the Air Force program. The conference resolved to establish an international committee on World War II history, and the publication of a comprehensive bibliography on that conflict. Positive microfilm copies of the papers are available, and may be obtained postpaid for the sum of \$3.75 from the New York Public Library's Photographic Service.

LETTER FROM DOWN UNDER

A welcome letter from Gavin Long, General Editor of the Official War History of Australia, states, "I have found most interesting and instructive the 'Guide to the

¹Items presented as of actual publication date June 1952.

Writing of American Military History' which has appeared in recent issues of your publication." He recommends the addition of several Australian works to the list of Special Military Works in Chapter VIII of Part Three (MILITARY AFFAIRS, XIV, No. 4, pp. 223f): *The Australian Imperial Force in France during the Allied Offensive, 1918*, by Charles E. W. Bean (Sydney, 1942) *Story of the Fifth Australian Division*, by Alexander D. Ellis (London, 1920); and *Australian Victories in France in 1918*, by John Monash (London, 1920). "Bean's volume covers in some detail the work of II American Corps (27th and 30th Divisions) at Hamel and in the Battle of the Hindenburg Line," continues Editor Long, "as also do those written by Ellis and General Monash." The latter officer, General Monash, commanded the Australian Corps during the 1918 Allied offensive in France.

FIREARMS WANTED

Have you a Frommer "Baby" .380, or a "Harmonica . . . pistol (Jarre) pinfire, 10-shot preferably," or a "Flash Light" pistol .22—5-shot—1½ inch barrel? If so, these and many other items of firearms are badly wanted by the Governor of Alabama. Should any of our readers manifest interest in getting rid of some heirlooms we advise that you communicate with the Honorable Gordon Persons, Governor, Executive Department, Montgomery, Alabama.

NEW INSTITUTE AT COLUMBIA

Although many of our readers are already acquainted with the fact, to others it may be news that an Institute of War and Peace Studies has been established at Columbia University during recent months. The Institute's function is to examine the impact of international tensions and wars on American society, conduct research on the causes of

war, and search for ways and means of protecting our free society by less costly methods than presently employed. Dr. William T. R. Fox, Professor of International Relations at Columbia, was appointed director of the Institute. Four special consultants will guide research: Frederick S. Dunn and Edward Mead Earle of Princeton, Pendleton Herring of the Social Science Research Council, and George F. Kennan of the State Department. The latter, however, has just assumed other duties as American Ambassador to Russia. The initiative for the organization of the Institute is said to have come from General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, who enlisted the pecuniary support of other interested individuals. Prior to the announcement of its establishment the Institute was in the planning stage for over two years.

WILBER ELLIOTT WILDER

The last surviving graduate of the West Point Class of 1877, and an honored member of the American Military Institute, Brigadier General Wilber Elliott Wilder, USA ret., passed away at the age of 95. He was born in Michigan, 16 August 1856. In the Spanish-American War he was a colonel of New York Volunteers, served in the Philippine Insurrection as lieutenant colonel of United States Volunteer Infantry, achieved the rank of Brigadier General in 1917, and was retired as a colonel in 1920. In 1927 he was again raised to Brigadier General on the retired list. General Wilder's mailing address was the University Club, New York City, but latterly he appears to have resided at The Elms Inn, Ridgefield, Connecticut. The Institute mourns the loss of one who, amongst his other distinctions, almost joined the exclusive company of the Centenarians.

FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTH, 1861-1865*

By ROBERT J. FUTRELL

**Editor's Note.* This article is a pioneer incursion in a practically virgin area of Civil War historical writing. It is based almost wholly upon manuscript records in the National Archives. Although, in recent years, a number of outstanding scholars and writers have used Civil War materials in the National Archives, that rich historical mine remains largely unexploited. The author, Dr. Futrell, states that this article is a summary of a projected large monograph on the subject. In view of the world-wide governmental activities of American military leaders, the gradual development of the history of American efforts in the field of military government is pertinent.

ON SEPTEMBER 7, 1863, while engaged in occupation duties at Vicksburg, General W. T. Sherman had occasion to express his views on the governmental powers of a Federal military commander: "In war," he informed a delegation of citizens, "the Commander on the Spot is the judge, and may take your house, your fields, your everything, and turn you all out helpless to starve."¹ From the outset of the American Civil War, most Union generals would have agreed with Sherman; for it appears that the central theme of Federal military government in the South during the period of hostilities was the determined effort of each commander to exercise absolute superiority within his geographical area of authority.

Most Federal commanders nevertheless considered themselves bound by what they loosely cited as the "rules of warfare." Regular officers had studied de Vattel, Wheaton, and Kent at the Military Academy,² and the lawyer generals of the Federal forces doubt-

less knew these and other volumes, including the 1861 edition of international law by Henry W. Halleck, the soldier-lawyer who would become General-in-Chief of the Federal Army.³ For the convenience of less experienced Federal officers, however, the War Department belatedly published in April 1863 its General Order 100, a code of acceptable rules of war compiled by Dr. Francis Lieber and a board of officers.⁴ Although this general order was a significant statement of the rules of war, Federal commanders were still permitted much latitude. Halleck, writing as General-in-Chief, instructed the Federal commander at Memphis that General Order 100 "was intended to embody the general principles of the laws of war, or the general rules by which commanders of armies, departments, districts, etc., are to be governed in their treatment of the inhabitants of the Country militarily occupied. The application of these principles or rules in particular places will be left mainly to the judgment and discretion of the commanders whose knowledge of the circumstances of each case, it is presumed, best qualifies them to decide."⁵

Two years of war had preceded the issuance of the War Department version of the rules

²James A. O'Brien, "Military Government of Mexico by American Forces under General Winfield Scott." (Mimeographed study prepared in the Historical Section, Army War College, 1943), p. 2.

³H. W. Halleck, *International Law* (San Francisco, 1861).

⁴Doris A. Graber, *The Development of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, 1863-1914* (New York, 1949), pp. 15-19.

⁵Ltr., Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief, Hq. Army, to Maj. Gen. S. A. Hurlbut, Memphis, Tenn., June 22, 1863, in W. D., Hqs. Army, Letter book, vol. 16, pp. 326-327. NA.

¹Ltr., Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman, Comdg. XV Army Corps, to H. W. Hill, Chairman of Committee of Citizens of Warren County, Miss., Sept 7, 1863, in War Department, Sherman letter books, vol. 23, pp. 122-124. Most manuscript sources herein cited are in The National Archives, Washington, D. C., and are indicated by the symbol NA.

of land warfare, and even then Federal commanders were permitted their own interpretation of General Order 100. It seems evident, therefore, that any historical treatment of Federal military government in the South must comprehend the records of many separate commanders as well as the infrequent statements of policy from Washington. This paper represents such a study of the manuscript records of the United States Army in The National Archives. In form, it will briefly notice the relations of Federal Army commanders with Lincoln's military governors and existing municipal governments, then examine the development of the techniques of military government found useful in the South.

As the Federal armies moved southward in the spring and summer of 1862, President Lincoln assumed that his generals should have more important business than the regulation of civil affairs. Lincoln therefore appointed military governors for each occupied state: Andrew Johnson for Tennessee, Edward Stanly for North Carolina, George F. Shepley for Louisiana, and John S. Phelps for Arkansas. Later that year, Andrew J. Hamilton was named military governor of Texas. With the exception of Shepley, each of the military governors was versed in politics. Johnson was the United States Senator from Tennessee who had refused to secede with his state.⁶ Stanly had served as a Whig Congressman from North Carolina for ten years before his defeat in 1853 led him to quit his native state for California.⁷ Phelps had been elected to Congress from Missouri in 1844 and had remained there for 18 years before entering the Union Army.⁸ Hamilton, a Congressman from Texas, had returned to his state after secession only to escape that state

when his continued Unionism gave difficulty.⁹ Shepley, a lawyer by profession and a native of Maine, had accompanied General Benjamin F. Butler's forces to New Orleans as commander of a regiment. Butler had promptly appointed him military commandant of New Orleans, and, deeming him acceptable to the general, Lincoln made him Military Governor of Louisiana.¹⁰ Each of the military governors was commissioned a Brigadier General of Volunteers.

Although Secretary of War Edwin Stanton specifically enjoined the cooperation of departmental commanding officers with their respective military governors, it is not remarkable that conflicts arose. Phelps visited Helena, Arkansas, where he dispatched two letters to Washington describing local military corruption, and then resigned under plea of ill health.¹¹ Stanly rapidly alienated Radical Republican sympathies by rigid enforcement of the old order represented in extant North Carolina statutes, including a ban on schools for Negroes, while close supervision by the Navy blockading squadron prevented him from opening the trade needed by the people of tidewater North Carolina. Constantly countermanded by military authority and discouraged by Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, which he saw as the end to all hope of a peace through conciliation, Stanly resigned in January 1863 and returned to California.¹² Governor Hamilton accom-

⁹Robert G. Caldwell, "Andrew Jackson Hamilton," in *D. A. B.*, VIII, 182-183.

¹⁰Robert E. Moody, "George Foster Shepley," in *D. A. B.*, XVII, 78-79; G. O. 24, Hq. Dept. of the Gulf, May 10, 1862, in W. D., Dept. of the Gulf, vol. 34, o.s. 43, p. 11; Ltr., Secretary of War E. M. Stanton to Butler, June 10, 1862, in W. D., Secretary of War, Military Book, vol. 49, pp. 378-380. NA.

¹¹Ltr., Phelps to Halleck, Aug. 17, 1862; Ltr., Phelps to Halleck, Sept. 28, 1862, in W. D., HQA, Ltr. files #P-761- and #P-785-HQA-1862. NA. Nettles, "John Smith Phelps," in *D. A. B.*, XIV, 530.

¹²House Executive Document, No. 123, 37th Cong., 2d Sess.; Ltrs., Stanly to Stanton, June 12, 1862, in W. D., Secretary of War, Ltr. file #N-207-1862; Stanly to Stanton, Dec. 23, 1862, in W. D., Secretary of War, Irregular Ltr. file, #N-26-1862. NA.

⁶St. George L. Sioussat, "Andrew Johnson," in *Dictionary of American Biography* (20 vols.; New York, 1928-1937), X, 81-90.

⁷J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton, *Reconstruction in North Carolina* (Raleigh, 1906), p. 84.

⁸H. Edward Nettles, "John Smith Phelps," in *D. A. B.*, XIV, 530.

panied the Banks' Expedition to Louisiana and, failing to gain a suitable site in Texas for his occupation government, remained at New Orleans throughout the war.¹³

Governor Shepley appears to have cooperated with the desires of General Butler, thereby gaining successful initiation of his duties. He appointed a provost marshal general for Louisiana, parish police, juries, parish school directors, and a series of acting-mayors of New Orleans.¹⁴ In October 1862, however, Lincoln established a United States Provisional Court at New Orleans,¹⁵ and General N. P. Banks, who assumed command of the Department of the Gulf in December, reduced Governor Shepley's powers by ordering all cases not punishable under military law turned over to the provisional court.¹⁶ In January 1863, Banks notified Shepley that policing of the state was to be considered a military matter and that Banks would name his own provost marshal.¹⁷ At Lincoln's direction, Banks rather than Shepley undertook management of the election of officials for a "loyal" state government, leading Governor Shepley to request relief as military governor.¹⁸ When Michael Hahn was elected as the "loyal" Governor of Louisiana, Lincoln additionally designated him military governor and relieved Shepley for general service in the Army.¹⁹ Governor Hahn, like his

elected counterpart in Arkansas, Isaac Murphy, would receive little assistance and some opposition from the Federal military authorities.²⁰

Of the several military governors, only Andrew Johnson was notably successful, a success due in part to his own strength of character, but also to firm support from Lincoln. Johnson's career as Military Governor of Tennessee has already been the subject of an excellent monograph,²¹ and it need be only noted here that the fiery Johnson met his share of military opposition, much of it due to his own intensity of purpose. Arriving in Nashville in March 1862, Johnson soon began to advise the local military authorities regarding their campaigns. He was sure that General Buell's line of campaign left Middle Tennessee vulnerable to Confederate inroads, a view which Buell thought "absurd."²² General Halleck, commanding in the West at the time, protested that "to send troops back to Nashville to accommodate Gov. Johnson would be releasing our grasp on the enemy's throat in order to pare his toe-nails."²³ Johnson also engaged in a heated controversy with Buell's assistant adjutant general over the control of confiscated property and finally secured the relief of this subordinate by Lincoln's order.²⁴ In January 1863 Johnson next became dissatisfied with the incompetency of

¹³Caldwell, "Andrew Jackson Hamilton," in *D. A. B.*, VIII, 182-183.

¹⁴See Shepley's series of general orders in *W. D.*, Dept. of the Gulf, vol. 91, o.s. 151, *passim*.

¹⁵Executive Order, A. Lincoln, Oct. 20, 1862, in *W. D.*, Secretary of War, Ltrs. received, Depts., #1205, Dec. 16/63. NA.

¹⁶S. O. 20, Hq. Dept. of the Gulf, Jan. 20, 1863, in *W. D.*, Dept. of the Gulf, vol. 28, o.s. 37, p. 96. NA.

¹⁷Ltr., Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks to Shepley, Jan. 27, 1863, in *ibid.*, vol. 4, o.s. 4, pp. 445-446. NA.

¹⁸Ltr., Shepley to Stanton, Jan. 28, 1864, in *W. D.*, Secretary of War, Ltrs. received, #S-304-Feb. 10/1864. NA.

¹⁹Ltr., Michael Hahn to Lincoln, Mar. 3, 1865, in *ibid.*, #L-523, Apr. 20/65; see also S. O. 59, Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Apr. 2, 1864, in *W. D.*, Adjutant General Order Book, 1864. NA.

²⁰See ltr., Hahn to Lincoln, Oct. 29, 1864, in *Lincoln Papers*, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, vol. 175; see also ltr., Isaac Murphy to Lincoln, July 23, 1864, in *ibid.*, vol. 162.

²¹Clifford R. Hall, *Andrew Johnson, Military Governor of Tennessee* (Princeton, 1916).

²²Telegram, Johnson to Stanton, Mar. 29, 1862, in *W. D.*, Secretary of War, Telegrams received, vol. 7, p. 145; telegrams, Buell to Johnson, Apr. 24, 1862, Buell to Halleck, Apr. 26, 1862, in *W. D.*, Dept. of the Ohio, vol. 52, o.s. 57D, pp. 18, 20. NA.

²³Ltr., Halleck to Buell, Apr. 26, 1862, in *W. D.*, Dept. of the Missouri, vol. 12, o. s. 20, pp. 27-28. NA.

²⁴Telegrams, Johnson to Stanton, July 10, 1862, in *W. D.*, Secretary of War, Telegrams received, vol. 17, pp. 356-357; Stanton to Capt. O. D. Green, July 12, 1862, in *W. D.*, Secretary of War, Telegrams sent, vol. 11, p. 365. NA.

local military detectives in Nashville,²⁵ a matter which led him into verbal conflict with the new departmental commander, General W. S. Rosecrans. The General, apparently misunderstanding Halleck's wordy instructions, attempted to call Brigadier General Johnson to a brigade command in the field,²⁶ but in the end Rosecrans agreed to respect Governor Johnson's authority.²⁷ Johnson, moreover, was given immediate command of a regiment of Tennessee troops for the defense and policing of Nashville.²⁸ In February 1864, General Grant's headquarters announced that "Governor Johnson must be regarded as fully responsible to the Government at Washington, and any orders of his relating to . . . [civil or quasi-civil government] will not be interfered with by the Military authorities."²⁹

During the course of the Rosecrans-Johnson controversy, Halleck attempted to make a pronouncement which would leave most civil affairs to Governor Johnson but would permit General Rosecrans to manage those civil matters affecting the military. Such jurisdictions, Halleck admitted, would often be confusing, because the crimes of murder or theft, for example, would ordinarily be matters for civil concern but guerrilla attacks against Federal troops or theft of military

stores would be tried by military authority.³⁰ Privately to General Sherman, however, Halleck was more critical of the military governors. "I have always opposed the origination of civico-military government, under civilians," he wrote. "It merely embarrasses the military government, without effecting any good."³¹ Grant was characteristically short-spoken on the same subject: "Please advise the President not to attempt to doctor up a State Government for Georgia by the appointment of citizens in any capacity whatever," he wired Stanton in September 1864. "Leave Sherman to treat all questions in his own way, the President reserving his power to approve or disapprove of his actions."³²

If Federal commanders in the South were impatient with "civico-military governments" they were more intolerant of local municipal governments which they found in being there. The course of relations between the military and the municipal government at Memphis began with the surrender of the city by its mayor on June 6, 1862.³³ Taking command at Memphis in July 1862, General Sherman professed to welcome the continuance of civil government, promised to confine his provost guard to military jurisdiction, and desired an augmented civil police force to guarantee order.³⁴ But such concessions as Sherman granted initially were gradually withdrawn. In October 1862 he appointed a provost marshal to head the Memphis civilian police, issued a set of rules for civil order, and directed the city authorities to enact his rules

²⁵Telegram, Johnson to Lincoln, Jan. 11, 1863, in W. D., HQA, Telegrams received, vol. 6, pp. 246-247. NA.

²⁶Ltr., Halleck to Rosecrans, Mar. 20, 1863, in W. D., HQA, Ltr. book. 14, pp. 882-887; telegram, Rosecrans to Halleck, Mar. 27, 1863, in W. D., HQA, Telegrams received, vol. 8, p. 1. NA.

²⁷Telegrams, Rosecrans to Halleck, Apr. 4, 1863, in W. D., HQA, Telegrams received, vol. 8, pp. 87-88; Rosecrans to Stanton, Apr. 5, 1863, in W. D., Secretary of War, Telegrams received, vol. 27, p. 388; Rosecrans to Lincoln, Apr. 21, 1863, in W. D., Secretary of War, Telegrams received—President, vol. 1, p. 26. NA.

²⁸Ltr., Stanton to Halleck, Apr. 22, 1863; endorsement, Halleck to Rosecrans, Apr. 23, 1863, in W. D., HQA, Ltrs. received, 1863, vol. 73, p. 575. NA.

²⁹Endorsement on ltr. from Johnson by Assistant Adjutant General, Hqs. Military Division of the Miss., Feb. 22, 1864, in W. D., Military Division of the Miss., vol. 11, o. s. 17, p. 144. NA.

³⁰Ltr., Halleck to Rosecrans, Mar. 20, 1863, in W. D., HQA, Ltr. book vol. 14, pp. 882-887. NA.

³¹Ltr., Halleck to Sherman, Oct. 1, 1863, in W. D., HQA, Ltr. book, vol. 13A, p. 372. NA.

³²Telegram, Grant to Stanton, Sept. 20, 1864, in W. D., Hq. of the Armies, vol. 1, p. 422. NA.

³³Telegram, Charles Ellett, Jr., Comdg. Ram Fleet Opposite Memphis, to Stanton, June 7, 1862, in W. D., Secretary of War, Telegrams received, vol. 15, pp. 203-206. NA.

³⁴Ltr., Sherman to John Park, July 27, 1862, in W. D., Sherman ltr. books, vol. 2, pp. 152-154. NA.

as local ordinances.³⁵ In November, when the judge of the Tennessee district court instructed a grand jury to bring bills against persons employing fugitive slaves in violation of Tennessee law, Sherman retorted that if the judge "uses his court for political purposes so as to nullify the law of Congress . . . he will himself change places with the criminal at the bar."³⁶ Sherman's several successors were less patient with the Memphis civil government. General Stephen A. Hurlbut, alleging that the Tennessee court was disloyal, transferred local judicial functions to a military commission in February 1863.³⁷ General C. C. Washburn relieved all civil officers on July 2, 1864, and appointed a new slate of civilians, headed by his assistant adjutant general, as acting-mayor. The old city government, Washburn observed, had existed "only by sufferance of the military authorities of the United States."³⁸

At Norfolk the municipal government met a similar but somewhat more subtle termination even though Virginia possessed a "loyal" governor in the person of Francis H. Pierpont.³⁹ As at Memphis, the City of Norfolk was surrendered to Federal forces by its mayor on May 9, 1862.⁴⁰ These city officials were soon discharged when they refused to take an oath of allegiance to the United States,⁴¹ but

another set of civilians was elected and served while Generals John A. Dix and John G. Foster commanded in Eastern Virginia. This lenient control of civil affairs came to an abrupt end when General Benjamin F. Butler took command late in 1863. Butler soon began to show an active interest in the local savings banks and city finances, and his provost marshal began to hear civil cases, some of them in regard to property matters. In June 1864 Butler shrewdly called an election to determine whether the civil government should be abolished, and, with the proponents of municipal administration indignantly refusing to participate, the municipal officials were voted out of office. Butler then erected a military government and announced that all civilian pretenders to office would be "stayed and quieted."⁴² As good as his word, he arrested a judge and the commonwealth's attorney, the former for attempting to hold court and the latter for "treasonable language." Butler's successor, General E. O. C. Ord, was not more liberal. "The town of Norfolk," Ord reasoned, "had better remain (as far as concerns protection of life, & matters of comfort, quiet and order) under Military control, simply because it must be held by the Military for if they quit the rebels would take it." Ord first seemed willing that the courts should function in chancery cases,⁴³

³⁵G. O. 90, Hq. 1st Div., Army of the Tenn., Oct. 25, 1862, in *ibid.*, vol. 5, pp. 183-185. NA.

³⁶Ltr., Sherman to Judge [J. T.] Swayne, Nov. 12, 1862; Sherman to Joseph Tagg, President, Washington Union Club, Nov. 17, 1862, in *ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 57-60, 81-82. NA.

³⁷Ltr., Maj. Gen. S. A. Hurlbut, Comdg., XVI Army Corps, to Lt. Col. John A. Rawlins, Asst. Adjutant General, Dept. of the Tenn., Feb. 21, 1863, in W. D., XVI Army Corps, vol. 1, o. s. 1, p. 17. NA.

³⁸S. O. 70, Hq., Dist. of West Tenn., July 2, 1864, in W. D., Dist. of West Tenn., vol. 12, pp. 117-118. NA.

³⁹Ltr., Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, to F. H. Pierpont, Wheeling, Va., Nov. 19, 1861, in W. D., Secretary of War, Military Book, vol. 47, pp. 101-102. NA.

⁴⁰Telegram, Maj. Gen. J. E. Wool to Stanton, May 12, 1862, in W. D., Secretary of War, Telegrams received, vol. 12, pp. 102-103. NA.

⁴¹Telegrams, — to Col. Stager, for Press, June 24, 1862, in *ibid.*, vol. 16, p. 286. NA.

⁴²Ltrs., Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler, Comdg. Dept. of Va. and N. C., to Brig. Gen. Barnes, Norfolk, Jan. 2, 1864; Butler to Daniel Collins, Mayor of Portsmouth, Va., Jan. 17, 1864, in W. D., Dept. of Va. and N. C., vol. 50, o. s. 72, pp. 1, 37-38; ltrs., Pierpont to Lincoln, Jan. 16, 1864; Pierpont to Stanton, Jan. 27, 1864, in W. D., Secretary of War, Irregular ltrs. received, 1864, files #V-18 and #V-20. G. O. — Hq. Dept. of Va. and N. C., June 30, 1864, in W. D., Dept. of Va. and N. C., vol. 52, o. s. 76, n. p. NA. See also John T. Morse (ed.), *The Diary of Gideon Welles* (Boston, 1911), II, 81.

⁴³Telegrams, Pierpont to Lincoln, Aug. 4, 1864, and Aug. 10, 1864; Butler to Lincoln, Aug. 21, 1864, in W. D., Secretary of War, Telegrams received—President, vol. 2, pp. 181, 189, 203. Endorsement, Maj. Gen. E. O. C. Ord, Comdg., Dept. of Va., Feb. 24, 1865, in W. D., Dept. of Va. and N. C., vol. 15, o. s. 17, pp. 315-316. NA.

but he changed his mind when he was reminded of the Federal Habeas Corpus Act. "The General further directs me to say," his adjutant wrote, "that there being now as it is believed, a law prohibiting the confinement or punishment of civilians—that is suspending the operations of martial law where civil courts are allowed—it becomes a matter of military necessity to interdict the renewal, reformation or practice of all civil courts . . ."⁴⁴

Federal commanders thus found little need for Lincoln's military governors and less need for municipal governments representing civilian constituencies in the South. Most of them appear to have preferred a purely military government operating through controls which insured their supremacy over civil affairs. At the same time that they were reducing the civil governments in the South, the Federal commanders were also developing both the theory and practice of military controls over an occupied area.

Foremost of these Federal military controls over Southern citizens was the practice of civilian trials by military courts. This practice, used by General Winfield Scott during the Mexican War, was given redefinition in Missouri, where during the summer of 1861 General John C. Fremont had several citizens of Palmyra tried for treason by a court martial. This court sentenced them to death by shooting, a severe punishment judged appropriate for bridge-burning. General Halleck, succeeding to Fremont's command in the West, disapproved the conviction of treason, an offense which could not be legally tried in military courts, but he justified military trials for civilians. Although military commissions for the trial of civilians were unknown to civil or martial statute law in the United States, Halleck considered them "tribunals of necessity organized for the investigation and punish-

ment of offenses which would otherwise go unpunished."⁴⁵ In a general order issued on January 1, 1862, Halleck formalized his views. Military commissions, he said, were essentially an attribute of a commanding general's authority, for a commander could, if he desired sentence a civilian without formal trial. Obviously realizing the tenuousness of his arguments, Halleck ordered that "Civil offenses cognizable by civil courts, whenever such loyal courts exist, will not be tried by a military commission."⁴⁶ Halleck's position met initial rebuff from the Judge Advocate General of the Federal Army, who ruled that military commissions were not known to the law in the United States, but Lincoln appears to have perceived that such military commissions would relieve him of the embarrassment of holding political prisoners in the North without trial. The Judge Advocate General was therefore retired and, contrary to Halleck's original premises, Lincoln would employ the military commissions to try draft violations or persons aiding the enemy in areas where civil courts were open for business.⁴⁷

Advancing Federal armies carried the military commissions into the South. Halleck permitted commanders of army corps, divisions, brigades, and districts of brigade strength to order such military trials, which in form came to resemble an ordinary general court martial.⁴⁸ Butler established his own military commission at New Orleans to try civil offenses, so far relaxing, moreover, the rules of evi-

⁴⁵G. O. 12, Hq. Western Department, Sept. 16, 1861; G. O. 20, Hq. Western Dept., Oct. 11, 1861, in W. D., Dept. of Mo., vol. 50, o. s. 77, pp. 36, 40-41; G. O. 20, Hq. Dept. of Mo., Jan. 14, 1862, in *ibid.*, pp. 84-94. NA.

⁴⁶G. O. 1, Hq. Dept. of Mo., Jan. 1, 1862, in W. D., Dept. of Mo., vol. 50, o. s. 77, pp. 38-39. NA.

⁴⁷Mary Bernard Allen, "Joseph Holt, Judge Advocate General (1862-1875): A Study in the Treatment of Political Prisoners by the United States Government during the Civil War." Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1927, pp. 37-42.

⁴⁸G. O. 13, Hq. Dept. of the Miss., Mar. 30, 1862, in W. D., Dept. of Mo., vol. 50, o. s. 77, sec. 3, p. 38. NA.

⁴⁴Ltr., Asst. Adjutant General, Dept. of Va., to Brig. Gen. George H. Gordon, Comdg. Dist. of Eastern Va., Mar. 9, 1865, in W. D., Dept. of Va., vol. 13, o. s. 15, p. 160. NA.

dence of the English common law as to permit the commission to question an accused without his consent.⁴⁹ Within a month the commission had convicted one William B. Mumford of "treason," his crime having consisted of a desecration to the United States flag. Butler confirmed the sentence and Mumford was hanged.⁵⁰ Such arbitrary and speedy trials soon brought the requirement that punishments of death would be confirmed by President Lincoln before execution. In view of Lincoln's known tendency toward clemency (Halleck figured that a guilty party had seven chances to escape to one of punishment) this reviewing authority was not favored by the military. Sherman, in fact, argued at length that his inability to execute the death sentence against spies and guerrillas forced his scouts to the practice of "losing prisoners in the swamp."⁵¹

As conceived by General Halleck, military commissions were essentially criminal courts with no jurisdiction over debt, trespass, and such matters between persons not in the military service.⁵² Other field commanders were more generous in their allocation of jurisdiction. Three days after he disbanded the Memphis municipal government, General Washburn established a military commission to hear cases regarding debt, contracts, and a wide variety of civilian matters including separate maintenance for a married woman in disputes between husband and wife.⁵³ While the line of difference was never precisely de-

fined, a military commission took on the more formal aspects of its military counterpart, the general court martial, while a second type of military tribunal, the provost court, often dealt with minor infractions.⁵⁴ As a general rule the operations of both courts derived from the will of an Army commander in a theater of operations, and Halleck, fearing that formal enactment of statute authority would too narrowly circumscribe military powers, did not see fit to ask Congress for exact legislation.⁵⁵ In view of the theory of military supremacy, Federal commanders did not hesitate to sentence civilians without any form of trial. General Butler imprisoned a number of citizens of New Orleans without any form of trial and often on slight evidence.⁵⁶ District commanders also found it possible to overrule a commission's verdict. When a military commission at Memphis found a civilian not guilty of being a guerrilla, General Hurlbut ordered him held in prison at Alton, Illinois, for the duration of the war.⁵⁷

Confiscation of the property of Confederate civilians and other persons sympathizing with the Southern cause was another effective technique of control available to the Federal command. During the Revolution the states had freely confiscated British and Loyalist property found within their borders,⁵⁸ and during the course of the Civil War the Federal Congress passed the acts of August 6, 1861, and July 17, 1862, providing measures for the confiscation of civilian property of Confed-

⁴⁹G. O. 23, Hq. Dept. of the Gulf, May 6, 1862, in W. D., Dept. of the Gulf, vol. 34, o. s. 43, p. 11. NA.

⁵⁰S. O. 70, Hq. Dept. of the Gulf, June 5, 1862, in *ibid.*, vol. 27, o. s. 36, p. 37. NA.

⁵¹Ltr., Halleck to Stanton, Sept. 9, 1863, in W. D., HQA, Ltr. book, vol. 16, pp. 608-610. Telegram, Sherman to Col. Joseph Holt, Judge Advocate General, Apr. 6, 1864, in W. D., Military Div. of the Miss., vol. 1, o. s. 3, p. 10; telegram, Holt to Sherman, in W. D., Secretary of War, Telegrams sent, vol. 23, p. 269. NA.

⁵²Ltr., Halleck to Brig. Gen. [J. H.] Carleton, Santa Fe, New Mex., Feb. 4, 1864, in W. D. HQA, Ltr. book 17, pp. 396-397. NA.

⁵³G. O. 10, Hq. Dist. of West Tenn., July 5, 1864, in W. D., Dist. of West Tenn., vol. 10, n. p. NA.

⁵⁴Ltr., Halleck to Dix, Feb. 3, 1863, inclosing opinion of Holt, Feb. 2, 1863, in W. D., HQA, Ltr. book 14, pp. 707-709. NA.

⁵⁵Ltr., Halleck to Dr. Francis Lieber, May 26, 1864, in W. D., HQA, Ltr. book, vol. 15, pp. 361-367. NA.

⁵⁶See S. O. 150, S. O. 151, S. O. 152, Hq. Dept. of the Gulf, June 30, 1861, in W. D., Dept. of the Gulf, vol. 27, o. s. 36, pp. 65-67. NA.

⁵⁷G. O. 54, Hq. XVI Army Corps, May 16, 1863, in W. D., XVI Army Corps, vol. 17, o. s. 24, pp. 146-152. NA.

⁵⁸James A. Gathings, *International Law and American Treatment of Alien Enemy Property* (Washington, 1940), pp. 15-29.

erates.⁵⁹ Neither the execution of these confiscation acts nor, after March 1863, the custody of "captured or abandoned" property in the South fell within the province of the military, but by Lincoln's order military commanders were empowered "in an orderly manner, [to] seize and use any property [in the Confederate States], real or personal, which may be necessary or convenient for their several commands, as supplies, or for other military purposes. . . ."⁶⁰

Once again citing his seemingly inexhaustible rules of war, General Halleck began military confiscation in Missouri late in 1861. In December of that year he directed his subordinate provost marshals to quarter refugees from southwestern Missouri and to feed and clothe them at the expense of avowed secessionists.⁶¹ To provide revenue Halleck levied a contribution of \$10,000 upon "men known to be hostile to the Union" in St. Louis. Persons so levied upon were given a week to satisfy a board of officers of their loyalty, and if they failed to satisfy the board a ten per cent penalty was added to their assessment.⁶² Halleck thus established another precedent which his commanders would carry into the Confederate States. One of the most striking of numerous assessment orders was issued by General Grant after he had assumed command of Federal armies in the West. Pertinent sections of this order, published on November 5, 1863, read as follows:⁶³

For every act of violence to the person of an unarmed Union citizen, a secessionist will be ar-

rested and held as hostage for the delivery of the offender.

For every dollars' worth of property taken from such citizens, or destroyed by raiders, an assessment will be made upon secessionists of the neighborhood, and collected by the nearest military forces . . . and the amount thus collected paid over to the sufferers.

When such assessments cannot be collected in money, property useful to the Government may be taken, at fair valuation, and the amount paid in money by a disbursing officer of the Government. . . .

Wealthy secession citizens will be assessed in money and provisions for the support of Union refugees, who have and may be driven from their homes, and into our lines, by the acts of those with whom such secession citizens are in sympathy.

This order was vigorously enforced by General G. M. Dodge in Middle Tennessee. His usual practice was to publish an order listing individuals deemed by him to be secessionists and the amount of money to be collected from each of them.⁶⁴

General Butler's fertile mind carried assessment and confiscation to their ultimate extremes in Louisiana. After taking all Confederate property remaining in New Orleans, Butler turned to assessments for relief of the "destitute poor of the city." In August 1862 he required residents to match their contributions to the Confederate cause and assessed other amounts against cotton brokers who had advised planters not to send their cotton to New Orleans.⁶⁵ In December 1862 he levied a second assessment against the same two lists of citizens.⁶⁶ But Butler's real forte was confiscation, for he explained that as a New England lawyer he was well versed in the property titles to real estate seized during the Revolu-

⁵⁹See James G. Randall, *The Confiscation of Property During the Civil War* (Indianapolis, 1913).

⁶⁰Executive Order, A. Lincoln, July 22, 1862, in W. D., Secretary of War, Telegrams sent. vol. 11, p. 449. NA.

⁶¹G. O. 13, Hq. Dept. of Mo., Dec. 4, 1861, in W. D., Dept. of Mo., vol. 50, o. s. 77, pp. 8-9. NA.

⁶²G. O. 25, Hq. Dept. of Mo., Dec. 12, 1861, in *ibid.*, p. 191. NA.

⁶³G. O. 4, Hq. Military Div. of the Miss., Nov. 5, 1863, in W. D., Military Div. of the Miss., vol. 14, o. s. 20, p. 2. NA.

⁶⁴S. O. 26, Hq. Left Wing, XVI Army Corps, Jan. 26, 1864; see also S. O. 35, Feb. 4, 1864, and S. O. 42, Feb. 15, 1864, in W. D., XVI Army Corps, vol. 34, o. s. 64, n. p. NA.

⁶⁵G. O. 55, Hq. Dept. of the Gulf, Aug. 4, 1862, in W. D., Dept. of the Gulf, vol. 34, o. s. 43, p. 25. NA.

⁶⁶G. O. 105, Hq. Dept. of the Gulf, Dec. 9, 1862, in *ibid.*, vol. 33, o. s. 42, p. 50. NA.

tion. Butler's greatest effort comprised his orders of November 9 and November 25, 1862, sequestering all disloyal property in Louisiana lying outside his military lines.⁶⁷ In eight months of command at New Orleans, Butler estimated that he had raised \$1,088,000 from taxation, assessments, and confiscation.⁶⁸

While assessments were made against individuals judged to be disloyal, Federal confiscation and foraging practices placed a premium upon future proof of loyalty for legal recovery. Federal troops, while foraging, were supposed to give vouchers to supposedly loyal persons for their property; those supposedly disloyal received no vouchers. Thus while in pursuit of Confederate General Forrest in North Mississippi, General Dodge passed a farmhouse of one W. C. McHenry. McHenry had taken an oath of allegiance but his family, mistaking Dodge's men for Confederates, came to the fence to cheer for Jeff Davis. Dodge thereupon confiscated a long list of property, justifying his actions with the observation, "Children never cheer for governments or men without their fathers and mothers are enemies too."⁶⁹

Probably the most common punishment for recalcitrant citizens in occupied areas, however, was banishment from their homes, sometimes to the region north of the Ohio, more often to Confederate territory. The Federal commanders found various reasons for banishment. General David Hunter ordered families having husbands, sons or brothers in the Confederate service sent out of Key West, Florida, in early 1863, an order which was protested by the Federal judge and district attorney

there.⁷⁰ The Catholic Bishop of the Diocese of Natchez was banished for refusing to read the ritual prayer for the President of the United States, but he was permitted to return to Natchez on Lincoln's order.⁷¹ At Vicksburg, on the other hand, five unmarried women were banished after they walked out of church as the Episcopal minister read prayers for the President of the United States.⁷² A citizen of Little Rock, Arkansas, was sent outside Federal lines when his letter, explaining to a Confederate friend that he had "taken the 'oath of allegiance' to Old Abe's Government . . . to keep . . . from starving," came into Federal hands.⁷³ Secessionist families were sent away from Memphis on numerous occasions in reprisal for guerrilla attacks in West Tennessee. It was the voluble Sherman, campaigning in the spring rains of North Georgia and presumably out of sorts, who proposed the ultimate in banishment: "Your military commanders, provost marshals, and other agents," he wrote his district commander in Kentucky, "may arrest all males and females who have encouraged or harbored guerrillas and robbers and you may cause them to be collected in Louisville and when you have enough, say 300 or 400, I will cause them to be sent down the Mississippi through their Guerrilla gauntlet and by a sailing ship send them to a land where they may take their negroes and make a colony

⁷⁰Ltr., William Marvin, U. S. District Judge, to Lincoln, Feb. 24, 1863, in W. D., Secretary of War, Ltrs. received, file M-72-1B, 1863. See also the file of correspondence accompanied by ltr., Maj. Gen. David Hunter, Comdg. Dept. of the South, to Stanton, May 20, 1863, in *ibid.*, file Depts.-EB-4/63. NA.

⁷¹Ltr., William H. Elder, Bishop of Natchez, to Lincoln, Apr. 7, 1864; ltr., Stanton to Brig. Gen. James Tuttle, Apr. 27, 1864, in W. D., Secretary of War, Ltrs. received, file K-800-May 4/64. NA.

⁷²G. O. 52, Hq. XVII Army Corps, Dec. 29, 1863, in W. D., XVII Army Corps, vol. 7, o. s. 11, pp. 146-147. NA.

⁷³Ltr., William E. Woodruff to Dr. Isaac Folsom, Feb. 26, 1864; G. O. 10, Hq. Dept. of Ark., Mar. 3, 1864, in W. D., Dept. of Ark., vol. 15, o. s. 23, n. p. NA.

⁶⁷G. O. 91, Hq. Dept. of the Gulf, Nov. 9, 1862; G. O. 101, Hq. Dept. of the Gulf, Nov. 25, 1862, in *ibid.*, vol. 34, o. s. 43, pp. 44, 49. NA.

⁶⁸*Senate Report*, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., No. 108, p. 354.

⁶⁹Ltr., Brig. Gen. G. M. Dodge, Comdg., Left Wing, XVI Army Corps, to Capt. Henry Binsmore, Asst. Adjutant General, XVI Army Corps, Mar. 23, 1863, in W. D., XVI Army Corps, vol. 32, o. s. 59½, p. 184. NA.

with Laws and a future of their own."⁷⁴ Sherman suggested to Secretary Stanton that British Honduras, French Guinea, San Domingo, Madagascar, or Lower California might be suitable sites for deported Confederates.⁷⁵

The Federal military governments also assumed a broad direction of Southern civil affairs, touching the lawful as well as the lawless. Shortly after each Federal conquest the local inhabitants were registered, frequently as loyal, disloyal, or neutral foreigners. Those citizens who chose to register as disloyal were subject to assessments and were generally banished, either immediately upon registration or spasmodically as was the case in Louisiana.⁷⁶ Contrary to the usages of international law, several commanders required the oath of allegiance to the Federal government. General John Pope attempted to coerce citizens in northern Virginia into oaths of allegiance, under penalty of removal from their homes.⁷⁷ If oaths of allegiance were not made compulsory, various pressures forced many citizens to take them. Allegiance was commonly required of professional men and tradesmen, and Butler also required the oath of allegiance from all clergymen in Eastern Virginia.⁷⁸ General Rosecrans in Tennessee properly required non-combatant oaths requiring only that the persons so subscribing would conduct

themselves as peaceable citizens.⁷⁹

After the disastrous Red River Campaign of 1864 all able bodied males between the ages of 18-45 residing in districts along the Mississippi were required to serve in locally organized militia forces.⁸⁰ This service, moreover, was made compulsory upon foreign aliens residing in Memphis,⁸¹ but payments of fifty dollars a month into the militia fund would excuse a militiaman from drill, inspections, reviews, and guard duty.⁸² In the spring of 1865 the Federal draft was enforced in Louisiana, Mississippi, Arkansas, and West Tennessee. Confederate deserters, while not subject to this draft, were encouraged to enlist with a promise of assignment to Federal regiments serving on the Indian frontiers.⁸³

The exercise of municipal functions by the Federal military similarly touched all citizens of occupied districts. General Banks and his successors enforced a tax of five dollars per bale of cotton, one dollar per hog-head of sugar, and twenty-five cents per barrel of molasses brought to the port of New Orleans for sale. The tax was for the benefit of Federal hospitals.⁸⁴ At Vicksburg a monthly tax of five cents per lineal frontage foot was levied to pay for gas lighting of the city's streets.⁸⁵ Other taxes were raised in most oc-

⁷⁹G. O. 43, Hq. Dept. of the Cumberland, Mar. 8, 1864, in W. D., Dept. of the Cumberland, vol. 45A, p. 102. NA.

⁸⁰G. O. 31, Hq. Military Div. of the West Miss., July 30, 1864, in W. D., Dept. of the Gulf, vol. 72, o. s. 116, pp. 33-34. NA.

⁸¹G. O. 18, Hq. Dist. of West Tenn., July 22, 1864, in W. D., Dist. of West Tenn., vol. 10, n. p.; telegram, Stanton to Washburn, July 20, 1864, in W. D., Secretary of War, Telegrams sent, vol. 25, pp. 426-428. NA.

⁸²S. O. 45, Hq. Dist. of West Tenn., Feb. 18, 1865, in W. D., Dist. of West Tenn., vol. 12, p. 230. NA.

⁸³G. O. 4, Hq. Military Div. of the West Miss., Jan. 8, 1865, in W. D., Dept. of the Gulf, vol. 72, o. s. 116, p. 135. NA.

⁸⁴S. O. 82, Hq. Dept. of the Gulf, Mar. 27, 1863, in W. D., Dept. of the Gulf, vol. 28, o. s. 37, p. 244; ltr., Banks to Stanton, June 8, 1864, in W. D., Secretary of War, Ltrs. received, file B-1592, June 23/64. NA.

⁸⁵G. O. 13, Hq. Post of Vicksburg, Apr. 5, 1864, in W. D., Dept. of Miss., vol. 36, o. s. 64, p. 41. NA.

⁷⁴S. O. 52, Hq. XVI Army Corps, Mar. 29, 1863, in W. D., XVI Army Corps, vol. 19, o. s. 27, pp. 60-61; ltr., Hurlbult to Rawlins, Apr. 18, 1863, in *ibid.*, vol. 2, o. s. 19, p. 56. Ltr., Sherman, Big Shanty, Ga., to Brig. Gen. [S. G.] Burbridge, Comdg. Dist. of Ky., June 21, 1864, in W. D., Military Div. of the Miss., vol. 3, o. s. 5, pp. 91-94. NA.

⁷⁵Ltr., Sherman to Stanton, June 21, 1864, in *ibid.*, pp. 94-95. NA.

⁷⁶Ltr., Brig. Gen. James Bowen, Provost Marshal General, to Banks, May 21, 1863, in W. D., Dept. of the Gulf, vol. 297, o. s. 671, p. 4; ltr., Col. T. E. Chickering, Asst. PMG, to Banks, June 18, 1864, in *ibid.*, vol. 299, p. 137. NA.

⁷⁷Garrard Glenn and A. Arthur Schiller, *The Army and the Law* (New York, 1943), pp. 123-124.

⁷⁸Ltr., Butler to Chaplain Thomas L. Poulson, Jan. 17, 1864, in W. D., Dept. of Va. and N. C., vol. 50, o. s. 72, p. 51. NA.

cupied areas for such purposes as street cleaning, maintenance of drains and sewers, and other public works.⁸⁶ In addition to taxation, the military authority utilized licensing and other means necessary to protect the public health and the welfare of their troops. Houses of ill fame were licensed in New Orleans in order to protect troop health and to provide revenues for the city.⁸⁷ Sales of liquor were strictly regulated in all occupied areas, and one commander closed all distilleries in Middle Tennessee.⁸⁸ Gambling houses were ordered closed in Memphis and New Orleans.⁸⁹ Vulnerability of occupation troops to epidemic diseases necessitated strict sanitary regulations, especially in New Orleans.⁹⁰ Compulsory inoculation of all citizens for small-pox was enforced in Eastern Virginia and at Vicksburg.⁹¹ At Helena the local military commander enjoined citizens not to allow filth and dead animals to accumulate about the town but to throw such in the Mississippi River.⁹² The post commander at Beaufort, North Carolina, forbade persons from allowing their hogs to roam in the streets but his

superior officer overruled him on the grounds that this was "an old custom of the place" and would "materially interfere with the raising of hogs."⁹³

During the course of the American Civil War the various Federal commanders thus pursued remarkably similar occupation policies: believing that competing jurisdictions would adversely affect their war efforts they overcame or supplanted civil governments where they were able; and, utilizing martial powers to punish and to regulate, they made themselves masters of the Southern population. It is nevertheless evident that the more responsible of these officers (Butler being eliminated by such a qualification) did not lose a fundamental respect for the institutions of popular government. It would appear, moreover, that few of them attempted to project their military governments beyond a scope of maintaining order and into a more dubious role of reforming the Southern social system. At the end of Confederate resistance, a majority of Federal commanders expressed a desire for speedy restoration of Southern governments.⁹⁴ Unfortunately such sound counsel would not prevail, and Federal military government, conceived as a necessity for successful military operations, would be perpetuated for political purposes during the "reconstruction" of the South.

⁸⁶Ltr., Brig. Gen. I. N. Palmer, Comdg. New Bern, N. C., to Mr. David Heaton, Treasury Agent, Aug. 11, 1863, in W. D., Dept. of N. C., vol. 40, o. s. 316, n. p. NA.

⁸⁷Endorsement, Maj. Gen. S. A. Hurlbut, Sept. 28, 1864, in W. D., Dept. of the Gulf, vol. 8, o. s. 8, p. 294. NA.

⁸⁸G. O. 19, Hq. Dept. of Va. and N. C., Feb. 11, 1864, in W. D., Dept. of Va. and N. C., vol. 52, o. s. 76, n. p.; S. O. 172, Hq. Dist. of West Tenn., in W. D., Dist. of West Tenn., vol. 17, p. 78; G. O. 78, Hq. Left Wing, XVI Army Corps, Dec. 2, 1863, in W. D., XVI Army Corps, vol. 34, o. s. 66, p. 18. NA.

⁸⁹S. O. 27, Hq. Dist. of West Tenn., Jan. 30, 1865, in W. D., Dist. of West Tenn., vol. 17, p. 207; ltr., Banks to George F. Shepley, Oct. 2, 1863, in W. D., HQA, Ltrs. received. 1863. NA.

⁹⁰Ltr., Bowen to Col. T. B. Thorpe, City Surveyor, Feb. 17, 1863, in W. D., Dept. of the Gulf, vol. 296, p. 132; ltr., Butler to Mayor of New Orleans, May 9, 1862, in W. D., Dept. of the Gulf, vol. 1, o. s. 1, pp. 202-203. NA.

⁹¹S. O. 17, Hq. Dist. of Vicksburg, Jan. 18, 1865, in W. D., Dept. of Miss., vol. 24, o. s. 34, p. 517; G. O. 7, Hq. Dist. of Eastern Va., Feb. 28, 1865, in W. D., Dist. of Eastern Va., vol. 88, o. s. 174, p. 78. NA.

⁹²G. O. 29, Hq. Dist. of East Ark., May 4, 1864, in W. D., Dept. of Ark., vol. 43, o. s. 110, pp. 302-303. NA.

⁹³Ltr., Asst. Adjutant General, Hq. XVIII Army Corps, to Col. A. B. Sprague, Mar. 20, 1863, in W. D., Dept. of Va., vol. 30, o. s. 49, p. 149. NA.

⁹⁴Ltr., Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, Comdg., Dept. of N. C., to Sherman, May 5, 1865, in W. D., Dept. of N. C., vol. 40, o. s. 100, pp. 94-95; telegram, Maj. Gen. E. R. S. Canby to Stanton, May 7, 1865, in W. D., Secretary of War, Telegrams received, vol. 46, pp. 484-485; ltr., Maj. Gen. N. T. J. Dana, Comdg., Dept. of Miss., to Brig. Gen. J. W. Davidson, Comdg., Dist. of Natchez, Apr. 24, 1865, in W. D., Dept. of Miss., vol. 1, o. s. 1, pp. 294-295; ltr., Maj. Gen. C. C. Washburn to Maj. Gen. G. H. Thomas, Apr. 12, 1865, in W. D., Dist. of West Tenn., vol. 1, o. s. 2, p. 83; ltr., Pope to Stanton, Apr. 19, 1865; endorsement by Grant, Apr. 23, 1865, in W. D., Secretary of War, Ltrs. received, file P-710, Apr. 27/65. NA.

SERVICE IN MONTANA, 1870 AND 1871

BY COLONEL EDWARD J. MCCLERNAND*

**Editor's Note.* Edward John McClernand was the son of John A. McClernand, Major General of Volunteers during the Civil War. Edward John was graduated from The Military Academy in the Class of 1870. The highest rank he attained was Colonel of Volunteers in the War with Spain in 1898. He was awarded a Medal of Honor for gallant conduct against the Nez Percé Indians, 30 September 1877; but the Medal was not issued until seventeen years later, that is, on 27 November 1894. This reminiscence was given as an address to a meeting of the Order of Indian Wars many years ago.

IN THE AUTUMN OF 1870 I joined the Second Cavalry as a graduate from West Point, and in compliance with the provisions of the order assigning the members of my class to their several regiments, I reported at the Headquarters of mine, then at Omaha Barracks, Nebraska.

While the Headquarters and two battalions, as the squadrons were then called, were thus located within, or near, the confines of civilization, the third was serving at Fort Ellis in far off Montana, where I was directed to report. Two classmates, Schofield and Jerome,¹ en-route to Ellis, met me at Omaha.

Quite a number of the members of our class had already passed through Omaha, en-route to their various stations, and had been cordially entertained by the late Captain Wm. P. Clark, who was then adjutant of the 2nd Cavalry, and by other gay spirits of the same regiment and of the 9th Infantry. The hospitality inaugurated for our preceding classmates continued to *flow* in our honor, and the post was indeed a merry place. I am inclined

to think the Department Commander, General Augur,² who resided at the Barracks, thought the feasting and good cheer for the class of "70" was continuing too long, for one day when we had proceeded to join, and got only as far as the town, we met the General on the street, whereupon he said he supposed we intended to start that day, and bade us good-bye. We replied that such had been our intention but there was not sufficient time to make the necessary preparations. We were then five blocks from our hotel, which was as far from the depot. The General drew his watch and very politely, but with much positiveness, said, "Young gentlemen you have an abundance of time, you have an hour." The hint was taken, our trunks packed with more haste than care and the depot reached none too soon.

Many of our newly made friends accompanied us to the train. To these we said good-bye, and turned our faces and our thoughts to our future and unknown home. When I say unknown, I mean not only to ourselves, but nearly so to our friends at Omaha Barracks. No map could be found showing the location of Fort Ellis, which was generally, and properly, supposed to be near the headwaters of the Missouri River. No one offered any more definite information, and with this we were forced to be content.

Our journey along the Union Pacific Rail

¹Charles B. Schofield, the son of Major General John M. Schofield, and Lovell H. Jerome.

²Christopher C. Augur, Brigadier General in 1870 and Major General by brevet. A graduate of The Military Academy in the Class of 1843, he rose from the rank of Major at the outbreak of the Civil War to the command of the 22d Corps in 1863.

Road to Ogden, its western terminus, was novel and interesting. The army officers whom we met at the different stations thought we were en-route to a wild and mysterious land, roamed over by numerous savage tribes of Indians. In the possession of youth and health, this ignorance of Montana only increased our desire to reach it.

Thirty miles northwest of Ogden at a place called Corinne, a station on the Central Pacific Rail Road, we left the railway intending to take a stage-coach on the following day, and late in the afternoon saw the Montana coach arrive. It turned the corner near our hotel with the horses on a full gallop, and the air made merry with the crack of the driver's whip. I learned afterwards that this speed was attained only while passing through a village. Doubtless the autocrat of the ribbons imagined he increased his importance thereby among the villagers.

Corinne, in the days of which we speak, was not a pretty town but it was a lively one; made so by drivers called bull-whackers, or mule-skinner, according as they blistered with the long whips they carried, the hide of the ox or the mule, and by gamblers and toughs generally. All night the noise of merry making as well as of quarrelling went on; still further enlivened every little while by some rowdy practising with his revolver. As the walls of my hotel were only thin pine boards, I managed to while away part of a nearly sleepless night by calculating the chances of a bullet coming in my direction.

The morning found us up bright and early, making our final preparations for a stage ride of more than five-hundred miles. Observing, with some displeasure, that the coach had not been dusted out since its arrival on the previous evening, I called the attention of one of the guards to the supposed omission, when he turned upon me with a look of profound contempt and muttering something about my being the worst "tender foot," (a name given

on the Plains to new comers from the East), he ever saw, quietly entered the stage and, with his ugly, sawed off, double barrel shotgun, placed himself so as to occupy the entire front seat, usually considered the best. It was my first lesson in frontier life, but it began to dawn upon me that my ways were not those of the far West, and as the people there seemed to be rather set in their manners and customs I concluded it would be the part of wisdom to somewhat alter my own. Fortunately the coach was not crowded; the pompous driver, three bragging guardsmen, and three "tender feet" constituting the crew and passenger list.

No account of the stage ride from Corinne to Montana in 1870 would be complete without a word about the relay and eating stations. The four horses were changed every ten or fifteen miles, the distance between stations varying somewhat with the nature of the road, and the location of water. The buildings were nearly all constructed of rough logs, and erected in the most primitive way. Where food was served, one end of the cabin was assigned as a kitchen and eating room, while the other was used as a stable, the dividing wall between the two being of the most flimsy material. Meals were served three times a day, and a half hour allowed for each. The breakfast hour varied from 5 to 9 A. M., and supper from 5 to 10 P. M., according to the location of the particular station, with dinner sandwiched in between without any apparent endeavor to divide the hours equally. The menu was simple, but not good. The frying pan seemed to be a favorite utensil with every cook, while the amount of grease supplied was enough to eat up all the profits derived from economies practiced elsewhere. Perhaps my experience on one occasion will suffice to give a general idea of the food furnished. We arrived at the supper station with our lips, nostrils and throats sore and feverish from alkaline dust; every one wishing for something cool and refreshing. The food put before us

was, as usual, swimming in grease and most uninviting, but at the end of the meal our hopes were raised by the waitress asking me if I would have some fruit. "Fruit," said I, "have you fruit?" "Oh, yes," replied the haughty damsel who condescended to serve us, "we have dried peaches."

Travelling, as we did, day and night, we caught on the morning of the fifth day our first glimpse of Helena, containing at that time about four-thousand inhabitants; having passed but few houses since leaving Corinne, other than the afore described station huts, a town was a welcome sight. On entering the village the driver applied the whip unmercifully, frightening the broken down horses into a gallop; we dashed through the streets in becoming style to the great delight of numerous small boys. It was a repetition of the grand entrée into Corinne.

At Helena, Lieut. Schofield and I received orders to join our companies (as "troops" were then named), then in camp near Fort Shaw, on Sun River, while the third member of our party, Lieut. Jerome was to continue his journey to Fort Ellis.

Taking another stage-coach Schofield and I reached Fort Shaw in about eighteen hours, and reported at camp.

Presumably all young officers are rather green on joining. I know we were. Having no clothing suitable for the field the captain in command of our battalion, or squadron as we will call it frequently hereafter, took us to the Quartermaster's storehouse and fitted us out in the clothing of a private. In those days but slight attention was given to the cut of the enlisted man's clothing, and it must be admitted we did not present a very officer-like appearance. In this garb, however, we were taken to report to the Post Commander, General Gibbon,³ who received us cordially until

³John Gibbon, Brigadier General in 1870 and Major General by brevet. A graduate of The Military Academy in 1847, he rose from the rank of Captain in 1861, to be commander of the 18th Army Corps in 1864.

informed we came to report for duty, whereupon he directed us to first don a proper uniform and then report without delay. Somewhat crestfallen we went back to camp, a mile away, and returned in full uniform in a mist that was almost a rain. At the time we thought the General's idea of discipline was only equaled by that which tradition credited to Old Harney.

In a few days, sometime in the latter part of November, our squadron received orders to return to Fort Ellis, distance one-hundred and eighty miles. The weather was cold, frequent snow storms were encountered and the nights were particularly severe. Schofield and I were poorly equipped for such a march, and at several camps we slept but little.

After our long and weary journey to reach Ellis, my friend and I were not a little disappointed to find that the post was a collection of log houses, with dirt roofs covered with boards. On the northwest and southeast corners there were block-houses, through the port-holes of which an effective rifle fire could be delivered. The fort served to protect the extreme eastern settlements of Montana. To the westward, scattered over a large area, were twenty-five or thirty thousand settlers, while to the east, if we except the buildings at the Crow Indian Agency, there was not a house for many hundreds of miles. On the latter side, that is to the east, the Crows were our nearest red neighbors, while beyond them, down the Yellowstone Valley, were the favorite hunting grounds of the Sioux, the Cheyennes and the Arapahoes, three of the most warlike and powerful Indian tribes.

Fort Ellis was located in the upper end of the beautiful Gallatin Valley, three miles from the little town of Bozeman, and on the East Fork of the Gallatin River, a clear and sparkling trout stream. The valley is thirty-three miles long and from five to fifteen wide. Mountains from seven to eight thousand feet high nearly surround it, and in summer

it is a lovely spot. At its lower end three rivers, the Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin unite and form the Missouri. A few settlers were scattered through the valley, which on the east was open to invasion by the Indians through three passes. The first, near Fort Ellis, is Bozeman Pass; the second, a narrow gorge, about twenty miles north, is named Flathead, and the third, Blackfoot Pass, ten miles north of the second. Through these passes the Indians made several raids upon the settlements, and did considerable damage. The presence of the troops at Ellis undoubtedly materially contributed to diminish the number of such incursions, although it was exceedingly difficult to intercept a war party after it had stolen unobserved into the valley; for the red-skins, their mischief once accomplished would dash away with the speed of the wind and be many miles on their retreat before news of their invasion reached the garrison.

All this made hard work for the troops, keeping the junior officers in the saddle almost constantly, and yet it was an exciting and invigorating labor. The country was beautiful and full of game, while the element of danger, always present, added a charm for the younger officers and men.

In the summer of "71" two troops were sent down the Yellowstone Valley as an escort to the surveyors for the proposed Northern Pacific Rail Road. The survey was discontinued for the season in the early part of November of the same year, at a point one-hundred and fifty miles from Ellis. One night on the return march a tent caught fire during a high wind; this quickly kindled the grass and in an incredibly short time the camp was destroyed. To add to the misfortunes of the detachment the weather became stormy and the snow fell to great depth. This was followed by intense cold. The situation was reported by courier and food and additional

clothing were sent from Ellis by the troop to which I belonged, and of which I was in temporary command. On the mountains immediately east of the post, that are now pierced by a tunnel and called the "Snowy Range" by the officials of the Northern Pacific Rail Road, the deep snow greatly impeded our progress. Frequently it was necessary to dig out a horse or pack-mule that had sunk to his back, and in spite of our earnest efforts all day, night overtook us when only eight miles out; utterly worn out we went into camp in a little grove of pines just below the summit of the divide. After many efforts a fire was started, but constant attention was required to prevent its being extinguished by the drifting snow. That night the thermometer at Ellis, a thousand or more feet below us, fell to forty-eight degrees below zero, and the wind blew a gale. The cold was intense and sleep out of the question; even the animals huddled around the fire in seeking protection from the bitter blasts.

At daybreak we broke camp, if it may properly be called such, and started on more weary, if that were possible, than when the previous night had overtaken us, but mercifully the weather moderated a little during the forenoon.

About 2 P. M., the returning escort was met near the "great bend" of the Yellowstone River and both commands turned towards Ellis, intending to camp among some cottonwood trees about five miles ahead. After marching two miles a blizzard struck us, and the howling wind drove the coarse snow, as hard and cutting as grains of sand, straight into our faces. In a few minutes all land marks were obscured and the trail recently made obliterated. As the rapidly drifting snow quickly filled the eyes of any one peering into the storm, each officer took his turn in leading the column and forcing his horse to advance against the gale. It grew suddenly colder, and after two hours of this

desperate struggle it was ascertained we had been travelling in a circle. The sensations produced by such a discovery can be appreciated only by one who has been lost on the prairie in the midst of one of those terrible storms.

Many troopers became numb, and a few threw themselves from their saddles and had to be lifted back and forced to follow. It was impossible to adjust the loads on the pack-mules, and conditions going from bad to worse all efforts to drive these animals along were abandoned. Some men cried and begged to be permitted to lie down and die; others wandered from the column and were forced to return by those who kept their heads. Cries that feet, hands and parts of the face were freezing were heard on all sides. Our weary horses seemed unable to continue the unequal struggle and were unmercifully spurred to keep them up to their work. There was great confusion; for a time it looked as if all discipline would be lost, and the command scattered in every direction upon the boundless prairie. To keep moving was our only hope, and the cooler heads fairly drove the others before them.

After five hours of this life and death struggle, we stumbled on the timber we had been seeking. Trumpeter Page, brave fellow that he was, seized his trumpet and sounded the "Rally," and never did a call sound sweeter. It meant life. Six years later Page, then a sergeant, fell, shot through the forehead at the battle of the Big Hole, where Gen. Gibbon attacked the Nez Percé Indians under Chief Joseph.

It was fortunate indeed that a thick growth of willows grew among the trees in which we had taken shelter; they helped to break the wind and made it possible to start fires, for no human being could have lived that night out in the open. As it was, fifty-three men out of the one hundred and fifty in the

command had their extremities frozen, many of them severely.⁴

August 1872 found us again on the banks of the Yellowstone, escorting the surveyors of the proposed Northern Pacific Rail Road. The escort consisted of four companies of the 7th Infantry and four troops of the Second Cavalry, all commanded by Major Eugene M. Baker of the latter regiment, who a few years before had given the Piegans such a trouncing, and thereby earning the soubriquet of Piegan Baker.

It was while on this duty that I engaged in my first buffalo chase. We were in the Valley of the Yellowstone, nearly opposite the mouth of Clark's Fork, when a herd of about one hundred buffaloes emerged from the cottonwood trees along the river, and passed at a full run in front of our moving column. Along with a number of others I received permission to give chase, and started off at a furious pace, thoroughly excited and oblivious to danger from my horse stepping in a gopher hole or stumbling on rough ground.

On we went, every leap of my good steed bringing me closer to the now hardly pressed herd. Rifles and pistols commenced to crack, and candor compels me to confess I was nearly wild from excitement. As I drew along side of my first buffalo I was amazed at his great size, and as his rapid motion shook the dust from his thick hair, thereby giving it a grayish tinge, I was impressed by his resemblance to an elephant, or so it seemed to me.

I was well armed, but in my agitation did poor shooting. In after years I learned how to gallop alongside of a buffalo and to send a bullet straight to his heart. However, in my first chase, which covered four miles, I killed four and naturally felt highly elated.

⁴About the same time a detachment of sixty-five men of the 7th Infantry, in the field near Fort Shaw, had a similar experience, resulting, as I was told, in twenty-two amputations.

The fourth was a huge old fellow; a pistol shot brought him to his knees, when I rode off to what seemed to be a safe distance, intending to dismount and finish him with my rifle, but my foot only touched the ground when he staggered to his feet and charged. This frightened my horse and he tried to break away; had he succeeded the situation would have been critical, for a charging buffalo is a dangerous foe, and, moreover, I had lost sight of my comrades and was practically alone in an Indian country. I have never been able to explain, even to myself, how I managed to reach the saddle just in time to escape the horns of the infuriated bull, but when I next dismounted it was necessary to employ long range fire.

On the 13th of August 1872 camp was pitched on the left bank of the Yellowstone not far below the mouth of Pryor's Creek, within a slough that, with the river, entirely surrounded the camp ground. This slough was fringed with large cottonwoods and at the lower end, extending some seventy-five yards from the river, there was also a thick growth of tall willow brush. Pickets were posted along the slough, and the wagons, perhaps a hundred in number, were parked in the form of an ellipse with one end open, so as to form a corral, into which the wagon mules, left out to graze during the night, could be driven if necessary.

The night was dark and about three o'clock on the 14th a few Indians succeeded in passing through the picket-line unobserved, but while they were trying to turn the loose mules in a convenient direction to start them into a run for the hills their presence was discovered by our herders. The darkness prevented the Indians from distinguishing the herders as white men, and the latter guided the head of the herd into the corral, so that when the rush came the mules in rear, following those in advance, ran in among the wagons and were secured. At

this moment the red men were seen and fired upon by a member of the inner guard. This shot was quickly followed by others, and cries of, "Indians, here they come," were heard on all sides as officers and men were awakened and sprang to arms.

At first the confusion was great owing to the difficulty of distinguishing friend from foe. Some people thought the pickets were deceived as to the presence of Indians, and that they were firing at imaginary red-skins, but a volley from the latter, together with their demoniacal yells and war-whoops did away with that belief. The darkness prevented the enemy taking full advantage of the surprise given us, and a volley from our infantry directed at the willows at the lower end of camp, where most of the Indians had posted themselves, promptly drove them from that point of vantage.

We soon pressed forward and regained the timber along the slough, from which the pickets had retired. The Indians did not try to hold it, as might have been expected; they were, perhaps, surprised in their turn at the promptness and vigor of our defense. The semi-circle of trees once more in our possession we felt comparatively safe.

The savages, dashing about on their ponies in our immediate front, kept up an unearthly and diabolical noise, but as it grew lighter they retired to the bluffs. These enclosed the valley on two sides of the camp; starting about four-hundred yards above the latter and gradually receding to a rocky point a thousand yards away. From the top of these bluffs the Indians tried to pick off our men as the latter dodged from tree to tree. Occasionally a daring warrior would dash down from the hills and ride his pony at full speed along our front. I do not recall that any were killed, but several were wounded. One pony was killed; his rider being picked up by two braves dashing along in rear, and by them carried away, one on either side of the dis-

mounted warrior.

At half past six A. M., the Indians drew off and disappeared down the valley. Captain Ball, with two troops, was sent to observe the retiring enemy, but the latter rode rapidly and were soon lost to sight. Our loss was two killed and five wounded, with fifteen or twenty horses killed, wounded, or missing. In addition, twenty-five beeves, intended for food, were driven into the hills and slaughtered.

This engagement caused much controversy, and the commanding officer was criticized by many, but in my opinion this criticism was largely unjust. The critics charged, with other censure, that bad judgment was shown in the selection of the camp-ground. With that view I distinctly disagreed.

The Indians left two dead on the field, and later admitted a loss of eleven killed and wounded. They had eleven hundred warriors present, while our command numbered a little less than five hundred. The losses on each side undoubtedly would have been greater but for the darkness during the early part of the fight, which made accurate shooting impossible.

The site of the engagement has since been known as Baker's Battleground.

At 10 A. M., the survey was resumed, but under conditions that did not inspire confidence. The fact was realized that the strength of the escort was not sufficient to guard the moving trains, or the camp, if established, and at the same time give proper protection to the surveyors, who frequently were strung out for two or three miles. As a result the Chief Engineer, three days later, decided to discontinue the survey along the Yellowstone, and asked to be escorted across

country to the Musselshell River, to run a line along that stream and over the intervening hills to the Missouri. This was done.

During our survey along the Musselshell, a man who used a Surveyor's Compass fell ill and as his absence materially lessened our daily progress the Chief Engineer asked me to replace him. As I had not been out of West Point long enough to grow rusty in such work I consented and assisted in that way for perhaps ten days. Then the Chief, himself, was taken ill, and he further requested that I replace him in selecting the line. While I felt considerable misgivings as to my qualifications, I again consented, and selected the line for the surveyors to follow for the next two or three days. As a reward for this assistance the Chief promised a life-long pass, but he did not foresee the early failure of Jay Cooke and Company, who were financing the enterprise; the long delay that followed in prosecuting the surveys, and the creation of a new company under which the road was built some years later. To date, I have received no pass.

In the early seventies the Musselshell country abounded with elk, and one evening a band of perhaps five hundred trotted by us just as the sun was sinking behind the Judith Mountains. They presented a beautiful sight as they disappeared over the rolling hills with their long antlers waving like so many plumes.

We reached Fort Ellis on September 30th, after an absence of about two months, and nearly four years passed before the white man again penetrated from the West into the Yellowstone Valley. The Indians loved their hunting grounds there, and many a brave soldier fell before they yielded them.

ECONOMIC MOBILIZATION PLANNING BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS

BY HARRY B. YOSHPE*

PART I

Relation of War to the National Economy.

THE CONCEPT and practice of economic mobilization are the product of twentieth century warfare. To be sure, earlier wars affected and in turn were influenced by the prevailing economic system. But by and large the economies of the combatant nations until the twentieth century continued to function during war substantially as in peacetime.

World Wars I and II, however, ushered in a revolution in the relation of war to the national economy. These wars, involving mechanization, mass armies, superior weapons, and rapidity of movement on far-flung fronts, engulfed the entire economies of the major powers. So large were the military and war-supporting requirements in relation to total resources that significant changes were necessary in the organization, direction and functioning of these economies. Such readjustments were particularly marked in World War II, with its heavier demands on the nation's resources to meet the unprecedented requirements of global warfare.

From this experience has come general recognition of the fact that the mobilization task

is no longer principally that of raising armed forces, but rather that of maximizing the nation's total productive output and diverting into war channels whatever portion of that output is needed for the national security. Such intensive use of the national resources and their redirection to the destructive purposes of war cannot be accomplished without controls. To feed the war machine and minimize the disruption of the supporting economy, the normal, comparatively unrestrained forces of the market place must give way to increasing controls over every part of the national life. Only in this way can the production be provided which will afford full support to the armed forces and at the same time keep the essential civilian economy in a state of efficiency.

It is this central direction and exercise by the government of controls over the distribution of the nation's resources that gives a war economy its most significant and distinctive character. Even in a democracy, it was found, the mobilization of the national resources for a major war must be planned, directed and controlled by the central government. The process of preparing for and carrying out the changes in the organization, operation and direction of all the resources of a nation for the purposes of war is the essence of economic mobilization.

*Based on his planning studies for the National Security Resources Board, Dr. Yoshpe presented this critical appraisal of pre-war planning, at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, December 1951, in New York City.

*Planning for Economic Mobilization.
The Lessons of World War I.*

Notwithstanding our potential strength in material and human resources and our opportunity to observe for some three years the struggle abroad, we entered World War I, as we did all other wars in our history, virtually unprepared. The demands which that war made upon all processes of the national life demonstrated the magnitude of the task of providing the economic support for a major military operation. In the absence of adequate preparatory measures, our experience in the organization and direction of the national economy during World War I left much to be desired. There was a serious lack of accurate information regarding our requirements and resources. Vital questions as to types and designs of equipment were still unsettled at the outbreak of hostilities. Untrained in the manufacture of munitions, industry encountered countless difficulties and delays in organizing for war production.

Inadequate plans for military procurement and for industrial mobilization brought confusion in the placement of orders, uncoordinated purchasing, inequitable distribution of the industrial load, delays in production of munitions, inefficient utilization of the transportation system, and other waste of national resources. The extraordinary and conflicting demands for materials and services resulted in considerable inflation, distortion of price relationships, and allowance of unconscionable war profits; and the government's efforts to check these evils were notoriously unsuccessful.

The controls needed for effective operation were very slowly imposed. It was not until we were far along in the war that we achieved, through the War Industries Board under the chairmanship of Bernard Baruch, any measure of effectiveness in the central control and the direction needed for admin-

istering the wartime economy. The delays in attaining necessary coordination and reforms were costly. So slow was the mobilization process that the full weight of our industrial might did not begin to be felt upon the European battlefronts until the closing months of the war. Furthermore, inadequate handling of some of the problems of demobilization found us coming out of the war with dangerous inflationary tendencies.

Two Decades of Planning.

In the years of peace following World War I, the military services, acting under a legislative mandate to the Assistant Secretary of War and coordinated by the Army and Navy Munitions Board (ANMB), undertook a comprehensive planning program in which they sought to profit by the lessons of that war and avoid the recurrence of past mistakes in another emergency. From their efforts emerged four successive editions of an *Industrial Mobilization Plan* (1930-31, 1933, 1936, and 1939), which provided an administrative blueprint for the control and direction, under civilian auspices, of the nation's resources in time of war.

The most substantive part of the planning was that relating to wartime procurement—a task clearly recognized as the mission of the military departments. Determinations were made of the types of munitions to be used, and requirements were computed to meet specific strategic objectives. Manufacturing facilities were surveyed and allocated among the procuring services and bureaus for the production of anticipated needs. Through educational orders and production studies, an effort was made to inject a practical element into the facility survey and allocation program by training industry for the production of problem items. The recruitment and training of personnel required to expand the peacetime procurement organiza-

tions to war strength received consideration. Furthermore, attention was given to the provision of suitable contracts and the development of proper contractual procedures for the fulfillment of the war production programs.

But while devoting their energies particularly to procurement planning, the planners did not neglect their broader task of preparing plans for the organization and direction of the nation's economic resources in war. For each basic area covered—facilities, commodities, labor, price control, war trade, transportation, power and fuel, and war finance—the planners outlined the nature and scope of the problems anticipated, policy recommendations, methods of control or operation, means to apply such methods effectively, and the organization and procedures for administrative operations in the various stages of transition from peace to war. Plans were also laid for public relations and selective service, and the legislative base prepared to cover the multitude of measures that would be required in the administration of a war economy. In addition, the planners delineated the over-all organization required to direct and coordinate the national economic mobilization. While recognizing that they would have a vital stake in the wartime organization and direction of the nation's resources, the military appreciated that other government agencies and the civilian economy would be no less concerned. Consequently, it was contemplated that the wartime direction and administration of the broader mobilization task would rest not with the military, but with a top-level civilian economic command under the President.

Appraisal of the Planning Program.

As the era of planning drew to a close, the planners felt confident that through their efforts the problems of economic mobilization

had been materially clarified and that adequate programs had been developed to meet these problems. Yet, when the emergency came, the Industrial Mobilization Plan, in some of its most essential features, was completely ignored. Once again the nation moved by uncertain steps. Controls and administration were improvised, and many of the same mistakes of World War I were repeated.

With experience in planning and managing the war economy behind us, we can look at the problems of economic mobilization in clearer perspective. An analysis of this experience indicates certain principles which are essential to effective mobilization planning. It may be interesting to evaluate our pre-war experience with mobilization planning in light of these principles. Perhaps in the process we can find some of the reasons for the limited influence of the IMP.

1. *Civilian Direction of the Planning Process.* Economic mobilization planning must be accomplished under civilian, and not military, direction. As a democratic nation, we take pride in the control which our citizens have over our destiny. In line with our traditional opposition to military control of the civilian economy, neither mobilization planning, nor the process of mobilization itself, can be under military direction. The Armed Services obviously must participate in the planning program by planning for the coordination of procurement, production and distribution within their jurisdiction and for the preparation of requirements for material and manpower resources and contributory services to meet military needs. Planning for the mobilization of the entire national economy, however, must rest squarely in civilian hands. Only in this way can we expect the American public to lend support to the planning.

Of course, it was the Congress which, by the National Defense Act of 1920, had

charged the Assistant Secretary of War with the responsibility for "the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of material and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs." Whatever the underlying motivation for this it was a mistake to vest in the military responsibility for more than the strictly military aspects of economic mobilization planning. When the test came in 1939, the public in general, and liberal and labor groups in particular, could hardly have been expected to look with favor upon a plan that was exclusively the product of the Armed Services in consultation with leading businessmen enjoying and anticipating profitable relations with them. With a strong dislike for war and "military preparedness," the liberal and labor groups traditionally associated the military with conservatism and the maintenance of the status quo. The IMP's proposed concentration of control in a War Resources Administration whose key positions would be held by "the patriotic business leaders of the Nation" was hardly calculated to evoke favorable reception in liberal circles.

Largely ignored in the development of the plans and given little knowledge of their contents, the public had a genuine fear that the IMP in operation would jeopardize civil liberties, the status and gains of organized labor, and the New Deal and other liberal social objectives. Had the major responsibility in economic mobilization planning been within the orbit of a civilian agency at the Presidential level, it would have been evident to everyone that such planning was essentially a civilian function, and we might have avoided the criticism of military dominance in planning for a program that embraces the entire national economy.

2. *Statistical Basis for Controls.* Effective wartime control of the economy is impossible without adequate methods of collecting and using industrial statistics. The

facts needed for war, we learned from costly experience, are very different from the type of data collected by the government in peacetime. In wartime, when the entire economy becomes subject to central direction of the government, statistics become the basis for specific actions in areas untouched by the normal peacetime functioning of the government. The data for such action by the central government have to be specific, accurate and up-to-the-minute, and obtained in greater detail, on a broader basis, on a wider variety of subject matter and in a shorter period of time than is deemed possible or necessary in peacetime.

Though a system of data collection beyond the needs of peacetime was developed in World War I, much of it was abandoned with the return to normalcy. In the two decades of planning which followed World War I, no systematic studies of statistical methodology to meet the needs of another emergency were inaugurated. One finds in the planning literature repeated references to the importance of statistics in industrial mobilization and to the existing government departments and regulatory bodies that could be counted on to furnish the facts needed to guide wartime policy and operations. But nowhere is there evidence of a clear concept of the statistical structure needed for the emergency management of the national economy.

The absence of a wartime reporting system, with the resultant delay in obtaining the information needed, created confusion, waste and loss of production when the emergency came. A scramble for factual knowledge brought inept procedures, and it was impossible to erase completely makeshift schemes and organizations in the effort to establish a satisfactory reporting system. It was not until late 1943 that the War Production Board established a sufficiently integrated reporting method to provide it quickly with the infor-

mation it needed to direct the nation's industrial effort. Molded from earlier improvisations and a compromise of powerful opposing influences, however, this reporting system at no time fully met the fundamental needs of policy and administration.

3. *Comprehensive Budgeting of Resources and Requirements.* Detailed balance sheets of our resources and requirements constitute the fundamental factual basis for economic mobilization plans. From such balance sheets it is possible to make sound judgments as to: how much of the estimated requirements are essential; whether screened requirements can be met, and, if not, by what degree the availabilities fall short; the several types of readiness measures necessary in peacetime to meet estimated requirements; and the direction, nature and extent of controls required in wartime to overcome indicated deficits. *The balancing process must be continuous, in order to reflect changes in needs and industrial potential.* Only through such advance budgeting of requirements and availabilities can we be sure to direct our efforts to the needs of the future and guard against the danger of static and unrealistic planning.

Wartime munitions requirements and the need and availability of facilities, materials, manpower and other factors contributory to their production were the subject of close study throughout the planning period. The planners predicated their efforts, however, on a maximum mobilization of some four million men. As a consequence, military procurement plans to support anticipated mobilization goals proved totally inadequate for wartime needs. Even within the goals set, there were serious limitations to the planners' computations of materiel requirements. Inadequate recognition was given to requirements of planes, tanks and motorized units, or to the problems of translating end-item requirements in terms of basic materials. Only the

most superficial consideration was given to the problem of determining essential civilian requirements. The necessity of aiding allies and of meshing foreign requirements into the national defense program was not anticipated. Furthermore, many of the elements in the requirements computations—mobilization rates, maintenance and distribution factors, rates of expenditure of ammunition, reserve stocks, and time consumed in getting new production from factory to depots—were unpredictable. Under the circumstances, despite the apparent certainty of the planners, there was good reason to doubt the reliability of their estimates of the quantities of munitions that would be required in war.

The low levels set for end-item needs were inevitably reflected in related resources mobilization plans. In respect to manpower, for example, the planners showed little concern about meeting wartime requirements. In the first three published versions of their IMP, the planners reiterated their confidence with respect to the adequacy of the Nation's manpower for a war economy. It was deemed "almost impossible to assume a situation where our population would be in danger of suffering actual hardships in war due to a lack of personnel to produce the necessities of life." Though deficits in certain categories of the labor force were anticipated and plans were developed for its most efficient distribution and use, the planners were convinced that the maximum force we were capable of supporting greatly exceeded any we would conceivably mobilize. Yet, in World War II, manpower was quick to follow materials as the most limiting factor in the mobilization effort.

Though their resources-requirements analyses in the commodities area were among the most intensive, here, too, the planners set their sights too low. On the basis of these analyses, they identified only 14 materials as "strategic" and 15 others as "critical," for

which specific proposals were made to alleviate anticipated wartime shortages. It is interesting to note, by way of contrast, that the Munitions Board's current list of strategic and critical materials for stockpiling covers 73 materials. Vital wartime materials, like magnesium, lead, zinc, bauxite, cadmium, cobalt, industrial diamonds and jewel bearings, were not considered strategic or critical. Of the three basic metals subject to rigid allocation control in World War II, aluminum had been deemed "critical" by the planners, but copper and steel were merely placed on a "surveillance list" of materials that for one reason or another might become strategic or critical at some time. Inadequate programming of wartime needs and belated and limited efforts to improve the nation's readiness position in respect to these key materials required a sudden expansion of industrial production capacity in World War II, which strained the economy in all its aspects.

Nor did the planners develop a reliable, comprehensive record of the nation's productive potential. With the limited mobilization objectives before them, they restricted their facility surveys and allocation program

to a minor fraction of the country's production potential. To meet the needs under the mobilization plans, they had inventoried only 20,000 facilities, and of these little more than half, representing "the cream of American industry," were definitely earmarked for the manufacture of munitions in war. To be sure it was foreseen that companies receiving prime contracts would have to organize the smaller concerns about them for the supply of parts and assemblies. On the eve of the emergency, the Assistant Secretary of War called on the procurement planning officers for a thorough blanketing of their districts, in the hope that "all concerns, however small, will have their part and the necessity for undue expansion of the prime contractors' plants will be avoided." Notwithstanding his eloquent pleas, the procuring services had little knowledge of the productive potential of the bulk of the country's industrial facilities. The unprecedented scope of the military effort consequently found the supply services and the civilian mobilization agencies without adequate data or programs for properly utilizing the facilities that were needed to meet the requirements of the war economy.

(To Be Continued)

ANGEL WANTED

Dr. John U. Nef of the University of Chicago, who doubles as vice president of the *Commission d'Histoire Militaire Comparee* whose headquarters are in Paris, has been communicating with members of the Institute with respect to the possibility of obtaining backing for the production of an American financed and edited number of the Commission's publication *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire*. Each number of the *Revue* is published by a different country,

but the format is coordinated by the Paris headquarters of the organization. The text of the *Revue* consists of descriptive articles of the military historical activities, archives, libraries, museums, and military historiography in general of the country sponsoring the relevant number. It is understood that a considerable number of countries have sponsored past issues, including Belgium, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES ON NAVAL AVIATION

I

COMMODORE KNOX ON NAVAL AIR DOCTRINE

Editor's Note: In this open letter, Commodore Dudley W. Knox, U.S.N. (Ret.), author of *A History of the United States Navy*, expresses his views with respect to an article published in *MILITARY AFFAIRS* (Vol. XV, No. 3), "The United States Navy and the Rise of the Doctrine of Air Power." Although a stiff discipline, history is not an exact science; apparent errors of fact, interpretation, and opinion abound. The American Military Institute, within the space limitations of its journal, welcomes varying views of professionals, scholars, and laymen.

YOUR "Fall 1951" issue, just received, carries an article entitled "The United States Navy and the Rise of the Doctrine of Air Power." From such a title an unsuspecting reader would naturally suppose that the Navy's part in the evolution of Airpower Doctrine would be set forth with some reasonable degree of completeness. Instead of this elementary need, in the interest of simple accuracy and justice, I find such general omission of pertinent facts as to result in what appears as gross distortion and misrepresentation.

For instance what the Navy did in the aviation field, up to the time when in 1920 General Mitchell began his public crusade against the Navy is completely ignored. This matter is of crucial importance to any fair understanding by a reader, more especially so in consideration of the "Rise of the Doctrine of Air Power." The author of your article seems to have no understanding whatever that the Navy's doctrine respecting airpower originated in 1908, has never changed

since and was brilliantly demonstrated as being thoroughly sound in the great World War II.

This basic naval doctrine of naval airpower, never mentioned by your author, in essence was to *integrate* aircraft with ships and other naval forces. Your author deals only with the false doctrine so ardently advocated by "Billy Mitchell," Lord Fisher of the British Navy and others, of the virtual abolition of naval vessels, except submarines, and the use of aircraft exclusively to control the sea's surface. Nowhere does your author make this differentiation clear, with the result that the misled reader is left in a state of sad confusion, and the United States Navy left with a wholly unwarranted black-eye.

Your author never even mentioned the considerable group of far-seeing naval officers who worked so ardently, valiantly and effectively towards integrating aircraft with ships from 1908. Many of them were well qualified aviators before Billy Mitchell even learned to fly. Their judgment on naval air doctrine was necessarily much better than his and they not only disagreed with him but rebuffed his constant, tempting offers to join his movement for an independent air force, with greatly increased rank.

By 1917 much progress had been made on the difficult naval integration problem. It was my privilege to assist in taking 3 naval planes on board the cruiser *Birmingham*,

from the Naval Air Station at Pensacola to Vera Cruz, where in 1914 they were the first airplanes ever to engage in warfare.

The process of integration was interrupted in 1917 by our entry into World War I. A Naval Aviation Unit was the first American military organization to reach France, except for an Army Medical Unit. Thereafter naval aviation in Europe was expanded rapidly into a force of about 10,000 that engaged in many air activities, even including a large bombing group to operate against German submarine bases. By 1918 Admiral Cone, commanding naval aviation in Europe, was among many naval officers who were thoroughly convinced of the profound influence that bombing, and other aviation activities would have on future naval warfare. Yet your article erroneously infers that Billy Mitchell was the pioneer American in such doctrine and was violently opposed in them by the Navy.

The truth is that the Navy was thoroughly alive to the naval air potentialities and undertook, promptly and vigorously, to develop that potential with scientific and professional care and certainty, more than a year before Mitchell began his crusade in December 1919. Within two weeks after the Armistice of November 1918, Admiral Mayo, Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, strongly recommended that "In view of the great advantage given to a fleet by an efficient air service" our Navy should "be provided with an air service sufficient in all respects for reconnaissance, spotting, carrying torpedoes, anti-submarine patrols and escort duty." The Admiral sent a detachment of planes to Guantanamo in January 1919, for exercises *with the Fleet*, which included bombing attacks.

Meanwhile the General Board of the Navy had begun a thorough study of the whole Aviation question, and in May 1919 made a preliminary report "That the development

of Fleet Aviation is of paramount importance and must be undertaken immediately if the United States is to take its proper place as a naval power."

The foregoing are but a few high-lights of the Navy's notable early aviation activities and of the development of its sound aviation doctrine, in step with the realities of the development of aviation itself. The omission of such highly important pertinent data by your author puts his article in the half-truth, half-baked category—an article better suited to mislead and confuse an uninformed reader, than to enlighten him on the subject of "The United States Navy and the Rise of the Doctrine of Air Power."

It also seems to be in order to ask what your author means by "The Doctrine of Air Power." At a number of places his article borders on a definition, yet few of them are in precise agreement with the others. Various brief quotations are made, but it is all rather vague. At one point he states that the chief advocate of "this revolutionary doctrine in America was General William Mitchell." What was it, therefore, that Billy Mitchell advocated? In brief substance I answer the question by the following quotations from his contemporary writings, principally his book "Winged Defense," but also an article in the *Atlantic Monthly*:

"Land power has become a holding agent which occupies a place conquered by air power. Sea power in its old role of defending a coastline has ceased to exist."

"The seas cannot be controlled through the agency of ships when such invincible enemies exist as aircraft and submarines."

"Air power has completely superseded seapower or land power as our first line of defense."

"Effectiveness (of anti-air guns) is constantly diminishing (and) never can improve much."

"If a naval war were attempted against Japan, for instance, the Japanese submarines and aircraft would sink the enemy fleet long before it came anywhere near their coast."

"at this time . . . it is practical to do away

entirely with the surface battleship, the airplane carrier . . .".

"The surface ship as an element of war is disappearing."

"An attempt to transport large bodies of troops, munitions and supplies across a great stretch of ocean, by seacraft, as was done during the World War (I) from the United States to Europe, would be an impossibility."

"A superior airpower will dominate all sea areas when they act from land bases and no seacraft, whether carrying aircraft or not, is able to contest their aerial supremacy."

"In the future the mere threat of bombing a town by an air force will cause it to be evacuated."

The quotations immediately foregoing fairly summarize the doctrine of airpower in its relation to naval power, as enunciated by

Billy Mitchell himself. Every one of these statements proved to be completely fallacious in the crucible of actual warfare on a grand scale in 1939-45.

Why then, should it now be implied, through half-truth, omission, or distortion, that the Navy of 1920 is open to censure for refusing to accept such false doctrines advanced by a self-appointed prophet of no naval proficiency whatever.

Considering the outstanding success of the Navy in the last War, rather is it not in order to praise the Navy of 1920 for its sane and sound wisdom in developing its own doctrines of integrating airpower with seapower to make an incomparably strong sea-air power to control the oceans?

II

NAVAL AVIATION PHOTOGRAPHS IN THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

By THOMAS W. RAY

Editor's Note: In conjunction with the article on "The United States Navy and the Doctrine of Air Power," in *MILITARY AFFAIRS* (Vol. XV, No. 3), the editor requested Josephine Cobb, Chief, Still Pictures Section, Audio-Visual Branch, National Archives, to tell us about photographic materials in their custody concerning naval aviation, particularly before and during the First World War. As a result, Thomas W. Ray of the Still Pictures Section prepared this report.

AMONG pictorial records on deposit in the Still Pictures Section of the National Archives, there are more than 100,000 photographic prints, negatives, and lantern slides concerned with the subject of naval aviation in the U.S.A. These items do not form a separate collection but may be located among records deposited by many government agencies, principally the Bureau of Aeronautics. They comprise a photographic background for illustration of the development of naval aviation pertinent to students of history.

Among photographic records on deposit by the Army Air Forces there are included a number of items illustrative of naval aviation which were used in courses of instruction given by the Army. These consist of pictures of land, sea, and racing planes, and of manufacturers such as Glenn H. Curtiss and Glenn L. Martin, and show activities at the joint Army and Navy School of Aviation at North Island, California, from 1910.

The part that naval aviation played during World War I is illustrated in the several series of photographic records of the Signal Corps and the Army War College. Pictures of many planes and lighter-than-air craft are here; some are ground scenes while others show flights, during training and in combat, of naval balloons and dirigibles. Aircraft accidents and crashes, engines, factories, inspec-

tion, personnel, and air stations in America and in Europe are additional subjects of interest to naval aviation, and cover the period 1912-1919.

The largest series of pictorial records devoted to naval aircraft is that deposited by the Bureau of Aeronautics. These pictures encompass every phase of naval aviation, and treat of every factor and component part that go to make up its history between the two World Wars. The majority of these views may be described as representing the following subjects: Inspections and tests; construction and progress views; maintenance and preservation; constituent parts of naval aircraft; aircraft as a unit; and launching and landing facilities.

Typical photographs on the subject of inspections and tests are those showing non-rigid airship and kite balloons and patch and fabric tests during inspections at the Good-year Tire and Rubber Co., Akron, Ohio, from 1917 to 1923. Further tests are included showing the aileron and wing girder, and inspections made at the Naval Aircraft Factory, Philadelphia, between 1918 and 1941.

Construction and progress views are those showing the progressive steps of assembling the ZR-2 dirigible and the NC-3, seaplane, to mention two of many built at the above factories. Detailed photographs of balloon gas cells and ballast bags made at the Good-year plant, ignition and lighting systems wired at the Naval Aircraft Factory, and naval planes under construction by various private contractors present a complete photographic record of this phase of naval aviation.

Pictures of the exterior and interior of hangars, mooring anchors, posts, and buoys, maintenance crews, equipment and tools exemplify the elementary factors utilized in naval aircraft maintenance and preservation. Photographs of dirigible frames, flying instruments, pieces of ordnance, wings, fins, rudders, cowlings, propellers, and engines (in-

cluding all the respective parts from carburetors to wrist pins), are a few of the constituent parts of the heavier and lighter-than-air craft covered by the pictorial records of the Bureau of Aeronautics from 1918.

Photographs of the heavier-than-air craft from the Naval Aircraft Factory, Philadelphia, 1918 to 1941, and lantern slides of naval land, sea, and amphibious planes, and dirigibles, balloons, and zeppelins constitute the major picture files of naval aircraft as a unit. Such airplanes as the F-5-L, N-1, NAF C-11, R-6, and the dirigibles "Shenandoah," "Los Angeles," and "Akron," shown in flight, landing, taxiing, at moorage, and in flight formation are included in this pictorial material.

Launching and landing facilities are illustrated by thousands of photographs showing landing fields, Naval air stations, aircraft carriers and tenders, runways, pick-up cranes, ramps, and catapults. Other pictures of this group show aerial maps, personnel, formation flying, smoke screens, historic flights, airplane models, and parachutes, from 1918 to 1941. of Ships and of the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Navy Department include occasional illustrative material on specific his-flights, airplane models, and parachutes, from 1918 to 1941.

The photographic records of the Bureau of Ships and of the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Navy Department include occasional illustrative material on specific historic events important to naval aviation, although these agencies are primarily concerned with ships and ship facilities. Their records include photographs of pre World War I take-off and landing experiments from converted vessels and barges; the Ellyson catapulting tests, utilizing Captain Washington Chambers' catapulting equipment, November and December 1912; and aircraft, personnel, and beaching facilities in operation and under construction at Pensacola, Florida,

1914, to name a few of the high-lights in development of naval aviation prior to World War I.

Illustrations dramatizing historic episodes in naval aviation since World War I are the photographs of the NC-4 in which the first transatlantic flight was accomplished, 1919; the "Langley" undergoing reconversion to become the first aircraft carrier, 1922; Commander Richard E. Byrd before his flight to the North Pole, in 1926; and Lieutenant Apollo Soucek, who established high altitude records for seaplanes in 1929 and 1930.

Two series of photographs of a more recent date relative to naval aviation are those among the pictorial records of the Office of War Information and the Office of Navy Public Relations, covering the years 1941 to 1945. These photographs show naval heavier and lighter-than-air craft, such as patrol bombers, dive bombers, fighters, and observation aircraft in the United States and abroad, during training and in combat. Pictures of instructors, pilots, cadets, maintenance crews and other personnel, air stations in the United States and overseas, aircraft carriers and

tenders in training and in action during World War II, complete the material from the pictorial records of the above named agencies.

The difficulties to be encountered in the use of this body of pictorial material are these: captions and identifications on individual pictures are not sufficiently full to allow the amateur to use the files with confidence. Many of the photographs lack identification of any sort, particularly those made before 1925. Indexes are incomplete and vary in style so that searches for particular subjects are time-consuming. Many of the series are represented by film or glass negatives only so that study of the records themselves is not possible. Finally, the items illustrative of the subject of naval aviation are interfiled and dispersed throughout the other records pertinent to the functions of these various agencies. For the more recent pictures, moreover, there are restrictions on photographs of aircraft constructed after 1941. Therefore the aviation enthusiast, and the general public, may encounter some difficulty in obtaining desired pictures made in the period of World War II.

A SOLDIER VIEWS THE SECESSION CRISIS

BY FRANK F. WHITE, JR.

During the first four months of 1861, the entire nation centered its thoughts on the political situation then confronting it. The most important topics of conversation were the speculation on whether the North would consent to the secession of the South or whether some form of reconciliation might be affected. Two letters from Colonel Jo-

seph King Fenno Mansfield, Inspector General of the Army,¹ to John H. B. Latrobe of

tion from West Point in 1822, he was commissioned second lieutenant of engineers. During the war with Mexico, he distinguished himself at Monterey and Buena Vista. He was appointed Inspector General of the Army by Secretary of War Jefferson Davis in 1853 and held that position to the outbreak of the Civil War. During the early phases of the Civil War, he commanded the defenses of Washington. Later assigned to a combat command, he was mortally wounded at Antietam, September 18, 1862.

¹Joseph King Fenno Mansfield was born in New Haven, Conn., on December 22, 1803. After his gradua-

Baltimore,² both written during the month of February, 1861, contain the reaction of a professional soldier to the crisis and the hope that influential men such as Latrobe might be able to avert the impending strife.³

These two letters written by Colonel Mansfield while he was visiting his friends in Middletown, Connecticut, increase our knowledge of the events of that period considerably. Since he had travelled so extensively throughout the Union on his tours of inspection, Mansfield was well qualified to express his opinion on the crisis and to advance possible solutions for it. Consequently, he attempted to exert what influence he possessed in a plea to save the country from disaster. That he selected Latrobe was no accident. Mansfield had known Latrobe for many years. In addition, he was aware of Latrobe's great influence not only in Maryland but in the middle states as well. That the pleas of both were unsuccessful was not the fault of either. The country was moving toward war at a rate faster than either realized and their efforts were shortly to be overshadowed by the Sumter crisis.

The letters also reveal the intense patriotism of a loyal officer and his horror of the political conditions of the time. To Mansfield, the country seemed to be approaching the brink of destruction. As he recalled the days of his youth when both he and Latrobe were cadets together at West Point,⁴ he felt that a blight had descended upon the people

who were bent on destroying "the best government in the world." To this gloomy prediction, however, he offered some encouragement. The situation in February, 1861, was not entirely hopeless, he felt. "We have," he thought, "not yet gone so far that our steps can not be retraced." It was his opinion, therefore, that the war which was imminent could still be averted, although the strongest persuasion by Latrobe would be necessary.

In addition, Mansfield's letters fix the responsibility for the crisis. Virginia, he thought, was partly responsible for the political situation. Because she had followed the lead of Jefferson Davis and her former governor Henry A. Wise, Mansfield felt that she had lost her former greatness. Upon them he placed the blame for the decline of her prestige. To regain her position of supremacy, therefore, Virginia should assume a more positive attitude in the Peace Convention then in progress by proposing a suitable remedy for the nation's troubles. What that remedy was to be, he does not say. Should Virginia fail to act and repudiate secession, she would face a loss of her trade and the decline of her major cities. The future for Virginia was not pleasant. Had the existence of a separate Confederacy been assured, it would have been interesting to observe whether Mansfield's predictions concerning Virginia would have been realized.

Finally, the letters contain Mansfield's prophecies regarding a bright future for Maryland. Since hostilities had not as yet broken out when Mansfield wrote to Latrobe, Mansfield undoubtedly assumed that the Union and the Confederacy could exist side by side as two separate nations. Consequently, he felt that Maryland would become the permanent boundary between the slave and the free states.

Middletown, Conn.
9th Feb. 1861

²John H. B. Latrobe, born in 1803, was a well-known lawyer inventor, and public servant in Baltimore. For many years, he served as the President of the Maryland Historical Society and was a leading figure in the activities of the Maryland Colonization Society. He died in 1891.

³The original letters are in the Latrobe Papers, Maryland Historical Society, to whom grateful acknowledgement is made for permission to publish them.

⁴Latrobe entered West Point in 1818, one year after Mansfield. However, Latrobe did not graduate with his class because he resigned to enter the law office of Robert Goodloe Harper in 1821.

My dear Sir:

Years have passed away since we were friends and associates as boys of the Military Academy.⁴ Our country had then just emerged from a war with Great Britain, and the people were patriotic, and loved our institutions and venerated the fathers who founded them. Since then the Country and people have prospered and we have become a great Power in the eyes of the world, and the first Military Powers of Europe respect our demands; and we are able to dictate terms, as to the nations south of us, on this Continent. But a blight is now over us; we have become tired of our prosperity and love of one another, and are now at work destroying the best government in the World. We have not yet gone so far that our steps cannot be retraced. There has been no blood spilt, and the power of reason has not yet lost its hold on those, who love their country, and venerate their sires. If I know you, you are a Patriot and will lend your aid to stay this besom of destruction manifest at the present time. You are a man of influence and standing in society, and particularly of your own beautiful city of Baltimore and the weight you throw into the scale of union will be powerful and effective. Let me entreat you to come forward and hang out your colors for the Great North American Republic. Let the disaffection go no farther than it has thro' the cotton states, and hold out to those states the right hand of reconciliation and brotherly love. Come forward Latrobe and do your duty to your country like a true Christian and I doubt not God will prosper you.

This disunion feeling all seems to me like a dream and I awake, and rub my eyes, and yet it is there. Oh that it were a dream! And I could exclaim, Thank God it is nothing but a phantom! Alas it is too true!

I have thus written to you, we were friends in youth, let us not be divided in old age, but

let us use our talents for the good of our Country and for suffering freedom and secure peace and good will to all.

I will now close with my best respects to your wife whom I had the pleasure to see at your house in Baltimore.⁵ May God bless you.

Your old friend,

Jos. F. K. MANSFIELD

John H. B. Latrobe
Baltimore

Middletown, Conn.

19 Feb. 1861

John H. B. Latrobe, Esq.
Baltimore

My dear Latrobe:

Yours of the 13th inst. came duly to hand with the printed matter.⁶ I have been in Texas from middle of September till the close of January and out of reach and sight of newspapers.⁷ Of course I had not seen these articles when I wrote to you.⁸ Yet I felt almost certain you would not let the country go to destruction without an effort to save it. I like all your productions and think they will all have their good work.

What a pity Virginia does not come forward and repudiate secession as an unclean thing, like the noble Senator from Tennessee.⁹ And then propose a proper remedy for the present evil. Her greatness has run down I fear. Her statesmen are dead. And the mushroom politicians of her present generation are content to follow in the wake of

⁵Mrs. Latrobe was the former Charlotte Virginia Claiborne whom he married in 1832.

⁶Not found among the Latrobe Papers.

⁷Mansfield was evidently absent on one of his inspection tours through the West when Latrobe's letters reached him.

⁸Not found among Latrobe Papers.

⁹Andrew Johnson (1808-1875), later President of the United States who vehemently denounced his Southern critics and insisted that the Union be preserved in a speech delivered February 5, 1861.

such men as Jefferson Davis and Gov. Wyse. [sic].¹⁰

Can it be that there is no more national and state pride in that state, than has been of late exhibited! Must the great North American Republic which she has almost instituted, and built up by her Washington and Patriots alone, fall to pieces because her mother has sued for divorce under false pretenses. Oh shame where is thy blush!¹¹

Can it be that a slave holding state would be so small as to ask for the restoration of the 36° 30" parallel, when by southern votes in the Senate and the House, that compromise was destroyed against the request and strong remonstrance of the north and their votes in Congress.¹² It seems childish and trifling—Give away the toy, and then cry to get it back again. It is very much like the fable of the wolf and the lamb. The water is muddy which side the lamb is disposed to drink.

What you say in relation to the frontier state in case of all the border slave states going over to the Secessionists is very true. Maryland will be the battlefield, it is true

¹⁰Henry A. Wise (1806-1876), congressman, governor of Virginia, 1856-1860, Confederate general, and an outspoken defender of slavery. As a delegate to the Virginia Convention of 1861, he favored upholding Southern rights by force, if necessary, without secession.

¹¹Mansfield here undoubtedly refers to the meeting of the Peace Convention of February 4 which was under the chairmanship of ex-President John Tyler.

and a permanent boundary will eventually be the Potomac.¹³ In such an event Baltimore will be an enormous city, with all the Northern free states for a back country. In that event, Virginia will suffer again by the Custom Houses around her, and being confined to a limited back country so that her importing Cities Richmond, etc. will fall off. This is a sad picture for old Virginia, and it is to be hoped our old mother of Patriots will hold fast to the Glorious Union hitherto the pride of every lover of freedom.

May God keep us from the horrors of civil strife, and give us hearts to love one another as we all should.

Hold fast Latrobe to the Union. Stand by the Stars and Stripes to the last, and let the world know, that a free people have a free Government and can take care of themselves and that all discord is but harmony the better to be understood.

May God bless you in all your efforts and keep you as the apple of his eye.

Your old friend,

JOS. F. K. MANSFIELD.

¹²Mansfield's reference here is probably to the unsuccessful attempts to pass the Crittenden Compromise which would have excluded slavery north of the 36° 30" line but protected it south of that line by Federal law.

¹³It is somewhat ironical that less than eighteen months later, Mansfield was killed on one of those battlefields which he prophesized would be in Maryland, namely Antietam.

EDITORIAL NOTE TO OUR READERS

The Editor and Editorial Board of MILITARY AFFAIRS are happy to call attention to the fact that with the issuance of this number of the Institute's Journal (Volume XV, Number 4), we are at last within sight of our goal, namely, to bring the publication year in concordance with the calendar year. Work on the first number for 1952 is already well advanced.

A CIVIL WAR SOLDIER: T. S. JONES

BY JAMES HIGH

The poignancy and touching quality of a soldier's letter to his wife has a timeless, universal appeal. Armies of masculine warriors may fight and march and win a war or lose a war, but the individual men, almost all of them, carry hearts in which there are great black voids. Their women are at home suffering and waiting, too. The women in a war have the hardest lot. It sometimes seems easier to die than to survive a beloved son or husband.

This letter of T. S. Jones' might have been written by any one of the millions of Americans who went away to fight in 1917 or 1941. He went in 1862 to fight for his beliefs.

When the war started following Lincoln's inauguration in 1861, Indiana regiments successively took the field, and by the spring of 1862, the 63d Indiana Volunteers was on active duty. Thomas S. Jones, a young man of twenty-five years and a postmaster by occupation, went to war with this regiment as first sergeant of Company G. After service in Tennessee, in a raid on the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, the Atlanta Campaign, and finally on the coast of North Carolina, he was mustered out at Greensboro, N. C., on June 21, 1865, as a lieutenant. He had been promoted on November 22, 1864, at Pulaski, Tenn. This was written from Alexandria, Va., a stopping point between the defeat of Hood's army at Nashville and Franklin and the expedition to North Carolina.

T. S. Jones has been dead for many years, but his letter to the woman he loved remains

to the twentieth century. Jones was a man of the nineteenth century—he would be out of place now—, but his feelings towards home and family would be understood equally well by a Roman legionnaire in 55 B. C. or an American Marine in Korea in 1951.

In addition to the timeless affection for family shown, the letter incidentally reveals a man with sensitive powers of observation. He noticed the weather, his surroundings, and the suffering of others. He had a sense of humor and could note the grim irony of southern resistance in 1865, as well as its futility and tragedy. He could write clearly and forcefully. He read the *Congressional Globe*, and was aware of the sectional characteristics of the country in which he lived. He was a westerner with a keen sense of the unity of the American land and the destiny of its people.

Wednesday, Feb. 1st, 1865
Alexandria, Virginia

Dear Wife

I again drop you a few lines hoping they may find you both in better health. I received your letter Dated Jan 15th last night which was the first I have had for nearly a month. You seem to intimate you wrote before that but I have not received it yet, but it is because we have been on the move So much. Our mail came here the next morning after we did, but the Postmasters had not been notified of the Change and they Sent it all back to Nashville, & it has not yet returned. I am in first rate health Still, & expect to be. The boys are all in good health. There is no prospect of us leaving by the river as it is intirely froze

over. I have not the least Idea how long we will remain, but I think not very long. We have made out our pay rolls and are anxiously expecting our pay but with poor prospects. I never was in Such a place as this. I Supposed that here at the Capitol of the Country we could get paid and equipped without trouble, but we got what we wanted in front of Atlanta easier than we can here. It is all Military and Stuck up airs here & officers punish a private for Speaking to them on the streets. Brushes & paper collars are all the go. These eastern officers look on the western Hoosiers with Contempt, & we console them by telling them of the many hard fought Battles & as many glorious Victorys that we have won & also of our long marches & our Glorious old Sherman, and we tell them we have now had to come to the east to fight their Battles & relieve them of their task of taking Richmond and Charleston. They have nothing to say on that Score, & we easy get rid of them. I have not yet found out which army we are destined for whether Grant or Sherman as it is all Kept in the dark.—I am Sorry I cant be there to share your warm bed for I do have a cold time of it once in a while. Frequently this winter I have never Slept a wink in a whole night on account of the cold, & then I think of home & you warm & Snug in bed, & I think if I was only there then there would be two that would not Sleep all night Sure, for I could put in about 2 nights & a week throwed in, hugging, &c, & telling about Some of the nights I have passed, &c, &c.

Sammy is still at Jeffersonville, Ind in the Jefferson Hospital. I have not heard from him Since we was at Nashville in December. Joe Smith, Strange to Say, is alive & has a good prospect for long life. He has been with the Company for 2 months past, He has been reported either dead, Killed, wounded, drowned, or froze to death a number of times, but he has miraculously escaped all, & is Still Sound & well. Providence appears to have a Special delight in Keeping him alive, all the reports and *wishes* of his friends to the Contrary notwithstanding. I received a letter from Sister Priscilla last night Stating that Billy was not a prisoner as your letter also informed me,

also thanking me for the pictures &c. She said they were all well at home. The letter was dated the 17th January. She wrote that he is at Sun Creek Station. How Sorry I am that the train was in Such a hurry when we passed there, for I Could have got to Seen him if I had got off the Cars, but Providence ordained it otherwise. There was a memorial from the Indiana Legislature presented to Congress yesterday to allow all men enlisted [in] 1862 in old Regiments to be mustered out with the Regiments, & it was ordered to be printed and referred to the Military Committee & it is Supposed here that it will become a law. If So we have not much longer to Serve. Col Stiles I am informed has been made a Brigadier General Since we arrived here. He has been at Washington City for Several days past. The weather has moderated & it is thawing now & has become quite Sloppy, & looks like rain. There is no war news except that Sherman cant Keep still, but is moving on Charleston. There is more talk of Peace here than any thing else. The Rebels have concluded that they cant gain their Independence, but I Suppose they are fighting just to use up what ammunition they have got, and to try to Strike the last lick. Next Summer will decide the question for General Sherman Says if the president will furnish Men enough, that him and Gen Grant Can end this war in 4 months, at farthest, & whatever Sherman Says he can do he generally does, for he always knows what he is at before he goes to work—

If you can get along till Spring or Summer without a bed fellow I will be on hand, and then as you say all lost time will be made up but I cant promise you yet that there will be nothing made but lost time, for I am getting nearly desperate & might forget any allowances for accidents. I would give a months pay to be with you even for a day or two, but the time is fast Coming around, & I'll be there Some day when you dont look for me—

Kiss Minnie as often for me as she wants you to and as often as you do for yourself, & when I get there I will divide between you.

As ever yours

T. S. JONES

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

Reviews

United States Army in World War II: The War Department, Washington Command Post: The Operations Divisions, by Ray S. Cline. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951. Pp. xvi, 413. \$3.25.)

Washington Command Post is a graphic account of how the War Department and the General Staff quickly and effectively met an unprecedented world-wide military situation with an equally unprecedented central command and staff organization, the Operations Division.

The absorbing interest developed in this factual presentation makes it an excellent text, not only in preparing officers for general staff duty, but also for university seminars or, for that matter, any one interested in being accurately informed on the functioning of the Army High Command.

This book was written by Dr. Ray S. Cline, under directive from the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army. The complete files of the War Department were at his disposal. His exhaustive research, careful and impersonal analysis and accurate correlation of facts and events have combined to make this volume an authentic and thoroughly documented work.

The operation of the Army High Command prior to Pearl Harbor consisted of the application of orthodox Command and General Staff principles and doctrine as developed since the establishment of the General Staff Corps on 15 August 1903. The 1920 Army reorganization laid down the principal elements of the General Staff system which was to last almost unchanged for the next 20 years. Functionally it consisted of the four

"G" divisions plus a fifth unit called the War Plans Division. There was no authority for the Chief of Staff or General Staff to exercise operational command. In short, the General Staff was fashioned to think about, but not participate in, military activities. At the time the Japs struck Pearl Harbor the General Staff still could not provide an effective linking of military activities in the Zone of Interior to those in the Theater of Operations.

The hurried mobilization in 1940-1941 and military and diplomatic developments abroad made it evident that decisions affecting military operations must be settled on a national and international basis rather than by the Army alone. To this end, informal liaisons were maintained by WPD officers with most of the executive agencies of the government, and particularly with State and Navy Departments. Although these were inadequate, at least the principle of liaison was established. The lack of international military collaboration was partially overcome in 1941 by the exchange with Great Britain of Joint Staff missions.

The key step in solving the problem of the Washington Command Post was taken when Congress passed the first War Powers Act of 18 December 1941, giving the President the necessary power to reorganize the War Department or other agencies in order to "expedite the prosecution of the war effort." Previous proposals for streamlining the War Department were put into final form, the President approved on 26 February, and the new organization went into effect on 9 March 1942—just three months after Pearl Harbor.

Basically, the new organization accomplished the following:

1. Gave paramount authority to the Chief of staff.
2. Established three commands—Army Ground Forces, Army Air Forces, and Services of Supply (later Army Service Forces).
3. Provided a complete tight-knit general staff as a central command post for the Chief of Staff, headed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division (OPD) and built around the old WPD.

OPD now had a legal basis, free from procedural traditions, to work like a General Staff in a field headquarters, issuing Chief of Staff orders and following up their execution in the theaters of operation. Where necessary, it could coordinate the work of the whole War Department.

Internally, OPD was organized into four groups: Strategy and Policy, Theater, Logistics, and Executive. The work of all groups required close working relationships with nearly every other Army and government agency. Speed, accuracy and decision were required daily. Coordination was more often than not oral and by direct personal contact.

In the national and international planning and policy fields, OPD either furnished or briefed Army representation on all joint and combined committees and in all international military conferences. Thus General Marshall, through his Washington Command Post, was able to project Army strategic and operational views and requirements across the whole field of wartime activities and bring everything into line with combat needs.

The Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff Committees, aided by their subordinate committees for strategy, plans, intelligence and logistics, provided the power and scope to resolve differences and issue timely directives. However, the United States continued to be weak throughout the war in articulating a balanced national policy and injecting such policy into the work of its various government agencies. The British worked from the top down, through the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and kept all agencies thoroughly briefed on current Empire policies.

One of the first tasks of the new OPD was to develop Army views on over-all strategy and employment of allied forces. In June, 1942, OPD's first Chief, General Eisenhower, was sent to command our invasion forces in England. He was succeeded in OPD by General Handy who possessed all the vision, vigor, stamina and resolution of his predecessor and furnished strong con-

tinuity throughout the next few critical years. OPD's superior work during the difficult period of planning for the North African invasion was ample evidence of its steady development.

After early experience with the British planning, it became imperative that we improve and strengthen our joint and combined planning technique. The speed and skill of development on the U. S. side is both an interesting and heartening account.

As the war encompassed theaters of operations in every part of the world, constant, close personal linkage between the Washington Command Post and the Theater Commanders and Staffs was imperative. How this need was adequately and enthusiastically met forms an absorbing and highly significant chapter. OPD officers, often taking part in the operations they had helped to plan and prepare for, gained invaluable field experience to bring back to their work in Washington. Demonstrating the closeness of OPD's contact with combat, four of its officers were killed in action, several wounded and many more received combat decorations. OPD "graduates" were in great demand in all theaters in both Staff and Command positions because of their OPD background.

As the war moved towards its successful conclusion, the integration of military planning and foreign affairs became increasingly important, and never was OPD more effective than in planning for the conclusion of the war against Japan.

No consideration of OPD in World War II would be complete without emphasizing the tremendous impetus and stamina given to that organization by its three chiefs, Generals Eisenhower, Handy and Hull. Under their calm and inspired leadership, close-knit esprit and loyalty were developed in OPD that have seldom been equaled.

Shortly after the surrender of Japan, reorganizations of the War Department General Staff again began. Whatever developments may take place, the experience of OPD in World War II will always be a guide in understanding staff assistance in the exercise of command.

So thorough was the research and evaluation of data selected for this book that any "review" or "digest" is a most difficult task. It is all "lean meat." This reviewer can only hope to point out the importance of a thorough study of the entire volume to every student of military history.

WILLIAM L. RITCHIE
Brigadier General
Washington, D. C.

Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942-April 1944, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume VII, by Samuel Eliot Morison. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951. Pp. 369. \$6.00.)

In this, the seventh volume of his history of U. S. naval operations in the second World War, Professor Morison lifts the curtain on the main drama of the Pacific war. For it was the drive across the Central Pacific, whose beginnings he treats here, that constituted the main effort in the Allies' war against Japan. In June of 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staffs outlined the offensive strategy which would be pursued until Japan was defeated. Their plan envisaged a two-pronged drive toward the Philippines and Japanese home waters. The lower prong would consist of MacArthur's advance up the coast of New Guinea and into the southern Philippines. The upper half would be made up of a series of amphibious assaults through the countless islands and atolls of the Central Pacific. It was to the latter that the Joint Chiefs assigned the "main effort" in the war against Japan and it was in fact the Central Pacific that proved to be the decisive theater in which the Japanese were brought to defeat.

As this book makes clear, the ultimate success of this drive was made possible chiefly because of two novel techniques of war that the U. S. naval service had forged and perfected. The first was carrier-based air power; the second the amphibious assault. This narrative account gives full demonstration of the efficacy of each.

Specifically, the bulk of the book deals with the American landings on Makin, Tarawa, Majuro, Kwajalein, Roi-Namur and Eniwetak and with the great carrier strike against Truk on 17-18 February, 1944. Morison deals fully and fairly with the mistakes made and misfortunes encountered by the American forces in the Gilberts, and shows how those mistakes and misfortunes were turned to profit in the skillfully planned and executed landings in the Marshalls. Although dealing primarily with naval activities, his treatment of the ground forces involved is more than adequate for the purpose and his assessment of the various troop units is, in this reviewer's opinion, both just and sound. Of the Army unit that took Makin, he "regretfully" concludes that "they put up a miserable dilatory performance . . ." (p. 13). Tarawa, he says, "was a magnificent victory, well planned and bravely

executed." (p. 184). Of the 4th Marine Division that fought on Roi-Namur, he states that, considering it "was untried in combat and that the training it had received at San Diego fell short of what was required for a major amphibious operation, it deserves high credit for performing a very difficult and complicated mission in so short a time as 26½ hours." (p. 250). Of the 7th Infantry Division which captured the southern half of Kwajalein Atoll he has nothing but praise, and concludes, "Seldom has military thinking been so agile and open to suggestion, so eager to grasp any new idea which sounded reasonable." (p. 280).

The first section of this book which treats the Aleutians campaign can well be quickly thumbed through by any reader except one interested in military mistakes. It is the story of a near-tragedy of errors. The campaign was misconceived in the first place, mismanaged in the second, and finally culminated in the ludicrous "battle of the pips" in which a U. S. naval task force fired over a thousand rounds of heavy shells at a non-existent target.

But no reader should neglect the introductory chapter which is written not by Professor Morison but by Commander James C. Shaw, USN. Commander Shaw's brief description of a typical carrier strike as seen from the flight deck of a big flat-top is a fascinating piece of writing. Here is the authentic "feel of combat" that few writers and very few professional historians are ever able to capture.

As to Morison's own style, it is superfluous at this point to commend it. His reputation for felicity and aptness of phrase will be fully sustained by this volume.

There are a few factual errors, but only one worth noting. Roi-Namur was not, as is stated here (p. 240) a "tougher nut to crack than Betio [Tarawa]." Contrary to Professor Morison, Roi-Namur was considerably less fortified and far less ably defended than was Tarawa. In fact, it was the realization of the relatively weak defenses of Roi-Namur and the rest of Kwajalein atoll that induced Admiral Nimitz to order it assaulted in the first place. That his guess was correct reflects well on the admiral's strategic acumen and should not go unrecorded.

Otherwise, this is a first rate book, the peer of its sister volumes and an important contribution to the history of World War II.

PHILIP A. CROWL
Office of the Chief of Military History
Washington, D. C.

United States Army in World War II, The European Theater of Operations: Cross-Channel Attack, By Gordon A. Harrison. (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1951. Pp. 519; Illustrated; Maps; Index. \$5.25.)

This is the first volume serially, although the second published, in the history of American participation in the conquest of Europe. Its author, previously trained as a scholar and experienced as a newspaper reporter and as a Harvard instructor, served during the war as historical officer in the Third Army. He joined the Historical Division of the Department of the Army in 1946. He thus is spared that over-enthusiasm and pride of unit accomplishment which so often comes from writers who have participated in operations being described. Indeed, his Third Army appears to be mentioned only twice in the book, once in connection with plans, and once in connection with the attachment to First Army of the 79th Division from the Third Army not yet operational.

Nor is this purely an account of operations. Of the 449 pages of actual text, the first 197 are devoted to the planning period, and the next 167 to preliminary operations and German defense measures from 1940 until June of 1944. Indeed, in spite of Morgan's *Overture to Overlord*, these are the most original and the most valuable portions of the volume. In the later actual combat period, much of the ground has already been covered in greater detail and therefore in some cases more clearly in the monographs on *Omaha Beach* and *Utah Beach* produced by the Department of the Army in 1947. In fact a high proportion of the maps are simply reprinted without too much change from those earlier printings. In this period however, we cannot look upon the author as a mere copier and condenser. He has been able by close scrutiny of original data to correct some facts and to revise misconceptions regarding events. For example, at the time it was understood from prisoners that the unexpectedly strong resistance met on Omaha Beach resulted from the fact that the German 352nd Division has been moved from St. Lo for defense exercises only a few days prior to the assault. The anonymous authors of *Omaha Beach* correctly estimated that this dispo-

sition made the attack tough but likewise used up the most substantial German reserve for possible counter attack as a succession of small groups on a water front cordon. They said that the 352nd had been moved from St. Lo in May. Since they wrote, Dr. Harrison has been able to discover in more German documents than they were then able to use that the 352nd Division had been moved up from St. Lo "almost three months" earlier. The distance was short, but it is "one of the more interesting mysteries of the war" why the move should have been missed by allied intelligence which so accurately spotted so many other German late moves, including the mid-May arrival of the German 91st Division at la Haye du Puits which caused a last minute change in the airborne drop on the Contentin peninsula. For such scrutiny and revision history must be grateful to the author. This movement was obviously a deliberate application of the over-riding Hitler decision to defend on the beaches themselves. Whether a weaker beach defense would have permitted us to get ashore stronger than we were actually able to do is not to be questioned. Whether we would still have been strong enough without the dislocations and casualties of the beach events, to have met the 352nd Division in a concentrated counter attack, is a question upon which we can only speculate. But, in any event, Dr. Harrison has made a vital question clear as it was not clear before.

It is in its earlier pages, however, that the volume is really most valuable. These tell of the whole concept of an attack onto the Continent, and the planning for such an attack. The opening chapter deals with high strategy and emphasizes how from as early as 1940 even the Americans began thinking of this operation and how it might be achieved. The book goes into the attitudes and opinions of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, and into the shifts of emphasis as events elsewhere transpired. Opinions, concerning opportunities in the Pacific and in the Mediterranean are followed in the discussions in Washington, London, Casablanca, and Quebec. Their possibilities were weighed in view of troops available, and particularly of landing craft available.

For instance, an early plan called SKYSCRAPER included a landing on the Cotentin peninsula. The initial OVERLORD plan ruled it out for lack of troops, even though at that time in other respects "it was necessary to assume resources that were not at hand and conditions that could hardly be foreseen." The revised OVERLORD restored the

Cotentin landing. Details such as these have been brought out and well narrated. The author has used official documents from the very highest levels, as well as more general but valuable sources like the published books of Sherwood, Stimson, and Churchill. These earlier pages are historical writing of a high order.

Regretfully, a reviewer is usually supposed to point out apparent errors in fact and points of opinion or technique on which he disagrees with an author. In a review for the general public these things may often be omitted, lest they occupy disproportionate space and give an unbalanced view of the general interest and merit of a book. For historians and specialists, such comments—trivial though they may be—are an essential lest inaccuracies be perpetuated and repeated by succeeding writers. Your present reviewer therefore is under the unpleasant necessity of commenting as follows:

It gives a false impression to say (p. 190) that the 1st Division was the assault division on Omaha Beach and the 29th Division the follow-up for the same beach. For the assault the 1st Division had at least two regiments of the 29th Division attached, and the afternoon follow-up force included only one of the 29th Division regiments and an entire Regimental Combat team from the 1st Division. It is true that the division commands were as stated; but the troops involved were divided between the divisions. The false impression would rob the 29th Division of the excellent work of its 115th and 116th Infantry regiments on D-day.

The author speaks of the need for "beaches suitable for prolonged maintenance operations" (p. 56) and apparently misuses "maintenance" for "supply"—or using, let us say the civilian idea of "maintaining" an effort but using the military word "maintenance," which usually means inspection, servicing, and repair. He should have used the word "supply." His "maintenance" gives a false impression of beaches being primarily utilized with motor and weapon "maintenance" shops.

The picture of the Carentan and Hill 30 Area (p. 362) spells it la Have du Puits instead of la Haye du Puits.

The text says (p. 359) that one company of the 327th Glider Infantry on June 10th moved east and made contact at Auville-sur-le-Vey with units of the V Corps. The map (XVII) shows Company A of the 401st Glider Infantry doing that job. This discrepancy is not sufficiently explained

by the footnote (p. 356) saying that the 401st was split and one battalion served as a third battalion of the 327th, and that "the attached battalions will be referred to as the 3d Battalions of the respective foster regiments." Another device should have been used for clarity.

These comments are, as has been said, trivial. The book is an excellent job, well documented from original and printed sources allied and enemy. If it has any general faults, they lie in the attempts at too much condensation, producing rather dull reading for the first 50 pages, and in the confusion in a reader's mind created by the narrative sometimes (p. 340ff.) going along the whole front a day at a time and losing the flow of events. But, after all, the volume will probably be read mostly by expert historians and professional soldiers, and they will have sufficient interest and curiosity to read with care and full attention. I recommend that they do.

ELBRIDGE COLBY

Colonel, U.S.A., Retired

The George Washington University

The Machine Gun: History, Evolution, and Development of Manual, Automatic, and Airborne Repeating Weapons. By Lieut. Col. George M. Chinn, USMC. Vol. I. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951. Pp. 688. \$5.00.)

Significant as is Colonel Chinn's book as the most complete and finished arms work in its field, it seems to this reviewer that its real significance lies in its consistent and planned use of the historical approach. This, to quote the author, "was prompted by the observation that practically all 'new' improvements made on automatic weapons during World War II were basically older than the would-be inventor." Because they deal with current experiments on automatic weapons, the second and third volumes of the work will be classified, hence not available to the general public.

To the ordnance historian the volume is a necessity no less than a delight. For ordnance has been shamefully neglected in virtually all military history, though it is close to being the crux of all warfare, but particularly that of America, which has so long dominated the field of firearms invention. Hitherto, the historical writer could claim that the arms story was so sparse and unsure that it was difficult to use. *The Machine Gun* does its

full share in correcting the situation. Thus, *The Long Arm of Lee* has for a generation been the criterion of Confederate artillery. Yet it fell into the grave error of confusing the Williams Gun with the utterly dissimilar Confederate Revolving Cannon, and Jennings Wise was blindly followed by most historians including, mea culpa!, this reviewer. Now we know better.

The expert staff headed by Colonel Chinn spent a year in exploring and digesting the arms work and background of this and many other countries. How well they wrought is shown in the close to half a million words and 417 excellent illustrations of the book. A short section is given to the pre-machine gun era. Perhaps the 119 pages which are devoted to the story of the manually-operated period (1856-1883) show the most striking examples of the value of the historical study of the machine weapon. Thus, Fortune Bailey decided to fire his gun without withdrawing the rounds from the belt. Any expert could have told him this was not possible. But Bailey knew no better, so he fired in this manner at the rate of 1,000 rounds per minute! Fortunately, complete drawings were made and here reproduced. The Ripley, patented in 1861, displayed many characteristics of later successful machine guns, but evidently failed because of its inventor's lack of "push."

The book's lessons to the military and to the industrialist are clear. Civilian demand may care for most rifle and pistol development, but only military expenditure will give the necessary drive for the advancement of artillery and machine weapons. The recorded fact that all but a few of our inventors were forced to rely upon European nations for acceptance of their weapons, strikes a sharp note of warning, now that recent authoritative re-valuation of the A-bomb and the long-range bomber indicate again that American cannot afford to neglect the finest possible weapons of every type. The book tells a fascinating story of the tremendous part which our armasmakers played in the development of the machine tool and the interchangeable part.

As in all first editions of technical works, there is a moderate representation of the typographical error; proofreading must come last, but why does it always seem hurried? And a more careful use of punctuation might make for slightly smoother reading. The volume closes with handy appendices of patents and of characteristics of machine guns

and aircraft cannon. A splendid bibliography contributes immensely to the value to the student, and a good index serves for handy reference.

Even a cursory reading of *The Machine Gun* makes it quite apparent that an attempt to build any military library without it, would be fatuous. The Government Printing Office has turned out an excellent piece of work at a very modest price. It now remains for other military agencies to follow the splendid example of the Navy's Bureau of Ordnance, and to give us the same kind of book on the mortar, the rocket, and other important ordnance materiel.

F. W. FOSTER GLEASON
Washington, D. C.

Communism and Christ, by Charles W. Lowry.
(New York: Morehouse Gorham Co. Pp. 176.
\$2.50.)

In presenting such a clear, yet brief, explanation of the fervent faith of the Communists, Dr. Lowry has made a very significant contribution to our knowledge of the free world's most potent enemy. The book can be of special value to military personnel, because understanding an enemy's beliefs and objectives is fully as necessary as understanding his military techniques and strategy.

Communism presents a very serious threat to all the things America believes in. To meet this threat, it is absolutely essential that thinking people everywhere understand the meaning of communism, appreciate its source of strength, and arm themselves adequately for the struggle. Slogans and propaganda are not enough. If we are to be successful in this type of psychological warfare, we must realize that the struggle is for the minds and souls of men. We must understand not only communism but also the Christian principles upon which our democracy is based.

The author has made a penetrating analysis of communism and shown it for what it really is—a universal salvation religion. It is a religion, of course, not in a sense in which we customarily use the term. It is the very antithesis of Christianity and democracy alike—a mockery or a caricature of both.

"Communism," says Dr. Lowry, "can only be understood as a new religion in a new religious age and for all its this-worldly modernity it parallels and parodies the development of other great religions, notably its rejected and hated mother, Christianity. . . ." The secret of communism's

appeal is the fact that it is "a faith, an expectation, a power of patience, a certainty." It is a "universal religion" that promises salvation now, in this life, not in the next. It promises "universal peace" and "classless brotherhood" to people in every region of the globe.

In one diagram and a brief summary, Dr. Lowry presents a brilliantly concise explanation of the Marxist system, with its foundation doctrine, Dialectical Materialism. And, elsewhere, he presents a revealing tabular comparison of the systems of Christianity and Communism. He compares, for example, the place in Christianity of "Three Persons of Revelation and Worship: Father, Christ, Spirit" with communism's "Marx the Lawgiver, Lenin the Incarnate Truth, Stalin the Guide and Comforter."

The book deals as much with Christianity as with communism, and in a way which sheds new light on each. Moreover, it gives a fresh evaluation to the American tradition and to democracy.

"Democracy is a doctrine of man. It is a sense

of the dignity and worth of man as man. It is faith in the value of the individual human person. This faith, as we have seen, did not just happen. It is Biblical and Christian in origin. It became a power in history because man after generations had been so indoctrinated with Christian ideas that they became part of his integral, natural consciousness."

The real revolution in the history of man began with the advent of Christ and reached its finest flowering to date here in the United States. The strength of our political system lies in the Christian principles upon which it is founded. Dr. Lowry has done a brilliant job of making this clear. He has clarified the basic issues at stake and has pointed the way to victory in the conflict. He is to be congratulated on his contribution to the literature on communism. His book should be read by every teacher of men and by every thoughtful citizen who believes in America and has its welfare at heart.

MAJOR GENERAL JOHN M. DEVINE
Washington, D. C.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

NEW MILITARY HISTORY PRIZE

The Moncado Revolving Book Fund Committee, of the American Military Institute, announces the decision to open a new competition for a cash prize of at least \$200 to be awarded the author of a book-length, unpublished manuscript on any phase of American military history. The prize will be awarded from the interest on a fund established by General Hilario Camino Moncado for the encouragement of research and writing in the field of American military history. As interpreted by the committee, military history covers all services and all types of military activity, including such matters as technology, supply, and logistics as well as operations and military policy.

Manuscripts should be typed in double space on standard sized typewriter paper and forwarded, before 30 June 1953, to the chairman, Moncado Revolving Book Fund Committee, c/o American Military Institute, 1529 18th Street, N. W., Washington 6, D. C. After reading and consideration, manuscripts will be returned at the author's expense. It is expected that the prize will be awarded approximately one year after the close of the competition. Further information may be obtained from the Secretary of the committee, Mr. Jacob B. Lischiner, 712 Peabody Street, N. W., Washington 11, D. C.

JOURNAL NUMBERS WANTED

The Institute has been called upon recently to help two institutional libraries complete their file of MILITARY AFFAIRS and its forerunner, the JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY INSTITUTE. The Charles Deering Libra-

ry of Northwestern University at Evanston, Illinois has asked us to locate good copies of Vol. I, Nos. 1 and 2; Vol. VII, Nos. 1, 2, and 4; Vol. VIII, Nos. 1 and 2; Vol. XI, Nos. 1 and 3, and Vol. XII, No. 2. The other library, the Army War College Library at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., has been able to complete its file with the exception of Vol. I, No. 2. Any members who can assist these institutions are urged to contact either the Secretary of the AMI or the library directly.

INSTITUTE ADDRESS CHANGED

Due to the recent removal of our Institute President, Colonel Joseph I. Greene, to fine new quarters in one of Washington's traditional mansions (which was purchased because of the need for enlarged space for the *Combat Forces Journal*), the address of the American Military Institute was, perforce, changed. The new address is 1529 18th St., N. W., Washington 6, D. C. We feel sure we speak for all Institute Members in wishing Colonel Greene and his staff many happy and successful years in their new home.

WE APPRECIATE THE COMPLIMENTS

Distinguished contemporaries have recently paid us the compliment of reprinting extensively (with due credit to MILITARY AFFAIRS) material from the pages of our journal. The *Military Review*, published by the Command and General Staff College, at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, reprinted in its July number the article of James A. Huston, "Tactical Use of Air Power in World War II: The Army Experience," which appeared originally in MILITARY AFFAIRS (Vol. XIV,

No. 4). Those desiring a reprint of this excellent study of tactical aviation may communicate with the Secretary of the American Military Institute, 1529 18th St., N. W., Washington 6, D. C. Please note the new address.

Hanson Baldwin, the noted military editor of *The New York Times*, on page 7 of the issue of 24 June, 1952, quotes at length from Louis Morton's article, "The Battling Bastards of Bataan," which first appeared in a recent issue of *MILITARY AFFAIRS* (Vol. XV, No. 2). Mr. Baldwin states that the article sheds "Additional new light on another phase of World War II—the Bataan campaign."

NEW LIFE MEMBER

The American Military Institute is happy to welcome Curtis H. A. O'Sullivan to life membership in the Institute. Life Member O'Sullivan is a resident of Napa, California. His military record includes service as G2, 49th Infantry Division, and courses at the Command and General Staff College, and at the Armor, Infantry, Tank Destroyer, and Field Artillery Schools; and in civilian life he is with the Advisory Boards of the United States Civil Service Examiners. Welcome, Major O'Sullivan!

CHARLES E. GREENOUGH

The American Military Institute mourns the loss of Lt. Colonel Charles E. Greenough, Hon. Res., a life member of the Institute, and a member of the Order of Indian Wars. Colonel Greenough, whose birth place was New York City, died there on 11 May 1952, at 72 years of age. After graduating from the Sheffield Scientific School of Yale, in 1902, he was active in prospecting and mining ventures, and became treasurer of the Grand Union Mining Company, and was also associated with other business enterprises. During the First World War, Colonel Greenough served in France, and was awarded a

number of decorations, including the Purple Heart, the Silver Star, and the Croix de Guerre. He is survived by a widow and two sons by a former marriage, to whom the Institute extends its condolences.

CIVIL WAR ROUND TABLE CAMPAIGNS

The weekend of June 20-22 was the occasion of a combined operation by the Civil War Round Tables of Chicago and Washington on the Antietam (Sharpsburg, suh) and Gettysburg Battlefields.

The organizations, composed of enthusiastic students of the American Civil War, hold winter dinner meetings in their respective cities with speakers on some phase of the war, and field trips in good weather to various scenes of Civil War significance. This Antietam-Gettysburg expedition on the part of the Chicago Round Table was its major field project for the year. The Washington group holds, in addition, various informal "bull sessions" during the winter indoor season.

Friday, June 20, was devoted to visits to Charles Town, Harpers Ferry, Sharpsburg, and Keedysville, closing with a dinner meeting at the Francis Scott Key Hotel in Frederick, Maryland where the group was addressed by Dr. Otto Eisenschiml.

On Saturday morning the group made a visit to the Rosensteel Museum to view the electric battlefield map and have a preview of the Battle of Gettysburg. Saturday afternoon and Sunday morning, June 21 and 22, were devoted to a tour of the field under the direction of Dr. Frederick Tilberg, and Park Supt. J. Walter Coleman and his staff.

Members of the American Military Institute who are interested in further information concerning the Civil War Round Table movement can contact Ralph G. Newman, 18 E. Chestnut St., Chicago 11, Illinois, or Bert Sheldon, 4827 43rd Place, N.W., Washington 16, D. C.